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Summary
Although renvoi has been discussed over a long period its difficulty makes 
such reflection not only interesting but also necessary. In fact, this discussion
leads to clarify a doubt on whether renvoi is really an inevitability of private 
international law or represents only a process that can be solved and eliminated
from this discipline, i.e., whether it is a necessary process or only a temporary 
device.
Moreover, renvoi is a difficult problem in the field of private international 
law which has divided scholars, jurisprudence, legal systems and International 
Conventions. For this and other reasons the present writer would like to show 
the difficulties that have been found not only by judges but also by scholars and 
s tu d en ts .
Further, if universal solution to the problem of renvoi is the aim intended 
by theorists and International Institutions, it will be useful to tackle the renvoi 
analysis both theoretically and practically and discuss its mechanism in both 
legislation and International Conventions.
On this basis the writer has tried to analyse the renvoi issue by dividing 
this work into four chapters.
The first chapter, which is an introductory chapter, tries to show the
importance of the history of private international law in order to understand the 
renvoi phenomenon. In truth, the reason for which renvoi is discussed from
historical point of view is that it represents an issue which is related to its 
history and cannot, according to the writer, be understood without it.
Further, as renvoi represents a controversial problem  its m echanism  
should not be isolated from other issues, such as, the problem of characterization. 
As a matter of fact the correlation between the two problems is strong and clear 
in that the latter represents one of the causes for the emergence of renvoi.
x x  i
Additionally, to understand the evolution of the renvoi pheneomenon the
discussion, in this chapter, does not start from the famous cases, such as the
Affair F o r g o  and Re A n n esley  but will rather refer to its roots before the
nineteenth Century.
In the second chapter, both the causes and forms of renvoi are taken into 
consideration with a special emphasis upon the former. Concerning the causes of 
renvoi this treatm ent is based upon the renvoi problem seen through the 
divergence between the two connecting factors, i.e., domicile and nationality. It
m eans that if  the problem  of dom icile contra nationality  rem ains the 
fundamental issue, such treatment will prove and show whether renvoi is useful 
to reconcile those two principles.
Further, this chapter includes both the dogmatic and pragmatic conceptions 
that have been expressed on the renvoi issue and tries to evaluate to what 
extent those justifications are correct. The discussion also intends to show 
whether renvoi can be used as a useful device or ruse and finds out if it is a 
principle of a general application or only an exception. The writer uses in this 
discussion both diagrams and sarcasm techniques. Concerning the latter this is a 
means by way of metaphor to understand the renvoi whether you call it by its 
name, surname or nickname. The discussion of different points through the 
method of diagrams also intends to clarify the renvoi theory as much as possible
and makes it easier for the reader to comprehend its process.
The third chapter concerns the application of the process of renvoi in legal 
systems and the position of International Conventions in this matter. Concerning
the former the renvoi issue has been analized with regard to the two different
legal systems, i.e., renvoi in Common law countries and Civil law countries. In 
fact, the work deals with legal systems which accept the doctrine of renvoi, such 
as, France and Great Britain. It also refers to those legal systems which do not 
adopt its process, such as Algeria, and those who reject it expressly. Further, this 
chapter is a contribution which intends to clarify the limitations of renvoi and 
tries to locate the areas where its working has been excluded. With regard to
x x i i
International Conventions, these have also taken different positions towards the 
m echanism  of renvoi in that there are those which accept its mechanism 
whereas others reject it. In fact, this is the case with both bilateral and 
m ultilateral Conventions starting from Geneva Conventions via the Hague 
Conventions to Rome Conventions.
The last chapter is a general conclusion about the mechanism of renvoi and 
its future in the field of private international law with some suggestions by the 
writer on the subject.
1CHAPTER ONE 
Introduction
S ection  1 :- Aims of the w ork and its scope
Through the discussion of scholars' controversies on the renvoi process as 
well as the consideration of the position of legal systems, jurisprudence and 
International Conventions, many im portant points have been clarified within 
four main chapters.
The firs t chapter em phasises the fact that the d iscussion  of the 
development of private international law, throughout different ages, represents 
the key to understanding the need and the necessity of the emergence of renvoi. 
In this respect, the purpose of this historical review should not be considered as 
an elementary introduction to private international law but a contribution of 
stressing that the history of this discipline is very important in order to clarify 
certain phenomenons, such as, the application of the theory of renvoi. In fact, 
this chapter tries to show that the history of private international law is the key 
of understanding phenomenons and one of the means of clarifying ambiguities.
Additionally, the writer also would like to stress the fact that renvoi is a 
problem but not a unique problem of private international law and is not 
isolated from other issues that overshadow this field. In other words, renvoi is a 
problem  which coexists and is also related to different issues, such as, 
characterization, preliminary questions, acquired right theory, and so on.
M ore im portant, different cases in both Common law and Continental 
countries have been discussed in chronological order for the simple reason that 
the Affair F o r g o  in France and R e A n n e s le y  in England should not be 
considered as the first cases which illustra te  the appearance of renvoi 
p h e n o m e n o n .
In chapter two the discussion of the causes of renvoi tries to show that if 
the clash between nationality and domicile is the basic problem, scholars' logic
and arguments will demonstrate whether renvoi represents a mediator, ruse or
a solution by itself.
In this chapter, the writer also tries to confront different approaches and 
solutions on renvoi in order to comprehend the aims and the dimensions of the 
many theories on the subject. In fact, by examinig both hostile and favourable 
arguments, this part tries to show that the phenomenon of renvoi represents a
difficult issue for students and a subject that tests judges and jurists' wisdom for
either rejecting or accepting renvoi.
Besides, for the sake of simplifying the analysis of renvoi two techniques 
are used in this chapter. The first one is the way of explaining the mechanism of 
renvoi by diagrams. The purpose of this method is to prove that if renvoi is a 
difficult problem and might seems ambiguous for some, it can be, however,
understood easily through such technique. The second one is the use of sarcasm 
in order to show that there are dimensions for introducing this technique in 
private international law. As a mattter of fact, the efficiency of the sarcasm
shows that its use by scholars makes the reader and the student more dynamic, 
more confident of understanding its process.
Concerning the third chapter, the discussion tries to indicate that the
theoretical considerations of renvoi in the second chapter will be incomplete if it 
does not deal with its mechanism pragmatically. In fact, the controversies upon 
the rejection and the acceptance of renvoi do not concern only scholars but also 
case law and International Conventions. It should be noted that the aim of 
relying mainly upon division of legal systems between nationality and domicile 
is to know whether renvoi can really be useful to concilate those two diverted 
connecting factors which has been considered as the most important contrast in 
com parative law .1 Another reason for discussing renvoi in both legal systems 
is to indicate that the same legal issue may be resolved differrently in both the 
country of domicile and that of nationality depending, of course, on the position 
on renvoi of the court seized of the legal issue. Three legal systems, therefore,
are discussed thoroughly. These are France, Great Britain and Algeria. The first
1- See B atiffo l, H., " Principes de Droit International Priv6" R ecue il  des cou rs , 
Volume 97, Tome II, (1959), p 478.
3one is an example of a country which adopts the nationality principle and 
accepts renvoi. The second one is an illustration of a country which adopts a 
theory of a unilateral application but is a legal system which adheres to the 
principle of domicile. The third country is an example of a legal system which 
adopts the nationality principle but is considered as hostile to its process. In fact, 
Algeria has been taken as a sample in order to indicate that the rejection of 
renvoi in this country will avoid applying Algerian family law to foreigners, i.e., 
Islamic religion principles. It must be borne in mind that the reflection on those
diverse legal systems does not deal with all the cases that involve renvoi nor all
the countries which either accept or reject its mechanism.
Furthermore, the scope of renvoi is discussed in both Civil and Common law 
countries in order to show that the field of renvoi operation has been restricted. 
Besides, the imposed restrictions expression used in the third chapter does not 
mean the total rejection of renvoi in those fields by all countries or in all fields by 
those countries. It means, however, that those restrictions could contribute to 
the failure of its process in future!
F urther, the reasons for the discussion of renvoi theory through
International Conventions is threefold. First, to indicate that the controversies 
upon its process have attracted even the concern of International Institutions 
which have tried to find out a proper solution that will be accepted by its
member States. Second, to show that renvoi is suffering not only from an
internal illness but also from an external challenge. In other words, if the renvoi
exceptions are an example of the former the hostility of Conventional rules to
renvoi, as a contemporary tendency is an illustration of the latter. Third, if legal
systems reject explicitly or are silent on renvoi, this situation can also be found in 
international Conventions in that there are those which reject renvoi explecitly 
whereas others reject it implicitly. The writer, however, would like to restrict his 
d iscussion  upon some of the Conventions which seems im portant and 
controversial, such as, the Hague Convention of 15 June 1955 known as Renvoi 
Convention, Geneva Conventions concerning bills of exchange and promissory 
notes of 1930-1931, the Hague Convention on the Conflict of Laws relating to the
4forms of testamentary dispositions concluded on 5th October 1961 and finally 
the Rome Convention on the applicable law to contractual obligation of June 19, 
1980. Concerning bilateral Conventions two of them have been cited. Selected 
for particular consideration are the Convention between France and Yugoslavia 
of 18 May 1971, which concerns, the competence and the applicable law in the 
field of personal and family law. Second, the Convention between France and 
Morocco on 10 August 1981 concerning the personal and family status and the
Judiciary Co-operation.
If the introductory chapter shows that the history of private international 
law is very important to understand renvoi, the last chapter tries to find out 
whether the emergence of renvoi is inevitable or can be eliminated from this
discipline. It deals also with the future of the process of renvoi and comprises,,,
the author' s own view on this matter.
j
5S e c t io n 2 : - P re lim in ary  n otion s
It might be easy to answer what renvoi is and what does it represent but 
it is too difficult to predict how it should be. This difficulty which represents a 
characteristic of its mechanism, therefore, should not be discussed in isolation 
from the difficulty that faces the discipline of private international law itself.2
It is true that each country has its peculiar system of private international 
law. The question that should be asked, in this respect, is how and when did 
private international law appear in order to know where and why it has been 
developed. Therefore, this reasoning will lead to consider the different 
approaches that have been proposed in this issue and to analyse the influence of 
the different schools and conceptions that still play part in different legal 
systems. In fact, there is a reason to suppose that this discipline represents a 
battlefield of different conceptions and this is best stated in F.K. Juenger' s point 
of view in which he maintains that "...the outstanding characteristic of conflict of 
laws is the lack of consensus on the discipline's goals and M ethods...the subject 
remains mired in confusion...one reason of this is the very surfeit theories that 
bedevil the conflict of law."3 This is why the writer believe that renvoi does 
not represent a complexity by itself but what makes it a difficult issue are the 
emergence of the different approaches and conceptions that have been adopted 
by scholars in different legal systems.
Accordingly, it is worth examining the development of private international 
law because renvoi, that will be later discussed, is thoroughly related to the 
history of private international law. It should be noted, in this context, that to 
understand when and why the problem  of renvoi did appear in private
2- It is w ell known that the dispute in private international law starts from the first 
page. In fact, if  the term inology o f international law should be related to the Roman 
expression ius gentium  which was translated to mean "lois des gens" or law o f nations, Dutch 
school has contributed directly or indirectly to the emergence o f the controversies about the 
suitable title o f this discipline. Conflict o f laws, p r iv a te  international law  or choice o f law  
rules. For discussion, see Rigaux, F., Droit International P r iv i ,  Bruxelles, M aison Ferdinand 
Larcier,1968, pp 38-39.
3- Juenger, F.K., "General Course on Private International Law "R ecueil  des cours  , 
Volume IV, Tome 193, (1985) p 131.
6in ternational law it must be looked to the different elem ents that have 
contributed to its appearance. For this reason the reference to the nineteenth 
Century, where the renvoi theory is said to be discovered, should not be isolated 
from the previous Centuries that have contributed and prepared directly or 
indirectly its emergence. Thus, the discussion of renvoi leads undoubtedly to the 
discussion of the conflict of law rules for the simple reason that renvoi means the 
reference to the foreign law as a whole including its conflict of law rules. From 
that point of view the conflict rules of the nineteenth and the twentieth
Centuries should not be discussed in isolation from the previous Centuries 
because this analysis will contribute in clarifying why renvoi theory has been 
considered as a product of the nineteenth Century and not before. It is worth, 
therefore, analysing the development of the conflict of laws from different 
conceptions and throughout different stages because it has been pointed out that 
" It is difficult to study a subject without at any rate a slight acquaintance with 
the historical development of the earlier and current trends of thought ".4
In addition, as renvoi is not a regional phenomenon, the discussion of the 
history of private international law is not peculiar to one conception and will not 
be limited to one legal system otherwise any suggestions, in this context, might
be unsuccessful, and the outcome of such reflection could be incomplete. It must 
be also remembered that if the renvoi theory represents a product of a precise 
Century it is worth discussing the situation before that time otherw ise the 
usefulness of any comparative study might be denied.
Accordingly, the reference to the history of private international law is 
useful in order to comprehend the evolution of this discipline, because it is not 
by chance that private international law has been considered as a compass that 
indicates the direction and tendency of each approach.5
Moreover, the discussion in this chapter of some issues, such as, the law of
contract, the rule of locus re git actum  and law of tort throughout their history is
4- Cheshire and North, Private International Law  by North P.M., (ed.,), 11th edition, 
London, Butterworths, 1987, p 2.
5- See .Gutzwiller, M., "Le Developpem ent Historique du Droit .International Prive 
Recueil des cours, Volume IV, Tome 29, (1929), p 293.
7based mainly on three main points which are; when, where, and how and this 
will clarify later why renvoi is excluded in some areas, such as, the law of
con tract.6
Finally, the writer believes that the history of private international law is 
not only renvoi, but renvoi is the history.
^ l? -S e c l i .Q n l ;.-SQme c o n s id e ra tio n  about the history of private
in tern ation a l la w .
I ) - H istor ica l su rvey  about the situ a tion  in the a n t iq u ity .
Concerning the principles of territoriality or personality in in the antiquity, the 
question which calls for consideration first of all is whether conflict of laws 
existed in Greece. Although scholars deny such claim there are who think that
there are indications which prove the existence of such conflicts in the antiquity. 
The reason for such claim is the historical discovery of the papyrus in an
Egyptian crocodile grave which contained edict that concerns m atter of 
jurisdiction. According to this point of view a conflict rule was discovered
because that edict means the recognition of an implied choice of law rule.7 
Besides, it has been maintained that conflict of law was resolved indirectly by 
the jurisdictional competence, i.e., by the language used in the contract the 
applicable law could be selected indirectly.8 The common view, however, is 
that there was no need for conflict of laws at that time.9
The second point is whether there was a need for a conflict rules in the 
R om an E m p ire .10 There was no need for the conflict rule problems in the
6- See Infra., Chapter 3, Sectionl, pp 169-170.
7- for discussion Juenger, F.K., L oc.cit . ,  pp 136-137.
8- The leg isla tive  com petence is indirectly determined because the com petence o f  
either Greek or Egyptian courts depends on the language by which the contract was written, 
see in this context Mayer, P., D roit  international p r i v i  , Deuxiem e Edition, Paris, Editions 
Montchrestien, 1983, p 9; Issad, M., Droit international p r iv i ,  Volume 1, Alger, O.P.U., 1986, pp 
29-31; Juenger, F.K J b i d . ,  p 137.
9- Juenger, F.K J b i d .
10-The basis o f law as a territorial or personal during the ancient Roman law, i.e., the 
coexistence o f two laws in Roman law, explains the nature o f the diversity o f law that might 
arise at that time. In fact during the fall o f the Roman Empire in the sixth to the tenth
8Roman Empire in that no Roman conflict laws system can be found.1 ^ n  
addition, it has been claimed that Roman law knew the coexistence of two laws; 
Jus  c iv i le m d  Jus  gen tium .  The latter avoids the emergence of conflict of laws 
because it is universal and also its rules are substantive rules and not rules of 
private international law.12
I I - H is to rica l_  fo rm ation  of conflict of laws
1 ) - The_ b a s e s _ of d iffe ren t schools in p r iva te  in te rn a t io n a l  law . It 
may be useful to look back at recent development of the conflict rules 
throughout the different schools in order to know the bases of each school and 
also to deduce the value of their contribution to the field of Private International 
law. In a general way, this analysis tries to confront the different schools' 
conceptions with the legal thought of the contemporary age especially with that 
of the American conflicts revolution. Accordingly, three schools are worth 
discussing:-
a)-First, concerning the Italian school, scholars began to analyse and discuss 
the Roman law, this happened in the glossators time in the 11th century and 
was followed by the commentators or p o s t  g lossa tors .  Among the work of the 
latter appeared the eminent Jurist Bartolus of Saxoferatto (1314-1357)13 w h o  
contributed to the development of the conflict of law by his theory of statute14. 
In fact, this school contributed to the field of private international law by 
creating the rule of locus regit actum  but the main difference of its application 
between now and during that time, is that before it was applied to both the form 
and substance.15
centuries the principle o f personality substituted for the principle o f territoriality. In the 
tenth century, however, there was a substitution o f territoriality o f law for personality o f  law. 
See Cheshire and North, O p .c i t ., pp 16-17.
11- See Issad, M., Volume I, Op.cit., pp 38-39.
12- See Mayer, P., Op.cit., P9; F.K. Juenger, F.K., Loc.cit., p 167.
13-.Cheshire and North ,Op cit., p 17.
14- See for example, Graveson, Jt.R .Jh e  Conflict o f  Laws, Private International Law,  
7th edition, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1974, pp 31-32.
15- Soulaiman, A .A ., Notes on Algerian Private International Law, Alger, O.P.U, 1984,
p 28.
b)-Secondly , the statute theory was developed in France by eminent 
ju r is ts  in the six teenth  Century, such as, D um oulin(1500-1566) and 
D'Argentre(1519-1590). Concerning the field of contract, it should not be
forgotten that Dumoulin was the first who supported the application of the law 
chosen by the parties and then contributed to the appearance and the 
development of the principle of the party autonomy.16 In addition, this scholar 
was also the first who discovered the qualification concept.17 D'Argentre
(1519-1590), however, was known by his theory of territoriality18 by which he 
considered the application of territoriality as a principle and the application of
the foreign law as an exception. More important, D'Argentre personal feeling
influenced his conception in that he maintains that matters of personal law are
subject to a domicile and not to nationality and here is the influence of the
territoriality principle.19
c)-Third, throughout the Dutch school, the statutist theory was developed
in the seventeenth Century by eminent scholars among them is Ulric 
H uber(l636-1694) who has influenced Americans and English scholars by his
conception which is based on the principle of sovereignty, i.e., the territoriality 
p r in c ip le .20 Besides, the characteristic of the Dutch school, in comparison with 
the previous statutist scholars, is the search for the basis of the application of 
foreign law and Huber's adoption of the comity principle is a case in point. It 
menas that Dutch scholars are well known for introducing international courtesy 
conception in the field of private international law. In fact, Huber reliance on
16-.Cheshire and North, O p .c i t . ,  pp 19-20. Concerning the principle o f  party autonomy 
see Infra.,  Chapter 3, Section 1, pp 167-172.
17- Soulaiman, A.A ., Op cit., pp 28-29. For Characterization see In fra .,  Section 1, pp 26-
27.
18- In fact his theory"reflects his strong feudal tradition."See Graveson, R.H., Op cit., 
pp 32-33.
19- Soulaiman, A .A ., Op cit., pp 29-30. This is why domicile is said to be territorial 
whereas nationality is personal. For more details concerning the clash o f the two principles 
in relation to renvoi see Infra.,  Chapter 2, Sectionl, pp 64-66.
20- It must be noted that the influence o f the French scholars, such as the territoriality 
theory o f D'Argentre, is obvious, in this context. Cheshire and North, Op cit., pp 20-22; Ulric 
Huber's influence is also clear in English conflict rules.See D icey & Morris, The Conflict o f  
Laws, by Larence Collins, 11th edition, London, Stevens & Sons Limited, 1987, p 8.
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international courtesy as a basis of the application of foreign law means that its 
application is not compulsory.21
What is of special interest in discussing those different scholars is to
emphasise the contribution of each school in the construction of the whole 
conception of private international law. In other words, by referring to the 
French school the notion of qualification could be noticed and considered. Dutch 
school, however, indicates the concern of its scholars' reflections on the basis of 
the application of foreign law.22
2 ) - E m ergence  of the  d i f fe ren t  concep tions  in the  c o n te m p o ra ry
a g e .  It is important to bear in mind that reflection on private international law 
should not be looked from one side but it must cover all tendencies that have 
contributed to the development of this discipline. In other words, the history of 
private international law is not only the study of the past but it is the analysis of 
both recent and current conceptions. In fact, the emergence of renvoi 
mechanism, theoretically and practically , does not concern one specific area but 
instead leads to consider the roots of the whole conception of this discipline. In
this context, it would be better to refer in this discussion to both continental and
Anglo-saxon scholars.
a)-In  the nineteenth Century a contribution in the development of conflict 
of laws had been noticed by the emergence of two German scholars Carl Von 
Wachter and Friedrich Carl Von Savigny, the former, by its criticism in his article 
of the different theories. The latter, however, published his work in 1849 with 
an opposite tendency to the former. The main difference between the two 
scholars is that Savigny adopts the universality principle whereas Wachter 
adopts the unilateralist approach. In fact, Savigny's approach is obvious, in that, 
it refutes and rejects the unilateralist approach of Wachter and the primacy of 
the lex f o r i ,23 Moreover, the work of Savigny should not be neglected because
21- See Mayer, P., Op cit., p 48; For discussion see Lipstein, K.," The General Principles of 
Private International Law " Recueil des cours, Volume I, Tome 135, (1972), pp 121-123.
22- Loussouarn, Y et Bourel, P., Droit International P r iv i ,  2eme edition, Paris, Dalloz, 
1980, p 85.
23-The same approach, seems to be adopted by Currie. In fact, in F.K. Juenger's opinion
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of his important contribution in the evolution of this discipline and also of his 
influence on both Common law and Civil law countries. Accordingly, two points 
are worthy of discussion. First, Savigny disagrees totally with his predecessors 
especially the Dutch and American scholars who relied upon the concept of 
comity and respect of the state sovereignty as a basis of the application of 
foreign law. Instead, Savigny thinks about the possibility of reaching the 
uniformity of decisions and of the universality of private international law. In 
fact, he believes that this universality leads undoubtedly to the stage where 
multi-state problems will be treated in the same way.24 In other words, the 
striking feature of Savigny's conception is his belief in the universal codification 
of private international law.25 More important, it has been recognized that 
Savigny was the first who formulated the international harmony of laws 
p r in c ip le .26 The writer would like to stress, in this context, the importance of 
Savigny's view in the achievement of the harmony of decision because reflection 
on such concept will prove whether renvoi,practically, can accomplish this 
t a s k .27 Besides, the influence of Savigny is obvious by his adoption of the 
domicile principle which represents the connecting factor of Common law 
c o u n t r i e s , 28 and also by his theory of the seat which has inspired other 
conceptions.29
"...like Currie , Wachter emphasised local 'policies ' and 'interest'...", Loc. cit., pp 158-161.at 159.
24- See Mayer, P., Op cit., PP59-62; Cheshire and North, O p.c i t . ,  pp 21-22; De Maekelt, T., 
" General Rules o f Private International Law in the Americas. New Approach" Recueil des 
cours,  Volume IV, Tome 177, (1982), p 206 .
25- Lewald, H., " La Theorie du Renvoi", Recueil des cours, Volume IV, Tome 29 (1929)
p 616.
26- Van Hecke, G„ "Principes et Methodes de Solution des Conflits de lois", Recueil  des  
cours, Volume I, Tome 126., (1969), p 437.
27- See Infra., Chapter 2, Section 3, pp 101-102
28- Savigny's conception concerning persons is based upon dom icile. In other words, 
capacity o f person is subject to dom icile principle and not to nationality. Juenger, F.K., L o c .  
cit., p 161; Gutzwiller, M., Loc.cit.,  pp 356-357. See Infra., Chapter 2, Section 1, pp 58-61.
29- It seems that modern legal thought owes more to Savigny concerning his theory o f 
the seat. In fact, W estlake approach known as" the most closely  connected" does not differ 
from the "local seat" o f Savigny. Audit, B.,"Le Caractere Fonctionnel de la R egie de Conflit" 
Recueil des cours, Volume III, Tome 186,(1984) p 238; W olff, M .,Private International Law,  
2nd edition, Oxford, The Clarendon Press, 1950, pp 34-38; Cheshire an North, 11th edition,Op
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b)-The next scholar, who is worth discussing, is the Italian lawyer and 
statesman Pasquale Stanislao Mancini because, historically and chronologically, 
Savigny's universalist approach was followed by Mancini's universalism. As a 
matter of fact, It has been pointed out that "Private International Law owes its 
development during the nineteenth Century mainly to three men, an American 
judge, a German professor, and an Italian statesman".30 It must also be 
remembered that the success of Mancini's approach can be seen on both 
national and international scales. An illustration of the latter is , for instance, the 
Hague Conventions which were inspired by his nationalist approach.31
If Savigny and Story prefer the use of the domicile principle, Mancini, 
however, advocates the application of the nationality principle and believes that 
this principle represents a basis of private international law. His claim, In fact, at 
the University of Turin has been considered as an explicit refutation of Saviny's 
dom icile  approach .32 Accordingly, the emergence of tht  l e x  p a t r i a e  as an
opposite conception to the lex domicilii  has led to the division of countries into 
two families of legal systems: First, legal systems that are based upon the 
nationality principle, and second, those which are based upon domicile 
p r in c ip le .33 It should be noted that dispite Mancini and Savigny adopt different 
principles both, however, have contributed to the creation of the choice of law 
Conventions.34
After all, different problems have resulted from the coexistence of the 
nationality and domicile principles, and renvoi is an example o f their 
d ivergence.35
c)- It remains to consider now the development of private international 
law in English law and in the United States of America.
i)-First of all, the analysis of the modern theory, known as the vested right
cit., pp 22-23. Emphasise added.
30- W olff,M .,Ibid., p 38.
31- Mayer, P.,Op cit., pp 63-64.
32- See Infra., Chapter 2, Section 1, pp 61-64.
33- Juenger, F.K., Loc. cit., pp 164-165; See also Wolff, M., Op.cit., pp 39-40 .
34- Juenger, F.K., Ibid., 281.
35- See Infra., Chapter 2 Section 1, pp 64-66.
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th eo ry ,36 finds its origin in the Dutch school, especially throughout the eminent 
scholar Huber which later has been advocated by both English,37 and American 
s c h o la r s .38 Following the development of private international law it can be 
seen that in common law countries there has been a substitution of the theory of 
the acquired right for the doctrine of comity.39 In fact, Dicey who adopts the 
theory of the acquired right, rejected the theory of comity.40 It has been said, in 
this context, that although comity principle might be found in some English
judgements, English courts, however, do not base its application of foreign law 
upon courtesy but in doing justice.41 In other words, justice represents a strong 
basis of the application of foreign law.42 Accordingly, this theory has been 
criticized on the ground that "comity provides an inadequate and unsatisfactory 
basis of the modern conflict of law" 43
In reality, the basis of the application of foreign law might differ from one 
country to another and so are the justifications. For this reason, it is important to 
know these bases in order to understand the reasoning of judges and the 
outcome of the judgement. It is worth stressing, therefore, that the different
approaches that have tried to justify the application of foreign law have a close
36- The vested right theory is a conception which is related to the territoriality
principle. Graveson, R.H., O p .c i t . ,  p 40; Cheshire and North, 11th edition, O p .c i t . ,  p 27. Despite
its simplicity it has been criticized , however, on the ground that the judge might create a
right that did not exist before. Mayer, P., Op.cit . ,  pp 94-96.
37-It has been pointed out that historically the notion o f the vested right was indicated, 
for the first time, by the judge William Scott and definited by professor Holland and then 
developed by Dicey. See Arminjon, P., " La Notion des Droits Acquis en Droit International 
Privd" Recueil des cours, Volume II, Tome, 44 (1933) pp 29-30; Lipstein, K., Loc.cit . ,  pp 135-136.
38- Cheshire and North, O p .c i t . ,  p 27; See also.Anton, A.E., Privaleln ternational Law,  A 
Treatise from the Standpoint of Scots Law, Edinburgh, W. green & Sons L.T.D. 1967, p 22.
39- Graveson, R.H., Op.cit., p 40.
40- Cheshire &North, Op.cit., pp 20-21; See also Audit, B , Loc.cit., p 238.
41- See the case o f Amin Rasheed Shipping Corp.v . Kuwait Insurance Co. [1984] A.C.
50, 65; For discussion see Dicey & Morris, O p .c i t . ,p 6; For more details see Jaffey, A. J. E. 
Introduction to the Conflict o f  Laws, London, Edinburgh, Butterworths, 1988, pp 274-278, For 
more details concerning the rejection o f renvoi in this case see In fra . ,  Chapter 3, Section 1, 
Sub-section 2, pp 171-172.
42- Cheshire &North, Op.cit., p 4.
43- See Graveson R.H , Op.cit., p 8.
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link with renvoi theory. As a matter of fact, by referring to the scholars' 
controversies upon the doctrine of renvoi it can be noticed that the pro-
renvoiists have tried to justify the application of renvoi by using different 
conceptions, such as, the protection of acquired rights, harmony of decisions, 
international courtesy and so on.44
ii)-Second, as stressed before, it might be useful to look back at recent
development of private international law in European countries but it seems
essential to analyse the new methods and conceptions that have emerged
outside the European countries.
To accomplish this task, it is useful to examine the new tendencies and
conceptions that have appeared in the United States of America and, then,
deduce the influence of such conflict rules revolution in both the United States 
and the European countries.
Starting by Story this scholar was influenced by the statutist especially the 
Dutch school in which he recognizes the foreign law as a fact and considers its 
application as based upon international comity.45
The influence of Dicey by Professor T.H. Holland, led afterwards to the 
in trod uc tion  of the vested  righ t  theory  by B eale in the f irs t
R e s t a t e m e n t ( l 9 3 4 ) . 46 Moreover Beale, who supports the theory of the
acquired right, emphasises the application of the municipal law, where a right
was created, without its conflict rules.47 In other words, by analysing his 
philosophy this scholar can be considered as one of those who are against the 
conflict of laws and relies ,instead, upon the analysis of the substantive rules.48
44- .See Infra., Chapter 2, Section 3, pp 81-98.
45- See De Maekelt, T., L oc .c i t . ,  p 241; Wolff, M., Op cit., pp 33-34. Throughout Story's
work both the principle o f c o m i ta s  and the principle o f justice can be noticed. .See Schwind,
F., "Aspects et Sens du Droit International Privd" Recueil  des cours,  Volum e IV, Tome 
118,(1984) p 52; Evrigenis, D., "Tendances Doctrinales Actuelles en Droit International Prive"
Recueil des cours Volume II, Tome 118 (1966), pp 326-327; Mayer, V.,Op.cit., p 56.
46-D e Maekelt, T., Ib id . ,  p 249; Juenger, F.K., Op cit., pp 179,193, 208-209; Audit, B., 
Loc.cit . ,  p 241; Kegel, G.,"The Crisis o f Conflict of Laws "Recueil des cours, Volume II, Tome 112, 
(1961), pp 105-106. See also Infra., Chapter 3, Section 1, Sub-section 1, p 180.
47 .- Cheshire & North, Op.cit .,  pp 28-29.
48- Audit, B., Loc. cit., pp 244-245. The assumption o f Beale has been criticised on the
ground that the reference is not only to the domestic law but also to the conflict o f the foreign
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It seems to the writer that the reference to this scholar is necessary in order to 
know why the first Restatement takes a negative position over renvoi and also 
to find out whether Beale, as an opponent of renvoi, rejects renvoi in all cases?4^
Another approach has appeared in the United States known as The 
Governm ental in terest ana lysis50 which is advocated by Currie.51 In fact, 
Currie is another American scholar, of the contemporary age, who has tried to
demonstrate the inadequacy of the traditional solution of conflict of laws 52 
This is why Currie is said to be against the conflict rule technique and advocates 
its elimination.53 In his own words, this scholar states that "...It seems clear that 
the problem of the renvoi would have no place at all in the analysis that has 
been su g g e s te d . . ." .54 The question remains what is the resemblance and 
difference between the governmental interest analysis and the unilateralist 
approach. In a nutshell, it is clear that both approaches agree in asking how the 
law of the forum is applied.55
Thus, scholars still wonder whether there has been a shift from the
law where the right is created., See Cheshire & North, Ib id .
49- See In fra .,  Chapter 2, Section 3, p 105 footnotes 291; See also Chapter 3, section l,
sub-section 2, p 180.
50-The interest analysis approach can be divided into two types o f conflicts, true 
conflicts and false conflicts. The former occurs when the two concerned states have an
interest in applying their own laws. The latter, however, means that one o f  the state has no 
interest in the application of its law. Egnal, John D„ " The ' Essentiall ' Role o f Modern Renvoi in 
the Governmental Interest Analysis Approach to Choice o f Law " 2 Temp. L. Q ., (1981), p239.
51-The main criticism o f his theory is, first, it requires an effort from the judge to 
examine the interest and policy o f the substantive laws which is not an easy task. Second, this
theory is applicable in interstate conflict and not in International conflicts. See Cheshire &
North, Op.cit.,  p 33
52- See Evarigenis, D., Loc.cit., pp 355, 359, 369; Lipstein, K., Loc.cit., pp 157-158, 161-162.
53-See Ferrer-Correia, A ., "Les Problemes de Codification en Droit International Prive"
Recueil des cours, Volume II, Tome 145, (1975), pp 78, 81.
54- Currie,B., Selected Essays on the Conflict o f  Laws, Durham, N.C ., University Press, 
1963, p 184; Egnal, John D., L o c .c i t . ,  p 252; See In fra . ,  Chapter 3, Section 1, sub-section2, 
p p l7 8 -1 7 9 .
55-In fact, throughout Currie's approach the law o f  the forum is applicable by a 
process o f analysing the governmental interest case per case. See Vitta, E., Cours Gindral de 
Droit International P riv t ,  Recueil des cours, Volume I, Tome 162, (1979), p 164.
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universal approach, i.e., the lex locus delic t i , to the interest analysis approach. 
Such doubt may well be illustrated by the case of B a b c o k .v .  Jackson ,56
In solving the true conflict, another American scholar has suggested an 
approach known as the principles of preference.57 It is believed, in fact, that 
Cavers calls the rules that he proposed principles of preference and not conflict
ru les58 and like Currie, he refers to the substantive law.59
Among the American scholars who have contributed to the development
of private International law is Cook’s approach known as the local law theory
which is opposed to the vested right theory.60 According to an opinion the
American Scholar, Cook "...has little need of the renvoi..."61 In other words, Cook 
is Considered as an opponent of the conflict rule methode in which he considers
that there is no place of any form of renvoi in this context.62
Generally, the American development and its conflict rules resolution has 
led to believe that "...this ' Softening of Concepts ' process taking the form of 
substitutions of ' soft ' for ' hard ' and of ' flexible ’ for ' regid ' connecting factors, 
has been considered  the dom inant feature  of con tem porary  p rivate  
international law." 63
The question that should be asked, therefore, is what is the success of the
56.12 N.Y. 2d 473; 191 N.E. 2 d 279; 240 N.Y.S. 2d 743(1963). For more details see Infra.,
Chapter 3, Section 1, sub-section2, p 179.
57- David, John D., Loc.cit., p 242.
58- Dimitrios Evrigenis, Op cit., p 346.
59- In selecting the suitable law Cavers relies in his choice on the better law that in . 
order to do justice whereas Curries bases his selection upon the analysis o f the governmental 
analysis and policy. .See Lipstein, K„ L oc .c i t . ,  pp 157-158, 161-162; Cheshire & North, O p .c i t . ,  
p34.
60- Falconbridge, J.D .,Essays on the conflict o f  laws, Toronto, Book Company L.T.d.,1947  
p32. See for discussion Schwind, F., Op.cit., p 54; Rigaux, F., Ibid., pp 208-209.
61- Von Mehren, A.T., "The Renvoi and its Relationa to Various Approaches to the 
Choice -o f -Law Problem" in XX Century Comparative Law and Conflicts Law, Legal Essays in 
Honor o f  Hessel E.Yntema, A.W. Sythoff. Leyden, (1961), p 386; Rigaux, F., La Thiorie des 
Qualifications en Droit International P riv i ,  1956, pp 208-209.
62- Audit, B .Joe.  cit., p 337.
63- See K ahn-F reund,0 .,"  General Problems o f  Private International Law" Recueil  
des cours, Volume III, Tome 143, (1974), p 406 Originally emphasised.; Vitta, E., " The ' Impact in 
Europe of the American ' Conflicts Revolution' " 30 Amer J. Comp L., (1982), p 1 5 ..
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American approaches and theories in the contemporary age. In this respect 
scholars' opinions are divided into two groups. There are those who think that 
the American approaches will be impracticable if they are shifted to the 
International sca led4 Others, however, think that interest analysis approach, for 
instance, has received attention even outside the United States of America65
and the best evidence of such influence is to be found within the Anglo 
American countries themselves such as the case of Boys  v .  Chaplin66
I I I ) - P ro b le m  of m e th o d o lo g ie s  in p r iv a te  in te rn a t io n a l  la w :- It 
has been stressed Conflict of laws is in its Crisis67 but to understand what have 
contributed to the emergence of such crisis, it is worth analyzing the emergence 
of the different methods in order to comprehend its dimensions and 
consequences.
Following the development of private international law it can be noticed 
that the discipline has known the coexistence of three main approaches which
are, the substantive law approach, unilateral law approach and multilateral law 
a p p r o a c h .68 To understand the consequences of such pluralism of methods, a
flash back to its history and its application in different legal systems seems 
necessary in order to comprehend the emergence of some phenomena in this
discipline, such as, renvoi. Otherwise, how can the player achieve success if he 
does not know both the strength and the weakness of his adversary? 
Accordingly, three points are worthy of note.
64-It has been pointed out that the American decisions concern the interstate conflicts 
and not International conflicts. See Evrigenuis, D .J .t Loc.cit., pp 385-386, 388; It has also been 
stressed that the influence o f the American approaches in recent laws or law projects are 
rather weak. See Von Overbeck, A.E., " Les Questions General du Droit International Priv6 A la 
Lumiere des Codifications et Projets Recents, Cours General de Droit International Privd" 
Recueil des cours, Volume III, Tome 176 (1982), pp 28-29.
65- Ehrenzweig, A.E., Private International Law: A Comparative Treatise on American  
International Conflict Laws Including the Law of  Admiralty , Leyden, A.W. Sijthoff, 1967, p 62.
66- (1969), 2 All ER. 1085; (1971) A.C. 356; For more details o f this case see Infra., Chapter 
3, Section 1, sub-section 2, pp 179-180.
67- Discussion o f this crisis is well illustrated and analysed by Professor Kegel in the 
Hague Academy. Kegel, G., Loc.cit.,  pp 95-221; See especially Audit, B., Loc.cit., p 231.
68- Juenger, F.K Loc.cit.,  p 168.
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1 )-The u n i la te ra l i sm  and  m u l t i l a t e r a l i s m :-69
As it has been indicated, the discussion of the development of the conflict of 
laws in Continental countries should, chronollogically, be followed by the analysis 
of the contribution of the American's scholars , i.e., the revolution in the courts.7® 
In fact, the best example of such revolution is the unilateralist approach of 
Currie, which leads him to the rejection of all choice of law rules by maintaining 
that "...We would be better off without choice of law rules."71 Currie's theory like 
Watcher's are related to the court sovereignty which leads undoubtedly to the 
application and to the primacy of the lex fo r i .  Accordingly, the application of 
Currie's conception means the predominance of the unilateralist approach and 
the exclusion of multilateralism.72 It should be noted that the case of B a b c o c k  
v Jackson  has caused legal consequences, such as, the doubt about whether the 
court applied the traditional approach, i.e., the lex loci delicti or governmental 
interest analysis approach. In other words, which of those methods have really 
been followed by the American courts, is it the unilateralist or the multilateralist 
approaches. According to the fact in to the case of Babcok  v J ackso n , it can be 
said that the judge Fuld applied the New York law to this case73 and had relied 
upon both approaches, i.e., the proper law and the governmental interest 
an a lys is .74 According to F.K Juenger both approaches, interest analysis and the 
lex loci delic ti , had been applied in the latest federal court decision in a tort 
case.75
69- U nilateralism  approach, which is considered as a means o f  advocating the 
application o f the law o f the forum, is opposed to "Savignisme" approach. See for example 
Gothot, P.," le Renouveau de la Tendance U nilateralist en Droit International Priv6" 
R e.cr i t .dr .in t l .p r iv . ,  (1971) p 34.
70- See Juenger, F.K.,Loc.cit., pp 215-218.
71- Currie, B.,Op.cit., p 183; For discussion see also Juenger, F.K J b i d .
72- If Currie represents a unilateralist scholar of the Common law Countries Wachter, 
however, is considered as a unilateralist continental's scholar. See Juenger, F.K., Ib id .
73- 12 N.Y.2d 473; 191 N.E. 2d 279 (1963); 240 N.Y.S. 2d 743 (1963).
74- Loussouarn, Y. et Bourel P., Droit International Prive  2eme edition, Paris, Dalloz, 
1980, pp 168, 184, 186; Juenger, F.K., "General Course on Private International Law'Xoc. cit., 
p283; For more details see Infra., Chapter 3, Section 1, pp 178-179.
IS- O' Rourke v Eastern Airlines, Inc, 730 F. 2d 842 (2d Cir. 1984). See the discussion of
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It follows that, American courts have followed many approaches 
concerning matter of choice of laws.but they might rely on one approach or 
apply them by combination.76
Concerning the shift of tendency in choice of laws F.K. Juenger has stressed 
that "In recent times both in the United States and in Europe, there are trends 
away from rigid multilateralism choice of law rules and the revival of 
U n i la te r a l i s m ." 77 With regard to the consequences of such multilateralism it 
may be useful to quote once more his opinion, in which , he considers that " The 
existing confusion may, in part be due to a tendency to gloss over the 
deficiencies of the multilateralism approach, of which the renvoi problem is a 
sym p to m ."78
On this basis, the question that might arise is whether the universalist 
approach of Savigny will be achieved. It has been presumed that the decisional 
harmony, which represents the aim of Savigny' s conception, is incapable of 
being achieved, because if such multilateralism will lead to the achievement of 
the uniformity of result, how can the appearance of problems, such as 
characterization and renvoi be justified.79
On the whole it has been admitted that the doctrines which favour the 
analysis of the laws and rejects the conflict rule method have no place of the 
renvoi mechanism.8®
2 ) - C on flic t ive  and  s u b s ta n t iv e  ru le  m etho d s  It is not only the 
conflict rules that exist in both national and international scale, but there are also 
the differences among nations, i.e., in both cases the rules are contained in 
International Conventions and positive laws. It should be noted, in this context, 
that if in cases concerning rules of immediate application judge applies the l e x
this case in Juenger, F.K J b i d . ,  pp 220-222.
76- In fact, better law, principle o f preference, the most significant relationship and 
governmental analysis are different and opposite approaches which are said to be included in 
the second Restatment (1974). See Juenger, F.K .Jbid.,  pp 219-220, 243, 245.
77- Ibid., p 168.
78- Ibid., p 199.
79- Ibid., pp 199, 205-206.
80- See Audit., B.JLoc.cit., p 339.
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f o r i , whereas in the conflictive method he has to choose between different laws, 
this is not the case in substantive law method.81 In other words, judge in the 
last approach, applies neither the lex fo r i  nor chooses between different laws, 
but instead he has to refer to the substantive rules that will resolve directly the 
issue.
Additionally, both conflict rules and substantive private international law, 
which are found in International Conventions, are known as uniform rules, and
it is well known that it is the Hague Conference of 1883 in the Netherlands
which represents an important contribution that has led to the elaboration of 
Conventions for the unification of conflict rules.82 It is clear that International 
Conventions may include either conflict rules or substantive rules, and the best 
example of the former is the Hague Convention on the conflict of laws relating to 
the form of testam entary d ispos it ions .83 C onern ing  the C on v en tio na l  
substantive rules, however, Geneva Conventions of 1930 and 1931 can be cited
as an example which adopt uniform rules in the field of bills of exchange and 
promissory notes.84
Before discussing the two different types of substantive rules, it is worth 
noting that this method is not a new one but there are indications that it had 
been used before, especially in the antiquity where the Jus Gentium  prevailed.
From the point of view of their sources, substantive rules are divided into 
two types, International substantive rules and national substantive rules. An 
illustration of the former are Conventions concerning carriage by air, sea and 
t r a d e .85 Substantive rules of national origin, however, are illustrated by the
81- Those rules are also labelled by different names, such as, substantive private 
international law, direct rules, and substantive rules.
82. The movement o f the codification is twofold: unification o f con flic t rules and
unification o f substantive rules. See Loussouarn, Y et Bourel P„Op cit., p 27.
83-.See Article 6 o f that Convention which was concluded in 5 junel961. For discussion
see Rigaux, F., Droit International Privd ,O p.cit . ,  PP97-99; See also the uniform conflict rules of 
the Rome Convention o f 19 junel980. Von Overbeck, A.E., Loc.cit . ,  PP41-42; For more details see 
Infra., Chapter 3, Section 2, pp 183-184, 196, 199.
84-See Batiffol, H., le Pluralisme des Methodes en Droit International Privd, R e c u e i l
des cours, Volume II, Tome 139, (1973), p 113; See Infra., Chapter 3, Section 2, pp 184-192-193.
85- Vienna Convention o f 11 April 1980 on international sale o f goods contracts;
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famous Czechoslovakian international commercial code of 4 December 1964.86
Furthermore, the field of International trade knows a body of substantive 
laws known as new law merchant which consist of custom, arbitrary sentences 
and Type-C ontracts .87 In fact, it hs been recognized that the substantive law 
approach "...has attracted renewed attention...by the advocate of the new  law  
m e r c h a n t , who argue that supranational rules of decision are preferable to 
choice of law rules."88
3 ) -Hu \ t e  su b s tan t iv e  ru les  m ethod  r e p re s e n t  a t h r e a t  to the
conflic tive m e th o d ? The discussion of such pluralism of methods leads to the 
question which is whether or not the conflict rules are safe from any threat? 
Whatever might be the answer, the fact is, that conflict rules are receiving a 
concurrence from the substantive rules.89 Concerning the latter it has been 
recognised that the harmonization of substantive law of different states 
represents one of the means which avoids conflict of laws.90 Furthermore, the 
conflictive method has received many attacks from outside and an illustration of 
this is the appearance of what has been called the new law m erchant  or "le 
droit spontane".91
As a result of such pluralism of methods, it must be remembered that 
scholars too are divided upon the nature of the competition of both the 
substantive and conflictive methods.92
Convention o f Chicago of carriage by air. See Von Overbeck, A.E., L oc .c i t . ,  pp 67-73; Isaad, M., 
Volume I, Op.cit., pp 101-104; Battifol, H., Ibid., pp 113-121.
86- See article 3 o f that code which contains in all seven hundred and twenty six  
articles. Von Overbeck, A.E., Ib id . ,  PP67-73; Vitta, E., "Cours General de Droit International 
Priv6" L o c .c i t . ,  pp 130-131; Battifol, H. ,Ib id„  pp 107-113; Mayer, P., O p .c i t . ,  P16; Audit, B., 
Loc.cit.,  pp 255-258.
87- See Audit, B., Ibid., P258; Von Overbeck, A.E .,Ibid„ p 27; Lipstein, K., Loc.cit.,  p 127.
88- Juenger, F.K .JLoc.cit., p 254.
89- For discussion see Von Overbeck, A.E., Ibid., pp 25-26.
90- Diamond, A.L., "Harmonization o f private International Law Relating to Contractual
Obligations", Recueil des cours, Volume IV, Tome' 199, (1986), p 242.
91- Loussouran.Y et Bourel, P .,O p .c i t . ,  p 60 Originally emphasised. There are , however,
who think that the lex m ercatoriadocs  not represent an element o f the crisis o f conflict of
laws. See in this context, Audit, B., Op.cit.,  p 258.
92- Loussouarn, Y et Bourel P., Ibid., p 58.
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Concerning the Czechoslovakian commercial code it is generally accepted 
that the conflictive method is not excluded from this code, and this can be
justified by the existence of a conflict rule in the code itself.93
Furthermore, according to Yvon Lousouarn and Pierre Bourel, Conventional 
uniform laws do not exclude the conflictive method, due to the fact the 
substantive rules are applied between the contracting States and is not of a 
universal application. In other words, conflict of laws still exists between non
contracting States.94
It is well known that Conventions may also contain a mixture of
substantive and conflictive rules when the contracting states themselves cannot 
reach an agreement in one or two points.9 5
It is clear that scholars have been concerned with the emergence of 
different approaches and methods in the field of private international law. On 
this basis, a prediction of the future of private international law should be based 
on fact and reality, because the fact indicates that the domination of the
substantive rules is not only in commercial law but also in private international 
law. In reality, however, it must be realized that what has been known as a 
Conventional substantive rules, are rules which are all dealing with International 
c o m m e r c e .96 From that reasoning it can be asked whether substantive rules 
represents, really, an exception to the conflictive method. The answer to such 
question is taken verbatim from Yon Loussouarn and Pierre Bourel who claim 
that "Le droit International connait done un pluralisme de methode, la methode 
conflictuelle demeurant la toile de fond sur laquelle se detachent les regies 
materielles qui ne sont encore que des exceptions fort rare, sauf dans le domaine
93- SecArticle 3. for more discussion see Yvon Loussouarn and Pierre Bourel, I b i d . ,
p 66.
9 4 -Ibid.,  pp 68-70.
95- The contracting States may reach an agreem ent in estab lish in g  uniform  
substantive rules by the process o f the unification which is believed to be reached only  
between them. Conflict rules, however,will still ex ist between those contracting States and a 
third one. See for example Yvon Loussouarn, Y et Bourel, P., Ib id . ,  Vitta, E., "Cours General de 
Droit International Priv6" Loc. cit., pp 142-143.
96- Loussouarn, Y et Bourel, P., Ibid., pp 73-74.
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du commerce International." 97
With regard to the coexistence of the various methods in the discipline
another question remains, will conflict of laws be eliminated by the uniform 
substantive rules throughout International Conventions? Frangois Rigaux argues 
that even if the uniformity of law does not eliminate the conflict of laws, at least 
it reduces it.98
S u b - s e c t i o n 2 :- O pposition  of conflict ru les  to su b s tan t iv e  ru les, 
In this context two points are worthy of note. First, the discussion of the 
opposition of the conflict rules to the substantive rules, and second, some
consideration behind the making of the conflict rules.
I)-In  the field of private international law one should realise the difference 
between substantive rules and conflict rules99,i.e., every system has two types 
of norms, conflictive and substantive rules.100 The latter regulates directly the
legal issue between the concerned parties whereas the former indicates and
selects * only the competent law and the legal system that might resolve the 
d i s p u t e 101 In other words conflict rules do not give a direct solution or 
re g u la t io n 102 to the legal issue as is the case with the substantive rules. Despite 
such differences it has been maintained that the combination between the two 
kind of rules contributes to the final solution.103
I I ) -  The discussion of the opposition of the choice rules to the substantive 
rules leads first, to the analysis of the former and then, deduce the purposes and 
dimensions that might have been taken into account in making such rules. As a 
matter of fact to comprehend the aims and the reasons of any legislation or bill,
9 1 - Ibid., p 16.
98- Rigaux, ¥ . , I b id „  For further discussion see Vitta, E., " Cours General de Droit 
International P rive 'T oc.c /L , pp 155-189.
99- See Graveson, R.H., Op.cit., p 3.
100-See Rigaux, F., Le Droit International Prive, Op.cit.,  p 26.
101- Isaad, M.,Volume I, Op.cit., p 23-24.
102- Anton, A.E., Op.cit . ,  p 6;. Salcedo, J.A.C., Loc .c it  , p 204; Maury, J.," Rbgles Generates 
des Conflits de Lois" Recueil des cours, Volume III, Tome 57,(1936) p 458.
103- Philip, A.," General Course on Private International Law" R ecueil  des cours, 
Volume III, Tome 160, (1978), p 18.
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it is necessary to refer to the preparatory works to clarify ambiguities of certain
ru les .104
The writer restrict his discussion, in this context, only upon the clash
between the two principles nationality and domicile. If the fact of the matter is 
that connecting factors and conflict rules differ from one legal system to
another.it is necessary, therefore, to go to the root of such differences, in order to 
understand the divergence between the two principles. In other words, if the
conflict rules of one country adopt the nationality principle whereas the other 
prefer the domicile principle it must be kept in mind that the policies and the 
aims of the law makers in adopting this principle, and not the other one, are the 
causes of such split. As a matter of fact, the adoption of the two principles is not 
isolated from the legal policy105 of any country and whatever are the reasons, 
historical or dem ographic ,106 they have, therefore, contributed directley or 
indirectley to the emergence of the problem of renvoi.
Overall, if the conflict of laws rules are opposite to the substantive rule, 
practically , the former might be found throughou modern codifications 
especially in the introductory part of the civil codes as other general notions.107
For example, the conflict rules of Democratic Republic of Germany are divided as
follow: the first four articles contain general principles whereas the other twenty 
fifth articles regulate the legal issue of the conflict rules.108 Moreover, the first 
twenty four articles of the Algerian civile code represent a conflict rules and are 
cited in the introductory part of that code.109
S u b -sec tio n  3: The s t ru c tu re  and in te rp re ta t io n  of conflic t ru les .
To understand the causes of renvoi, which are differences in connecting factors
and differences in qualifications, it might be necessary to refer first and foremost
104- Ibid., p 30.
105.-Audit, B., Loc.cit ., p 239.
106.- See Infra., Chapter 2, Section 1, pp 59-60.
107- See Audit, B„ Loc.cit., p 249.
108- The law of 5 December 1975; for discussion see Von Overbeck, A.E., Loc.cit . ,  p 30.
109- See Order N ° 75-78 of 26 September 1975 which concerns the Algerian Civil Code.
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to the conflict rules themselves, i.e., to their structure and interpretation. In fact, 
this sub-section, in which the talk is divided into two main points, is merely a 
contribution to the latter discussion110.
I ) - S t ru c tu re  of the conflict ru le .  The existence of what has been
labelled as operative facts, points of contact, element of introduction and 
categories, means that private international law contains different substantive 
laws which may be grouped into one or different categories, such as, marriage, 
succession, moveables and so on.111 Thus, each category will have one or more
connecting factors, such as, domicile, nationality, habitual residence, intention of
parties, place of wrong and so on.112 From judges via lectures down to the 
students, structure of the conflict rules is analyzed from two main points; its
categories and connecting factors. The former determines the latter which in its
turn leads to the selection of the applicable law.
Besides, each legal system has different rules to resolve multistate 
problems, and choosing any rule will be done after using intellectual efforts by 
judges which will lead, of course, to the application of the proper law. Between 
the two stages the judge is restricted by the coexistence of various road signs
and these connecting factors will show him the direction.
After this double consideration of the structure of the conflict rules the 
relevant point, therefore, is why conflict rules in many countries may contain
one connecting factor whereas others may have more than one. Whatever is the 
answer, there is a reason to suppose that if in the international scale the Hague 
Convention on the conflict of laws relating to the form of testamentary
dispositions uses five connecting factors, this is due to the fact that there is a legal
policy behind making such ru les .113 In addition, if the lex p a tr ia e  is the
110- See Infra., Chapter2. Section 1, pp 66-75.
111- See R oberts'Ion, A .H ., Characterization in the Conflict o f  Laws,  Cam bridge, 
Massachussetts, Harvard University Press, 1940, p 92.
112- See Lipstein, K., Loc. cit., pp 195-196.
113-See article 1 of the Convention concluded in 5 October 1961. Conference de la Haye de 
Droit International Privd, Receuil des Conventions de la Haye, (1951-1977) Editd par le Bureau
Permanent de la Conference de la Haye, Pays Bas, Martinus Nijhoff, p 49; See Rigaux, F., D r o i t
In ternational Prive ,  Op. cit., pp 112-114; For more discussion o f the problem of renvoi in this 
context s t t ln f r a . ,  Chapter 3, Section 1, sub-section 2, pp 172-173. and Section 2, p 246.
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connecting factor in Civil law countries, Common law countries, however, favour 
the use of the lex d o m i c i l i i } ^
Furthermore, if  renvoi appears as a consequences of the divergence 
between nationality and domicile, it does not mean that they are the only 
connecting factors that govern the personal law. The emergence of the habitual 
residence, however, should not be neglected from the discussion of renvoi, due 
to its penetration even in International Conventions.115
I I ) - In te rn re ta t io n  of the conflict ru le s . In the interpretation of the 
conflict rules many issues emerge such as C haracteriza tion ,116r e n v o i ,  
preliminary question and public policy.117 Concerning the application of either 
forum or foreign law, which contains a foreign element, judges refer obviously 
to two techniques which are used, practically, in chronological order.118 It means 
that, the application of the proper law is not the first stage but it is preceded by a 
preliminary process, which is characterization.119 One cannot deny, therefore, 
the importance of the process of characterization in private international law, in 
fact, according to Yvon Loussouarn and Pierre Bourel "...qualification command 
the solution of conflict of law".120
Further, if characterization represents an earlier stage before renvoi 
mechanism, it has known ,however, many doctrines such as characterization of 
the lex f o r i , characterization to the lex  causae,  P rim ary and secondary
114- Dicey & Morris, Op .cit., pp 29-30.
115. See for instance, article 5 o f the Hague Convention o f 15 juin 1955 for the 
determination o f the conflict between the national law and the law o f dom icile. See I n f r a . ,  
Chapter 3, Section 2, pp 191-192.
116- It is w ell known that the question o f characterization emerged throughout the 
work o f Continrntal scholarss, such as, the German Kahn and the French Bartin by their 
articles. The former in 1891 and the latter in 1897. The emergence o f such process is due to the 
m ovement o f the "particularisme" in the 19th Century and the nationalism approach. See  
Salcedo, J.A.C., L oc.cit . ,  p 189; Maury, J., Loc.cit . ,  pp 461-462; Ehrenzweing, A.A., O p.c i t . ,  p 113; 
Dicey and Morris, Op.cit., pp 34-35; Mayer, P., Op.cit., p 134.
117- See for example, Vitta, E., "Cours General de Droit International Prive" L oc.cit . ,  p 60.
118 - C oncern ing  the co n n ectin g  factors th ese  are d eterm ined  after the 
accomplishement o f the first stage, .i.e, after the characterization process.
119- See De Maekelt, T., Loc.cit., p 262.
120- .Loussouarn, Y et Bourel, P., Op.cit., p 241.
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characterization and analytical jurisprudence principle and comparative law.121 
It can be deduced from such pluralism of theories that, the divergence does not 
concern only the problem of terminology122 but it is also a matter of methods.12  ^
In other words, irrespective of differences in terminology, the real problem in 
this context is the conflict of qualification and the classical B a r t h o l o ' s  
decision124 is an illustration of such conflict.125
It is well known, therefore, that the process of characterization, which is 
used to select the applicable law, leads undoubtedly to the emergence of the 
conflict of laws between different States. The reason of such conflict is that each 
judge may classify the legal issue under one category whereas the other one 
may classify the same issue under a different category. For instance , what can 
be considered as a matter of formalities in one country may be considered as a 
matter of substance in a different country. Accordingly, the question that should 
be asked is whether this process , i.e., characterization, affects directly or 
indirectly the emergence of renvoi.126 To answer this question it is necessary to 
refer first, to the different theories that have been adopted to explain the 
emergence of renvoi and, then, to look for the correlation between renvoi and
characterization .
1 ) -First of all, the discussion of the conflict rules interpretation leads
automatically to the examination of the emergence of the different types of 
conflicts, such as, latent and patent conflicts. In this context, it has been stressed
that the emergence of the patent conflict of conflict rules is due to the fact that
121- If the lex fo r i  is the favourable tendency in positive laws in different legal 
system s, the usefulness o f the lex causae  approach must not be forgotten, although, both 
have been criticized. See Issad, M.., Volume 1, Op.cit ., pp 142-147; Wolff, M., Op.cit.,  p 40.
122- From terminological standpoint, it can be said that various names have been used 
by scholars in all over the world. For instance, there are who prefer the word o f classification  
such as Beckett, others use characterization, such as, Falconbridge and a third group advocates 
the qualification terminology, such as, Lorczen. For more details see Roberston, A.H., O p .c i t . ,  
pp 23-24.
123- Ibid., p 25.
124- Alger, 24 Decembre 1889, Clunet, 1891, 1171.
125- Sec in this context, Rigaux, F., Droit International Privd,Op. cit., pp 149-154.
126- See in this context, Infra., Chapter 2 Section 1, pp 66-70.
2 8
for the same legal issue the conflict rule of the forum may use the nationality 
principle whereas the foreign country may prefer the domicile principle, i.e., the
conflict rules of the two countries are not identical. The latent conflict, however,
occurs in the first and second stages. It should be noted in this latter conflict that
although the conflict rules of the two concerned countries are alike in that they 
use the same connecting factors both, however, differ in the characterization 
p r o c e s s . 127 As it will be shown later, both patent and latent conflict rules
contribute to the appearance of renvoi.128 In fact, it has been claimed, that the
emergence of renvoi can be well noticed in the patent conflict. The latent conflict,
however, may also lead to the problem of renvoi.129
If some scholars rely on three stages to solve a conflict of laws cases, there 
are, however , who think that those stages are not th reefo ld13 ° b  u t
fo u r fo ld .13According to the later assumption, the court during the first stage will 
be dealing with the primary characterization ,i.e., the characterization of the 
issue. In the second stage, however, the court proceeds to the characterization of 
the connecting factors in order to determine the connecting factor. In the third 
stage, which represents the stage of the selection of the proper law, the renvoi 
problem arises. Concerning the fourth stage, it has been stressed that the
primary characterization in the first stage leads to the secondary characterization 
during the fourth stage, which represent a period of the application of the proper 
l a w .132 As it has been shown, the problem of renvoi arises during the stage of
the selection of the proper law and after the determination of the connecting
factor.133
127-In the first stage, i.e., in the latent conflict, although the conflict rules o f the two 
countries are the same, by using identical connecting factors, the same issue may have 
different sense because o f  the divergence in the process o f characterization. A dditionally, in 
the latent conflict o f the conflict o f laws the same cconnecting factor might be used, such as, 
dom icile, but the divergence arises in the characterization o f that dom icile.
128- See Falconbridge, J. D., O p .c i t . ,  P 159. For more details in this context see In fra . ,
Chapter 2 Section 1, pp 68-70.
129- Falconbridge, J.D., Ibid., pp 159, 167,184-185.
130- See for example, Philip, A., Loc.cit., p 141.
131- See Roberston, A.H ., Op.cit., pp 92-95.
132- Ibid.
133- Ibid., p 96.
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2)- Secondly, concerning the relation between renvoi and characterization
it should be kept in mind that the process of characterization is not the last step 
but it represents a primary phase before applying any substantive rule. In other 
words, the close link that exists between renvoi and characterization is due to 
the fact that the former occurs after the latter, in fact, the selection of the proper 
law presupposes that the task of localizing the connecting factors and the 
primary characterization have already been achieved.134 The main reason for 
this claim is that characterization cannot work by itself and the application of the 
proper law is not done automatically. Renvoi, therefore, does not occur in 
isolation from other process but it is preceded by previous stages which are 
characterization of the matter, the selection of the proper law and finally the
application of forum or foreign substantive rules.135 To be more pragmatic, the 
writer should draw the attention that in legal matters an appeal presuppose a 
previous judgment.
. On this basis, it can be said that the analysis of both characterization and
renvoi is important because of their correlation and also both of them represent
a difficulty that faces judges scholars and students. Concerning the importance of 
those two issues ,it is worth quoting, therefore, Rodolfo de Nova’s point of view in 
which he says that " ...the troublesome problem of 'renvoi'surfaced from 
the...acknowledgment of the plurality and variety of conflicts systems. And soon
afterwards the problem of 'qualification' came up to vie with renvoi as the main
worry of conflicts scholars."136
The fact of the matter, is that scholars differ in their view on the suitable 
solution that should be applied to the characterization issue. The truth, however, 
is that characterization on the whole has affected the renvoi mechanism. 
F u r th e rm o re ,  th e  d iv e rg e n c e  b e tw e e n  p r im a ry  and se c o n d a ry
134- After the judge finishes the process o f  characterization by including the legal 
relation under its adequate system, he has to find out, therefore, the applicable law to this
relation, see for example, Roberston, A.H., Ibid., p 102; See also Soulaiman, k . ,O p .c i t . ,  p 45.
,135- Falconbridge, J.D., Op.cit., pp 159-160.
136- De Nova, R., "Historical and Comparative Introduction to Conflict o f Law s"/?ec«e// 
des cours Volume II, Tome 118, (1966) pp 478-479. Originally emphasised.
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c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n 137 leads straight to the point which is, if primary 
characterization is governed by the the lex / o r /138 should characterization after 
renvoi be done according to the lex fo r i  or the lex causae. To say it differently, 
the question is whether or not the forum judge must rely on the foreign 
determination of connecting factors, such as, domicile. To avoid any repetition 
this point will be discussed simultaneously with the coming section concerning 
the conditions of renvoi.139
Section 3 : -The h is to rica l  discovery of re n v o i . It should be noted
that the above discussion of the history of private international law is not 
isolated from the analysis of renvoi as a phenomenon or as a theory. It means 
that if private international law represents a mixture of theories by the
contribution of different tendencies, renvoi also is not peculiar, for instance, to 
German, English or French jurisprudence but it concerns the whole conception of 
private international law. .
On this basis, the historical background of renvoi leads to the following
questions. First, assuming that renvoi represents a product of the nineteenth 
Century does it mean that the previous centuries ignored it totally? Second, with 
regard to the various cases of renvoi, what are the main reasons for which 
L 'A ffa ire  Forgo  has been considered as a torch of the theory of renvoi.
To answer these questions, the discussion in this section will not be based
upon which of the different types of renvoi that have been applied by English
and French courts. It would rather emphasise upon the renvoi from the first 
time it was considered till 1882, i.e., the time when the theory was established.
Given this data, one might ask what is the renvoi theory? The answer, however, 
might differ if the question is what is renvoi. The reason for such belief is that
137- It must be noted that this theory is said to be first abondonned. Secondly the
distinction between primary and secondary characterization has been considered as artificial. 
See This view in Dicey & Morris, Op.cit.,  pp 40-41.
138- It has been said that if  primary characterization is governed by the lex fo r i  subject 
to exceptions, lex causae, however, governs the secondary characterization. Roberston, A .H ., 
Op.cit., pp 75-78, 130-134; See also Falconbridge, J.D., Op.cit., pp 98-101.
x  139- See Infra., Chapter 2 , Section 1, pp 70-75.
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the theory of renvoi seems to be quite different from the appearance of renvoi 
phenomenon
S u b - s e c t i o n l : - Origin of renvoi. It is possible to understand the renvoi 
theory at first degree by referring to the famous Forgo  's case, but it is not easy 
to start from R e A n n e s l e y 140 case to analyse the concept of English law
concerning renvoi. In fact, to understand the idea of renvoi principle in English
law the discussion should start from the earliest reasoning in the previous cases 
which preceded Re A n n e s le y . 141 Further, to comprehend the controversies 
between scholars on the appearance of renvoi before 1882, it must be
remembered that the discussion of the emergence of renvoi between the 
seventeenth and the nineteenth Centuries, will not be successful unless the 
decision of the court in both Continental and Common law countries are taken 
into consideration.
Noting that the analysis of renvoi within these three Centuries is done in 
chronological order and includes only some of the selected cases.
I ) -B y  referring to the history of private international law, it can be 
deduced that renvoi was known in the seventeenth Century.142 In fact, a
reasoning of a lawyer at that time might be considered as an example and sign 
which proves that renvoi was not ignored in the earliest lawyer1 s thought.
The whole idea on Carue* s defence,143 who pleaded the brother against the 
claim of their sisters on the equal right of succession, is that the judge of
Normandy must respect the disposition of the conflict rules. In other words, in
applying the custom of Mainz, the judge must respect the conflict rules of Mainz
which refer matter of succession to the law of domicile, i.e., to the law of
Normandy where the sisters are excluded from the right of succession.144 In
140- [1926JI Ch. 692.
141- C./.Vitta, E., "Cours G6n6ral de Droit International Priv6"Loc.cit., p 64.
142. Wolff, M., Op.cit., pp 189-190.
143- The facts o f this annonymous Affair arc cited by Meijers, E.M. " La Question du 
Renvoi " 38 Bulletin de Vlnstitut Juridique International (1938), pp 197-198.
144-The Normandian deceased, who posseded an annuties on property situated in Mainz, 
died survived by sisters and brothers as relatives. The problem that arose before the court was
32
order to prove the existence and the use of renvoi idea and terminology at that
time, it is worth quoting the whole speech of that barrister who says in his
defence :145
"que suivant la jurisprudence des arrets du parlement de Paris, dans le  
ressort duquel etoit la Mayne, les rentes, constitutes se regloient par la
coutume du dom icile du creancier; que la succession dont il s'agissoit etoit 
ouverte en Normandie; que suivant le coutume de cette province les rentes 
de cette nature etoient soum ises a la coutume des lieux ou les debiteurs 
avoient leurs biens; que celles en question etoit dues sur des fonds du Maine, 
dont pour consequent l'usage r e n v o v a it le partage en question a la coutume 
de Normandi, qui axcluoit les femelles des successions quand il y avoit des 
m ales."
Throughout the decision of the parliament of Rouen in February 21st 
1652 it has been emphasized, however, that the law of the domicile of the
creditor was applicable because of the custom of Normandy accepted such rule, 
in case immovables are outside Normandy, and not because of order from the
custom of Mainz.146
II)-V iew s differ between scholars on whether or not Collier  v. R/vaz147 
represents an authority that favours the application of renvoi. It is true that this 
case has been criticized but the analogy and analysis of the earliest judges which
have contributed to the adoption of total renvoi by English Judges in later cases 
must not be forgotten. Besides, if renvoi problem leads to consider whether the 
reference is to the whole conflict rules or only to its substantive rules, this has led
the difference between the custom of Mainz and that o f Normandy with regard to the right of 
succession. According to the former the sisters have the same right as their brothers and
succession is subject to the law o f the dom icile o f  the creditor. In the latter, however, the 
brother excluded the sisters from succession and such annuities are governed by the law
where the Mortgaged property are situated. For discussion See, Meijers, E.M., Ib id .
145- Ibid.,  My emphasise
146- Ibid., p 198.
147- (1842) 2 curt 855 ; 163 E.R. Full Rep 608.
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some scholars to believe that this reasoning was raised for the first time in
England before it emerged in Continental countries.148
The facts in this case concern the formalities of wills made by a British
citizen who died in 1829 domiciled in Belgium in view of English law, but in 
view of Belgian law he had never acquired a domicile in Belgium due to the fact 
that he did not receive an authorization for that.149 The question that arose was 
whether the four codicils that had not complied with the formalities of Belgian 
internal law should probate as well as the will and the two codicils which had 
complied with internal Belgian law? From the reasoning of an English judge all 
of them were considered as formally valid.150 In fact, Judge Herbert Jenner
reached this solution by an astonishing reasoning151 that the court sitting in 
England would decide the case of the formal validity of wills in the same way as 
if it was sitting in Belgium. 152 It can be said, therefore, that the reasoning of Sir 
Herbert Jenner, in upholding the will and codicils, means that his reference was
interpreted as a reference to both conflict and substantive rules of the
domicile.153
It must be noted, however, that there is a considerable controversy on 
whether or not Collier  v R iv a z  represents a case of renvoi and also whether it 
is an illustration of the foreign court theory.154 An essential point clarified by
some scholars is that this case cannot be considered as an authority which
148- Westlake, JM Treatise on Private International Law , by Bentwich Norman (ed.,), 7th 
edition, London, Sweet & Maxwell, Limited, 1925, p 35.
149- Mr Ryan did not receive a king authorization according to article 13 o f the French
civil code which was in force in Belgium at that time. See Falconbridge, J. D., O p .c i t ., p 122.
150- This reasonning led him to validate the testaments after hearing the view  o f both
the Dutch and Beige experts. Meijers, E.M., Loc.cit.,  p 201.
151- His reasoning can be found in Collier  v Rivaz  (1841) via Maltas v Maltas (1844) to 
Frere v F r e r e a bit later in (1847).
152- Graveson, R.H., O p.c it ., p 67; Cheshire & North, Op.cit.,  p 66.
153- In fact, his reasoning led to the validation and probation o f the four codicils, by
referring to the conflict rule o f domicile, and also to the validation o f the w ill and the two
codicils by referring to the Belgian internal law. Falconbridge, J. D.," Renvoi in New York and
Elswhere" 6 Vauderbilt Law Review, (1953), p 712; Falconbridge, J. D., Essays on The Conflict 
o f  Laws, O p . c i t ., p 122; Graveson, R.H., "Le Renvoi dans le Droit A nglais Actuel" 57. 
R e.cr i t .dr .in t l .p r iv ,  (1968), p 260.
154- For more details see Infra., Chapter 3, Section 1, pp 135, 147 footnotes 149.
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favours the doctrine of renvoi as a general principle because the reference from 
English private international law to the law of the domicile "...was interpreted as 
a rule of alternative reference either to the domestic rules or to the conflict rules 
of the law of the domicile..." 155 This is said to contredict with the renvoi theory 
which does not mean the reference to the substantive rule of the chosen law.156
This is, in fact, what Sir Herbert Jenner did when he admitted the formal validity
of wills if they complied with either the substantive or private international
rules of the foreign legal system.157 Accordingly, his reasoning has been
crirticized on the ground that the reference to the foreign system is either to its
substantive or private international rules and not both.
It should be noted that the division between scholars concerning the case of 
Collier  v R ivaz , is clear in that there are who advocate it as a renvoi case15 8 
whereas others denied i t .159 Although there has been doubt about the
application of renvoi doctrine before Forgo  's case, it can be inferred between
the lines of Dicey and Morris's comment that renvoi was applied before that 
case. In fact this can be noticed from the scope of the doctrine where it has been 
argued that " The English renvoi doctrine has been applied to the formal and 
intrinstic validity of wills and...to the law of the domicile".160
It may be difficult to prove the obsolete advocacy of renvoi in C ollier  v
155- Dicey & Morris, Op.cit., p 77.
156- Ibid.
157- Cheshire & North, Op.cit., p 66.
158- Among authors who consider Collier  v Rivaz  as a renvoi case is Anton who says
that the English court and more precisely Sir Herbert Jenner was facing a problerm o f renvoi
for the first time in 1841. See Anton, A.E., O p.c i t . ,  p 64 ; Meijers also goes in supporting the view  
that the first application o f  renvoi in jurisprudence was in England through the case  
o f  Collier  v Rivaz. Meijers, E.M., L o c .c i t . ,  p 201. According to Lewald, the court knew and 
admitted renvoi before Forgo case, but its admittion by the court was"unconscious" in C o l l i e r  
v Rivaz. Lewald, H.,"La Question de Droit International des Successions" Recueil des cours, 
Volume IV, Tome 9 (1925), p 28.
159- Some scholars do not consider Collier  v Rivaz  as a precedent, in fact, they
em phasise, that from the reasonnig o f the judge Herbert jenner there is no doubt that
evidences given by Dutch experts had m isled him. M endelssohn-Bartholdy, A .,Renvo i in 
Modern English Law,  by Cheshire, G.C., (ed.,), Oxford, The Clarendon Press, 1937, PP63-64; 
From Abbot's point o f view the decision of Collier  v Rivaz  denies any involvement o f renvoi. 
Abbot, E.H.,"Is The Renvoi Part of the Common Law?" 24 Law Quar. Rev., (1908), P 143.
160- Dicey & Morris, Op.cit., PP 81-82, Notes 37, 40.
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R iv a z  but it is illogical to deny its influence and contribution in the outcome of
the British conception of renvoi. In fact as Elizabeth Edinger points out
" Iro n ica lly  Collier v Rivaz is the Seminal case for the foreign court theory and
yet is explicable only as a use of renvoi as an alternative validating rule."161
Moreover, by supporting the fact that total renvoi owes its origin to the 
nineteenth Century, J. D. Falconbridge claims that " This formula originated in
English law in 1841 in the case of C ollier  v R i v a z , but when that case was
decided the theory of total renvoi had not been thought of."162 This scholar goes
on to confirm that "...This formula became the basis of judgments in subsequent 
cases of a different kind...".163
To show the contribution of the reasoning of Sir Herbert Jenner in the
outcome of the renvoi process in English legal system R.H. Graveson has also 
stressed that "Taking Collier  v Rivaz  as a precedent, English courts in 1926
began to develop a refinement of what has aptly been called the foreign court 
th e o ry " .164 The question of whether or not Collier v R iv a z  represents a renvoi 
case can, therefore, be better explained by Rodolfo de nova's point of view 
concerning the reasoning of Sir Herbert Jenner: In fact this scholar maintains
that T65
" the trouble is that he was not choosing between belgian"internal" or
"municipal" rules at all. He was playing renvoi, even though he did not
know it, as often happens to pioneers...The rule on which the English court 
based its decision in the C o l l i e r  case, therefore, was discovered by a detour 
over a foreign rule o f International conflict o f laws. And this is renvoi !"
On the whole the finger print of Herbert Jenner’s reasoning which has 
contributed to the adoption of a mechanism that has inspired the total renvoi
161- Elizabeth, E., "Renvoi in Canada: Form and Availability", 14 Manitoba L aw  Journal 
(1984) p 41.
162- Falconbridge, J.D., "Renvoi in New York and Elswhere", L o c .c i t ., p 717.
163- Falconbridge, J. D., Essays on the Conflict of Laws, Op.cit.,  p 211.
164- Graveson, R.H., Conflict of Laws. Private International Law, Op.cit . ,  p 68.
165- De Nova, R., Loc.cit., p 505.
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theory should not be denied.16^  In other words, the technique used by Sir
Herbert Jenner represents an inspiration for a later cases especially in Re 
A n n e s le y  and in the decision of judge luxmoore in Re R oss . 167
I I I ) - I t  is also believed that six years after the decision of Collier v  R i v a z ,  
Sir Herbert Jenner applied renvoi in the case of Frere  v F r e re } ® *  The legal
matter in this case was a question of the formal validity of will made in English
form by a British citizen domiciled in Malta. The decision of the court advocated 
the validity of the will because according to the law of Malta, a person who is
domiciled in Malta and makes a will outside Malta will be considered as formally 
valid if it is done according to the forms required by the lex loci a c tu s} 69 
According to experts the court of Justice in.M alta would recognize the validity of 
will made outside Malta if it was made in accordance with the lex locis locus. In 
other words English conflict rules applied the lex loci domicilii  whereas Maltese 
private international law, according to experts, applied the lex loci ac tus ,170 
Althought the will should be attested by five witnesses according to Maltese law 
it was held that the will of movables or immovables made by a Maltese subject 
will be held as valid in Malta if it was made according to the place of its 
execution.171
According to the reasoning of judge Herbert Jenner Fust, it can be said that 
the case of Frere  v Frere advocates the application of renvoi.172
IV)-Chronologically, before the discussion of the French cour de cassation  
previous cases must, therefore, be not be discussed.173 In fact, one cannot deny
166- See Cheshire & North, O p.c i t ., p 66.
167- [1930] 1 Ch. 377; See Falconbridge, J .D., Essays on the Conflict o f  Laws, Op.cit., p 145.
168- (1847) 5 N.C. 593; Cheshire & North, Op.cit., p 67.
169- Sir Herbert Jenner, in the Prerogative court o f Cantebury, uphold the w ill made in 
1826 by J. Hookham. See Bate, J.P., Notes on the Doctrine o f  Renvoi in Private International
L a w ,  London, Stevens & Sons, Limited, 1904, p 11; Falconbridge, J.D., Essays on the Conflict of
Laws, Op.cit., pp 147-148.
170- See Mendelssohn- Bartholdy, A., Op.cit.,  pp 67-69.
171-In his will, however, he was attested by three witnesses. See Schreiber, E. 0 .,  " The
Doctrine o f the Renvoi in Anglo -American Law" 31 Harv. L. Rev., (1917-1918), pp 541-542.
172- Falconbridge, J.D., Essays on the Conflict o f  Laws, O p .c i t . ,  p 147; See Mendelssohn-
Bartholdy, A., Op.cit., pp 67-69; See Infra., Chapter 3, Section 1, p 136.
173- Maury, J., Loc.cit., P 519, Note 4.
decisions of renvoi before F o r  go's  case during the nineteenth Century and more 
precisely in Continental countries. As a matter of fact it has been indicated that 
in those countries renvoi from Prussian law to the law of Holland was refused by 
the court of Guelderland in 1856. A bite later, in 1861, came the case of Liibeck 
c o u r t .174 It has been claimed, in this context, that if renvoi means the reference 
to the whole law of the foreign country and not only to its substantive rules, 
there are indications which prove that taking foreign conflict rules into account
did not start from F o r  go ' s  case but it can also be found in the decision of 21 
Mars 1861.175 In this case the supreme tribunal of Germany, which had its 
headquarter in Liibeck, applied the law which was indicated by conflict rules.176 
In fact, throught the judgment of Liibeck court in Krebs w . R o s a l i n o ^ ^  the court 
decided that the case should be resolved exactly as if it had been resolved by the 
law of the domicile of the deceased. It means that if the conflict rules of the
forum refers to the lex  domic i l i i  this reference must be considered as a whole
reference, i.e., a G e s a m t v e r w e i s u n g ,178 Besides, the Appelate court said that if
there is a reference from Mainz choice of law rules, as a last domicile of the
decedent, to Frankfurt law, as the law of his nationality, the court should,
therefore, accept and respect this reference and not refuse it. 179
It is not necessary to go into details but it is worthy to quote some of the
reasoning of the Liibeck court at that time in which he states:180
174- O.A.G. Liibeck, 21 Mars 1861; See in this context Bate, J.P., Op.cit., p 24
175- Krebs v. Rosalino, Appeal Court o f Liibeck, 1861, S euffert 's  Archiv. 14, N 'e 107.
176- Vitta, E., " Cours General de Droit International Priv6" Loc.cit .,  p 203, N otel33.
177- Here are the fact; the so called K r e b s  who are brothers claimed, according to the
law of Mainz, where their mother is said to be domiciled at the time o f her death, a part o f her
estate. Frankfurt law, however, claims the application o f its law because their mother did not 
receive an authorization for that and also she did not loose her citizenship, which means that 
she is still considered as a national o f Frankfurt. For more details see De Nova, R., L oc .c i t . ,  p491.
178- Graveson also believes that the Liibeck court o f appeal was dealing in Krebs  v
Rosalino  with problem o f renvoi. Graveson, R.H., Conflict o f  Laws. P riva te  International  
Law, Op.cit., p 65.
179- See Juenger, F.K., Loc.cit.,  p 197
180- As quoted from De Nova, R., Loc.cit., pp 492-493, My emphasise.
3 8
"If the court is ordered to decide a case of succession according to the laws in 
force at the dom icile o f the decedent, the reason for this rule can only be 
that it is considered right to apply those legal provisions to which the estate 
of the decedent was subject when he died...likewise, a court, when it has to 
apply a foreign law, must also take into account the fact that law exempts 
from the impact o f its own rules on succession a given class o f persons, 
namely those who, although dom iciled in that country, are foreigners, and
directs that they be judged according to their national law. If the principle 
whereby the lex domicilii applies, is followed faithfully, as it should be, the 
law which in force at the dom icile of the deceased should be applied in its  
to ta lity , and the said succession should consequently be treated as it would 
have been if  it had fallen to the courts of the domicile to deal with."
What the writer finds more remarkable, first of all, is the divergence of the 
law between Mainz and Frankfurt which is a difference of the conflict rules
concern ing  succession . In fact, Frankfurt law, which represents a German
Common law, applies the law of domicile of the deceased whereas the law of 
Mainz, which is of a French origin, applies the national law of the deceased who 
has a domicile of fact.181 Secondly, the last sentence of the Liibeck court can
remind the reader of an earliest reasoning used by an English judge in the case 
of Collier v. Rivaz ,182
\ ) - G o o d s  o f  Lacroix183 has also been considered as a renvoi case in that it 
ignored B r e m e r  v. F r e e m a n  decision and returned, however, to Frere  v .  
F r e r e , 184 This case is also dealing with the formal validity of will but the
difference is that this case occurred after the passing of Lord Kingsdown's Act in 
1861, which allows and recognizes many forms.185 Due to the fact that B o n i s  
Lacro ix  came after the passing of Lord Kingsdown Act both wills made in
181- Ibid., pp 491-492.
182- I b id . ,  P 496. In discussing the double renvoi theory Mr W olff refers first to the 
reasoning o f Sir Herbert Jenner and then to the appeal lubeck court. W olff, M., O p .c i t . ,  p 195, 
Note 7.
183- (1877) 2. P.D.94
184- Mendelssohn-Bartholdy, A., Op.cit., pp 71-72, 75.
185- Falconbridge, J .D .,Renvoi in New York and Ehwhere, Loc .c it . ,  pp 712-713.
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France by British subject were admitted to probate.18  ^ The reasons for such 
recognition is that the will and a codicil were allowed probation in England 
because they were made in English form according to French conflict rules. The 
holographic codicil, however, was allowe'd probation because it was made 
according to French substantive law.187
Besides, it has been stated that in the case of Goods o f  La cro ix  t h e  
reference to the law of domicile means the application of both its internal and 
private international law as it happened in the case of Coll ier  v /?/vaz.188 
According to others this case represents a renvoi case and the meaning of the 
word French law in the judgment should be interpreted as French private 
international law .189 This leads Albrecht Mendelsohn to presume that " In the 
Goods o f  Lacroix  is another decision in favour of renvoi, but...does not give any 
reasons for it, ignoring Bremer  v Freeman ."190
VI)- The appearance of renvoi in the nineteenth Century is not isolated 
from the existence of different legal systems which differ not only in their 
substantive rules but also in their choice of law rules. This is what happened, 
indeed, in France before the French cour de cassat ion , 191 According to the facts 
of the famous F o r g o 1 s case192 Frangois  Xavier  Forgo  the Bavarian child ,who 
was illegitimate, died intestate at the age of 68 years old leaving moveables 
succession to which were a matter of dispute between collaterals of his mother 
and the French treasury. The former claim the right of succession under
186- The decceased made two w ills one according to French form and the other 
according to English form . The latter was admitted to probate because it was made according to 
the lex loci actus, i.e., the place where it was made. See Dicey & Morris, O p .c i t . ,  p 78; Morris, 
J.H.C., The Conflict o f  Lawsx 3rd edition, London, Stevens & Sons 1984, p 472. For the required 
formalities according to this Act See Infra., Chapter 3 Section 1 p 205 footnotes 540.
187- Falconbridge, J.D.," Renvoi in New York and Elswhere" Loc.cit . ,  p 713
188- Cheshire & North, Op.cit.,  p 66, note 15.
189- Mendelssohn-Bartholdy, A., Op.cit ., pp 71-72.
190- Ibid., p 75.
191- Cheshire & North, Op.cit., p 60.
192- Heritiers Forgo, v. Administration Des Domaines.[1%15] Dalloz 1.343 (note); [1875] 
Sirey 1.409 (note); Administration des Domaines  v. Heritiers Forgo.[\Z19]  Dalloz 1. 56 (note), 
[1878] Sirey 1.429 (note); Heritiers Forgo Dichtel  v. Adm inis tra tion  D es D om aines  [1882] 
Dalloz 1.301 (note); [1882] Sirey 1.393 (note Labbe).
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Bavarian law because Forgo did not acquire a legal domicile according to article 
13 of the French civil code.19  ^ To be more specific the controversies of his 
succession was between the Bavarian law and the code of Napoleon , i.e., 
whether his succession should be distributed in accordance with the law 
designed by Bavarian system of private international law.194 Furthermore, the 
French cour de cassat ion  had also to find out whether the natural child was 
domiciled in France legally or in fact. The consequence of that is important 
because applying the French domestic law as the law of the domicile of the 
deceased will deprive F o r  g o ' s  natural sister and brother from succession.195 
The application of the domestic law of the domicile, however, leads to the 
rejection of the French Treasury claim to be entitled to his succession. Due to the 
fact that this case knew different judgments throughout different stages from 
1874 to 1882, the discussion of those decisions, therefore, will be cited
chronologicala order.
1)-The court of Pau dismissed the action of plaintiff, who claimed the right 
of successions under Internal Bavarian law that gives the same right to both 
legitimate and illegitimate child in succession. In fact, this court decided in 11 
Mars 1874 that French law was applicable on the ground that moveables
succession are governed by the law of the domicile of the c u j u s ..This decision, 
however, was quashed by the cour de cassat ion  in 5 May 1875196 on the
ground that Forgo  has never had a legal domicile in France and Bavarian law,
therefore, should be applied as the law of his domicile.
2 ) -The Bordeaux court of appeal decided in 24 May 1876 that internal
193- Anton, A.E., Op.cit ., p 56.
194- See Francescakis, P.H., La Theorie du Renvoi el les Conflits de Systimes en Droit  
International P r i v i , Paris, Sirey,1958, p 3.
195- The reason for that is French law at that time,i.e., before the law of 3/1/1972, did not
recongnize a right o f succession o f an illegitimate child if  he is not a mother, brother or a
father. Sec Soulaiman, A.A., O p.c i t ., p 47.
196- Clunet, 1875. 357; Cass.civ., 5 Mai 1875, S., 1875, 1. 409; D. P. 1875, 1. 343; The decision of
the French cour de cassation  was that F o r g o ,w h o  died intestate leaving m oveable in France,
was not legally dom iciled in France because he did not receive a governmental authorization 
according to article 13 o f the French civil code. The distribution o f his estate, therefore, should 
be done according to his domicile of origin ,i.e., Bavarian law.
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Bavarian law was applicable as the law of domicil of origin by which it gave the 
right of succession to the plaintiff, i.e., the collaterals. The decision was quashed 
for the second time by the cour de cassation in 24 June 1878197 because the 
court applied Bavarian internal law and not its conflict rules which refer the
matter to French law as a law of the domicil of fact of the deceased.
3 ) -The matter was referred to the Appeal court of Toulouse which 
accepted the process of renvoi and applied French law in its decision of 22 May 
188 0 .198
4 ) -The last step of Forgo'  s case was by the refusal of the c h a m b r e  de  
r e q u e t e s  in 22 February 1882 of Forgo collaterals' claim that the Toulouse 
Appeal court applied Bavarian conflict rules without consulting its internal 
ru les .199
It can be seen in this case that both countries used the same connecting 
factors but they differ in their results.200 The outcome of that was the 
acceptance of the French cour the cassation  of renvoi from Bavarian law. On 
the whole the nine years of struggle of the French cour  de cassat ion  led to the
adoption of renvoi by French legal system which represents a constant of the
French jurisprudence.201
As indicated above, view of scholars differ upon the origin of renvoi 
appearance. There are, in fact, those who believe that the application of renvoi 
started from Forgo's case whereas others refer to previous cases.202
197- Cour de Bordeaux, 24 Mai 1876, S. 1877, 2. 109; Cass.civ., 24 Juin 1878, S. 1878, 1. 429, 
D.P.1879, 1. 56. The decision o f the French cour de cassation in June 24, 1878 contredicted the 
above decision supporting the claim of the French treasury that French law is applicable to 
his succession because from Bavarian law point o f view  succession o f moveable is governed 
by the law o f the domicile in fact o f the deceased or by his habitual residence.
198- S .1880,2. 294; D.P.1881, 2. 93.
199- S. 1882, 1. 393, note Labb6e; D.P. 1882, 1 304.
200- M unro.C.R., 'The Magic Roundabout o f Conflict o f Laws", The Jur. Rev., Part 1,
(1978),. p .66 See in this context Infra., Chapter 2, Section 1, pp 68-69, footnotes 81.
201- For discussion o f the different steps o f the French court in F o r g o  case. See
Derruppd, J., "Etude Thdorique du Renvoi", Fasc. 532-A , 1984, J u r i s -C la s s e u r  de D ro it
International P r i v i  (1987). p 3; See also Maury, J., L o c .c i t . ,  pp 519-521; Falconbridge, J.D.,
Essays on the Conflict o f  Laws, Op.cit., pp 136-138; Soulaiman, A.A.,Op.cit.,  pp 47-48.
202- In fact Mayer Believes that renvoi at first degree was accepted for the first time in
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S u b -sec t io n  2 : - D iffe ren t  e lem en ts  th a t  have c o n t r ib u te d  to the 
em ergen ce  and the  deve lopm en t of renvo i.  It has been claimed that 
renvoi represents a product of the nineteenth Century.20  ^ The question which 
calls for consideration, first of all is why scholars have considered the renvoi 
theory as a product of a precise Century and not a process that might have been 
arisen since the manifestation of private international law itself. Bearing in mind 
that renvoi is a vague issue and may arise in many areas of private international 
law, and more important it concerns the whole conception of private 
international law. In fact, Mr Hans Lewald' s view, in this context, is worth 
quoting in which he considers renvoi as "...un sujet qui... touche aux bases meme 
de notre science influe et s' etend sur toutes les matieres speciales...comment se 
fait-il alors que les siecles precedents aient presque totalement ignore ce 
prob lem e."204
l ) -T o  understand the reasons for the emergence of renvoi the reference 
must not be only restricted to the two different legal systems but more 
important it should include the movement of codifications that have started 
since the eighteenth Century.
A more precise answer to the previous question is well stated by John 
Pawley Bate who assumes that "In the earlier days of the science, however, the 
rules of private international law were, in theory at any rate, uniform; they were 
conceived of as constituting universal law adopted by all individual systems e x  
c o m i t a t e ."205 This scholar goes on to admit that " in such circumstances there 
could be no renvoi question."206
As indicated above, although conceptions and methods of private 
international law differ from one school to another they had one common 
element which is the claim of the universality of the conflict rules. In fact,
Forgo case. Mayer, P., O p.cit ., p 191; De Nova, R., Loc.cit ., p 486.
203- Ehrenzweig, A.A.,1967, Op.cit.,  p 141.
204- Lewald, H., " La Th6orie du Renvoi" , Loc.cit., p 519.
205- Bate , J.P., Op.cit., p 3.
206- Ibid.
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scholars of the different schools tried to give solutions of universal application, 
i.e., to establish a universal doctrine of conflict rules which should be applied 
irrespective of the place where the dispute might arise.
In the nineteenth Century, however, uniformity is said to be "...impossible 
... even as an ideal. Fundamental conceptions began to diverge...domicile ceased
to be the universal criterion, Nationality being, adopted by many systems". The 
outcome of such divergence, therefore, ".. made the renvoi question possible."207
It can be said that the hope of the universality of the conflict rules received
a revolution from the movement of the codification by which conflict of laws 
were nationalized by the process of legislation and States, therefore, began to
establish their own code of conflict rules.
Concerning the movement of codification, it should be noted that this 
movement did not start in the nineteenth Century but there is indication which 
proves that it took place before that time. Chronologically, the reference will be 
to the earliest legislative conflict rules included in the C o d e x  m a x i m i l i a n e u s
Bavaricus  civilis of 1756, and soon after that code came the Prussian general
code in 1794.208 Down to 1804 there was a promulgation of the famous French
civil code followed by the Austrian civil code of 1811 and so on.209
From that time the revolution of the codification began to expand to other
countries by the influence of the French civil code, such as, the Netherlands code 
of 1829, the Italian code of 1856 renewed by codes of 1938 andl942 and the
civil code of Germany of 1896. In the twentieth Century many countries have
started the promulgation of their civil codes by reserving articles which deal 
with private international law, such as, the civil code of Czechoslovakia in 10 
April 1948 and the Algerian civil code of 1975. In Common law countries, such 
as, Great Britain it can be referred to the promulgation of statutes210 which
207- Bate, J.P., Op.cit ., pp 3-4.
208- The Prussian c iv il code, which contains many paragraphs concerning Private 
International Law in its introductory part, represents the first continental c iv il code. See
Gutzwiller, M., Loc.cit ., p 333.
2 0 9 -Ibid.
210-W ills A ct o f Lord Kingsdown o f 1861, Marriage (Scotland) A ct 1977, British  
Nationality A ctl981, Family Law Act 1986.
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contain rules of private international law. In the United States of America these 
rules can be found in the so called Restatements which are considered as an 
alternative to a civil code.211
It is important, therefore, to relate the discussion of renvoi, for instance, to 
article 13 of the French civil code. In fact , the content of that article, which 
allowed the foreigners to enjoy all civil rights if they had received an
authorization from the government , and later from the King to establish their 
domicile in France, created a problem which had faced courts at that time.212
This problem is well clarified by both Continental and Common law cases, such
as, L'Affaire Forgo , Collier  v R iv a z .  and others. Concerning the former case the 
French civil code in its article 768212 with article 13, which are both opposed to 
the codex Maximi l ianeus  Bavaricus  civilus  of 1756, are a pure example of this 
movement. 214
To answer the question why the nineteenth Century represents the time 
where the manifestation of renvoi was possible it should be borne in mind that
this is due to the fact that the divergence between the law of different countries 
was bigger. For instance, in matter of personal law succession was not subject to 
the same rule, i.e., some countries use the nationality principle whereas others, 
prefer the application of the domicile as the case of Forgo illustates it.215
Generally, it can be indicated that the emergence of renvoi should not be 
discussed in isolation from the movement of the codification of private
international law which is, in fact, an important element that contributed to the
appearance of the renvoi theory.216
211.- First Restatment 1934 and the second Restatment o f 1973. See W olff, M .,O p .c i t . ,  
p p 4 2 -4 6 .
212- Falconbridge, J.D., Essays on the Conflict o f  Laws, Op.cit., p 117.
215- This article gives right to the French treasury.
214- The dispositions o f codex Maximilianeus Bavaricus  was applied by the French 
cour de casation  thorough this case. See Schwind, F., L o c . c i t . ,  p 94; Lewald, H., "Droit 
International des Successions" Loc .c it . ,  p 28.
215- Renvoi appeared in a moment where a divergence between the two legal system  
began to extend. More important, the French civil code contributed directly to that stage by
the substitution o f  nationality principle for the Domicile in article 3 of the code o f 1804. For
further discussion see. Meijers, E.M., "La Question du Renvoi" Loc.cit . ,  p 202.
216- Professor E.M. Meijers has pointed out that in order that the renvoi issue might
4 5
2 )- In  answering why renvoi has been considered as a product of the
nineteenth Century the contribution of literature must also be taken into 
consideration to comprehend its developments. It can be said, in this context, 
that what makes the torch of the theory of renvoi are the many discussions that 
have emerged between scholars in different legal systems, and more important 
is the division among scholars themselves into two camps; pro-renvoiists and 
anti-renvoiists. In fact, the decision of the French cour de cassat ion  in F o r  g o ' s  
case led to the emergence of controversies on renvoi theory in that a huge 
literature has been noticed to discuss renvoi just after its discovery.217 As a 
matter of fact, statistics show that only in 1913 the number of scholars who 
treated renvoi exceeded two hundred writers.218 Concerning the Continental 
contribution , this is well illustrated by Labbe's article who started the discussion 
of renvoi in F o r g o 's case and in other articles.219 M oreover, if  Meijers's
conclusion indicates that renvoi was less treated because it appeared rarely and 
also its advocates were few in its earlier stage.220
As will be discussed later renvoi have led to the division of authors and 
lawyers into two camps 221 In fact soon after the last decision of the French 
cour  de cassat ion  renvoi have found acceptance among scholars and was 
advocated by lawyers not only in France but also outside Europe. In a general 
way renvoi imposed its idea and conception through the pro-renvoiists camps 
which afterwards led to its introduction into the statutory private international 
law where it appears for the first time in Hungarian legislation222 and then in
arise there should be the existence o f two legislative systems that have different rules o f laws 
by which the same issue is resolved differently. Ib id . ,p 193.
217  Derrupe, J., "Etude Theorique du Renvoi", Loc.cit ., p 3
2 1 8 - Lewald, H., "La Question du Droit International des Succcsions", Loc.cit . ,  p 27.
219- Labbe, Du Conflit Entre la Loi Nationale du Juge saisi et une Loi Etranger  
Relativement determination de la loi applicable a la Cause  (1882) 12 C l u n e t  5; See also
P hilonenko, M .,"L'Affaire Forgo (1874-1882)- Contribution h 1' etude des Sources du Droit
International Priv6" 59 C lu ne t ,  (1932), p 281. Meijers, E.M.," La Question du Renvoi" L o c .c i t . ,  
p 203.
220- Meijers, E.M., Ibid., p 200.
2 2 1 - See Infra., Chapter 2, Section 3, pp 81-108.
222- See Article 108 o f the Hungarian law of December the 9th 1894.
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Art 27 of the German civil code of 1896 222
Overall, the literature was not the last element which have contributed to
the development of renvoi but there is also the concern of International 
Conventions which show the deep divergence between their members 
concerning its mechanism.224
Section 4 ;- Renvoi and the conflict of conflict laws.
S u b -sec t io n  1 : - Tvnes of conflict th a t  resu lt  from the conflict of 
conflic t ru les .  If the conflict rules are opposed to the substantive rules, the 
former , however, can be divided into three types which are unilateral conflict 
rules, bilateral conflict rules and multilateral conflict rules.
First, the technique known as the unilateral rules means the application of
the lex fo r i  ,i.e., the legislature may determine , in this context, the field of the 
application of its own law.225 In fact, in Continental countries, for example,
articles 10 and 13 of the Algerian civil code226 and article 3 of the French civil 
code of 1804 are cases in point. In common law countries, however, unilateral 
conflict rules can be found in some English and Scottish statutes, such as, the
Marriage (Scotland) Act of 1977.
Second, the bilaterality of the conflict rules, however, means the application 
of either the lex f o r i  or foreign law, such as, Article 11 of the Algerian civil
code.227
As an example of the third type, however, is the English wills Act of 1963 
which provides several multilateral conflict rules. 228
This distinction between unilateral and bilateral conflict rules seems to be
223- See De Nova, R„ Op.cit., p 511.
226- See Infra., Chapter 2, Section 3, pp 125-126, footnotes 340-341.
225- See Gothot, P., Loc.cit., p 1.
228- For instance article 13 states that "...S i 1' un des deux conjoints est A lgerien, au
moment de la conclusion du mariage, la loi algdrienne est seule applicable, sauf en ce qui
concerne la capacite de se marier."
227- According to this ariclc" les conditions relatives a la validite du mariage sont regies 
par la loi nationale de chacun des deux conjoints."
228- For discussion see Dicey & Morris, O p .c i t . ,  pp 15-18. For discussion o f this Act see 
Infra., Chapter 3, Section 1, pp 173-174.
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very important, on the ground that while those types of conflict can be found in 
the conflict of laws, it has been maintained that in conflict rules of jurisdiction the 
rules are only unilateral. 22  ^ It can be asked, therefore, if in conflict of laws, 
conflict rules are opposite to the substantive rule, does the former exists in the 
conflict of jurisdiction?230 Scholars' views are also divided, in this context. 
Generally it has been claimed that if renvoi is accepted in conflict of laws issues 
its application concerning judicial competence, however, has been rejected by 
both doctrine and jurisprudence. 231 This has been justified by the fact that the 
conflict rule does not give a Judicial competence but a legislative competence.232 
In other words, renvoi is said to have no relation with judicial competence for 
the simple reason that the state is competent not because of renvoi from another 
state but for public order consideration to avoid any deny of justice.233 From 
that reasoning it can be said that whether renvoi is peculiar to the conflict of 
conflict laws or it may emerge also in the conflict of jurisdiction is a controversial 
issue.234
Furthermore, it has been shown above that different countries have 
different conflict rules and use different connecting factors, such as, nationality 
and domicile, in other words, as private international rules are not identical 
differences between different legal systems lead automatically to the emergence 
of two types of conflict; positive conflict and negative conflict.235 In the former, of 
course, the judge applies its own law ,i.e., the preference of the lex f o r i  w h e n  
both the forum and the foreign laws claim competence in the application of their 
own laws. The solution in the positive conflict is related to the principle of
229- Isaad, M., Volume I, O p.cit ., pp 23-24.
230- See Loussouarn, Y et Bourel, P., Op.cit.,  p 553.
231- Potu, E., La Question du Renvoi en D ro it  International P r iv i ,  Paris, Juris- 
Classeurs,1913, p 269.
232- Mayer, P., Op.cit., p.194.
233- Fragistas, Ch.N.,"la Competence Internationale en Droit ?nv6,"Recueil des cours  
Volume m  , Tome 104, (1961), pp 190-191.
234- See for instance Scholars' controversies upon the case o f Re Trufort (1887) 36 
Ch.D. 600,Infra., Chapter 3 Section 1, p 137 and Section 2, p 202.
235- Lewald, H.," La Th6orie du Renvoi" Loc.cit.,  p 27.
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sovereignty in that French judge, for instance, should ignore the foreign law and 
apply French law if he is seized of the matter. If an English judge, however, is 
seized of the matter he has to ignore French law and applies English law. In the 
latter, however, i.e., a negative conflict the diversity of the connecting factors of 
each law leads to the attribution of competence from one legal system to 
a n o th e r .236 In fact, the negative conflict has been interpreted as a conflict of 
systems in which the forum system may refer to the foreign one which in its 
turn will refer back the competence to the forum or to a third system.237
S u b - s e c t i o n 2 : R e l a t i o n s h i p  b e t w e e n  n eg a tiv e  co n f l ic t  and 
r e n v o i .  The question that may arise, therefore, is why renvoi is related to the 
negative and not to the positive conflict? . This has been suggested by the fact 
that the attitude of the two jurisdictions in the latter conflict is positive whereas 
in the former it is negative 238and renvoi application in this kind of conflict is to 
resolve such conflict.239 Accordingly, the correlation between the negative 
conflict and renvoi is clear240in that the consensus of scholars is that renvoi 
appears in the negative conflict because it is this kind of conflict that gave birth 
to renvoi.241
S ec tio n  5:- T h e  co n c ep t  and  th e  m ean in g  of the theo ry  of 
r e n v o i .
S u b - s e c t i o n l :  D e f i n i t i o n . There are two important questions that must 
be asked concerning the reference to the foreign law. The first is what should 
the judge do when he is referred to a foreign law. The Second one is why there 
is a reference to foreign conflict rules. The latter , however, will be discussed 
l a t e r .242 Concerning the former question, should the judge apply only the
236- Munro, C.R., Loc.cit .,p 67.
237- Francescakis, P.h., Op.cit.,  pp 79, 81-82.
238- Munro, Colin. R., Loc.cit.,  p 67.
239- Ibid., p 84.
240- Derrupp6, J., L oc .x i t . ,  p 2.
241- Lewald, H.," La Theorie du Renvoi" Loc.cit., P 27.; See also Ferrer-Corria, A., L oc .c i t ,  
p 145; Von Overbeck., A., Loc.cit., pp 169-170.
242- See Infra., Chapter 2. Section 1, sub-sectionl, p 55 and sub-section 2, pp 82-98.
4 9
foreign internal law or should he refer to the whole law of the foreign country. 
In other words, what is the meaning of the law of the country in view of the 
forum law. Does it mean foreign domestic law or foreign conflict rules? If the 
Latter one is taken into consideration, it can be said that the case is dealing with 
r e n v o i .243 The former, however, means the exclusion of any form of renvoi. 
Furthermore, conflict rules of the forum may refer to the conflict rules of the 
foreign law which in its turn may refer the solution to the legal issue backward
to the forum or forward to a third country.244
Renvoi can be defined, therefore, as a theory that means the reference to
the foreign law by applying its private international rules.245 From this legal 
definition, it seems to the writer that renvoi represents a mechanism that works
in Presence of two or more states. Its engine operates by the power of the 
conflict rules and stops by the brake of the substantive rules.
S u b - s e c t i o n 2:- P ro b lem  of te rm in o lo g y. It must be noticed, in this 
context, that the difficulty and the complexity of private internationl law is 
general and extends to its whole body. For example, expressions that are used to 
label the issue of characterization are not uniform. Even the title of this discipline 
has not escaped from this clash of vocabulary, which means that there is not a 
universal consensus on terminology.246 Renvoi itself knows this pluralism of
vocabulary between English, French, Italian, German and Arab scholars. If the
dispute, as indicated above, starts from the first page it can also be said that the
ambiguitiy of renvoi mechanism extends even to its vocabulary. F.K Juenger 's 
remark, in fact, is clear enough to justify the fact that "...Words such as
Renvoi,...Characterization hardly facilitate discourse...Worse yet, the expression 
used to describe these phenomena are neither uniform nor consistent."247
243- Castel, J.C., Conflict o f  Laws, Cases. Notes and Materials,  3rd edition, Toronto, 
Butterworths, 1974, pp 42-44.
244- See Infra., Chapter 2, Section 1, sub-section 2, pp 75-78
245- See Soulaiman, A.A., O p .c i t . ,  p 49. See Infra .,  Chapter 2, Section 1, sub-section 1, 
p p 55 -5 6 .
246- Juenger, F.K., Loc.cit., pp 134-135, See Supra., p 5 footnotes 2.
247- Juenger, F.K., Ibid., p 134.
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Besides, to analyse Bernard Audit's point of view , that renvoi has been
considered as a universal term,248 and to know to what extent this claim is true,
it is useful, therefore, to refer not only to Continental countries but also to
Common law countries.
More precisely, the application of renvoi or its rejection is legally called in 
German terminology as Gesamtverwei sung  or S a c h n o r w e n v e r w e i s u n g .  The 
former means the application of the whole law of the foreign system whereas 
the latter means the application only of its internal law.249
The terminology, therefore, might be divided into two groups. The first 
group includes conceptions, such as, single or partial renvoi, remission, 
transmission, renvoi at first degree, renvoi at second degree, imperfect renvoi, 
respective renvoi , renvoi remittal R u c k v e r w e i z u n g , W e i t e r v e r w e i z u n g , 
V e r w i j z i n g  ,R i n v i o  indietro,  Rinvio  a l t r o v e ^  and El ihala el  Ouhadia .251 The 
second group, however, contains conceptions, such as, double renvoi, foreign 
court theory, total renvoi, total reference, integral renvoi, perfect renvoi, true
renvoi, ping pong doctrine 252 and El ihala el Mouzdawija  253
As you can see, the different names proposed to label renvoi have led 
scholars to distinguish between renvoi as a part of each legal system. In fact 
Rodolfo de nova has pointed out that "The two types of renvoi are also labelled...' 
English' renvoi as against 'continental' renvoi."254
It is clear that from Coll ier  v Rivaz  down to F o r g o '  s case, renvoi use has
248- Audit, B., Loc.cit., p 234.
249- Meijers, E.M., L o c .c i t . ,  p 192; G e s a m t e r v e r w i s u n g  in its turn is divided into two 
typ es, R u c k v e r w e i z u n g  w hich means rem ission  to the law  o f  the forum and 
W e i t e r v e r w e i s u n g  which means transmission to a third law. See Ago, R., " Ragles Generates 
des Conflits de Lois" Recueil des cours, Volume IV, Tome 58, (1936), p 382. See Infra., Chapter 2 
Section 2, sub-section 2, pp 75 -78.
250- Falconbridge, J.D., Renvoi in New York and Elswhere, Loc.cit., p 717; Rigaux, F., 
O p.c i t . ,  p 301, note 1; Von Overbeck, A., L oc .c it . ,  p 127; P.H. Francescakis, O p.c i t . ,  p 80, note 1;
Falconbridge, J.D., Essays on the Conflict of Laws, O p .c i t . ,  p 167; Derruppe, J., L oc .c i t . ,  p 3; See
Maury, J., Loc.cit,  p 521.
251- This is the arabic meaning o f single renvoi.
252- See for example Castel, J.C Op.cit., p 44; See also Wolff, M., Op.cit., p 195.
253- This arabic translation connotes the double renvoi theory.
254- De Nova, R., Loc.cit., p 502. Originally emphasised.
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spread from French jurisprudence to other legal systems and civil codes. But also 
the term of renvoi as a French terminology has been adopted by English and 
American scholars.
It should also be noted that renvoi is renvoi but the mechanism differs. In
fact, courts in both Continental and Common law countries agree on the existence
of single renvoi and double renvoi and fortunately not treble renvoi. Thus, the 
mechanism is within the two.
To sum up renvoi has been considered as a universal phenomenon that 
was discovered by jurisprudence and since that time its mechanism and 
terminology have been used by many courts and introduced in different civil 
codes. Whatever is the conception and the terminology chosen by the court 
renvoi is renvoi. In fact, whatever is the tendency used there is still a 
mechanism of references and contra references. To put it briefly driving on the
left or on the right does not prevent from going backward or forward.
Sub-sec tion  3 : Some p re l im in a ry  exam ples .  Before discussing the 
theory of renvoi and its controversies in different legal systems it may be useful 
to give some preliminary and hypothetical examples which will be later 
followed by factual cases.
A)- Assuming that the same scenario of Re O' Keefe'  s case arises before 
an English court with a slight differences concerning the countries involved. 
Supposing, therefore that . English court is seized of matter concerning succession 
of a British citizen who died intestate in Algeria leaving assets situated in 
England. Taking into consideration that X is a British deceased whose domicile of 
origin is in Scotland. It follows that as f a r ' as Algeria repudiates the renvoi 
theory, the applicable law will be undoubtedly the law of Scotland if the court 
accepts the survival of the deceased1 s domicil of origin.
Supposing now that the country of domicile, which has been chosen to be 
Algeria, will change its position and accepts the theory of renvoi( which is not the 
case at the moment). The result will be the application of the Algerian law as the 
law of the last domicile of the deceased. Is it acceptable to say that this change of
5 2
position will have a negative consequences upon foreigners, who die domiciled 
in a moslem country, on the ground that succession in this country is considered 
as a matter of family law and is governed mainly by Islamic religious 
princip les?255
B)- Assuming that in matter of contract X and Y choose expressly the law 
of a country Z to govern their contract bearing in mind that renvoi in contractual 
obligation is excluded. The question that arises is if the internal law of the 
country Z must be applied without its conflict rules, is it logical that the interest of 
the contracting parties is protected only in contractual obligations by excluding 
any form of renvoi in this field256 whereas its mechanism is still adopted in 
other matters, such as, family law and succession? It may, however, that the 
cases are significantly different.
255- See Infra., Chapter 3, Section 1, sub-section 2, pp 161-165.
256- For more details see Infra., Chapter 3, Section 1, sub-section 1, pp 167-172.
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R e m a r k s : -
1)-Before concluding this chapter it should be noted that the reference to 
the controversies among scholars concerning the nature of private international 
law, i.e., whether private international law is national or supranational is very 
important to understand the emergence of renvoi and its future in this 
discipline. As a matter of fact, it has been remarked that if conflict rules are 
considered as supranational rules, i.e., above all ju rid ical norms, the 
consequences is that renvoi will be excluded according to this legal thought.257
2 ) -The difference of conceptions and tendencies in different legal systems, 
or within one legal system, have led to the adoption of the unilateralist258 and 
multilateralist approaches. As a result, it might be asked which of these 
approaches has predominance and whether the preference should be given to 
multilateralism, unilateralism or the substantive law approach?
A more remarkable concern about the emergence of the substantive law 
approach is best illustrated by Juenger, F. K, who has argued that "...What could 
we teach and write about once the entire field of multistate transactions 
disappears into the black hole of substantive law."259
It can be noticed that the consequences of multilateralism, practically, can 
be seen through the emergence of certain problems in private international law. 
In this context, it seems worth quoting F.K. Juenger' s view in which he 
emphasises that "..The conceptual predicaments of renvoi, characterizatio...are 
but sym ptom s of the inab il ity  of m u lti la te ra lism  to ach ieve  its 
objectives...Unilateralism does no better...neither of the two orthodox approaches 
guarantee predictability and consistency in the adjudication of multistate
257-. See for example, Meijers, E.MJLoc.cit., pp 207-208.
258- Among the various unilateralist approaches there are, for example,"lois de police" 
and "mandatory rules" which may be found even in International Conventions. See in this 
context article 7 o f the E.E.C. Convention on the applicable law in contract, Rome 19 june 1980; 
See also the Hague Convention on the law applicable to Agency. Audit, B., Loc. cit., p 249; For 
discussion see Yon Overbeck, A.E., Loc. cit.f pp 177-185; For the overriding statutes, see Dicey  
and Morris, O p . c i t ., pp 21-25; Loussouarn, Y., " La R egie de Conflit est-e lle  une R egie 
N eutreT rav. Comitd, Frangais. dr. in. privi,  Anndes 1980-1981, Tome 2, (1983), pp 57-59.
259- Juenger, F.K. Loc.cit., p 320.
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disputes." 260
3)- Another important matter which should be considered is that the 
discussion of renvoi issue must differentiate at least between the idea of renvoi 
or its phenomenon and that of the theory of renvoi. According to the history of 
private international law, F o r g o  and Re A n n e s l e y  are an illustration of the 
renvoi theory. The use of renvoi idea, however, does not start from such cases 
but it can be noticed in various reasoning before those cases.
4 ) -The writer would like to draw attention that though the controversy 
about the origin of renvoi in English jurisprudence has been traced to Coll ier  v .  
R i v a z there are, however, those who think that the question of renvoi was 
raised before that time in Balfour  v. Scott , a case before the House of Lords.261 
In fact, Emile potu considers this case as an origin of renvoi which illustrates the 
idea that an English judge had to decide as the foreign judge would do, i.e., he 
had to apply the law of domicil as a whole including its rules of private 
international law.262
260- This scholars also believes that "...We have to leave...w ith a 'pluralism of method' 
Ibid., pp 202, 257.
261-(1793) 6 Brown' s Parliamentary Cases,. 534.
262- Potu, E .,0p.ch.,pp 122-123.
55
CHAPTER TWO 
Theoretical Analysis 
of the Doctrine of Renvoi
Section 1 :- Renvoi theory , its conditions and fo rm s .
S ub -sec tion  1 ; - W hen does renvoi a n n e a r  ?
As explained above renvoi arises because of lack of harmony between 
different conflict ru les1 and occurs as a. result of the negative conflict.2 This 
chapter, however, will consider the question of how the process of renvoi could 
technically arises. In other words, this discussion leaves the point of what type 
of conflict does renvoi appear to examine the question when and how its 
mechanism occurs?
I ) -  Global re ference  to foreign law As indicated at the outset3 the 
adoption or repudiation of renvoi mechanism is explained according to German 
terminology by the situation of either a S a c h n o r m v e r w e i s u n g  or a 
G e s a m t v e r w e i s u n g .
In fact, two possibilities are followed in the interpretation of private 
international rules. First, the forum may apply either the G e s a m t v e r w e i s u n g  
conception, i.e, taking into account the whole foreign law and respecting any 
form of renvoi made by this choice of law rules to either the forum or a third 
law. Secondly, he might, however, apply directly the S a c h n o r m v e r w e i s u n g  
conception which leads him to the application of the foreign substantive rules.4 
It follows that the inquiry is whether a reference should be considered as a
  ---------------------------------------------------  i
1- See Isaad, M.,Doit International Privi,  Volume I, Alger, O.P.U. ,1986 , p 164.
2 -See Supra., Chapter 1, Section 3 Sub- Section 3, pp 42-43 and Section 4 Sub-section
p 48.
3-See Supra.,  Chapter 1.Section 5 Sub-section 2.
4- Sperduti, G., "Theorie du Droit International Prive", Recueil des cours, III, Part 122, 
(1967) p 224. See also Audit, B„ "Le Caractere Fonctionnel de la Regie de Conflit (Sur la ' Crise ' 
des Conflits de Lois", Recueil des cours, III, Part 186, (1984), p 328.
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global reference to a foreign law or merely to its domestic law and by 
maintaining only the former concept that the renvoi issue could arise.5
In other words, to confirm the general rule of renvoi which says that both 
the internal and the conflict rules of the foreign country form the whole law of 
that system^ it is only the G e s a m t v e r w e i s u n g  conception which means such 
global reference.7
It should be noted, however, that some scholars are doubtful about the use 
of the term the "whole law of the country" which in their view cannot, 
practically, be achieved. According to them the result will be therefore, the 
application of either the internal or the foreign conflict rules and not both. This is 
the view approved by Mr Thomas. A. Cowan who has pointed out that there 
must be a choice between either the foreign conflict rules or its internal laws 
because the application of each one leads to different results. The reason for 
such claim is that the application of X internal law does not have the same result 
as if its conflict rules will have been applied because the latter may lead to the 
application of either the law of the country X or Y.8
I I ) - D ifference in the connecting  fa c to rs .
A 1-Renvoi as a re su lt  of the d iversity  of the conflict ru le s . As 
already clarified in the previous chapter9 renvoi arises because of the diversity 
of the choice of law rules in different jurisdictions. This is, in fact, the position of
5- See in this context Kahn-Freund, 0 . ,  "General Problems o f Private International 
Law", Recueil des cours, III, Part 143, (1974),p 431.
6- See W estlake,J.,A Treatise On Private International Law, by Norman Bentw ich, 
(ed.,), 7 edition, London, Sweet & Maxwell Limited, 1925, P. 28.; Nouveau Repertoire de Droit, 
Mise A Jour (1980-1987) Jurisprudence G6n6ralc Dalloz, Paris (1987), .p 928.
7-The G e s a m t v e r w e i s u n g  concept has been qualified as representing a direct and 
immediate reference to the whole foreign law in which the judge should consider that law as 
one and indivisible; Derrupp6, J., "Etude Theorique du Renvoi", Fasc. 532-A , 1984, J u r i s -  
Classeur de Droit International, 7., (1987). Paris, Editions Techniques, p 3 , Sperduti, G., Loc.cit .,
p 228
8- Cowan, T.A., "Renvoi Does not Involve a Logical Fallacy", 87 U. Pa. L. Rev., (1938- 
1939). p 39. See Graveson, R.H., Conflict o f  Laws, Private International Law,  7th edition, 
London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1974, pp 64-65.
9- See Supra.,  Chapter 1, Section 3 Sub-section 2
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many scholars who believe that "...if the choice of law rules of all jurisdictions 
were identical...the renvoi problem could never arise."10 In fact, renvoi is due to 
the diversity of the conflict rules in different legal systems where one legal
system may adopt the principle of nationality in personal law whereas the other
one favours the use of the domicile principle. As a result of this diversity it has
been held that the appearance of the renvoi mechanism represents in itself a 
conflict of connecting factors11, i.e., nationality contra domicile and vice versa.
B ) ■D iv is io n  o f  the- tw o c o n t e m p o r a r y  s y s te m s  b e tw e e n  
n a t io n a l i ty  and  dom icile  . As discussed above each category has one or 
more connecting factors12 and it is not by chance that the same issue, such as, 
personal status is governed by different connecting factors, i.e., either domicile or 
n a t i o n a l i t y . 13 The general consensus among scholars’ views is that in 
comparative law the division of legal systems, concerning the personal law, 
between domicile and nationality is the most important divergence.14 Here it is 
enough to say that both jurists and legal systems differ widely upon an 
important question which consists on the suitable connecting factor that 
regulates best matters of capacity, status of persons and succession. Is it 
nationality or domicile?15
It should be remembred that legal systems in all over the world are 
divided, according to the principle adopted, into two main camps. This diversity 
in the connecting factors, therefore, can well be clarified by comparing the two
legal systems. Those who adopt nationality as a principle of personal status1 6
10- Von Mehren, A.T., "The Renvoi and its Relation to Various Approaches to the Choice 
- of- Law Problem", in XXth Century Comparative and Conflicts Law, Legal Essays in Honor o f  
Hessel E . YNTEMA, by Nadelmann, Kurt, H., et al (ed.,), Leyden, A.W. Sythoff, (1961), p 380.
11- Derruppe, J., Loc.cit.,  p 2.
12- See Supra .,  Chapter 1 Section 2 Sub-section3, pp 25-26.
13- Maridakis, G.S.."Introduction au Droit International Prive", R e c u e i l ,d e s  cours ,  
Volume I, Tome 105 , (1962), pp.392-393.
14- Batiffol, H., "Principes de Droit International Privd, Recueil des cours,  Volume II, 
Tome 97 (1959), p 478.
15- W olff, M., Priva te  International law, 2nd edition, Oxford, the Clarendon Press,1950.
p 100.
16- I f  a person's "civil status" is related to dom icile principle, "a political status", 
however, is indicated by nationality,.i.e., a political link between a citizen and the country that
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and those who favour domicile as an opposite connecting factor.17 As a matter 
of fact, domicile is the connecting factor of the common law countries18 w hereas  
nationality, represents the favorite principle for the civil legal systems.
1 ) - Advantages of the use of domicile p r inc ip le  As personal law is 
governed by two different principles domicile and nationality, it should be 
borne in mind that if in common law countries the question is mainly where the 
person permanent home is 1^  in the country of nationality, however, the 
question is to which state this person (X) belongs politically.20 To say it 
differently, in common law countries the personal law of the subject X is the law 
of his domicile whereas in civil law countries it is based on the citizenship 
criteria, i.e., the country that X is a citizen21 This is why, it is thought, that the 
adoption of the domicile means the localization of person within the state's 
territorial Jurisdiction22 whereas nationality has a political character23
he has its nationality Cheshire and North, P riva te  International Law,  by North, P.M., (ed.,), 
11th edition, London, Butterworths,1987, p 168; See also Isaad, M., Volume II O p .c i t . ,  p 92. my 
e m p h a s ise .
17- If the personal status which is governed in France, for example, by nationality in 
England, however, it is subject to another criterion which is dom icile.See for instance, See 
Francescakis, P.h., La Theorie du Renvoi et les Conflits de Syst'emes en Droit International 
P r i v e ,  Paris, Sirey, 1958. pp 86-87; Derruppd, J., L o c .c i t . ,  P16; Nadelmann, K.H., "Mancini's 
Nationality Rule and Non-U nified Legal System s, Nationality Versus Dom icile", 17 Amer. J. 
Comp. L„  (1969), p 418; Batiffol, H., L oc .c i t . ,  pp 488,498. For more details see also Westlake, J., 
Op.cit., p .23.
18- D om icile  is adopted by A nglo  Saxon, Scandanivian and Latino Am erican  
countries.See Graveson, R.H., O p .c i t . ,  p 62; Isaad, M.,O p .c i t . ,  Volume I, p 134; Nadelmann, 
K urt..H ., Conflict o f  laws: International and Interstate , Selected Essays by Cavers, D.F., et al„ 
The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1972, p 49.
19- Dom icile in English and American conception is said to have the meaning o f a legal 
home. See in this context Graveson, R.H.," The Comparative Evolution o f Principles o f  the 
Conflict of Laws in England and the U.S.A." Recueil des cours, Volumel, Tome 99.(1960), p 43
20-A nton , A .E ., Priva te  International Law, A Treatise from  the Standpoint o f  Scots  
Law s,  Edinburgh, W. Green & Son L.T.D, 1967, p 156.
2 1 -S e e  J a ffc y ,A .J .E . , Introduction to the Conflict o f  Laws,  London, Edinburgh, 
Butterworths, 1988. p 7
22- In addition to using domicile as a connecting factor in conflict o f laws, it has also 
been used "...in some contexts as a jurisdictional link..." See Carter, P.B., "Domicile: The Case for 
Radical Reform in the United Kingdom," 36 Int’ & Comp. L. Q„ (1987), p. 714.
23- Francescakis, P.h., Op.cit.,  p 142.
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Isn't it clear enough, therefore, to affirm that the division between the two 
legal systems occurred not only because of the difference in connecting factors 
but more important there are other policies that have been taken into 
consideration. It means that practical and political considerations are taken into 
account by legislators and the law makers.24
For the sake of simplicity and clarity of those considerations domicile 
principle, therefore, will be discusses in relation to both immigrant countries and 
non unified systems.
First, if nationality is applicable for a political consideration domicile, 
however, may be based on economic considerations in order to facilitate the 
incorporations of the immigrants into the social background of the immigration 
c o u n tr ie s .25 This is clear enough to maintain that the use of domicile principle 
by immigrant countries,26 such as the United States of America and the United 
Kingdom, represents an advantage for those countries.27
It must be noted that the political interest can be seen from both emigrant 
and immigrant countries. The former, of course, try to keep the link between its 
citizen and their countries by the nationality principle although they may no 
longer live in their country of nationality.28 The latter has as well an interest in 
that it tries to keep those who came to live or work in its land.29 From this 
there has arisen a belief that the application of domicile to personal law by the 
immigration States and nationality by emigrant States is inevitable.30
24- If the conflict rules refer to nationality or dom icile concerning matters o f  personal 
status their should be definitely a legal poliocy from adopting one o f the two connecting  
factors. See.Lewald, H., "La Th6orie du Renvoi" Recueil des cours, Volume IV, Tome 29 (1929),
p610.
25- See Rabel, E., The Conflict o f  Laws, A Comparative study, 2nd edition, Volum e 1, 
Ann Anbor, University o f Michigan,, 1958, pp 162-163.
26- Although France has been considered as an Immigration country it has, however, 
adopted the nationality principle to govern personal status for political reasons. See B atiffo l, 
H .,Loc.cit., p 441; JLewald, H.Loc.cit.,  p 605.
27- Batiffol, H .,Ibid., pp 509, 511; Wolfff, M.,Op.cit., p 104.
28-The main purpose is to maintain the permanent link between the mother country 
and its citizen. See Wolff, M., Ibid.
29- Maridakis, G.S., Loc.cit., pp 503-504.
30- Batiffol, H.£,oc.cit., p 440.
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Secondly, other countries have an interest to adopt the domicile principle 
known as the countries of a non unified legislation.31 This is the case, for 
instance, in the United States of America which consists of different federal 
States where each State has its own system of law. Great Britain which is 
composed by Scotland and England too has different system of laws.32
Much more important is that nationality has never been introduced in 
most composite countries.33 In this context, a major problem arises concerning 
the determination of the nationality of person who is considered as a citizen of a 
composite system. The question that might arise before the court is what is the 
person nationality? This is, in fact, another legal problem that must be solved 
by judges. As 0  Kahn-Freund puts it 1 This...is not where the trouble ends, but 
where it begins.”34 The general view, however, is that nationality breaks down 
when the person is said to be a national of a political units.35 In other words, 
the national law of a Canadian or a British subjects is "meaningless” in these 
political units.36
While it would seem that, practically, domicile and nationality might be 
easily determined and applied they, however, represent a problem for judges
through the process of renvoi. This is the case when the law of the domicile
designs the country of nationality as the applicable law whereas the latter may
be a country with a composite systems where the principle of nationality does 
not work and breaks down. The judge, therefore, must find out the national law 
of a citizen within this plurilegislative system. As a mater of fact the ambiguities 
of nationality in non unified systems is not easy or simple to be determined 
when the country X, for instance, refers the legal matter to the United States of 
America where there are Fifty one American federal laws.37 Effectively, British
31-The non unified system s, which have different municipal laws also benefit also
from the use o f domicile. Wolff, M., Op.cit.,  p 105.
32- Batiffol, H., Loc.cit., p 509.
33- Kahn-Freund, 0 . ,  Loc.cit., p 313.
34- Ibid.
35-Cheshire & North , Op.cit.,  p 170.
36- Ibid., p 169. My emphasise.
37- See .Kahn-Freund, O., Loc.cit., p 390
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judges, for instance, will be confronting this problem when the process of renvoi 
leads to the application of the foreign conflict rules which refers the legal issue to 
a person’s nationality. According to their inquiry they have to find out what is
the view of that foreign law and then determine the person nationality through
the foreign expert witnesses. Their solutions, therefore, will be the substitution of
the domicile for nationality.38
The question whether the superiority of domicile of origin to nationality is
true will be discussed later in relation to the judge judicial inquiry on how to find 
out the national law of the British subject.3  ^ By referring to the case of Re o' 
K e e f e  the solution adopted by the Hague Convention on the conflict of laws 
relating to the form of testamentary dispositions should be taken into
c o n s i d e r a t i o n . 40 This Convention which has been ratified by the United 
Kingdom has not used domicile or habitual residence conception to deal with the 
national law of non unified system but instead it adopts a new approach known 
as the most real connection as a connecting factor to determine the law of the 
testator1 s nationality.41
2)- P a s q u a le  M a n c in i  and  th e  t r i u m p h  of th e  n a t io n a l i t y
p r i n c i p l e  As has already been said42 until the beginning of the nineteenth 
Century domicile was the universal connecting factor that governed personal 
l a w .43 This principle has been retained by the Common law countries whereas
38-It has been confirmed that dom icile is superior to nationality in a country o f a non
unified systems. If, however, the division in those systems is based on religion or race it will be
the ■ superiority of nationality over domicile. Batiffol, H., L o c .c i t ., pp 529-530.
39- See Infra., Chapter 3, Section 1 Sub-section 1, pp 157-158.
40-Concluded in October 5, 1961.
41- Article 1 (e) says "...if a national law consists o f a non unified system, the law to be 
applied shall be determined by the rules in force in that system and, failing any such rules, by 
the most real connexion which the testator had with any one o f the various laws within that 
system. See Confernce de la Haye de Droit International Prive, Receuil des Conventions , Editd 
par le Bureau Permanent de la Conference, (1951-1977),La Haye, Pays Bas, Martinus Nijhoff,
p49.; For discussion see Nadelmann, K.H.," Mancini' s Nationality Rule and Non-Unified Legal
Systems, Nationality Versus Dom icilC’Loc.cit . ,  pp 443,446-447; See also Lalive, P., " Tendances et
Mdthodes du Droit International Privd (Cours General)", Recueil d e s ■ cours, Volume II, Tome
155, (1977) p 303.
42- See Supra .,  Chapter 1, Section sub-section 1, pp 10-11.
43- H istorica lly  dom icile  was the connecting factor admitted universally  at the
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in the continental countries there was a shift44 from domicile to nationality.45
The adoption of nationality46 as a principle that determines the personal 
law of person during the nineteenth century should be related first to article 3 
paragraph 3 of the Napoleon code and, then, to the scholar Mancini.47
It has generally been agreed that the doctrine of the national law should be 
referred to Mr Pasquale Mancini the Italian statesman and teacher of Torino 
University who called for the adoption of nationality as a basis of both private 
and public international law and considers the personality of law as the principle 
of the former in personal law and succession.48 This scholar, in fact, is said to be 
the primarily responsible for the switch in the connecting factor from domicile to 
nationality in which the latter governs matters of family law, succession, status 
and capacity.49 As a result of the shift from one connecting factor to another
beginning o f the XIX Century. Nationality as a connecting factor appeared for the first time in 
article 3 o f the code o f Napoleon. See Van Hecke, G„ "Principes et Mdthodes de Solution des 
Conflits de Lois", Recueil des Cours (1969), Vol I, Tome 126. (1969). p. 532.
44-A switch from domicile to nationality occured, for instance, in the new German civil 
code.and also in France. Nadelmann,K.H.," Mancini's Nationality Rule and N on-U nified Legal 
Systems, Nationality Versus Domicile" Loc.cit ., p 440
45- Graveson, R.H., Conflict o f  laws, Private International Law, Op.cit.,  p 187.
46- If dom icile can be divided into domicile o f origin and domicile o f choice nationality
can also be divided into nationality o f origin and acquired nationality. Concerning the
nationality o f origin this is based upon two creterion, the ju s  sangunius, i.e .,th e person w ill 
have the nationality o f his father and Jus solis which means that the person obtains the
nationality o f the place or the territory where he was born. See Soulaiman, A .A .,N otes en 
Algerian Private International Law" Alger, O.P.U., 1984, p 185.
47- The penetration o f nationality principle into positive laws can be , o f  course, 
justified by the influence o f both the Napoleon code and Mancini' s conception. For example 
the conception o f Mancini that person should be governed by the law o f his nation has 
affected the Italian and other civil codes. See in this context Ehrenzweweig, A .A ., "Specific 
Principles o f Private Transnational Law", Recueil des cours, V olum ell, Tome 124 (1968), 
pp354-355; See also Rabel, E., Op.cit., pp 120-121.
48- In 22 January 1851, Pasquale Stanislao Mancini gave his famous speech at Turin 
University where he maintained that the nationality principle should be considered as a basis 
o f the law o f nations (international law). See His discourse which was published in D iritto  
I n te r n a z io n a le  (Naples, 1873), pp 1-64 ; Gutzwiller, M., "Le D 6veloppem ent H istorique du 
Droit International Prive", Recueil des cours, Volume IV, Part 29(1929), p 365; Anton, A.E., 
O p.cit . ,  pp 26,158; Wolff, M., Op.cit . ,  p 38; Nadelmann, K.H., "Conflict o f Laws: International and 
Interstate" Op. cit., pp 49,51; Batiffol, H., Loc.cit., pp 500-501.
49- See Lewald, H., L o c .c i t . ,  p 606; Nadelmann, K.H., "Mancini's Nationality Rule and
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conflict between different legal systems has increased.50
More important Mancini considers nationality as a principle which is not 
peculiar to Italian civil code but an idea that should be recognized 
e v e r y w h e r e .51 Although he held that nationality governs a person's status 
capacity and family relations he gave, however, domicile a subsidiary
ap p l ica tio n 52 when the person belongs to a country where there is a coexistence
of several legal systems , such as, the the United States of America or if a person
is a stateless or has a double nationality.53
It is generally admitted that the nationalism triumphal referred to 
M a n c i n i 54 has led to the penetration of the national law principle in many 
legislations in Europe and outside Europe55 and his conception of nationality has
Non-Unified Legal Systems, Nationality Versus Domicile" L oc .c i t . ,  p 418; See also Nadelmann, 
K.H., Conflict o f  Laws: International and Interstate, Selected Essays, Ibid.,p  49.
50- Nadelmann, K.H., "Mancini's Nationality Rule and N on-U nified  Legal System s,
Nationality Versus Domicile" Ibid.,  p 421.
51- Kahn-Freund, 0 . ,  Loc.cit.,  p 432.
52- According to him the principle o f nationality should have its own scope. In fact he 
recognizes the territoriality o f law as an exception to the principle o f the personality o f law. 
Among those exceptions are the rules o f Public Law which are territorial, the rule o f  locus
regit actum , criminal law , lois de polisznd  the law chosen by the parties where nationality
should be eliminated. See Isaad, M .,.O p.cit . ,  Volume I, PP 64-65; Soulaiman, A.A., Op.c it . ,  pp 33- 
34.
5 3 - Nadelmann, K.H., " M ancini Nationality Rule and N on-U nified  Legal System s,
Nationality Versus Domicile" L oc .c it . , .pp 418,420,424-425; See also Graveson, R.H., C o m p a r a t iv e  
Conflict o f  Laws, Selected  Essays, Vol I, Amsterdam, New York, Oxford, North Holland, 
Publishing Company, 1977, p 359.
54- The so called  nationalism  m ovem ent contributed to the adoption by many 
continental countries o f nationality as a basis o f personal law and has influenced some 
American State Laws and, is favoured by M oslem and Arabe countries. Graveson, R.H., 
Conflict o f  Laws, Private International Laws, O p .c i t . ,  p 190; Nadelmann, K.H., Ib id . ,  pp 420-
421; Soulaiman, A.A., Op.cit.,  pp 173-175.
55- His influence can be noticed in its early days, for instance, in the Italian civ il code
o f 1865 and the code o f 1942 and has affected , then, the Spanish civil code o f 1889 and the
German civ il code o f 1896 which were based upon the doctrine o f nationality. For the adoption
of nationality as connecting factor in other civ il laws countries. See, for instance, the new
Algerian code o f nationality established by ordonnance N 70.86 in 15 December 1970. Batiffol,
H., L oc .c i t . ,  pp 500-501; Gutzwiller, M., Loc.cit . ,  p 369; Isaad, M., Op.cit . ,  Volume I and II, pp 65- 
66, 129.
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been advocated by eminent scholars, such as, Andre and Bartin.56
It must be noted that the adoption of nationality in personal status, for
example, did not affect only the Italian or the French civil code but it has been
applied as a principle on the worldwide scale.57 In fact, Mancini' s success can 
clearly be seen through the adoption and the penetration of nationalism in 
International Conventions. From historical point of view these are; first, the
Hague Convention of 1896. Second, the adoption of the third Hague Conference 
of two Conventions which are based on nationality as a primary connecting 
factor.58
C)- Clash between n a tio n a l i ty  and domicile p r inc ip le
1)- C lash between n a t io n a l i ty  and dom icile re p re s e n ts  the  main 
occasion of the renvoi m echanism . The application of the theory of renvoi 
is chiefly due to the clash between the two principles, nationality and 
d o m i c i l e 59 , i.e., in most cases which involve renvoi the domicile contra
nationality is the controversial issue60 that has to be regulated by courts.61
The reason why the clash between nationality and domicile represents the 
main occasion of the renvoi mechanism the fact that those two principles are the 
main connecting factors used by different legal systems.62 This is why the clash 
between the nationality countries and that of the domicile represents the "...most 
im portant topic of in ternational disputes and negotiations in P rivate  
International Law..."63
56- Rabel, E., Op.cit., pp 10-11.
57- Ibid., P74; Kahn-Freund, 0 .,  Loc.cit.,  pp 312-313.
58- See the Hague Convention on the conclusion o f marriage and the Convention on 
divorce and separation o f 12 June 1902. P.M. North, "Development o f  Rules o f  Private 
International Law",Recueil des cours Volume I, Tome 166(1980), pp 91-92; W olff, M., O p .c i t . ,  
p47; Isaad, M, Op.cit., Volume 1, p 66
59- Graveson, R.H .,Conflict o f  Laws, Private International Law, Op.cit . ,  p 76.
60-In a legal relation that concerns a person X there might be a reference from the 
law o f his nationality to the law o f his domicile or vice versa.
61-See Sperduti, G., Loc.cit., p 218.
62- Graveson, R.H., Conflict o f  Laws, Private International Law,Op.cit. ,  p 62.
63- Ehrenzweing, A.A., Loc.cit.,  p 355.
6 5
2 ) -  R envoi and the con c il ia t io n  of the  two p r in c ip le s  By
examining the different cases on renvoi, it can be noticed that the clash between 
the nationality countries and those who adhere to domicile occurs most of the
time in personal laws and succession.64
If the fact of the matter is that the world is divided into two different and
contradictory systems Ernst, Rabel himself said that although renvoi is not the
only one it represents, however, one of the best means to reach a certain kind of
m o d u s  v i v e n d i ,65 According to another view the clash between nationality 
and domicile can be solved by the process of renvoi66 on the basis that its 
mechanism represents a way of creating a kind of conciliation between the two
contrad ic to ry  p r in c ip le s .67 In other words, renvoi has been considered as a
useful means to conciliate only the two diverted connecting factors, i.e.,
nationality and domicile.68
It has been pointed out, however, that the admission of renvoi makes the 
conciliation between nationality and domicile impossible because one of the 
obstacles to this conciliation is that capacity and state of person are governed by 
d iffe ren t  p r in c ip le s .69 For those who adhere to this view the divergence 
between connecting factors indicates that the theory of renvoi cannot delete this 
clash but it multiplies Judges' difficulties.70
Furthermore, it must be remembered that renvoi does not occur only as a
result of the divergence of domicile and nationality. The aim of relying mostly
64- See Von Overbeck, A.E., "Les Questions General du Droit International Privd, A la 
Lumibre de Codifications et Projets Recents, Cours General de Droit International Prive", 
Recueil des cours, Volume III, Tom e,176 (1982), p 153. Baxter, I an, F .G.,Essays on Private  
International Law, Canada, University o f Toronto Press, 1 9 6 6 ,  pp 50, 58.
65- Renvoi mechanism has been considered as the " most effective means..." to achieve 
this modus vivendis  between nationality and domicile principles. Rabel, E., O p.c i t . ,  pp 82,168.
66- See Maridakis, G.S., "Le Renvoi en Droit International Prive ", Annuaire , Session de 
Salzbourg, Volume 49, Tome II, (1961) p 276..
67-.Baxter, Ian F.G.,Op.cit., pp 58.
68- Von Overbeck, A.E., Loc.cit., p 167.
69- Lcwald, H., Loc.cit., p 581.
70- M aridakis, G .S., "Les Principaux Traits de la Redcente C odifiaction Hell6nique 
Touchant le Droit International Prive", Recueil des cours, Volume I, Tome 85, (1954), p 169.
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upon these two principles is to prove that renvoi mechanism occurs most of the 
time when the case leads to the emergence of controversies about nationality 
and domicile. In fact, there are situations where renvoi occurs also when a 
reference is made from the lex loci actus to the national law as the case of
Goods o f  Lacroix  illustrates it.71
I l l ) -  D iffe ren c e  in q u a lif ic a tio n  If renvoi occurs as a result of the 
diversity of the two principles of nationality and domicile, the different meaning 
of the latter should also be considered as an aspect of the renvoi controversy7 2 
It means that if domicile and nationality are the main connecting factors the 
former, however, leads to the problem of interpretation in which the conception 
of dom icile in English law differs from that of American and Continental
co ncep tions.73 For example, if domicile in English law is subject to two criteria in 
France, however, domicile has a different meaning.74 D espite these differences, 
succession to movables in both countries is governed by the law of the deceased' 
s last domicile.
As renvoi is a universal phenomenon, it is therefore, necessary and 
im portant to examine the qualification process not only in Common law 
countries but also in Civil law countries and across the spectrum of legal 
concepts.
71- (1877) 2 P. D. 94,96,97. In that case there was renvoi from the lex loci actus  to a 
national law of the deceased which led to the validity o f the will. See in this context W olff, M., 
O p .c i t ., pp 188, 190; For more details on this case see Infra., Chapter 3., Section 1, p 136
72- Renvoi is not only the outcome o f the difference in connecting factors but it is also
a result o f differences in characterization. It is apparent, therefore, that dom icile may be 
defined differently, i.e., can be considered as a domicile o f origin from the point o f  view  o f the 
country X whereas the country Y may define it as a domicile o f choice or the last dom icile. Von 
Mehren, A.T., L oc .c i t . ,  p 380.; See Ehrenzweing, A .A .,Private International Law a Comparative  
Treatise on American International Conflicts Law, Including the Law o f  Admiralty, O p . c i t . ,  
p 139.
73-S ee for exam ple, Graveson, R.H., Conflict o f  Laws, P riva te  In ternational Law,  
Op.cit., p 63
74- In order to claim having a French domicile, the person concerned had to obtain an 
authorization for that purpose according to article 13 o f the French civ il code. After 1927, 
succession o f movable, however, has been governed by the dom icile " de fait ". See Kahn- 
Freund, 0 .JLoc.cit., pp 392-393.
67
A V C onflic t o f q u a lif ic a tio n  and ren v o i Although the two legal
systems may have the same conflict rules, i.e., they are identical the same legal
issue, however, may be subject to different categories. An illustration of such 
conflict is that the country X may consider one issue as a personal law whereas 
the country Y may consider it as a matter of form or succession.75
The question here is to what extent the process of qualification affects the 
process of renvoi? To this question it has been replied that a conflict of 
qualification transforms to a renvoi. In fact, in P.h. Francescakis own words "le
conflit de qualification est done convertible en conflit de renvoi."76
In order to justify  this claim the writer would like to take the same 
example stated by the P.h Francescakis which concerns the distribution of 
immovable situated in a county B that belongs to the succession of X a national
of the country A and siscuss it through diagrams. In this example which
represents a negative conflict it will be proved that such conflict can be analyzed
as either a conflict of qualification (see diagram A) or as a conflict of connecting
factors (see diagram B).77
Diagram A
conflict of 
qualification
Succession of 
immovables
Country (A) may classify
this succession under 
real status.
Country (B), however, may 
classify it under a personal 
status
75- Potu, E .,La Question du Renvoi en Droit International Priv i ,  Paris , Juris- Classeurs, 
1913. p 10.
76- Francescakis, P . h Op.cit.,. p 85.
77- Ibid.
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Diagram (B)
Succession of 
immovables
Conflict of 
connecting factors
In the country (B) such 
succession is governed 
by the law of (A) , i.e., 
the law of X nationality
Succession of mmovables 
is governed in country (A) 
by the lex rei sitae.i.e., the 
law of (B)
If renvoi arises because of the clash between domicile and nationality it 
does not, however, result only from the clash between those two main
connecting factors. Effectively, it can also arise because of the "...hidden
differences in classification.or from hidden differences in interpreting connecting 
factors, of which domicil is the most important...".78 To say it differently, if the 
renvoi mechanism is the consequence of the diversity of the connecting factors, 
i.e., a patent conflict where the two involved countries use nationality and 
domicile for the same legal issue79 it does not mean that it is the only case of 
renvoi appearance. The latent conflict of conflict rules, however, may also lead to 
the emergence of renvoi.80 In this context, the way in which such conflict occurs
is best seen by discussing a French and English cases.
First, in F o r g o 1 s case domicile was the issue to be interpreted between the
French and the Bavarian laws. In fact, the two countries agreed upon the view
78- Kahn-Freund, 0 . ,  Loc.cit.,  p 435.
79- It may happen that two countries use for the same issue, such as, succession o f
movables, different connecting factors, i.e., either dom icile or nationality. See for instance the 
case o f Re Ross  [1930] 1 Ch. 377 ; Castel, J.G.,Conflict o f  Laws, Cases Notes and Materials, 3 rd
edition, Toronto, Butterworths, 1974, p 43.
80- In this typet o f conflict o f conflict rules the same connecting factors can be used 
but the difference is in its definition..Kahn-Freund, 0 .,L o c .c i t . ,  P 393; Anton, A.E., O p .c i t . ,  
p p 56 -5 7 .
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that domicile is the connecting factor which governs the succession of Forgo  but 
they disagree on the meaning and the interpretation of that domiciled1 It is to 
be remarked that in view of others, however, Forgo  case represents only a 
divergence in the concept of connecting factor, i.e., domicile and not a conflict of 
qualification.82
Secondly, in Re Annesley  the same connecting factor was used, which is
the last domicile of the deceased, but the difference is that French law considers
her to be domiciled in England whereas English law considers the deceased as
domiciled in France.83
In Fact, Mr 0  Kahn-Freund's view is clear in which he says that: 84
"...what is remarkable...is that both in France and in England the leading  
judicial decisions dealing with this problem o f renvoi arose from situations 
in which the connecting factors were seem ingly identical, but actually
different. Both M. F o r g o  and Mrs. Annesley have achieved immortality by 
providing for future generations textbook o f exam ples o f the con flict o f  
seem ingly identical connecting concepts....H ence it is only the facts o f the 
A n n esley  case and not the reasoning o f the judge which provide an 
example for the ' hidden renvoi'..."
On the whole, it has been accepted that the patent conflict of conflict rules
81- What happened, in fact, in the French cour de cassation  is that both Bavaria and 
France differ upon the qualification o f Forgo' s dom icile and the question was whether F o r g o  
had obtained a legal dom icile in France. In other words, although succession to movables is 
governed by the dom icile o f  the deceased in both France and Bavaria the former, however, 
considers him not legally dom iciled in France according to article 13 whereas the conflict 
rules o f the latter refer the distribution of his succession to French law as his dom icile o f fact. 
See Munro, C.R., "The Magic Roundabout o f Conflict of Laws", The Jur. Rev., Part 1,(1978) p.66; 
BAXTER, Ian, F.G., O p.c i t . ,  pp 50-51; Isaad, M., Volume 1,O p .c it . ,p  166; See S u pra . ,  Chapter 1 
r Section 3, Sub-section 1, pp 39-41.
82- Derruppe, J et Agostini, E.," Le Renvoi dans la Jurisprudence Frangaise" Fasc, 532- 
B ,1985, Juris-Classeur de Droit International, 7, (1987), Paris, Editions Techniques, pp 16-17.
83-In Re A n n es ley  both the lex causae  and the lex for i  use the sam e connecting  
factor, i.e., domicile, but differ on its interpretation. [1926] Ch. 692; See Collier, J.G., Conflict of  
L a w s ,  Cambridge University Press, 1987 P21; For more details see Infra.,  Chapter 3., Sectionl, 
Sub-sectionl, pp 141-142.
84- Kahn-Freund, 0 . ,  Loc.cit., pp 393-394.
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leads to the emergence of renvoi whereas there is still dispute upon the question 
whether the latent conflict of conflict rules leads to the emergence of the 
problem of characterization or renvoi.85
Having examined renvoi in relation to conflict of qualification it should also 
be remembred that renvoi can result from the difference of connecting factors 
without the emergence of differences in qualification.86 Here it is enough to say 
that if the fact is that renvoi is due also to a problem of differences in 
qualification chronologically the conflict of qualification leads to a negative 
conflict and then to a renvoi.87
B)- Q u a l i f i c a t i o n  hv the l e x  f o r i  o r the l e x  c a u s a e  and  th e  
process of renvoi. As explained above if the process of qualification occurs 
before the mechanism of renvoi88, this chapter, however, intends to discuss and 
examine by which law the connecting factor, such as domicile and nationality, 
should be characterized through the process of renvoi. The practical cases which 
will serve as a basis of this discussion and provide an answer to that situation 
are both taken from civil and common law countries.
The first decision worth discussing, in this respect, is the decision of the 
court of appeal of Monaco in 1972.89 This case concerns succession of movables
of a Belgian citizen who was domiciled in Monaco. Her succession is governed by
the law of her nationality according to the conflict rule of Monaco.90
The problem which arose before the court of appeal is that according to
Belgian law dame de Jon ge , the heiress of d e m o i s e l l e  K e n g i a e r t  de Ghel ieve l t
85- Dicey & Morris, The Conflict o f  Laws , by Lawrence Collins, 1 ledition , Volum e 1, 
London, Stevens & Sons Limited, 1987, p 35.
86- According to this view  the problem o f renvoi can be seen only in conflict of
connecting factors and not in the conflict o f qualification. Derrupp6, J., et Agostin, E., L o c .c i t . ,  
pp 16-17.
87- Ibid., p 17.
88-See Supra .,  Chapter 1, section 2, Sub-section, pp 26-30.
89- A dm in is tra tion  des Domaines  C . dame Rouffignac et autres.  Cour d' appel de 
Monaco- 17 Avril 1972, 63 R e.crit .dr .in tl .priv ,  (1974). pp 76-82. Note Yvon Loussouarn.
90- The Deceased, demoiselle kengiaert de Gheluvlet who is a Belgian national was said 
to continue living in Monte -carlo., Ibid.,  p 79.
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in the 6 degree, cannot claim such succession whereas according to the law of 
Monaco the heiress can be a successor of her relative.91 This led dame de 
j o n g e  to call upon the application of the law of M onaco whereas the 
adm inistration  des d o m a i n e s  invoked the application of Belgian law.92 In  
other words, the question which arose before the judges of Monaco is that when 
the conflict rules of Monaco refer to Belgian law, as the law of nationality, does 
this reference mean the application Belgian private international law or only its 
internal law. The solution reached, in this respect, was that the reference means 
the consideration of Belgian private international law by which the court of 
Appeal admitted renvoi from Belgian law.93
Besides, from Monaco court of appeal' s point of view the determination 
and the definition of the deceased' s domicile should be done according to 
Belgian law and not to the law of Monaco on the ground that the domicile of the 
deceased was taken into consideration only after the process of renvoi from 
Belgian law .94 The court, then, held that la dame de jonge  could not claim the 
succession of movables unless it is admitted that the deceased was domiciled in 
Monaco at the time of her death. It means that the determination of her domicile 
should be done according to Belgian law.95 The court of appeal, therefore, took a 
positive position when it had considered the deceased as domiciled in Monaco 
although she had never been admitted to domicile in the principality of Monaco. 
In other words, by referring to Belgian law by which the deceased' s domicile 
was defined, the judges of Monaco held that the succession should be governed 
by the law of Monaco.96
91- It can be noticed that this case is similar to the Forgo  Affair in  that the application 
of Belgian law (in contrast to Bavaria) will not allow Dame de Jonge  (see also the collateral of 
F o r g o 's mother) to be a successor o f that moveables which goes instead to the administration 
des domaines ( see also the French Treasury), Ibid.,  pp 78-79.
92- Ibid., p 79.
93- Ibid.,  pp 79-81.
94- Ibid., pp 76, 81.
95- In fact the definition of domicile according to the law of Monaco differs from that of 
Belgian law. According to the former, in order to be legally domiciled in Monaco you should be 
admitted to dom icile in that principality whereas dom icile in Belgian is based upon the 
principal establishment. Article 102 of the civil code, See Ibid.,  pp 78, 81.
96- Ibid., p 81.
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It follows, that if the process of characterization can be achieved either 
according to the lex f o r i  or the lex causea  the former, however, is subject to 
exceptions in which characterization in those cases escape from the lex for i  
p r in c ip le .97 In this context, it has been pointed out that once the problem 
concerns the interpretation of the rule of renvoi, there is a consensus among the 
m ajority  of Authors and Jurisprudence of the c iv ilian  trad ition  that 
characterization after renvoi could not be done according to the lex f o r i 98 It 
means that if characterization, normally, can be done according to the lex fo r i  
other exceptions, however, must be taken into consideration among them is the 
qualification after the process of. renvoi which in their view concerns the l e x  
ca u sea . "
Secondly, in Common law countries, however, the general consensus among 
scholars is that the determination of the connecting factor should be done 
according to the lex fori .  It seems, therefore, worth referring to this ru le100 by 
examining the case of Re  A n nes ley  101 and Re O' Keefe . 102 According to the 
former case the deceased had been considered as acquiring domicile of choice in 
France.whereas under that law she was domiciled in England. More important, 
although Re An nes ley  declared in the clause 8 that she did not have any
intention to abandon her domicile of origin, which is England, on the ground that
she had not made an application to obtain a French domicile according to article
97- Loussouarn, Y et Bourel, P., Droit International Prive,  2eme edition, Paris, Dalloz,
1980. p.255; It has been said that qualification o f property as movables or immovables, for 
instance, concerns the lex causae and not the lex fori.  See in this context Isaad, M., Volume I, 
Op.cit., pp 162-163.
98- Loussoaurn, Y et Bourel, P.,Ibid„ P 258.; Isaad, M.,Ibid„  p 163.
99- See Isaad, M„ Ibid., p 163.
100- A ccording to this rule for the purpose o f an English co n flic t rule, the
determination o f the connecting factor must be done according to the lex for i  .It means that
the determination o f the meaning o f the connecting factor, such as, dom icile and the inquiry 
of whether a person is domiciled in England or in a foreign country should be done according 
to the lex fori,i.e., English law . See Dicey & Morris, Op.cit.,  pp 30-32, footnotes 60.
101-[1926] Ch. 692.
102-[1940] Ch. 124.
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13 of the French civil code. The judge Russell. J., however, considers her as
domiciled in France.103 In his view , France was her domicile of choice because 
her intention was to reside there continuously for * an unlimited time. In other 
words, not to comply with the formalities required by article 13 are irrelevant 
here as far as both factors, residence and the intention of remaining, are being 
satisfied according to English Law .104In this context, it is worth quoting Mr 
Russell's reasoning in which he says.105
"...to  follow my own view, I would prefer to follow ...the true view ...that the 
question whether a person is or is not domiciled in a foreign country is to be 
determined in accordance with the requirements o f  English law as to
dom icile, irrespective o f the question whether the person in question has or 
has not acquired a domicil in the foreign country in the eyes o f the law o f 
that country."
According to his view the identification of the connecting factor and the 
determination of its constituent elements are matters for the forum .106
It has been claimed, however, that if the determination of the connecting 
factors should be done according to the lex f o r i  nationality is an exception to 
that rule. It means that if the law of the country X refers , for example, matters 
of succession or marriage to the law of nationality it only gives a definition and 
the meaning of that nationality. It cannot, however, say that the person 
involved is a national or a citizen of the country X or Z. Claiming the citizenship of
103- Mrs Syhil Annesleydkd  on January 16th 1924 in France at the Chateau de Quille 
bandy at orthez, that she bought in 1897 where she resided continously until 1924 the time o f  
her death. Castel, I.G .,O p.cit . ,  pp .51-53; For more details, see Infra.,  Chapter 3. Section 1, Sub­
section 1, pp 141-142.
104- There are indications according to her daughter 's claim that Mrs A n n e s l e y
desired to reside in France until her death and also to be buried there. Castel, J., Ib id . ,  pp 52-53,
56.
105- [1926} Ch.692. 705; See in this context Mendelssohn-Bartholdy, A ., Renvoi in Modern 
English Law, By Cheshire, G.C.,(ed.,), Oxford, The Clarendon Press, 1937. p 36; W olff, M., Op.cit.,  p 
136. See Castel, J.G., Ibid., p .56.
106- See in this context, Collier, J.G., Op.cit., p 14.
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the involved person to either the country Y or Z should be done only by those
two countries.107 In this context, the English reasoning concerning the definition 
of domicile, in the case of Re O' Keefe , has been criticized and refuted. In fact, 
from Kahn- Freund* s point of view the English judge in Re O'  Keefe  had to 
consider the law governing the issue, i.e., Italian law as a matter of fact and not 
as a question of English law. In other words he had to hear the view of experts 
on what law should be applied by an Italian judge in case of citizen who is a 
national of a composite legal system .108 This scholar goes on to stress that the
view of the English judge that "...Italian lawyers cannot say what is the meaning
of the law of the nationality, when there is more than one system of law of 
n a tio n a lity " 109 is in fact a mistake. The reason, acoording to this scholar, is that 
the only lawyers who can give the meaning of nationality are Italians because it 
concerns the definition of nationality as a connecting factor in Italian private
international law .110 Another exception can be cited which concerns the Civil 
Jurisdiction and Judgment Act 1982. According to this Act, in order to
determine the domicile of a person, who is not domiciled in England but in 
another contracting State, English court will have to apply the law of the state 
where he is considered as having his domicile.111
Furthermore, R.H. Graveson stresses that in order to know whether X is 
domiciled in England or in France this domicile will be defined according to the 
English conception although the foreign country may have a different view. To 
define, however, whether X is domiciled not in England but in France or in 
Germany he states an exception according to the Act of 1971112 saying that
107- According to the stated exception tion the lex fo r i  can define the meaning o f
nationality but cannot say or claim that X is a national of that country Z. This is the duty o f the 
law o f the foreign State. See , for instance, Kahn-Freund, 0 . ,  L o c .c i t . ,  p 389; Rabel, E., O p .c i t . ,  
p l4 6 .
108- Kahn-Freund, 0 .L oc .c i t . ,  p 390.
109- [1940] 124 at 129.
110-Kahn-Freund, O., L o c .c i t . ,  p 390. For more details concerning this case see I n fr a . ,  
Chapter 3 Sectionl, pp 154-157.
111-Dicey & Morris, Op.cit., pp 31-32, See also Rule 24.1(c) pp 278-279, 282
112- See the Recognition o f divorce and legal separation Act SS 3 (2) and 5 (2). See also
Rule 81. 1(b), Ibid., p 690.
75
English court must accept the foreign conception or definition of domicile. The 
result of this is that the forum has to determine the dom icile of spouses 
according to the law of the foreign country on domicile.113 However, the 1971 
Act was repealed in toto by the family Law Act 1986 which by S.46(5) allows 
refemce to "domicile" either in the foreign or in " home sense".
S u b - s e c t i o n 2: F orm s of ren v o i.
It is generally accepted that there are two forms of renvoi, single or partial 
renvoi and double renvoi.114 In fact, renvoi from the foreign law to the lex fo r i  
is know n as R u c k v e r w e i s u n g  w hereas tran sm iss io n  is know n as 
w e i t e r v e r w e i s u n g ,115
I ) - Renvoi a t the f irs t and second degree
A ) - R em ission and the lex  for i  p r in c ip le  Following the process of 
this form it has been said that its adoption by French law, for instance, is used as 
a means of allowing only the competence of French law .116 In fact, Mr Jaque 
Foyer is doubtful about such form of renvoi and asks whether this is not a kind 
o f u n ila te ra lism .117 E ffectively , applying and favoring this nationalism  
p r in c ip le 118 means automatically the application of the forum's substantive law. 
Further, this form of renvoi, which is qualified as a simple method, has not only 
been adopted in France but it is also followed in other legal systems.119
It is understandable, therefore, why scholars characterize renvoi remission 
as a lex f o r i  principle. As a matter of fact such nationalism or the national
113- See Graveson, R.H., Conflict o f  Laws, Private International law, O p .c i t . ,  pp 63-64; 
North, P.M., The Private International law o f  Matrimonial Causes in the British Isles and the 
Republic o f  Ireland, Volume 1, North Holland, 1977, p 8.
114- Jaffey, A.J.E., Op.cit., p 259; Mayer, P., Droit International Prive, 2eme edition, Paris, 
Editions Montchrestien, 1983, p 191.
115- Potu, E.,Op.cit., p. 179.
116- See the comment o f Soulaiman, A.A., Op.cit.,  p.51.
117- See the view of Mr Foyer, J., " Requiem pour le Renvoi?" Sdance du 14 Juin 1980, 
Trav. Comiti, Frangais. dr. in. prive, (1979-1980), p.127.
118- This , nationalist principle is said to represent the base o f renvoi at first degree. Potu, 
Emile, Op.cit., p 16.
119- See Von Overbeck, A.E., Loc.cit . ,  pp 134-135. Sperduti, G., L oc .c i t . ,  p 213; See Infra., 
Chapter 3, Section 1, p l28 .
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feelings can be well illustrated by the attitude and the reasoning of both the 
French scholar Batiffol and the report of conseil ler  Mr Denis. The latter, in fact, 
was clear when he considers French law as better than the foreign law in the 
case of Soul ier  before la chambre de reque teAccordmg  to his view "...j'aim e 
mieux que les tribunaux Frangais...Jugent d' apres la loi Frangaise que d1 apres 
une loi etrangere qu'ils ne connaissent pas. J1 aime mieux la loi Frangaise que la 
loi etrangere."120 Another scholar has noticed, therefore, that " ...in  practice the 
reference back to the lex fo r i  is a strong temptation to follow the 1 homeward 
trend V as-can be seen from the dictum quoted above."121
Thus, it is true to affirm that the advantage of the renvoi remission if 
accepted is that it leads automatically to the application of the internal law of the 
fo ru m 122 which can be interpreted as kind of lex fo r i  preference.123 In fact, Mr 
Batiffol' s advocacy of renvoi theory in the Institute of International law led him 
to maintain that if there is a remission from the foreign conflict rule to the l e x  
f o r i  isn1 t it, practically, a good choice that the judge applies its own law on the 
ground that his law is the best known.124
One should also remember that the adoption of renvoi remission by the 
French cour  de c a s s a t i o n  is not based only upon the view that the lex f o r i  
must be applied because Bavarian conflict rules refer to French internal law. 
The true reason, however, is that French law advocates the application of its own 
law because it wants also to protect its national interest.125
Furtherm ore, the application of renvoi rem ission has been related to
120- See Cass. req. Mars 1910, D.P. 1912. 1. 262., For discussion on this case see Kahn- 
Freund, 0 L oc .c i t . ,  p 426. See Potu, E., Op.cit., p. 317. For an English example o f this point see 
the case of H. v. H  [19541, p. 259, 4.
121- Kahn-Freund, 0 . ,  Ibid.,  pp 431-432. Originally emphasised.
122- See Munro, C.R., Loc.cit., p 69.
123- Derruppd, J.,"Etude Thdorique du Renvoi" L o c .c i t . ,  pp 20- 21;. Baxter, Ian F.G., 
Op.cit., pp 55-56.
124- Von Overbeck, A.E., "Renvoi in the Institute o f  International Law", 12 Amer. J. 
Comp. L., p 546; Sadekh, H.A.,Op.cit., p 81.
125- This in fact allowed the French treasury to get its hand on the property and exclude 
F o rg o 's collateral claim as successors. See Sadekh, H.A., Ibid.,  pp 79-80; Rabel, E., O p.c i t . ,  p 78. 
Notes 13. See Supra.,  Chapter 1, Section, Sub-section 2, pp 39-41.
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another practical issue, which is the nature of the foreign law. According to that 
view the application of the lex f o r i , i.e., the French substantive rules by the 
renvoi process can be justified  by the position of the French law and
jurisprudence towards the foreign law. It is well known that French law
considers the foreign law as a matter of fact and not as a law126 and this means 
that with regard to the practical difficulty of finding out the content of the 
foreign law it is not the judge who must prove that law but it is the burden of
the parties to do it.127 By referring to English jurisprudence two cases can be
cited in his context. The first one is the case of thtD u ke  o f  Well ington  in which 
it has ben stated that "The task of an English judge...is...finding as a 'fact' what is 
the relevant foreign law ..."128 Re Askew  is the second case in which Maugham 
J. applied German law by considering the deposition given by Doctor Hellmut 
Rost as proving as a fact.129
G enerally, the tendency of applying the lex f o r i  approach has been
criticized on the ground that it diminishes the possibilities of the application of 
foreign law in favour of the forum law.130 Besides, if the application of the l e x  
f o r i  favors the forum shopping this has led others to claim that the nationalism
126- Both Lerebours-Pigeonniere and Battifol consider the application o f foreign law as 
matter o f fact. According to the former this is due to a practical d ifficulty,i.e., it is a very 
difficult task for a judge to know all different laws in the world. The latter considers the 
foreign law as a fact which prohibits the judge from applying foreign law or finding out its 
content w illingly because its application is not obligatory. See Souliaman, A .A ., O p .c i t . ,  p 147; 
Sadekh, H .A .,Ibid., pp 100-101, 105.
127- In France it is for the parties to prove the content o f the foreign law and not the
judge. This can be done by the certificate de coutume  or by any other means o f proof. In 
England this can be done by the expert witnesses. Failure o f proving the foreign law by the 
parties leads undoubtedly the judge to apply its own law. See Soulaiman, A.A., Ibid.,  pp 137-139; 
Collier, J.G., Op.cit . ,  pp 36-37; Kahn-Freund, 0 .,  Loc.cit . ,  p 306; Jaffey, A.J.E., Op.cit . ,  p. 6; Mayer, 
P., Op.cit . ,  pp 161-165. See the Scottish cases o f of P ryd e  v. Proctor and Gamble. L.td. 1971. S.L.T 
notes 18; B onnor  v. Balfour Kilpatrick. Ltd, 1974. S.L.T. 187, notes 3.
128-[1947], 1 Ch. 506, 515, per Wynn Parry J , emphasise added; See in this context Baxter, 
Ian, F.G .,Op .cit . ,  p 54; For more informations see Infra., Section 3, Sub-sectionl, pp 139-141.
129- Re Askew, [1930] 2 Ch. pp 266-267, 275-276. See Castel, J.C., O p.c i t . ,  pp 60-61. For 
further details see Infra., Chapter 3. Section 1, p l43 .
130- This has been considered as a sign o f  advocating the territorilaity principle. See 
Sadekh, H.A., Op.cit., p 81.
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of the lex f o r i  is a disadvantage because it affects another important principle
131which is the harmony of solutions.
B ) - T ra n s m is s io n  cases  Renvoi at the second degree means that the 
foreign conflict rules does not refer back to the lex fo r i  but a reference could be 
to a third or a fourth law. For example, if the forum law chooses X conflict rules 
to be competent to deal with the legal matter, those conflict rules according to 
the mechanism of transmission might refer the matter not to the lex fo r ibu t  to 
a third law Y.132
Theoretically, renvoi at the second degree is not the last step. There might
be renvoi at a third or fourth degree.133 Practically, however, the connecting
factors that govern some legal matters are limited and not numerous and can be
an obstacle to the supposition of a fourth and a fifth renvoi.
II)- T he u n ila te ra l app lica tion  of the foreign co u r t th e o ry .
Leaving the previous question of when renvoi was first introduced in 
English law 134 the analysis, in this respect, considers the point of how the process 
of the foreign court theory works? A close examination of the foreign court 
theory mechanism clearly indicates that the forum judge, who else than the 
English judge, must make an inquiry asking about the way how the case would 
be solved by the foreign court.135 In this respect Professor de Nova states that 
"...the English judges 1 impersonates' the foreign judge, seeking to act precisely as 
he would have acted."136
The peculiarity of the foreign court theory, therefore, is that the English 
court has to respect the position of the foreign court on renvoi whatever is this
131- Mayer, P., O p . c i t ., p 200; For further discussion on renvoi and the principle o f 
harmony o f solutions see Infra.,  Section 3. pp 85-90.
132- Loussouarn, Y et Bourel, P., Droit International P r iv t ,  2eme Edition, Paris, Dalloz. 
1980, p .262.
133- Mayer, P.,Op.cit., p 193.
134- See Supra.,  Chapter 1 Section 3, pp 32-36.
135- See Edinger, E., "Renvoi in Canada-Form and Availability", 14 M an itob a  L aw  
J o u r n a l ,  (1984). p 38. For the basis of the application o f the foreign court theory see I n f r a . ,  
Section 3, pp 95-96.
136- See in this context Kahn-Freund, 0 . ,Loc .cit . ,  p 434. Originally emphasised.
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view a positive or negative one and there will be an impasse if the foreign court 
could be thought to be playing the same game.
On the whole, the unilateral application of this approach means that the 
foreign court theory works only if the other country rejects it, i.e., if its
application is not generalized.137
S&ft i QH__ 2 : - _ P ossib le  so lu tio n s  th a t  can be ad o p ted  bv cou rts
Renvoi is said to be either accepted or rejected. The former has been called the
total reference principle in contrast to the substantive law reference principle of
the latter.138
On the whole, the judge will be faced with three solutions, either to apply 
the internal law theory or simple and partial renvoi or double renvoi theory.139 
These possible solutions which mean the application of either the substantive 
law or the foreign conflict rules by courts and legal systems140 have led some
scholars to confirm that whatever is the solution adopted, rejection or acceptance 
of renvoi, this choice or preference should not be isolated from the legal policy of 
the legislature.141
S u b - s e c t i o n l R e j e c t i o n  of renvoi It is well known that the rejection 
of renvoi m eans that the foreign conflic t ru les are not taken into 
c o n s id e ra tio n .142 In fact, as indicated above when the reference is only to the 
substantive rules of the foreign law this must be interpreted as a case of
137- Batiffol, H., L o c . c i t ., ,  p 485. For the conequences o f the foreign court theory see 
Infra., Section 3, pp 127-129. .
138- P agenslecher, M ., "Renvoi in the United State: A Proposal", 29 T u l .  L. Rev .,
(1954-1955), p 382.
139- See for discussion, Cowan, T .A ., "Renvoi does not Involve a Logical Fallacy"
8 7 University o f  Pennsylvania Law Review,  (1938), pp 37-38; Dicey & Morris, O p .c i t . , .pp  74-76; 
Falconbridge, J.D., "Renvoi in New York and Elswhere" 6 V a n d . L .  Rev., (1953), p 716-717; 
.Kahn-Freund, 0 . ,Loc.cit.,  p 432. Cheshire & North, Op.cit.,  p 58.
140- See for insatnce Wolff, M.,Op.cit., p 186.
141- See the Observations de Hans, Kelsen in "Le Renvoi en Droit International Prive" 
A n n u a i r e ,  V ingt Troisibme Comm ission, Session d'Amsterdam, Volum e 47, Tome 11,(1957) 
p l2 1 .
142- See for instance, Castel, J.G., Op.cit., p 43.
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S a c h n o r m v e r w e i s u n g , 143 It means that according to the internal law theory 
conception the reference backward to the lex f o r i  or forward to a third law 
should not be accepted. The solution, therefore, is the application only of the
foreign internal L aw .144 It follows from the non consideration of the whole 
foreign law that in this approach the proof concerns only the foreign internal law 
and not its conflict rules.145
S u b - S e c t i o n 2 : - A ccep tance of ren v o i.
The second solution that can be followed by court is the adoption of renvoi 
rem ission  or renvoi tran sm ission , i.e ., e ither R u c k v e r w e i s u n g  or 
W e i t e r v e r w e i s u n g . It has been claimed, in this context, that in renvoi 
transmission or renvoi remission the reference to the foreign law is a reference 
to the whole law without its rules on renvoi in that the forum court will not
considers which type of renvoi is applied by the conflict rules of the foreign 
c o u n t r y .146 In other words, in partial or single renvoi, it is only the foreign 
conflict rules which require proof and not its conflict rules on renvoi.147
Concerning the English version of the theory of renvoi known as the foreign 
court theory, however, an English judge must not ignore the point of view of the 
foreign court on renvoi. As a matter of fact English court must take into 
consideration not only Y conflict rule but also the position of the country Y on the 
theory of renvoi and this inform ation with regard to any third country
in v o lv e d .148 To put it in different manner, the English court has to find out 
whether or not the country Y accepts the renvoi theory and if so what type of
renvoi it adopts.149
143- See J Deruppe, J.JLoc.cit., p 3. See Supra .,  Chapter 2 Section 1, Sub-section 1, pp 55-
56.
144- Kahn-Freund, 0 .^oc .c it . ,  p 432; See Munro, C.R., Loc.cit., pp 68-69.
145- Dicey & Morris, Op.cit., p 75.
146- Kahn-Freund, 0 . ,  Loc.cit., pp 432-434; Castel, J.G., Op.cit.,  p 44.
147- Dicey &Morris, Op.cit.,  p 75.
148- See Falconbridge, L oc .c i t . ,  P 717; Jaffey A.J.E., O p.c i t . ,  p 260; .Munro, C.R .^ o c . c i t . ,  
p70; Derruppd, J.," Etude Th&mque du Renvoi” Loc.cit . ,  p 3.
149- Concerning the total renvoi the proof are required in both foreign conflict rules 
and its rules on renvoi. Dicey & Morrris, Op.cit . ,  p 76.
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Section 3 :- R envoi betw een accep tance  and re je c tio n .
Sj!.b.-.S,.ec t i o n l : -  legal bases of the advocates and  th e  opponen ts  
of re n v o i. The basic feature of the doctrine of renvoi is the fact that it is a 
controversial issue. In fact, the controversies which have emerged on renvoi 
issue is said to be "...The most famous dispute in conflicts law, a classical example 
of violently prejudiced literature confronting naively consistent p ractice..."15® In 
this chapter, therfore, the discussion will cover the different conceptions that 
have emerged to deal with the mechanism of renvoi from both sides. Its 
positive and negative aspects. Further, the distinction that will be drawn 
between the arguments of the two different camps seems to make a perfect 
sense in that it attempts to clarify certain conceptions and, then, to prove which 
of the discussed arguments can be considered as logical and acceptable.
Before dealing with this point it must be admitted that the division on 
renvoi problem does not concern only scholars but also jurisprudence and legal 
sy s tem s.151
I)- A nalysis of a rg u m en ts  th a t fav o u r the renvo i th eo ry .
Those writers who favour renvoi are, therefore, cited in order to show that
the pro-renvoiists’ arguments should be considered as an important tendency of
renvoi justification and not merely as a contradictory camp to the anti-renvoiists.
Chronologically, it can be said that the support came first from the German 
Von Bar, although it has been stressed that he does not defend renvoi, then, 
Rolin from Belgium in 1893 followed by Fiore from Italy.152 Other scholars have 
been considered as sympathetic to renvoi, such as, Bentwich, Dicey, Westlake, 
Abbot, Holland, LorenzenDean Griswold, Professor Rabel, Lerebours-Pigeonniere, 
Batiffol and Jean Derruppe.153
150- Rabel, E.,Op.cit., pp 75-76.
151- See Issad, M., Volume I, Op.cit.,  p 164; See Infra., Chapter 3.
152-.M eijers. E. M ," La Question du Renvoi" 38 B ulletin  de I'Institut Juridique  
In tern a tiona l ,  (1938), pp 203-204
153- See Potu, E., O p.c i t . ,  pp 198-201; Von Mehren, A.T. and Donald Tautman, D.T., The 
Law o f  Multistate Problems, Cases and Materials on Conflict o f  Laws,  Boston, Toronto, Little 
Brown and Compagny, 1965, p. 512; Griswold, E.N., "Renvoi Revisited", 51 Har. L. R., (1937-1938) 
1165; See Von Mehren, A.T., Loc.cit .,  .p 382; Rabel, E., Op.cit .,  p. 89; Cheatham, E„ "Problems and
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It should be pointed out that accepting or rejecting the renvoi theory has a 
close link with the nature of the law as whole. In fact, those who favour renvoi, 
naturally refer to the indivisibility of the conflict rules and substantive rules on 
the ground that such indivisibility  makes the renvoi process possib le .154 
According to them as far as each state is free to apply the foreign law, it must 
apply it as a whole because of its indivisibility. In other words, it is illogical to 
apply a foreign internal law whereas its conflict rules does not accept such 
legislative com petence.155
Furtherm ore , w ith regard  to the conception of w estlake of the 
ind isso lubility  of substantive and private international rules it has been 
m a in ta in e d 156 that concerning the basis of renvoi theories it is not possible from 
a legal point of view to apply a foreign substantive rule without the consent of 
private international rules of that foreign state. It means, that if the forum 
applies foreign substantive law this, however, must be done with the agreement 
of private international law of that state and not against its will.157
In order to justify why the reference should be to the conflict rule of this or
that country, scholars have given different views and explanations to support 
and defend the possibility of renvoi.158 It should be noted, in this context, that 
for the sake of clarity it seems worth explaining scholars' examples and 
justifications by diagrams.
1)- From renvoi advocates' standpoint, when rules of private international 
laws refer to foreign law this means the reference to the whole law and not only 
to its internal law otherwise there will be a kind of distortion to foreign law .159
Methods in Conflict o f Laws" Recueil des cours  Volume I, Tome 99, p 337. Notes 5; Audit, B., 
Loc.cit., p 337; Foyer, J.,"Loc.cit., p 106.
154- Meijers E. M. L oc.cit ., p 210.
155- Soulaiman, A.A., Op.cit., p .50; Sadekh, H.A., Op.cit., p 66.
156- See Maury, J., "Ragles Generates des Conflits de Lois," Recueil des cours , V olum elll,
Tome 57.(1936) pp 329-563 especially at 526.
157- For more details see Lalive, P., Loc.cit., p 263.
158- See Batiffol, H., Loc.cit., p 468.
159- According to them there is no justification which allow the application o f the 
foreign internal law whereas its conflict rules decline the competence. Isaad, M„ Volum e I, 
Op.cit., p 170. See Munro, C.R., Loc.cit., p. 78.
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2 )- Concerning the difficulty that could arise from applying only the 
foreign internal law, the pro-renvoiists defend their positions by relying on a
practical example. They stress that if the country X applies only the internal law 
of Y this will put the forum judge in a big difficulty on how to find out the 
internal law of the subject Z who belongs, for instance, to a plurilegislative 
system that contains different statute laws as it is the case in the United 
Kingdom and the United States of America.160 *
3)- To justify the mechanism of renvoi its advocates refer to the validity
of certain acts and take as an illustration of that a question concerning the 
validity of marriage. In their view, it may occur that the legal matter will be 
considered as null by virtue of the application of the foreign internal law of the
country X whereas the application of its conflict rules may validate such act. It
means that if the forum conflict rules refer directly to the internal law of the 
country X, as the law of the common nationality , for instance, such marriage 
may be considered as void according to X law. This marriage, however, would 
be considered as valid if X conflict rules were applied which might refer either to
the law of the domicile or the lex loci celebrationis ,161 To defend the principle of
renvoi Leo Raape justifies his argument by a marriage case in which a Swiss 
husband got married with his niece in Russia where they were domiciled. In his 
example the marriage is said to be void according to Swiss internal law 162 an d  
valid according to Russian law. Considering that later on the spouses establish 
their domicil in Hambourg where the husband brought before a German court
an action asking for the nullity of the m arriage.163 If the judge interprets the 
national law of the spouses as m erely a Switzerland substantive law the 
m arriage, therefore, will be held void. If however, he refers to Switzerland 
private international law 164 ,then, renvoi from Swiss law to the Soviet law as the
160- See Soulaiman, A.A., Op.cit., p 50.
161- P.h. Francescakis, Op.cit.,  p 153.
162- Article 120 alinea 3 o f the Swiss civil code.
163- See Maury, J., Loc.cit., p 532.
164- The result according to article 7 o f the Federal Law on 25 June 1891 is that Marriage 
celebrated in a foreign country according to the rules o f that country w ill be held valid in 
Sw itzerland. R aape, L.,"Les Rapports Juridiques Entre Parents et Enfants Comme Point de
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lex loci celebrationis  will validate the marriage.165 On the whole the facts given 
in this example try to justify that under both Swiss and Russia law this marriage 
will be considered as valid by the use of the mechanism of renvoi.166
4)- With regard to the argument of sovereignty in relation to renvoi it has 
been claimed that rejecting renvoi by the application only of the internal law 
affects the sovereignty of the state. It means that applying foreign law, which 
does not accept the application of its law, is somehow m aintaining the 
superiority of the forum to the foreign sovereignty167 whereas in single renvoi at 
least the forum is bowing to the foreign court' s conflict view of things.
5)- In addition to that, the pro-renvoiists have drawn scholars' attention to 
another positive result of the mechanism of renvoi which is the connection 
between renvoi and the extra-territorial effect of judgments. According to this 
view, applying the recommendation of the foreign conflict rules will facilitate the 
execution of the judgment. Refusing renvoi mechanism, however, would have a 
negative consequences upon the exequatur of the court decisions. For instance, 
the foreign state Y whose law has been applied will refuse the execution of this 
judgment because the competent court X did not act in her judgm ent according 
to Y conflict ru les.168 According to another hypothetical exam ple, if three 
countries are involved in which the law of the country A does not apply the law 
of the country B, its judgment cannot obtain exequatur in the country C.169
To support their claim its advocates have stressed that the decision of the 
French cour de cassat ion , in the Affair F o r g o ,would be executed in Bavaria on 
the ground that French law applied the recommendation of the Bavarian conflict 
ru les .170
Depart d'une Explication Pratique d'Anciens et de Nouveaux ProbRmes Fondamentaux du Droit 
International Prive", Receuil des Cours, Volume IV, Tome 50 (1934) p. 413, notes 2.
165-Lalive, P., Loc.cit., pp 274-275.
166- Sperduti, G., Loc.cit., PP. 261-262; Batiffol, H., Loc.cit., p 477.
1 6 7 -  Audit, B .JLoc.cit., p 329.
168- See Sadekh, H.A., Op.cit., pp 69-70.
169- Bate, J.P., Notes on the Doctrine o f  Renvoi in Private International Law, London, 
Stevens and Sons , 1904. p 30.
170- See Soulaiman, A.A., Op.cit., p 50.
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6 )- Other scholars have based their suggestions upon the use of renvoi 
upon two main principles nationalist and internationalist. The former can be
seen through the lex fo r i  p r i n c i p l e 171 whereas in the latter tendency they 
m aintain that the international harmony and the coordination of systems 
between involved States could be achieved through the mechanism of renvoi.172 
According to this view, these two principles can both be satisfied through renvoi 
and should not be considered as contradictory.172 It should be borne in mind, 
therefore, that among the strongest arguments which defend the use of renvoi is 
that of the harmony of decision. 174 , i.e., identical decisions will be reached by 
different courts in the same case through the mechanism of renvoi.
In fact, to justify their claim the pro-renvoiists have given an example 
concerning the testamentary capacity of X a Dane aged 19 domiciled in Italy.175
From their point of view if there is no renvoi in this case Italian court will 
consider him as an incapable whereas he has a capacity according to Danish 
c o u r t176 ( See Diagram C). The pro-renvoiists, however, admit that if renvoi is 
accepted by the Italian court (which, of course, is not the case at present time) X 
will be considered capable by both courts ( see Diagram D).
171- Those sympathetic to renvoi stress upon the advantage o f the renvoi o f first degree
by claiming that such form allows the forum court to aplly its own internal law and then the
danger o f any mistakes are diminished. Loussouam, Y et Bourel, P., O p .c i t ., p 270.
172- The reason why renvoi at second degree , for instance, is said to achieve the 
international principle is that the possible connecting factors are , in fact, restricted and 
limited. It menas that the fear o f a second, third or a fourth renvoi w ill be soon over. See Von 
Overbeck, A .E., " Les Questions Generates du Droit International Prive: A la Lumiere des 
Codifications et Projets Recents: Cour General de Droit International Privd" L o c .c i t . ,  pp 153- 
157; Mayer, P., Op.cit., p 193.
173- Harmony o f decision and coordination o f  system s have been considered as a 
p ositive result o f renvoi which ju stifies strongly its mechanism in both rem ission and 
transmission forms. See for instance, Von Overbeck, A.E., Ib id . ,  p 134; See also Derruppe, J., 
Loc.cit., p 22.
174- The advocates o f renvoi have stressed that harmony o f decision principle, which  
represents the main aim o f private international law can be achieved by the process of 
renvoi, although not in all cases Derruppd, J., Ibid.,  p 19.
175- In Italian law, which adopts nationality, this capacity begins at the age o f 18 
whereas in Danish law, which adopts domicile, such capacity begins at the age o f 21.
176- Bate, J.P., Op.cit.,  p 28; For the opposite view see Infra., Diagram I, p 102.
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Diagram C
No Renvoi
He is CapableHe is incapable
Danish law(Domicile)Italian law (nationality)
Capacity of Danish X (19) domiciled 
___________ In Italy
Diagram D
Renvoi
Danish law refer 
to domicile
Italian law refer to 
Nationality
X is capable according 
to the Italian judge
Capacity of the Danish X
Furthermore, in his article, colin R. Munro states six possibilities on whether 
uniformity of decisions is achievable when the case involves two countries.177 
These possibilities, therfore, can be explained into two main points. F irst the
177- The Author considers only partial renvoi in the form o f rem ission. He neither 
claims uniformity or diversity when the case involves two countries adopting the total renvoi 
theory. Munro, C.R., L o c . c i t pp 78-79.
87
adoption of the same theory by both countries.( See Diagram E). Second, the
adoption of different theories by both countries. ( SeeDiagram F)
Diagram E
Both X and Y apply the internal law theory
\
in those 
uniform 
not achi
/
cases 
ity is 
evable
or
Both X and Y apply the partial renvoi theory -
✓ V ""....
Diagram F
X applies internal law 
Y applies total renvoi
X applies internal law 
Y applies partial renvoi
X applies partial renvoi 
Y applies torla renvoi
In those three cases 
uniformity is 
achievable
For further evidence on whether harmony of decision is achievable it is 
important to refer to the German scholar Martin W olff who claims that this 
harmony can be achieved in three possible ways.
a )-  Harmony of decision is achievable if only the country x adopts renvoi 
remission while the country Y applies the internal law theory. Accordingly, both 
X and Y apply in this case the law of X.178
b )- Harmony is achievable if the country X adopts renvoi remission while Y 
adopts the double renvoi theory.179
178- Wolff, M., Op.cit., p 202.
179- Ibid.
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c)- Transmission to the law of a third country can lead to the harmony of 
decision between three countries X, Y and Z. This occurs if the country Y and Z, 
through a transmission process, agree to apply one internal law, i.e., either the 
law of Z or that of Y and taking into account that the court of X adopts a double 
renvoi theory .180 This can be illustrated by an example concerning the position 
of an English court X in which it has to determine the succession of M a national 
of the country Y who died domiciled in the country Z ( See Diagram G)
Diagram G
The law of the country 
Z will apply, for instance, 
the law of Y as the law of 
his nationality
The law of Y, for instance, 
applies also the law of his 
nationality, i.e., the law of
the country Y
The court X, then, will apply 
law of Y which is accepted 
by the law of both countries 
Y and Z.
English court X which adopts 
double renvoi theory will refer 
to the law of Z as the law of 
domicile of M.
If, however, both countries Y and Z disagree on the application of the same 
law, harmony of decision cannot be obtained.( Diagram H)
180- C /., Morris, J.H.C. The Conflict o f  Laws , 3rd edition, London, Stevens & Sons, 1984,
p477.
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Diagram H
The law of the country Z 
will apply the law of his 
nationality, i.e., the law 
of Y.
The law of Y, however, 
refers the matter to the 
law of Z as the law of his 
domicile.
English court X which applies 
double renvoi theory will refer 
to the law of his domicile,i.e., 
the law of Z
There is no harmony of decision 
between the law of the countrues 
Y and Z, i.e., the conflict rule of 
Z indicates the law of Y which in 
its turn refers back to the law of
As a matter of fact, it has been held that the use of renvoi in the essential 
validity of m arriage,181 for instance, led to the uniformity of the status of the
husband by three countries. It means that his remarriage was considered as
void not only by English law but also by the law of his domicile, i.e., Switzerland, 
and that of Italy as a law of his nationality.182
Generally, in order to know how the position of different legal systems on 
the theory of renvoi can practically achieve uniformity of decision it is important, 
therefore, to discuss this problem in both sides, i.e, countries which reject renvoi
181- See the case o f Regina  v. B rentw ood  Superintendent R eg is tra r  R e g is t ra r  o f  
M arriages Exparte Arias[  1968] 2 Q. B. 956; [1968] 3 All ER. 279; See also In fra .,  Chapter 3. 
Section 1 Sub-sectionl, pp 137-138, 149-150.
182- According to the pro o f renvoi the uniformity o f the status o f the husband in the
case o f R e g i n a  v. B re n tw o o d  S u prin ten den t  M a rr ia ge  R e g is t r a r  was achieved, i.e ., the
husband lacks capacity to remarry not only in England but also in Switzerland and Italy. 
Jaffey, A.J.E., Op.cit., .pp 262-263. See now 1986 Family Law Act, Section 50. which serves to 
break a knot. Thus it can be seen in B rentw ood Suprintendent M arr iage R eg is trar  that the 
unusual effect o f the Swiss conflict rules was to deny the validity o f the Sw iss consistorial 
d e cre e .
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and those who adopt it. Concerning renvoi at first degree, it has been claimed 
that this form can achieve harmony of decision provided it is not adopted by the 
two involved countries. For example, harmony of decision is achievable 
between France and Italy concerning the succession of movables of a French 
citizen domiciled in Italy. In this case both France and Italy will apply French 
Internal Law due to the fact that the former accepts renvoi from the law of Italy, 
as the law of the last domicile of the deceased, which rejects renvoi.183 If, 
however, the both involved countries apply renvoi at first degree then "...Renvoi 
turns the negative conflict into a positive conflict, each country applying its own 
la w ." 184 This is the case with France in relation to Germany in which both accept 
renvoi at first degree from each other. In fact, if the French national, for instance, 
is domiciled in Germany, his movables succession will lead the French court, if it 
is seized, to accept renvoi from the law of Germany, as the law of the last 
domicile of the deceased, to the French law as the law of his nationality. If, 
however, German law is seized of the matter it w ill. accept renvoi from the law of 
his nationality, i.e, French law to the law of his last domicile which is Germany.185
In addition to that, pro-renvoiists have also related the uniformity of decision 
with double renvoi. According to their arguments, among the reasons of 
adopting this theory is the desire for the English courts to do ju s tice186 and 
because this form has an advantage which is the contribution of making 
positive dec isions.187 It means that if the courts X or Y were seized of a legal 
matter, their decisions would be identical to that given by an English court.188
8)- Albert Ehrenzweig, however, rejects international harmony of solution 
and the risk of distortion as a justification of renvoi. In his view the only 
justification is the principle of deference to foreign sovereign. In fact, as
183- .Kahn-Freund, 0 .,Op.cit., pp 432-433.
184 -Ibid., p 433.
185 -Id.
186- Graveson, R.H., Conflict o f  Laws, Private International law, 7th edition, London, 
Sweet & Maxwell, 1974, pp 74-75.
187- See, for example, Re Askew  where English court recognized to M its legitim acy. 
[1930] 2 Ch 259; Graveson, R.U.,Ibid., p 75.
188- Mayer, P., Op.cit., p 194.
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Ehrenzweing puts it : "...Nor can a general principle of acceptance of renvoi be 
based on such policy reasons as the desirability of the uniformity of decision...or
the danger of distortion...The only policy which will occasionally require renvoi is
deference to a foreign sovereign"189 The whole idea of his view, therfore, is that 
both the ideal of uniformity of decision and the distortion risk cannot be 
considered as a justification of a general principle of renvoi.190
What Ehrenzweing has indicated on the distortion danger argum ent191 is 
said to be based upon a well known American case, which is B a b c o c k  v . 
J a c k s o n , 192 According to this view if the New york court refused to apply the
Ontario guest statute because that law is said to be inapplicable if the assured is 
domiciled in New York and also if the insurance company is from New York. It 
follows that the Ontario law would be subject to a distortion if the New york 
court applied it.193
9)- As will be discussed later the opponents of the renvoi theory have
offered a strong argument against its use. This position, however, has led some to 
say that "...There is no reason to reject renvoi altogether."194 Some scholars, such 
as, Cowan has arrived to prove that from the point of view of logic renvoi is
p o ss ib le .195 Others have advocated the usefulness of the renvoi theory provided
its use is not mechanical.196 Even Mr Jacque Foyer' s answer to his colleague
189- Ehrenzweig, A., "Specific Principles o f Private International Law", L oc .c i t . ,  p 240.
190- Ibid., pp .242 -271.
191- He is said to have supported his argument o f the deference to a foreign sovereign 
as the only policy o f - renvoi justification by referring to Switzerland private international law 
dispositions. In his v iew  those rules which take into considerations foreign private
international law are, in fact, based upon the idea o f the deference to a foreign sovereign
policy, such as, article 28 o f the Swiss Federal statute. L.R.D.C. of 1891. See in this context Lalive,
P., Loc.cit., p 271.
192- 12 N.Y. 2d 473; 191 N.E. 2d 279; N.Y.S. 2d 743 (1963). For more detail on this case see
Infra.,  Chapter 3. Section 1, Sub-section 2, p 179.
193- Lalive, Y.JLoc.cit., p 273
194- Edinger, E., Loc.cit.,  p 49.
195- See Cowan, T.A .JLoc.cit,, PP 34-49; Rabel, E.,Op.cit., p 89.
196- Philip, A ., General Course on Private International Law", Recueil des cours  
Volume I, Tome 160, (1978)., p 48.
92
intervention during renvoi debate has shown his fascination by renvoi. More 
than that he believes that it will be a shame to desert it.197 In the debate, Mr 
Loussouarn, however, disagrees totally with the term"Requiem?" given as a title 
by J. Foyer. The former, in fact, is doubtful about such requiem by drawing the 
line upon the question mark made in the title and , then, says, that renvoi
currently does not deserve such Requiem.198
Overall, the truth which cannot be denied is that those who favour renvoi, 
however, recognize the differences between its forms. 199 In other words, 
although they favour renvoi theory they differ on the type of renvoi that may 
be the most acceptable.200 Moreover, they also recognize some exceptions to the 
mechanism of renvoi in certain matters, such as, form of acts and the proper
law of contract.201
I I ) -  D iffe re n t w avs of the  ren v o i in te rp r e ta t io n  Due to the 
unconvincing arguments given by the renvoi advocates others conceptions have 
been proposed to explain the mechanism of renvoi. In fact, it was the duty of 
the theorists who advocate its mechanism to find out arguments to justify it and 
gives it a legal, theoretical or rational bases.202
A - C lassical in te rp re ta tio n  of the renvoi theory
The first classical conception of renvoi interpretation is that of the renvoi 
d e le g a tio n .203 The general idea of this conception is that when X conflict rule 
indicates the foreign law Y as competent, this must be interpreted as a matter of
delegation of competence given by the forum law to the whole foreign law. This
law, then, must be considered as one and indivisible.204 In other words, its
197- See Foyer, J., Loc.cit., p 130.
198- Ibid.,  p 123. Originally emphasised.
199- Edinger, E.,Loc.cit., pp 37-38.
200- Within the pro-renvoiists camp there are d ivision about the application o f  the
suitable form o f renvoi. There are who favor only the adoptin o f renvoi rem ission as an
oappropriate form whereas others prefer the renvoi transm ission. See Soulaim an, A .A .,
Op.cit., pp 50-51; See also Sadekh, H.A., Op.cit., pp 81-82.
201- See Sadekh, H.A., Ib id . ,  pp 83-86; For more details see Infra .,  Chapter 3, Sectionl 
Sub-section 2, p 166-172.
202- Lewald, H., Loc.cit., p 583.
203- Issad, M., Volume I, Op.cit., p 171.
204- The renvoi delegation conception is based on the undivisibility o f the foreign
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advocates claim that there is a delegation from the forum to the foreign legislator
by which the former gives the latter the right and power to select the substantial
applicable law .205 If, however, both the forum and the foreign conflict rules are 
not harmonized, the result is that the delegation will lead to a substitution of the 
foreign solution for the home one, i.e., the solution of the foreign conflict rules 
should be respected whether it leads to a remission or a transmission.206 This 
conception is said to be the oldest interpretation of renvoi theory
B )- M odern conceptions of the renvoi theory  As a result of criticism
over the classical interpretation of renvoi, scholars have tried to justify  its
mechanism by offering a new arguments with a scientific bases.207It means that 
other theories have been proposed in order to give renvoi a new base and
maintains its result, i.e., supporting the view that a reference to a foreign law is a 
G e s a m t v e r w e i s u n g ,208
1)- It has been accepted that the theory of Lerebours-Pigeonniere known 
as the theory of subsidiary regulation finds its origin in the desistance conception
in which the English scholar Westlake referred to it in 1900 when he discussed
the renvoi issue in the Institute of International Law.209 This conception was 
proposed by Lerebours- Pigeonniere in 1924 in which he maintains that the 
competence of foreign law does not mean that French private international law 
shows its d esin te rest.210 As French private international law does not 
d is in te re s t211 another law should be designed by a subsidiary conflict rule if it
competent law, i.e., the reference to foreign law should include both its internal and conflict
rules. Derruppe, J., Loc.cit., p 5.
205- Mayer, P., Op.cit.,$ 195.
206- This theory, then, leads to the application o f either French internal law or a third
law by a way o f renvoi from foreign private international law. Loussouarn, Y et Bourel, P.,
Op.cit., pp 275- 286.
207- Sadekh, H.A., Op.cit., p 70.
208- See Derruppd, J., L o c .c i t . ,  P .10; Maridakis, G.S.,"Le Renvoi en Droit International
Privd". Volume 47JLoc.cit., p 33; Lewald, H., Loc.cit., pp 599-600.
209- Derruppd, J., Ibid., p 10.
210- According to him when the judge refers to foreign conflict rule because those
rules are stated by its own conflict rules. Here he shows its support that renvoi does not mean
the abandonement o f the forum conflict rule. Batiffol, H., Loc.cit., p 468.
211- Its advocates believe that if there is a refusal, there will be always a second conflict
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appears that foreign private international law is inapplicable.212 In other words, 
the m eaning of Lerebours- Pigeonniere' s theory is that if the principal
connecting factor refers the competence to the law of Y the result will be that the 
substantive law of that law must be applied. If, however, the law of ,the country 
Y refuses this competence, it means that the law of the country X is applicable by 
the intervention of the lex for i  and according to the subsidiary connecting factor 
of the country X.213 It would also be noticed that according to this scholar either 
the lex fo r i  or foreign law will be applied, for instance, the law of domicile will 
be applied instead of nationality by a subsidiary rule of the forum.214
According to those who favor the renvoi reg lement  subs id ia ire ,  this theory
is quite different from the renvoi delegation conception in that the former
eliminates the complication of the mechanism of renvoi, such as, renvoi at first
and second degree.215 Jacques Foyer, however, has maintained that the true
renvoi is that of renvoi delegation and not the renvoi r e g l e m e n t  s u b s i d i a i r e
th eo ry .21^
2)-N iboyet, another French scholar, has offered a conception which
interprets renvoi by the public policy approach. According to his theory there is 
a substitution of the lex for i  for foreign law if the latter refuses the competence 
given by the forum conflict's rules.217 The main justification of his theory is to 
avoid a legal relationship being stateless.218 His justification is that when the
foreign law refuses competence the forum law must assume this competence 
by the name of public policy intervention which does not allow a legal
relationship, which is connected to France, to be without regulation.219 It means
rule that contains a subsidiary connecting factor. Mayer, P.,O p.c i t . ,  p 196.
212- Loussouarn, Y. et Bourel, P., Op.cit.,  p 276.
213- Sadekh, H.A .,Op.cit., p 71.
214- Derrupp6, J., Loc.cit.,  p 4.
215- Francescakis, P.H., Op.cit., p 100.
216- Foyer, J., Loc.cit., p. 127.
217- According to Niboyet's theory, the only subsidiary connecting factor is the l e x
f o r i .S c e  Francescakis, P.h., O p .c i t .,p 188.
218- See Loussouarn, Y., Loc.cit.,  p 378.
219- Loussouarn, Y et Bourel, P., Op.cit.,  p 280.
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that when the foreign conflict rules refuses the competence the law of the l e x  
f o r i , a u to m a tic a lly , in te rv e n e s 2211 in the name of the public policy 
re s e rv a t io n .221 Concerning the sim ilarities between Niboyet and Lerebours- 
Pigeonniere 's theories is that both scholars agree that you should not oblige the 
foreign law to be competent if it refuses such com petence.222 The two 
conceptions, how ever, d iffer in that despite both scholars taking into 
consideration foreign conflict rule they differ on the reason for the application of 
the law of the forum, i.e., public policy reservation of Niboyet contra Lerebours- 
Pigeonniere1 s subsidiary conflict rule.223
3 ) -A fter discussing how the foreign court theory w orks,224 another 
element which justifies its mechanism, should also be examined. The inquiry in 
this context, therfore, is to find out the basis of the application of the mechanism 
of the total renvoi. As a matter of fact, English lawyers have justified the 
mechanism of renvoi by an approach which is different and opposed to the 
continental renvoi and which has been considered as peculiar to English law. An 
explanation of the theory of renvoi in the English Jurisprudence has related this 
theory to the so called international competence.225 According to Emile Potu the 
decisions given by courts which are internationally competent will be considered
220- In his theory Niboyet suggests that when the legal relationship is said to be statless 
there should be a return to the territoriality o f law principle by which the forum can apply its 
own law. Soulaiman, A.A., Op.cit.,  pp 53-54.
221- To avoid criticism to his theory Niboyet admits that there should be an objection to 
the application o f the law o f  the lex fo r i  when the legal issue has no link with France. 
Derrupp6, J.JLoc.cit., pp 11-13.; See also Isaad, M., Volume I, Op.cit.,  p 171.
222- According to Lerebours-Pigeonniere and Niboyet a subsidiary conflict rule must be 
found in order to avoid the legislative emptiness when both the forum principal conflict rule 
and the foeign conflict rule refuse to be applied. See Issad, U.,Ibid.,  Sadekh, H.A., Op.cit . ,  p 74 .
223- Derruppe, J., Loc.cit.,  p 4
224- See Supra., Chapter 2 Section 1, pp 78-79.
225-W hilhelm  Wengler stresses that "...The foreign court theory presupposes the there 
is a concurrent jurisdiction for the English court and the foreign court, but that the foreign 
court, indicated by the English conflict rule , has some kind o f better jurisdiction. W engler, 
W.,"The General Principles o f Private International Law," Recueil des cours, Volume III, Tome 
104, (1961) p 381.
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as valid irrespective of the fact that it is given by an English or a foreign court 
provided, of course, that they don' t hurt the English public policy. He, then, goes 
to point out that although a foreign judge may be internationally competent this 
does not prevent an English judge to rule on the case. To do that an English 
judge must decide the case as the foreign judge will do . Again Emile potu would 
draw the line arguing that this can be considered as the origin of the renvoi in 
the English jurisprudence226, i.e., this type of reasoning is said to be the basis of 
English private international law. 227
4)- The eminent French scholar Batiffol has used a different approach to 
justify  the use of renvoi. His reasoning is that, if you want to reach the 
harmonization between different legal systems of private international law this 
negative conflict, should be resolved by certain coordination 228 of both French 
and foreign conflict rule.229 Concerning the advantage of this conception it has 
been held that although renvoi does not lead to the unification of solutions230 It 
can, however, achieve the coordination of different systems.231 Accordingly, it 
has been recognized that the strong basis of his theory makes it far away from 
the vicious circle criticism. 232
From the point of view of similarities between Lerebours-Pigeonniere and 
B atiffo l1 s conceptions the general view is that both have in mind this 
harmonization of private international law and try to avoid the criticism of the 
abandonment of sovereignty that has been said against the classical conception 
of renvoi.233 In fact, to support his claim Mr Batiffol underlines that the conflict
226- Potu, E.,Op.cit., p 122.
229- Ibid., p 135.
228- The purpose o f o f Mr Batiffol' s theory which accepts renvoi is the coordination o f 
different conflict systems, i.e, renvoi in his view has a coordinator role. See Maridakis, G.S.," Le 
Renvoi en Droit International Prive ", Volume 49, L o c .c i t . ,  p 277. Derruppd, I . ,L oc .c i t . ,  pp 21- 
22 .
229- Loussouarn, Y. et Bourel, P., Op.cit., p 281.
230- This has led to believe that such coordination leads to the achievem ent o f  
International harmony o f solutions. .Mayer, P., O p.c it . ,  p 198.
231- Derrupp6, J., Loc.cit., p .22.
232- Ibid.
233- Loussouarn, Y. et Bourel, Y.,Op.cit., p 282.
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rule does not work by itself but it enters into the process because it is designed 
by the French conflict rule.234 Concerning their dissimilarity the two conceptions, 
however, differ first on the basis of the application of the lex fori 235 They also 
differ on the possible form that can be applied in that if in Batiffol' s conception 
the renvoi at second degree is possible23  ^ it is, however, excluded by Lerebours- 
pigeonniere' s conception.237 More important, Batiffol maintains that renvoi is 
simply an exception because the principle is that each judge applies its own 
conflict rule and allows the application of foreign conflict rule only in certain 
cases.238
5 ) -Another technique known as the desistance theory has been advanced 
by W estlake.239 The idea of this English scholar is said to be repeated in France 
first by Ambroise Colin and then by Lerebours-Pigeonniere.240
The question that must be asked is what the forum should do to respect 
the basis of such theory? To do that he has to be sure that the foreign system 
does not show its disinterest and, then, find out whether it applies its internal 
law. If, however, such disinterest is confirmed the lex for i  , i .e .,  th e  la w  o f  th e  
fo ru m  w il l  b e  a p p l ie d .241 For example, if French judge applies French law 
because English legislature shows its disinterest and not because of renvoi from 
English law.242 In his words Westlake maintains: "...W hy the French judge will
234- According to his conception there is no abandonment o f the French conflict rules 
to the profit of the foreign rule. See Mayer, P., O p.cit . ,  pl97; Loussouarn, Y. et Bourel, P., Ibid.
235- If Battifol thinks that the application o f the lex for i  is made according to the 
reference to the foerign con flict rule which refuses com petence, Lerebours-pigeonniere, 
however, stresses that it is the subsidiary connecting factor that leads to the application o f the 
lex fori. Sadekh, H.A., Op.cit., p 76.
236- If  according to lerebours-Pigeonniere renvoi at first degree must be applied by the 
application o f the subsidiary conflict rules, Battifol's conception, however, leads even to the 
application o f renvoi transmission. See Isaad, M., Volume I, O p .c i t . ,  p 172; Sadekh, H.A., Ib id . ,  
pp 78;79.
237- Loussouarn, Y. et Bourel, P., Op.cit., p 282.
288- Batiffol, H., Loc.cit., p 472.
239- Griswold, E.N .yLoc.cit., p 1168.
240- See Francescakis, P.h., Op.cit., p 136.
241- Edinger, E.,Loc.cit., p 37.
242- See Lewald, H., Loc.cit., p 601.
9 8
apply French law is, not because the English law maker refers the matter to him, 
but because the English law-maker pronounces the matter outside his interest. 
La loi anglaise ne renvoie pas\elle ne fa i t  que se desinter esse...  " 243
With regard to the form of renvoi it has been held that this theory leads 
only to renvoi remission and there is no possibility for renvoi transmission.244 In 
other words, the desistance theory has been considered as partial renvoi, i.e., 
renvoi R u c k v e r w e i s u n g .246 According to another view, however, among the
reasons why the theory of desistance cannot be considered as a true renvoi is 
due to the fact that there is no remission or transmission from the foreign 
conflict ru les.246 Another difference between the theory of desistance and that
of renvoi is that if the lawn tennis is inevitable in the proper renvoi this,
however, cannot occurs in the theory of Westlake and Von Bar.247
Furthermore, Mrs Elizabeth Edinger goes on to consider such desistance to 
be found within the English reasoning in the case of Re Askew.  A lthough she 
cited the reasoning of the judge Maugham in that case she considers, however,
that "...the desistance has never become part of the common law."248
I l l )-  A rgum en ts  a g a in s t the  renvo i th eo ry
A)- R efu ta tio n  o f renvoi ad v o ca tes ' a rg u m en ts  Those who oppose 
renvoi have given various arguments which deny the u tility  of renvoi
m echanism . These arguments are not cited according to their degree of
importance but are rather discussed in respect of the previous justifications of 
renvoi advocates.
1)- According to the anti-renvoiists claiming the indivisibility of the foreign 
law is totally wrong.249 In their view if the forum law applies the foreign law Y
243- As quoted from Bate, J.P.,Op.cit., p 68.
244- See the view of Wolff, M., O p.c it ., pp 198-199.
245- The main reason that makes scholars believe that the declinature or desistm ent
theory is identical to renvoi is that both refer to the foreign conflict rules. Bate, J.P., Op.cit . ,  
p74 ; Edinger, E., Loc.cit.., p 37.
246- Edinger, E., Ibid.
247- See for instance Bate, J.P., Op.cit., p 74.
248- Re Askew, [19301. 2. Ch. D., p 269..See Edinger, E .JLoc.cit., p 38.
249- If the pro-renvoiists insist that the application o f foreign law must be considered as
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as an indivisible and that law will refer back to the forum law the latter should 
also be considered in its turn as one and indivisible. It means that the reference 
made by the forum conflict rules to the law of Y must also be respected and,
then, the vicious circle is inevitable.250 In fact Kahn has pinted out that "...The 
consequence is that in virtue of the foreign law ours is applied in its totality and 
in virtue of ours the foreign law is again applied in its totality and so on and so 
on: a logical ’cabinet of mirrors'... "251 Georges S. Maridakis too concluded in his 
defin itive report during the session of Am sterdam  that the so called 
G e s a m t v e r w e i s u n g , i.e., a global reference to foreign law, has no basis or
foundation in doctrine.252
2)- The cons of renvoi stresses that the process of renvoi can, practically, 
cause problems to judges and also will have a negative effects on the rights of 
subjects especially when the conflict rules of the country X refer to a 
plurilegislative systems Y of either territorial or personal law,253 In fact this
represents one of the problems that face judges who try to find out the
nationality of a person who belongs to this non unified system.254 This occurs in 
situation when, for instance, the conflict rules of a country refer to a person's
nationality which could be the United States of America , Canada or the United 
K in g d o m .255 In this context, it has been stressed that " ...the existence of 
different legal systems within the United Kingdom may still cause complications,
and sometimes any solutions adopted will appear un real..." .256 To show the
all hom ogeneous including both the substantive and con flict rules the opponent camp, 
however, claim s that such b elie f leads to the lawn tennis or an infinite circle. Potu, E.,
Op.cit .,pp .227-228.
250- Derrupp6, J., Loc.cit.,  P 6.
251- As quoted from Bate, J.P., Op.cit., p 50.
252- Maridakis, G.S., " Le Renvoi en Droit International Prive" Volume 47, L oc .c it . ,  p 15.
253- This type o f renvoi has been called by some scholars as internal renvoi. In their 
view  the country X will not decline competence to another law but it will define the applicable 
internal law among the different existing laws. See for that Sadekh, H.A., O p.c i t . ,  pp 89-90.
254-The difficulty occurs when the judge proceed to the definition o f  the connecting  
factor in order to find out whether X is a natioanl o f a composite legal system. See Cheshire & 
North, Op.cit.,  pp 63-64.
255- Munro, C.R., Loc.cit., pp 72-73.
2 5 6 -Ib id . ,  P 73; For more details on this case see Infra.,  Chapter3, Section 1, Sutsection l,
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uselessness of renvoi process, when the reference is made to a plurilegislative 
country of several unit laws, the opponent camp,< therefore, considers Re O'  
Keefe .as  a best case which illustrates that fact.257
3)- The anti-renvoiists claim that taking into account a foreign conflict 
rules affect undoubtedly the sovereignty of the forum .258 In their view 
referring to the foreign conflict rules is a kind of surrender or capitulation of the 
forum rules to the foreign conflict rules.259 Avoiding such inconvenient, i.e., the 
abandonment of sovereignty, renvoi opponents say that it is the forum private 
international law which should determine the competent internal foreign law 
otherwise the forum private international law will bow down to Foreign private 
international law .260 In fact, Cheshire1 s point of view is clear when he stresses 
that "...the doctrine involves nothing less than a substitution of the foreign for the 
English choice-of-law rules..." 261
4)- C laim ing that renvoi fa c ilita tes  the exequatur o f judgm ents 
presupposes that its execution takes place in the countries which the court has 
applied and respected its conflict rules through the process of renvoi. This is, 
however, is not always the case because it may happen that the judgement will 
be executed in another country.262 It follows that renvoi will be considered as an 
obstacle to the execution of that judgment in the country B if the law applied by
pp 153-158.
257- [1940] Ch. 124, [1940] 1 All ER. 216, See Jaffey, A.J.E., Op.cit., P..262;. Collier, J.G., Op.cit., 
pp 25-26..
258- The application o f foreign conflict rules has been objected on the ground that it 
allows the forum to leave the decision to the court and the law o f a foreign State Cheatham, E.E., 
Loc.cit., pp 337-338.
259- Munro, C.R .JLoc.cit., pp 74-75.
260- Loussouarn, Y et Bourel, P., Op.cit., pp 264-265.
261- See Cheshire's P riva te  In ternational Law,  by North P.M. (ed.,), 9th edition,, 
London, Butterworths, 1974, p 64.
262- It may happen that the judgment could be executed in the country X , i.e., the lex 
f o r i  and not in the foreign country Y. This execution may also take place in the same country 
which prounounced the judgment or in a third country and not forccly in the country that 
made the reference to the forum law. Sadekh, H.A., Op.cit., p 70; Soulaiman, A.A., O p.cit .,  p 52.
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the process of renvoi is not the law which will be selected and applied by that 
co u n try .263 Moreover, claiming that by renvoi the country B will exequatur the 
judgment given by the country A is not easy to confirm for the simple reason 
that in order to implement this decision, the former must look to other 
important elements, such as, whether the country A is in fact competent 264 
According to their opinion in the case of Armilage  v .A t t o r n e y  G e n e r a l ,265 
which concerns the recognition of foreign judgment, there is no renvoi in this 
situation but only a consideration of foreign private international law.266 Their 
basic view, therefore, is that there is no need of renvoi pretext to recognize a 
foreign judgm ent pronounced according to a law chosen by its own conflict 
ru le .267
5)- Concerning the question on whether the theory of renvoi may achieve
uniformity of decision, it should be borne in mind that this uniformity is one of 
the most serious objections to renvoi by the anti-renvoiists. According to them
arguments related to the uniformity principle are not strong to justify the renvoi 
u s e  because uniform ity cannot be achieved suddenly and to tally  in the
worldwide scale.268 It means that if the uniformity is one of the objects of renvoi 
theory it does not mean, however, that it can be achieved in all areas.269 
M oreover, the anti-renvoiists have examined the cases given above 270 a n d ,
263- Derruppe.J., Loc.cit .,  p 18.
264- Bate, J.P., Op.cit., pp 30-31.
265- [1906] p 136.
266-This situation was compared to renvoi because in the view  o f  English courts the
divorce judgment pronounced by a foreign country, which is the State o f south Dakota, should 
be recognized because it is also recognized by the State o f New York as the State o f domicile. See 
Lalive, P., Loc.cit .,  p 307. See Infra., Chapter 3 Section 1 Sub-section 1, pp 148-149, 202.
267- See Von Overbeck, A.E., "Les Questions General du Droit International Prive, A la 
Lumibre de C odifications et Projets Recents, Cours General de Droit International Prive" 
Loc.cit.,  p 164.
268- Uniformity o f decisions, however, is said to be achievable only if  the country X  
adopts renvoi mechanism whereas the country Y rejects it. Besides, harmony o f solutions also 
cannot be achieved if  renvoi is accepted by all countries. See Francescakis, P.h., O p .c i t . ,  p 172. 
C .f ,  Cheshire & North, 11th edition, Op.cit.,  p 62.
269- Edinger, E., Loc.cit., p 47.
270- See Supra., Diagram D, p 86.
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then, rejected the view that if renvoi was applied Danish judge would have also 
admitted to X its capacity.271 It can be deduced from such refutation, therefore, 
that identical decisions is not achievable because X is incapable according to 
Danish law.( see Diagram I)_
Diagram I
Capacity of a Dane X
V
If Danish court is 
seized it will refer 
to the law of domicile
7 T \
V
X is incapable because 
he has not reached the
testemantary capacity
which is 21 years of
age. ________
Renvoi > l
Italian law,however, 
refers to nationality
Furthermore, it has been pointed out that admission of renvoi does not lead 
to the legal harmony but it leads to negative consequences. In other words, this 
theory causes incertitudes and doubts and should be considered as a misleading 
and fallacious doctrine.272 In Emile potu' s point of view uniformity becomes 
impossible if more than two legislations are in conflicts and all decisions of the 
court involved will be, therefore, contradictory.273
6 ) -The view that draws the distinction between principal ’and subsidiary 
regulation is untrue according to the anti-renvoiists and renvoi r e g l e m e n t  
s u b s i d i a i r e  is, then, an artificial hypothesis which has no relation with positive 
la w .274 Their belief is that there is a unitary conflict rule275 and the subsidiary
271- Bate, J.P.,Op.cit., p 28.
272- Lewald, H., Loc.cit., pp 615, 571-572.
273- Potu, E., Op.cit., p 221.
274- It has been held that Lerebours-Pigeonnibre' s theory is based on international 
courtoisie conception, a principle that can not be considered as the bases o f private 
international law because o f its insufficiency. See Derruppd, J., Loc.cit., p 10.
275- Loussouarn, Y. et Bourel, P., Op.cit.,  pp 278-280.
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connecting factor stated by Lerebours-Pigeonniere is not true. It is a wrong and 
unfounded hypothesis which does not prove that each connecting factor, 
practically, has a subsidiary one.276
7)- If the Pro-renvoiists consider Niboyet' s conception as simple because 
it avoids and cancel renvoi transm ission,i.e., renvoi at second degree. This 
conception, however, has been considered to be based upon an abstract 
re a s o n in g 277 that leads to an immediate and automatic competence of the l e x  
f o r i  and can not lead to the harmonization of solutions.278 Besides, the non 
application of foreign law on the ground that it refuses the competence is a 
wrong analysis because this leads automatically to believe that the basis of the 
application of foreign law is international courtesy.279
8)- To affirm the uselessness of Batiffol' s arguments which make the 
coordination of private international law in different countries possible by the 
process of renvoi, George S. Maridakis stresses that such conception force both 
judge and parties in making a hard effort which is not more than waste of 
tim e .280 Francescakis, however, considers the theory of Batiffol as an insufficient 
for the justification of renvoi. In his view this theory represents merely a kind 
of applying the mechanism of the classical theory of renvoi delegation.281. From 
a practical point of view, It has been maintained that if the coordination of the 
conflict rules could be fulfilled by the mechanism of renvoi in personal law and 
succession this is due to fact that the connecting factors used in this area are not 
numerous. This, however, is not the case in other areas, such as, the legal
276- See Sadekh, H.A., Op.cit., p 73.
277- The idea that makes Niboyet believes that a legal relation can be without a country 
is rejected on the ground that it is unlikely that all legal systems will refuse their competence. 
Ibid., pp 74-75.
278- Loussouarn, Y. et Bourel, P., Op.cit., pp 280-281.
279- Sadekh, H.A., Op.cit., p 75
280- Maridakis, G.S., " Le Renvoi en Droit International Privd ".Volume, 47, Loc.cit . ,  p 15.
281- Francescakis, ?.h.,Op.cit., p 224; For discussion see Derruppe, J., Loc.cit .,  p 22.
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m atrim onial property regim e.282
9)- According to the opponent camp the important thing to bear in mind 
concerning the desistance theory is that it is based on a false imagination. It 
means, that if the foreign state was really asked about the jurisdiction it would 
accept it and not decline i t 283
10)- Those who oppose renvoi refer to another difficult issue which is the 
proof of foreign law. From their point of view it is not easy for all judges to know 
the real position of the foreign court about renvoi.284 This led them to maintain 
that if the application of the foreign internal law is not easy the application of the 
foreign conflict rules, however, are much more difficult to be known defined and 
ap p lied .285 As a matter of fact the case of Re Duke o f  Wellington  is said to be far 
enough to show the difficulty that faced an English judge in his judgement. To
use Wynn- Parry' s reasoning :"...It would be difficult to imagine a harder task
than that which faces me, namely of expounding for the first tim e...the relevant
law of Spain [on renvoi] as it would be expounded by the supreme court of 
Spain, which up to the present time has made no pronouncem ent on the
subject..."286
The point to be emphasised, therefore, is that although the mechanism of
renvoi has been adopted by courts and defended by its advocates in Civil and 
Common law countries a big number of writers, however, have rejected its
m e c h a n is m .287 As those opponents are numerous the writer, however, would
like to cite the well known scholars from both Civil and Common law countries.
282- The possible connecting factors used in this area are, for instance, the national law,
the law o f the matrimonial domicile, the implicit intention o f the parties and so on. For more 
discussion see Aldroze, G., "Regimes Matrimoniaux en Droit International Prive", Recueil  des  
cours,  Volume HI, Part 143, (1974), pp 118, 122-123.
283- Munro, C.R., Loc.cit ., p 71.
284- See Anton, A.E .,Op.cit., p .59 .
285- Cheatham, E.E., Loc.cit., p 338.; Wolff, M.,Op.cit., p 198.
286- In this case the judge recognizes that it is difficult to find out whether renvoi is 
adopted by Spanish law due to the diffrences o f both writers and court decisions on renvoi. 
[1947] Ch. 506. at 515. Originally emphasised. See also Maugham ' s view in Re Askew  [1930] 2 
Ch. 259 at p. 276. See in this context Munro, C.R., O p.cit .,  pp 71-72; Collier, J.G., O p .c i t ., p 25; For 
more details on those cases see Infra.,  Chapter 3. Section 1 Sub-section 1, pp 139-141, 143.
287- See Collier, J.G., Ibid., P. 22; Batiffol, H .JLoc.cit., p 467.
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These are, for instance, the Italian Buzzati288 the F rench  Bartin 289 Pillet,290, the 
American Beale291 and the English scholar Cheshire292.
The anti-renvoiists have also rejected renvoi in International Conventions 
by their tough position against its mechanism.293 This is, for instance, the position 
of Mr Asser form Netherlands, the French Laine,294 and the Dutch George S. 
M aridak is.295
288- Lewald, H., Loc.cit., P. 574; Potu, E.,Op.cit., pp 198-201.
289- Francescakis, ?M.,Op.cit., p 98.
290- His basic argument against renvoi is that in Private International law there is a 
limitation of sovereignty. Meijers E. M. Loc.cit . ,  p 213.
291- Although he rejects the renvoi theory he admits its mechanism in exceptional
cases., i.e., he is in favour of a limited application of the partial renvoi in matter o f the validity
o f divorce decrees and o f title o f land. See Beale, J.H., A Treatise on the Conflict o f  Laws, New
York, 1935 § 7.3, pp 56-57.; Von Mehren, A.T., L oc .c i t . ,  p 382; See also Von Mehren, A.T., and 
Tautman, D.T., O p.cit . ,  pp 509-510; Levontin, A.V., Choice o f  Law and Conflict o f  Laws,L eyden, 
A.W. Sijthoff, 1976. p 54.
292- According to his view the application o f the foreign substantive law is the correct
and desirable solution. Although Cheshire objects renvoi as a principle he, however, admits its 
mechanism in exceptional cases. Cheshire & North, 11th edition, O p .c i t . ,  p 59; Anton, A.E., 
Op.cit., pp 60-61, notes 89.
293- Lewald, H., Loc.cit., p 584
294- During the three Hague Conferences on Marriage in 1893, 1894 and 1900 those two 
delegates and others have shown their opponancy to renvoi. Potu, E.,O p.c i t . ,  p 159.
295- During the session o f Amsterdam George S. Maridakis presented his defin itif report
concerning the theory o f renvoi during the 23th com m ision,which was created in 1952. In
his report he estimated that the Institute would maintain the resolution and the expression of 
1900 in the session o f Neuchatel in which the vote within the Institute o f International Law 
shows a massive condemnation o f renvoi as a principle by a majority o f twenty one scholars 
against six. Among the opponents who formed the majority are Asser, Buzzati and Holland. 
Those who were in favour are Von Bar and Westlake. According to Mr George S. Maridakis, the
refernce to the foreign laws should be only to the internal law o f that country and not to its
rules o f private international law. Latter, however, he admitted that the institute should reject 
renvoi as a general principle but allowing certain exceptions, i.e ., returning to the Neuchatel 
resolution by adding other exceptions. This solution was accepted and shared by other 
scholars such as Mr Cheshire himself. See, Maridakis, G.S., " Le Renvoi en Droit International
Priv6 "Volume 47, L o c . c i t . ,  pp 1, 7, 16-17, 53, 62; Maridakis, G.S., Le Renvoi en D ro it-  
International Privd" A n n u a ir e ,  Quatribme S6ance Pldnibre, Session de Varsovie, Volum e 51, 
Tome 11,(1965) pp 147-148, 150, 155; Marisdakis, G.S., "Introduction au Droit International Prive" 
L o c .c i t . ,  p 422; Von Overbeck, A.E.," Renvoi in the Institute o f International Law" L o c .c i t . ,
Finally after confronting arguments of the two camps it must be noted that 
even the anti-renvoiists camp admits certain exceptions to the rejection of
renvoi as a general principle.
B)- E vidence th a t  ju stifies  the uselessness of re n v o i.
1 ) - E v id en ce  th a t  c o n c e rn s  th e  co n seq u en ces  o f th e  fo re ig n
c o u r t th eo ry  a p p lic a tio n .
It has been indicated that the idea of sitting in England and deciding the
case at the same way as it would be decided by foreign court is only a fictitious 
id ea .296 In fact the process of the foreign court theory will be blocked if both the 
lex f o r i  and the lex  cau sae  show their interest of applying it at the same
tim e .297 In other words, the application of its reasoning by both courts means
that both judges will spend the time asking each other mutually.298
In addition to the principal objection that it is based on an imaginary
reasoning the foreign court theory has been considered as exceptional because it 
is not of a general application.299 In fact Martin W olff has observed that 
"...should, however, the English renvoi system become universal it would break 
down entirely and result in an endless circle...for the time being the English 
solution works well."300 Max Pagenstecher too stresses that if American court 
adopted the foreign court theory the result would be that "...U niform ity of
decision that exists at present between England and the United States would be
d e s t ro y e d ." 301 To be pragmatic no decision will be made or reached.302 It 
means that, practically, uniformity could not be achieved if the so called total 
reference principle is adopted by the two involved countries or applied by all
p544; Sperduti, G.Loc.cit.,  p 233; Westlake, J., Op.cit., p 34.
296- See Wolff, M., Op.cit .,p 200; Isaad, M., Volume I, Op.cit., p 168.
297- See Wolff, M.,Ibid., p 201.
298- Loussouarn, Y. et Bourel, P., Op.cit., p 290
399- This theory is only o f a unilateral application which cannot be generalizaed and 
applied outside England. Loussouarn, Y., L oc .c i t . ,  p 282; Sperduti, G., L o c .c i t . ,  p 214; See also 
Derrupp6, J., Loc.cit .,  p 6.
300- Wolff, M., Op.cit., pp 201-202.
3 0 1 -  Pagenstecher, M., Loc.cit . ,  p 394.
302- Ibid., p 387.
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States. 303
On the whole the anti-renvoiists reject totally the idea of im itating the 
foreign court.304 In their view this idea is wrong on the basis that the forum 
judge, in his judgment is only bound by its own legislature and not by the
foreign one.30  ^ This has led to the opinion that the foreign court theory leads to 
the fact that there is a substitution of the foreign for the forum conflict rules.3
The main critical point which is worth emphasizing through the anti-
renvoiists’ arguments, therefore, reads as follows. What is the usefulness of this 
theory which can work unless it is adopted by one and only one side? 307
2)- E v id en ce  a g a in s t th e  p a r t ia l  ren v o i use. A ccording to the 
opponents camp the uselessness of the perfect renvoi can be seen in its two
forms, remission and transmission.
a)- In the former if both countries X and Y apply renvoi at first degree,
there will be no harmony of solution. In fact, if X is seized of the matter it will 
apply its own internal law by a renvoi from y conflict rules. If it is Y that is seized 
of the matter it will apply its own internal law by a renvoi from X conflict rules.
If, however, both countries refuse renvoi it has been confirmed that X will 
apply Y internal law whereas Y will apply X internal law. Following such fact it 
has been said that there will be a harmony of solutions only without renvoi. 303 
Moreover, there are who believe that renvoi remission does not lead to the 
achievement of international harmony but it satisfies mainly the interest of the 
fo rum .309
3 0 3 -  Ibid., p 385.
304- According to them this form of renvoi is absurd because its mechanism obliges the 
forum judge to imitate totally the foreign legal solution from the supposed foreign court. 
Francescakis, P.h., Op.cit., pp 106-107.
305- See Sadekh, H.A., Op.cit., p 69.
306- Cheshire & North, 11th edition, Op.cit.,  p 63.
3 0 7 -  This theory is said to be useless on the ground that a theory that is applicable only 
from one side is inacceptable and its value will be lost when two countries adopt it at the same 
time. See Falconbridge, J.D., L o c .c i t . ,  p 717; Soulaiman, A.A ., O p .c i t . ,  p 55. Despite such 
unilateral conception and its double reasoning there are who consider goes to consider this 
imperfect renvoi as a sophisticated version o f the renvoi theory Philip, A., Loc.cit., p. 48.
308- Loussouarn, Y. et Bourel, P., Op.cit., PP 265-266.
3 0 9 -  This is the view o f M. Vekas, For that see Von. Overbeck, A.E., " Les Questions
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b )- The latter form can also lead to an impasse. This might happen when 
the conflict rule of the third law Z designed through the process of transmission 
refuses such competence and would rather refer the matter back to the country 
Y which is the country that has already been chosen by the conflict rule of forum 
X. Accordingly, it has been stressed that renvoi at second degree leads to a
• • 3  1 Qvicious circle and the p ing  pong  game could not be broken or ended. From 
another point of view renvoi at the second degree will not work if it is adopted 
by all systems.311 In a nutshell these hostile arguments try to justify that renvoi 
at the second degree is, then, jammed. 312 ( see diagram J)
D iagram J
\ /
Court X applies to A a national 
of the country Y the law of his 
nationality. p >
The conflict rules of the country 
Y refers the matter to Z as the 
country of his domicile.
\
Z conflict rules refer the matter 
to the law of his nationality, i.e., 
the law of the country Y.
Generates du Droit International Privd, A la Lumikre des Codifications et Projets Recents. Cours 
GSndral de Droit International Prive", L o c . c i t ., p 136. Concerning the apllication o f  the l e x
f o r i  Emile Potu , however, claims that if we accept that the native law is the best and the only 
just law why don' t we return to the principle o f the territoriality o f law. According to him if 
French law is the best for French this is not the case for other individuals who are different 
by their civilisations and traditions. Potu, E., Op.cit ., p 226.
3 1 0 -  This vicious circle is said to occur when we are in presence o f the so called le
"renvoi toupie", i.e ., in the situation where the renvoi mechanism refers back to a country 
that had already refused the competence or to the law that was consulted the first. See Batiffol,
H., Loc.cit., p 479; Derrupp6, J. et Agostini, E., Loc.cit., p 10 ; Isaad, M., Volume I, Op.cit., p 169.
311- Lalive, P.JLoc.cit., p 270.
312- Loussouarn, Y. et Bourel, P., Op.cit., p 266.
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S u b - s e c t i o n 2: S a rcasm  as a te c h n iq u e  in tre a tin g  the renvoi 
problem.
I)- J u s t i f i c a t io n s  o f s c h o la r s ' a rg u m e n ts  th ro u g h  s a r c a s m . 
Generally, renvoi has been seen through different ways and sides and labelled 
by different nicknames. Of course the imagination of scholars differ on this issue 
in that each scholar has got its own imagination on the process of renvoi. As a 
matter of fact, there are who compare it to a " logical 'cabinet of mirrors' 
(sp iege lkab ine tt)"  such as K ahn313 and to the game of a "Lawn tennis 
International" by Buzzati 314 and to / ' animal qui mange ses pat tes  Catoblepas 
by Bartin315 and Marry-go-round by Ehrwin N. Griswold.316
Besides, the tendency of accepting or rejecting the theory of renvoi has 
been interpreted as follows: Renvoi represents a game that you can either play 
or refuse to play.317
In order to differentiate between the mechanism of total renvoi and that of 
partial renvoi the imagination of some scholars led them to set up a certain rules 
for the renvoi game. According to them the regulations will be as follow ...I 
will play if you agree not to play in may way...I shall put the ball into my pocket 
and go."318
With regard to the circulus inextricabilis, Martin W olff has explained this 
endless reference by an amusing example. In this context, he points out that: "In 
an old German comedy, Die deutschen Kleins tadterby  Katzbue, some over polite
313- Griswold, E.N., L oc .c it . ,  P 1167, Notes 8; Originally emphasised; Derruppe, J., L oc .c i t . ,
P 6; Sperduti, G., Loc.cit., p 238; Francescakis, P.h.,Op.cit.,  p 96.
314- Buzzati, G.C Renvoi en Droit International P r iv i  , Milan, 1898, P 77; Derruppe, J., 
Ib id . ,  Sperduti, G., Ib id . ,  Originally emphasised; Francescakis, P.h., Ib id . ,  Isaad , M., Volume I„ 
Op.cit., p 169.
315- Sperduti, G.,Ibid.
316- Griswold, E.N .Loc.cit.,  p 1167, notes 8.
317- Egnal, J. D., "The ' Essential' Role of Modern Renvoi in the Governmental Interest
Analysis Approach to Choice o f Law", S^Temp. L. Q„ (1981), p 246.
3 1 8 -  The first rule refers to the total renvoi whereas the latter is an indication to the 
partial renvoi. As quoted from, Baxter, Ian, F.G., O p .c i t . ,  p 55; See also Munro, C.R., L o c .c i t . ,  
p p 70 -7 1 .
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provincials stand before an open door bowing and inviting each other to take 
precedence until the curtain falls, and when the curtain rises for the next act
they are still standing in the same place."319 Is there any solution for this 
amusing show? Effectively an answer has been proposed in which "...Alphonse 
and Gaston would never get through the door unless we could find some other
way to help them o u t."320 According to Bruce W elling and Richard Hoffman 
"...The usual technique is to injecte an irrational wild card into the process in the 
hope that it will confuse every one...There is no better, no more irrational wild 
card than ' la danse macabre d'Alphonse et Gaston'...".321
Additionally, renvoi is said to represent a flagpole of private international 
law. An example has been proposed to illustrate this symbol which says that if 
you really want to to help an ignorant student in an exams just ask him a
simple and a brief question. What is renvoi?322 Another im portant and well 
chosen metaphor, in this context, is that given by Colin R. Munro that considers 
renvoi as "...the bete noire of conflict of laws".323 Besides M. Malaurie refers to 
the moments spent in the faculty of law claiming that when he left this faculty 
he had forgotten everything except the renvoi image. 324
Furtherm ore, to show the importance and the difficulty of the mechanism 
of renvoi another view relates it to the jurists themselves from a psychological 
standpoint. This view, in fact, maintains that renvoi can excite and provoke even 
the mind of the quiet scholars. 325 It means that the mechanism of renvoi leads
not only to a physical game , such as, the p ing  p o n g  game or the international
lawn tennis but also to a kind of "mental Gymnastics" as Colin Munro calls it 326
319- See Wolff, M Op.cit., p 203.; Munro, C.R., Ibid., p 76
320- See Griswold, E.N., Loc.cit., p 1169 .
321-W elling, B. and Hoffman, R.," 'The Law o fin  Choice o f Law Rules: 'Renvoi' Comme 
Nostalgie de la Boue" 23 University o f  Western Ontario Law Review, (1985), p 80. Originally 
em p h a s ised .
3 2 2 -  Von Overbeck, A.E.," Les Questions G6n6rales du Droit International Privd, A la
Lumibre des Codifications et Projets Rccents. Cours General de Droit International Privd",
Loc.cit., p 127.
323- Munro, C.R .JLoc.cit., p 65.
324- Foyer, J., Loc.cit., p 128.
325- Mcijers E.M., Loc.cit., p 207.
326- Munro, C.R., Loc.cit.,  p 70; Sec Bate, J.P., Op.cit .,  p 54;. Maridakis, G.S.," Le Renvoi en
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Concerning the condemnation of renvoi and the restrictions made upon its
field another fascinating metaphor has been given by the French scholar Jacques
Foyer.who claims a sorte of requiem for renvoi in response to Derruppe who
takes a positive position by calling for a plea for renvoi.327 It must be borne in
mind that the funeral term used by Jacque Foyer is not chosen by chance.328 
According to his view, we cannot innovate or create a new idea to the classical 
arguments given by the two different camps. He believes, however, that to open 
the renvoi trial there must be a new argument for that. He goes on to support 
that it is the illness 329 of the renvoi which represents a new phenomenon. 330 
To prove his claim Jacques Foyer considers renvoi not as a normal illness but as 
a pernicious one and, then, suggested for that a diagnostic followed by a forecast 
331 In other words he suggests that before any prediction of the future, of the 
renvoi illness its symptoms have to be analysed.332 After such Diagnostic one 
has the right to ask the "Doctor" Jaques Foyer to identify the illness that renvoi is 
suffering from. In fact, this scholar reaches a conclusion that renvoi until 1980 
suffers from an anemia and paralysis which has extended and stretched to its 
whole body. 333 Additionally among the best metaphor which must be cited to 
indicate the negative position of scholars is that of Cheshire who wishes that Mr 
F o r g o  was never bom or came to life. Unfortunately as the birth of Mr Forgo 
did occur, Cheshire wishes that at least his personality should be buried for 
ever.334
Droit International Prive" Volume 49, Loc.cit . ,  p 274.
327- Jacques Foyer considers that a plea for renvoi presumes an accused that committed 
an offence which in his view is an exageration. See Foyer, J., L oc .c i t . ,  pp 105-106.
328- Jacques Foyer have found a title to his speech which reminds the reader 
undoubtedly to a deceased person. See Foyer, J., Ibid., p 105.
329-M r Baxter too is "...concerned with the raison d'etre o f the renvoi, which is a 
symptom o f an underlying disease. Baxter, Ian G.,O p.cit . ,  p 50.
330- Foyer, J.JLoc.cit., P 106.
331- Foyer, J., Ibid., p 107; See also 70 Re.crit .dr .intl .priv  (1981), notes P. Bellet. p 210.
332- Foyer, I.,Ibid.
333- Legally this means that the field o f renvoi application is restricted from two sides, 
internal conflict rules and International Conventions. Jacques Foyer, Ib id . ,  pp 107-114; My 
emphasise. See Infra., Chapter3, pp 166-183, 193-200.
334- Maridakis, G.S., "Le Renvoi en Droit International Privd", Volume 49, Loc.cit . ,  p 289.
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After such reflection on the penetration of the sarcasm technique in private 
international law and by taking into consideration, as well, the positive and 
negative aspects of renvoi the writer would like to add, despite what has already 
been said, that renvoi is a trip which is also subjects to the notion of the single or 
return ticket. It leads, effectively, to visit at least three main places, the stadium 
before taking off and either the slaughterhouse or the hairdresser after the
landing. 335
II)- I ts  d im ensions and con seq u en ces . If the previous analysis have 
tried to show some of the difficulties that erupted from the renvoi mechanism
the writer, however, believes that this academic way of analyzing is not enough 
to interpret and discuss the mechanism of renvoi. It requires, therefore, other 
technique which can make its mechanism much more clear to the reader, 
commentator and students. In other words, scholars feel that the normal and 
classical analysis of treating other legal issues is not sufficient for the discussion 
of renvoi mechanism. To cope with the insufficiency of such classical method 
and to overcome it they have, therefore, relied on sarcasm as a new and 
relevant technique. In a nutshell, sarcasm can be considered as a kind of 
compensation that shows the failure of doctrine, legal systems and jurisprudence 
to find a united solution to deal with this important phenomenon.
Moreover, if the renvoi opponents consider its mechanism as a p ing -  p on g  
game, in which each player refers the ball to the other side, the reason for this 
comparison is to show that such references and contra references may take long 
and leads to a v icious  c i r c l e . Furthermore, using metaphors, such as, the
mirror cabinet can also justify the consequences of the renvoi process which is
the c ircul is  inextr icabi l i s  and shows the strong refutation of renvoi by the anti- 
ren v o iis ts .337 In fact, if in the foreign court theory the English judge will bow to 
the foreign one and vice versa one thing is possible which is that its mechanism
335- The first place is an example of the controversial arguments o f both camps on the 
mechanism of renvoi. The second place means the refutation o f renvoi by the anti -renvoiists. 
The last place is an example o f the acceptance o f renvoi but subject to exceptions.
336- See for instance, Sadekh, H .A Op.cit.,  p 67.
3 3 7 -  Rabel, E., Op.cit., p 80.
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leads to an "endless oscil lation ." 338
It should also be noted that the question of whether sarcasm is a positive
or a negative technique is not important. What is worth underlying, however, is
to what extent can scholars, students and lawyers benefit from such technique.
To this it could be replied that whatever is the answer, positive or negative, the
fact of the matter is that renvoi can be understood with and without sarcasm
but cannot be analyzed without it.
What does appear relatively clear from using the sarcasm technique is that 
renvoi is not only a difficult issue but also a peculiar and an important issue. It 
is suggested, in this context, that sacarsm is used as a mystifiying device in a 
mysterious and formidable area.
Above all the writer' s answer would be in favor of the application of the 
sarcasm as a technique. Effectively, it is reasonable that you may understand an 
overseas film provided you either know or speak its language. You might not,
however, fully comprehend the same movie for the first time if there is neither
a sub-title nor you comprehend the language of the movie.
S u b -sec tio n  3 :- To w hat ex ten t those arg u m en ts  a re  tru e .
As shown above each camp gives its own arguments and tries to refute
those given by their opponents. The discussion in this context, however, tries to 
find out not only whether those justifications are true or wrong arguments but 
more important to decide whether they are really acceptable and convincing. 
Accordingly, this reflection will show up the real purposes behind the use of the 
theory of renvoi and clarify whether it is used as a ruse or as a necessity and 
also indicate whether renvoi must be applied as a general principle or only as an 
exception.
1 )-It is true that if the conflict rules and the internal rules are considered
as indivisible the problem of renvoi automatically arises.339 It is also true that
renvoi means the application of foreign law in its totality and not merely its
338- Wolff, M , Op.cit., p 201.
3 3 9 -S e e  Meijers.E.M., Loc.cit., p 210.
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internal rules. This claim, has been clarified by opposing the two methods 
S a c h n o r m e n v e r w e i s u n g  and G e s a m t v e r w e i s u n g  which clearly correspond 
with the arguments given by both the pro and anti-renvoiists. In fact, the 
method of S a c h n o r w e n v e r w e i s u n g  can be matched to the arguments given by 
the renvoi opponents whereas the pro-renvoiists favour the application of the so 
called G e s m a t e r w e i s u n g , which means the possibility of renvoi.
2)- Scholars differ widely on the basis of the application of the theory of 
renvoi by supporting different conceptions that maintain its result. What is true 
is that whenever the judge applies the theory of renvoi he will have the 
opportunity to apply its own law which might be inapplicable if he refutes the 
renvoi theory.340
3)- The reality is that renvoi have received a criticism from all over the 
world as a useless theory, and practically, a dangerous m echanism .341 I ts  
principle is said to be unable to ensure a modern and rational conception of 
private international law. 342
4)- To those who think that renvoi achieve international harmony of 
solution it can be replied that if the mechanism of renvoi really can achieve this 
principle why it has not been adopted by all legal systems. It can be maintained, 
therefore, that the repudiation of renvoi by the anti-renvoiists ' movement 
means one thing that it is wrong to say that only renvoi can achieve this
p r in c ip le .343 In other words, uniformity argument should not overshadow the 
scholars justifications because they are not the only reasons344 for applying the 
renvoi mechanism .
Concerning the view which say that renvoi may achieve international 
harmony of solutions so long as it is not applied by all countries it can be replied 
to such argument that this reasoning is not different from that of the unilateralist
340- Ibid., p 219.
3 4 1 -  Potu, E., Op.cit., p 267.
342- Sperduti, G., Loc.cit., p 236.
343- According to Lalive it is not only renvoi which should be taken into account but it
must be considered as one among other means which could achieve in the international
scale a suitable solution. Lalive, P .£,oc.cit., p 277.
344- Anton, A.E., Op.cit., p 58.
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application of the foreign court theory. In fact, although the two may lead to 
different consequences they, however, start from the same basis which is the 
argument of if and only if. It should be noted, therefore, that it is still doubtful 
how the international harmony principle can be achieved only if renvoi is
applied by a few countries and will not be achieved if it is excluded by all
co u n trie s?
Additionally, it seems that harmony of decisions and unity of solutions,
practically, may loose much of its force when a reader realizes that although
such unity or uniformity might be achieved by the so called renvoi Convention 
this, however, has not been yet ratified.345 Do these scholars, however, realize 
that this uniformity has been considered as an ideal346 of private international 
law and even the work of international Conventions is still going on to reach this 
purpose. This of course remind the reader of the legal harmony advocated by 
Savigny. Is it really achievable? In this context, H. Lewald's point of view is that 
although the conflict rules divergence might be eliminated the realization of the 
legal harmony might not be achieved in all legal relations. Concerning the 
possibilities of a general and a complete uniformity of law Haroldo Valladao 
argues that "...Universal uniformity of the positive law is an utopia."347 This 
scholar, then, goes on to consider that " the legislative uniform ity, when 
completely realized entails the disappearance of Private International Law." 348
Overall, whether renvoi can really achieve unity of solution will be 
illustrated by a hypothetical case in which three countries are involved. ( See 
diagram K)
345- See Convention de la Haye Pour Regler les Conflits entre la Loi Nationale et la Loi du 
Domicile, Conclue en 15 Juin 1955; For further informations see Infra.,  Chapter 3. Section 2, 
Sub-section 2, p 192.
346- See in this context Philip, A., Loc.cit . ,  p 33
347- Valladko, H., "Private International Law, Uniform Law and Comparative Law", in 
XXth Century Comparative and Conflicts Law, Legal Essays in Honor o f  Hessel E.Yntema, by 
Nadelmann K.H et al, (ed.,), Leyden, A.W. Sythoff (1961), p 99.
348- Ibid., p 102
Diagram 00
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Taking into consideration 
that all three countries 
accept renvoi.
*
Supposing that X is a national of the 
country A which applies to his 
succession the lex situs
___________ Vj</______________
X is domiciled in the country B which 
adopts the principle of nationality to 
his succession
He left movables in country C which 
adopts domicile as a creterion to 
govern successions
i)- If the country C is seized of the matter it will apply its internal law after 
a transmission from A
ii)-If the country B is seized, however, it will apply its internal law after a 
transmission from the country C.
iii)- Lastly, if the legal issue arises before the country A this will apply its 
internal law after a transmission from the country B
It follows from this hypothesis that the three involved countries A, B and C
will distribute the succession of X according to their own internal law. So where
is the unity of solutions?
5 ) -Theoretically, renvoi at first, second, third and fourth degree might
arise. Practically, however, this series of ping  pong  will be over soon and will
not extend to a renvoi at a third or a fourth degree because the most common
3 49and adopted connecting factors are chiefly nationality and domicile. In fact,
the com parative study has proved that positive law and jurisprudence in
different legal systems have adopted either renvoi of first degree or stopped to a
3 5 0renvoi at second degree.
349- Isaad, M., Volume I,Op.cit., p 167
350- Sadekh, H.A., Op.cit., p 71.
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6)- The c ircu lus  inextr icabi l is  argument also loses much of its value as far 
as no case has proved that the foreign court theory was applied by both
countries. It can, therefore, be m aintained that this argument is legally 
exaggerating on the basis that practically this situation has not occured.351
It seems that the English theory based on the hypothesis of if the court X
yes and the court Y no, although it is theoretically supported, is neither logical
nor rational. Will these judges and scholars understand that it is possible to take 
Z place and follow his policy and tendency but it does not mean you are really Z
himself. This fact shows that the fictions of pretending all possible reactions and
belief of Z may get you access to everything except the control and the
possession of Z mind. If this argument is not true could those who refute it 
prove that other legal systems are totally wrong because of not accepting this 
unilateral conception. Could those scholars, as well, justify why the foreign court 
theory has been considered as a part of the English legal system and not part of 
American legal system and other Common law countries. Accordingly, the 
writer would like to share the view of those who says that this theory "...is by no 
means a universal key to the renvoi problem ..."352
7 )-  The question that should also be asked is whether there are any
justifications for not contributing into the discussion and the writing on renvoi
issue? An answer has been given by 0  .Kahn- Freund's who claims that " ...It is
difficult to believe that anyone could produce any argument which has not
353already been advanced." Besides, from Pierre Lalive' s standpoint it is much 
better for the jurist' s reflex to keep quiet on hackneyed and well known subject 
such as renvoi rather than to add further comments.354 The present w riter, 
therefore, might agree with Pierre Lalive' s observation if it means only a certain 
lull or a pause for a jurist. There will be a disagreement, however, if the
meaning is to abandon or give up any comments on renvoi controversies. In 
fact, if the former is normal and could be acceptable the latter, however, is
351- Dicey & Morris, 1987, Op.cit., p 88.
352- Anton, A.E., Op.cit., P 66.
353- Kahn-Freund, 0 .,  Loc.cit.,  p 431.
354- Lalive, P., Loc.cit., pp 266-267
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neither recommended nor logical because it stands against the development of
private international law itself and also because the rig id ity  of private 
international law should not be supported.
8)- From the point of view of analyzing the nature of renvoi it is of great 
importance to confirm whether renvoi represents an over complex or merely a 
difficult issue. Concerning the complexity of renvoi, there are, in fact, who thinks 
that "...G enerations of students have been conditioned against its study by
forew arning of com plexity"355 Others believe that the so called p i n g  p o n g  
doctrine is "...somewhat complicated theory..."356 Furthermore, M Malaurie, does 
not like renvoi because of its complexity and its unpredictable consequences.357
It seems that it is the view which support the difficulty of renvoi358 that is 
acceptable and not that which maintains its complexity. In fact, the former 
aspect is the accurate answer for different reasons.
First, the analysis of renvoi differs from judges, scholars and students due 
to the fact that each side looks to the problem from different sides. Effectively, if 
one considers only the point of view of one side renvoi analysis becomes 
incomplete. This, therefore, may lead to the assumption that renvoi represents a
complex issue which practically is not the case.
Second, renvoi difficulty which is due to internal and external elements can 
be resolved and comprehended. Adm itting its undue com plexity, however, 
means that this is a characteristic which have been established since its 
discovery. That also is not true.
Third, renvoi can not be considered. as a complex issue despite the huge 
contribution of scholars into its difficulty by their different justifications and 
a p p ro a c h e s .359 Those who think differently, i.e., they support the complexity 
argument, should remember that if the complexity of private international law 
is one among other characteristics to this fie ld ,360 this is because it is a
355- See Munro, C.R., Loc.cit.,  p 65.
366- See this view in Wolff, M., Op.cit., p 195.
357- Foyer, J., Loc.cit., p 128.
358- See Wolff, M., Op.cit., p 198.
359- See Lalive, P., Loc.cit., pp 77-79.
360- For more details see Cheatham, E.E., Loc.cit . ,  pp 240, 308, 347; Loussouarn, Y .JLoc.cit.,
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complexity by nature.361 In fact, if in their views renvoi has such characteristic 
all issues, fields and theories in private international law, therefore, should be 
considered as complex without any exceptions!
Fourth, it has been admitted that private international law as other fields 
includes a part of the so called game mind by which lawyers also want and like 
to play. It follows that the comparison of renvoi with various games has not 
been done by chance or mistake362 but there are reasons for that. Among them 
is the fact that renvoi is a flexible issue and can easily be understood by making 
its mechanism less difficult to the lawyer and student through the sarcasm 
tech n iq u e .
9)- The question what arguments are true, the pro or anti-renvoiists is 
irrelevant if other important elements related to renvoi are ignored. In this case 
it must be remembered that lawyers, legislators, judges should not care only 
about the usefulness of renvoi merely because it achieves those desirable 
private international law principles. The important question is whether the 
substantive law which will be applicable at the end of the renvoi process is 
really effective363 and does not abuse the right and expectation of the involved 
parties.
10)- Through the theoretical discussion of renvoi in the Institu t of 
International Law and with' regard to both favourable and unfavorable positions 
of scholars’ observations on Georges S. Maridakis' s report, it can be said that 
three tendencies have emerged.364
First, the absolute rejection of renvoi.365
p 275.
361- Lalive, P .J^oc.cit., p 77.
362- Ibid.
363- In this context see especially the view of Mr Sperduti, G., L oc.cit . ,  p 237
364- See Derruppd, J., Loc.cit., p 22.
365- This is the view o f both Professors Ago and Cheshire despite the latter was in favour 
o f making an exception concerning the possibilities o f referring to private international 
rules o f the situs o f movables and immovables. See Von Overbeck, A.E., " Renvoi in the 
Institute o f International Law", L o c .c i t . ,  p 546; See Maridakis, G.S., " Le Renvoi en Droit 
International Priv6" Volume, 49, Loc.cit . ,  pp 286, 289.
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Second, the rejection of renvoi as a general principle but admitting certain
exceptions.366
Third, the acceptance of renvoi as a general principle but certain exceptions
should be made.367
11)- Through renvoi controversies it can be seen that there is no general 
consensus on the accuracy of either a general repudiation or acceptance of its
mechanism. It means the question of whether renvoi should be accepted as a
general p rincip le or only as an exception has received d ifferen t and 
contradictory answers. This is, in fact , the view approved by certain scholars 
such as J D. Falconbridge who draws the line arguing that " In my view the 
doctrine should be neither rejected nor accepted in toto."368 Moreover, P. Lalive 
m aintains that there should be no general principle which either rejects or 
adopts renvoi.369 Jacques Foyer, however, believes that renvoi is not a general 
principle but can be considered as an exception.370 In view of others the internal 
law theory can be useful if it is adopted in special situations but not as a general 
p rincip le .371
12)- If the divergence between the two camps is much wider, practically, 
it has led to the application of the whole foreign law in some areas and the 
internal law only in other specific areas.372 As a matter of fact if J. Derruppe, 
through his speech in 1966, affirms the safety of renvoi, Jacques Foyer, however,
366- Professor Makarov's view  concerning those exceptions was supported by Professor 
Wengler. See Von Overbeck, A.E., Ibid.,  See also Maridakis, G.S.,Ibid., pp 279-280, 283, 312; 
Makarov, A .., " Le Renvoi en Droit International Prive" A n n u a i r e ,  V ingt T roisiem e  
Commission, Session de Varsovie, Volume 51, Tome I, (1965), pp 344-345.
367- Professor Batiffol is said to be sharing this opinion in which he considers that 
renvoi should not be excluded mainly because of its illogicality, Von Overbeck, A .E.,Ib id . ,  See 
Maridakis, G.S., " Le Renvoi en Droit International Prive" Volume 49, L o c .c i t . ,  pp 282, 305- 
307; See also Makarov, A., Ibid., p 343.
368- Falconbridge, J.D., Loc.cit.,  p 708.
369- Lalive, P., Loc.cit., p 275.
370- Foyer, J., Loc.cit., P 130.
371- This is the view o f Anton who maintains that although the internal law theory is 
simple "...it is not a solution to the problem of renvoi in more than a few cases." Anton, A.E., 
Op.cit., pp 61-62.
372- See Munro, C.R., Loc.cit., p 80.
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claims that from that period the field of renvoi application has decreased and
that this can be seen from the cases.373
1 3 )-If Emile Potu1 s Survey in 1913 shows that 54 authors were in favor 
of renvoi whereas 134 were against it374 his survey indicates that this huge 
numbers in both camps does not prove that their arguments and suggestions 
are true one hundred percent. As an illustration of this Elliot E. Cheatham's
remark is im portant and clear enough to prove that these different answers 
" ...range from unwise, absurd, logically impossible, to appropriate, obvious, 
n e c e s s a ry ." 375 Ernst Rabel too has stressed that "In the course of the debate, 
many wrong arguments, ' logical' and ' practical ', were advanced on either 
s id e ."376 If this claim is supported because many elements have contributed to 
such contradictory arguments among them is the use of renvoi as a ruse.
14)- The question whether sarcasm can be justified as a technique in 
interpreting renvoi should be related to another im portant characteristic of 
private international law which is the language used in that field. One might 
think that the question whether sarcasm can be unsuitable for discussing renvoi 
is the same as whether scholars can discuss and analyse private international 
law problems without using technical terms and expressions, such as, seat,
renvoi and qualification .377 It is, therefore, neither funny nor impossible to 
advocate the sarcasm technique in interpreting renvoi for a simple logical reason 
that the discipline of private international law, as A. Philip has remarked, 
"...offers a rich opportunity for intellectual exercise".378
In reply to those who seems to forget everything except the image of
renvoi when they left the faculty of law379 the present writer, however, would 
like to stress that he has not forgotten the im portant issues in private
373- Foyer, J., Loc.cit.,  p 107.
374- Potu , E.,Op.cit., p 201.
375- Cheatham, E.E.,Loc.cit., p 335.
376- Rabel, E., Op.cit., p 77.
377- Lalive, P., Loc.cit., p 82.
378- Philip, A., Loc.cit., p 9.
379- See Supra., p 110.
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international law but he does not remember how many times he received 
contradictory answers and unanswered questions about renvoi. The writer
remembers, however, that once upon a time a lot of inks had been used to draw 
in different styles the portrait of a new born star called F o r g o .
1 2 3
R e m a r k s
1 ) - Although Common law and Civil law countries favour dom icile to 
nationality or vice versa both principles, however, have positive and negative 
points. If the latter represents a problem in plurilegislative legal system, the
fo rm e r380 might have different meanings, such as, domicile of origin and that of 
choice and so on.381 The fact is that generally it is easier to know and discover 
the nationality of X than his domicile.382 It should also be borne in mind that 
those countries who adhere to the nationality principle take into account 
domicile as a connecting factor in some legal matters, such as, the question of
stateless and refugees. N ationality too is taken into consideration by the 
countries of domicile.383
2 )-If  the pro-renvoiists relate the validity of a legal act to the mechanism 
of renvoi, practically, in both legislation and International Conventions such 
validity can be achieved without the process of renvoi.384 To say it differently, if
renvoi really maintains such validity why have International Conventions and
positive laws established in this context alternative conflict rules?
3 )-  It is well to bear in mind that though the discussion of the clash
380-A lthough dom icile is considered more difficult to be identified than nationality it 
has, however, an advantage over the latter in that each person must have only one dom icile 
"...at the same time for the same purpose...". Graveson, R.H., Conflict o f  Laws, P riva te  
International Law, Op.cit . ,  p 190.
381- Nationality is said to be clear, simple concept, more stable and has a strong link than 
dom icile. Its stability means that it cannot be changed only by intention and changing a 
person home. Baxter, Ian F.G O p .c i t . ,  pp 58-59; Rabel, E., O p .c i t . ,  p 166; Maridakis, G.S., 
"Introduction au Droit International Vrive",Loc.cit., P 503; Anton, A.E., O p.c i t . ,  p 160; Batiffol, 
H., Loc.cit., p 503
382- North, P.M., The Private International Law o f  Matrimonial Causes in the British  
Isles and the Republic o f  Ireland, O p.cit . ,  p 9
383- Ehrenzwing, A.A.," Specific Principles o f  Private Transnational Law", L o c . c i t . ,  
p355; Batiffol, H., Ib id . ,  .PP 504-505. See, for instance, the English W ill Act o f 1963 which 
refers as well to the law o f nationality. Dicey &Morris, 1987, O p.c i t . ,  rule 140, section 6 (a) and 
(b) .p i011; C f ,  Adoption (Sc.) Act, 1978.
384-See for instance, Convention On The Conflicts of Laws to the Form of Testamentary 
Dispositions o f 5 October 1961. Article 1; See also the English Act o f 1961; For more details see 
Infra., Chapter 3, Sectionl, Sub-section 2, pp 172-174 and Section 2 Sub-section 3, p 196.
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between the two camps is important it must not be forgotten that the analysis 
of exceptions to renvoi are also important. The writer, therfore, thinks that the 
question is not what are the exceptions to renvoi but what will happen when 
these exceptions multiply in the future?
4)- Finally any scholar can be asked this question. Which way do you 
want to follow; to be a pro-renvoiists or an opponent to renvoi? W hatever
might be their answers this, however, should neither be considered as a rule to 
deal with renvoi nor a rule to be followed. In fact, failure to choose one way will 
not render the scholar liable to any kind of fine or imprisonment and also
because it is not a pride to be a pro or anti-renvoiists. More important, 
however, is the failure to give a reasonable justification  of renvoi as a 
phenomenon, theory and process. If the writer will have the opportunity to
answer this question he might choose the method of logic (which rejects any
dogmatic arguments, e. g.,where there will be infringement of the expectation of 
the parties involved, or the use of renvoi as a ruse to cover the failure of scholars' 
a rg u m en ts) .
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CHAPTER THREE
Renvoi Mechanism in Legislation.
Case Law 
and International Conventions,
Section 1: Renvoi m echanism  in leg islation  and case law.
W hile it is interesting to examine the controversy upon renvoi from a 
theoretical point of view, it is equally important to analyse them practically and 
see their repercussion on different legal systems and through the courts' 
decisions. It means that theoretical controversies on renvoi might have no 
practical value if discussed without considering the position of the courts, 
legislations and International conventions concerning its mechanism. In this 
context, it seems worth referring to 0 . Kahn-Freund who emphasises that 
"...W hatever attitude to this problem academic writers may adopt, its solution 
does not depend on the acceptance or rejection of any a prior principle it is 
advisable to approach the problem pragmatically rather than dogm atically."1
S u b -S e c tio n  1: D i s c u s s i o n  of renvoi m echan ism  in to  th e  two 
d iv e rted  legal system s. It is important, therefore to refer to renvoi in both 
countries, i.e.; those which adopts nationality and others which favour domicile 
as a connecting factors. The consideration of those two legal systems is 
necessary because persons who live either in a continental or common law 
c o u n tr ie s 2 will be subject to different law systems and their cases might be 
decided in different ways depending on the court before which the case is 
brought. It could be a country which adheres to nationality or a country which
1- Kahn- Freund, 0 . ,  "General Problems o f Private International Law" Recueil des  
cours,  Vol m , Part 143 (1974), p 436.
2- It was discovered that in 1909 that 500 millions o f men lived in dom icil countries 
whereas 460 millions were governed by the law o f nationality. See in this context, W olff, M., 
Private International L aw , Oxford, the Clarendon Press, 1950, p 105.
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adopts domicil.
I)- SHIM of t M  c o u n tr ie s  w h ich  a re  in fa v o u r of ren v o i
m e c h a n ism  The discussion in this context is based mainly upon two countries; 
France and Great Britain. The former is an example of the admission of renvoi in 
a Civil law country whereas the latter illustrates the admission of renvoi in a 
Common law country. Before this it seems worth referring to the acceptance of 
renvoi in other countries whether they are countries which adopt the principle 
of nationality or domicile. This will support the above arguments that renvoi 
mechanism  has been used for different purposes not only by nationality  
countries but also by domicil countries.
Accordingly, it would be worthwhile to refer to some countries which are 
in favour of renvoi in Europe and outside Europe. In the former these are, for 
in s tan ce , w est G erm any3 , Y u g o s lav ia4 , Spain5 . Outside Europe its 
m echanism  has been adopted in A ustria6 and the United Arab Em irates7 .
3- This country has been considered as the first one to have issued legislation on 
renvoi mechanism. See in this context the introductory law of the German civ il code o f 1896 
that came into force in 1900. Renvoi remission and transmission is said to be maintained by 
the West German project of E G B G B in article 27. See also Article 4 in the law of 25 july 1986 
supporting reform o f the German private international law. 76 Re. crit dr. inti, priv.,  (1987), 
p l71 ; See for instance, Von Overbeck, A.E., "Les Questions Gendrales du Droit International
Priv6 A la Lumiere des Codifications et Projets Recents, Cours General du Droit International
V n v 6 ' \R e c u e i l  des cours, Vol III, Tome 176,(1982), pp 135.,137; T.M .C.Asser Institutut, L e s  
Legislations de Droit International Prive, Oslo, Universitetsforlaget, (1971), p 76; De Nova, R., 
"Historical and Comparative Introduction to conflict o f Laws", Recueil des cours Vol II, Tome 
118, (1966) pp 511-516; Francescakis, P.h., La Thiorie du Renvoi et les Conflits de Systems en 
Droit International P r iv i ,  Paris, Sirey, 1958, p 265.
4- Yugoslavia is a State which admits not only remission but also transmission in its 
article 6. See Aranguren, G.P., "General Course o f Private International, Law : Selected  
Problem s",Recueil des cours,Vol I I I , Tome 210 , (1988) p 82.
5- Spain is among the country o f nationality which accept renvoi in Its article 12, 
Para. 2 of the Spanish civil code. See Aranguren, G.P., Ibid.,  P 81, Von Overbeck, A.E., L o c .c i t . ,  
p 154. notes 574; loussouarn, Y et Bourel, P., D roit international P r iv ix 2eme edition, Paris, 
Dalloz, 1980, p 274: Siehr, K. G., " Domestic Relations in Europe: European Equivalents to 
American Evolutions" 30 Amer. J. Comp. L., (1982), p 65.
6- Renvoi in its two forms remission and transmission is said to be accepted by  
Austrian law. See § 5 (1) and (2) of the federal statute o f 15 june 1978 on private international
law. See in this context, Palmer, E., "The Austrian Codification o f Conflicts of Law", 28 Amer. J.
Comp. L„  (1980) pp 209-210, 222.
7-In Article 26. Para. 2. See in this context, Aranguren, G.P., Loc.cit . ,  p 81.
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Renvoi is said to be adopted also in most Latin American countries8 and has 
also been used in Canada9.
A)- F ra n c e  as an exam ple  of legal system  w hich  a d h e re s  to 
n a t io n a l i ty  France has been taken as an example of a Civil law country which 
admits renvoi mechanism. This is one reason for this analysis. The second one is 
that it represents the country which dealt with the controversy of L ' A f f a i r e
F o r g o  which many scholars believe represents the origin of the theory of 
ren v o i.10
The discussion of the admission of renvoi in this issue will be based only on 
the field of the application of renvoi by the French case law and legislation.
Some of the scope of this theory in this country will be, however, discussed later
se p a ra te ly .11
l ) - D evelopm ent of renvoi in F rench  case law . Renvoi application 
in French jurisprudence is not absolute. In fact, following the development of
French decisions it can be said that besides the many cases which have admitted
renvoi there are other cases which reject it. As a matter of fact Emile Potu's
view is that from 1878 to 1913 seven decisions were in favour of renvoi and
only five of them were against i t12 Besides, the statistic given by Maury and
Derruppe indicate that the French courts used renvoi in 30 cases, among 31 
c a s e s .13 This led to confirm that the majority of decisions have pronounced in 
favour .of renvoi with some restrictions whereas the minority are in favour of 
the rejection of renvoi in all cases.14.
8- Ibid., p 82.
9- It has been applied, for instance to matters o f formal validity o f  a will, legitim acy, 
recognition o f foreign divorce decree and capacity to marry. See Edinger, E., "Renvoi in 
Canada-Form and Availability" , 14 Manitoba Law Journal, (1984), p 45.
10- See Supra., Chapter 1, Section 2, Sub-section 1, pp 39-41.
11- S e t  Infra., Section 1, Sub-section 2, pp 176-177, 183.
12- Potu, E., La Question du Renvoi en Droit International Privi. Paris, Juris Classeurs, 
1913, p 65.
13-See Foyer, J., "Requiem Pour le Renvoi?" Stance du 4 Juin 1980, Trav. Corniti,  
Frangais. dr.in.privi. ,  (1979- 1980), pp 106, 129.
14- Potu, E., Op cit., pp 65-66, 75-76.
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2)- The use of d iffe ren t approaches of renvoi in F ra n c e . First of
all the French legislation has been considered as admitting renvoi in its two 
forms. From historical point of view, article 2284 of the French civil code of 1804 
states that the foreign conflict rules are taken into account whenever they lead 
to the application of either French internal law or the internal law of another 
state which accepts this reference.15 Later on, the French project of 1967 
admits renvoi remission and also admits the application of renvoi to a law that 
accepts ju r isd ic tio n .16 This has led, therefore, to maintain that renvoi at first 
degree is accepted as a principle by French law.17
Secondly, by referring to the French case law it has been indicated that 
renvoi at first degree was applied by the French court in the case of F o r g o t  In  
which the French conflict rule referred to the Bavarian law as the law of domicile 
which in its turn referred back to French law as the the law of the domicile of 
fa c t .19 The justification of the use of renvoi at first degree can also be noticed in 
the decision of Soulier.20 Renvoi transmission had also been used by Paris court 
in 1967 in the Affaire Banque  O ttom ane21 and in the case of P a l i n o ,22
On the whole the application of renvoi remission and transmission has been 
confirmed whereas the double renvoi theory is ignored by French law.23
15-See T.M.C. Asser Institut, Op.cit., p 60; Von Overbec, A.E.," Loc.cit., p 135.
16- See article 2281, a l.l. See Von Overbeck, A.E., Ibid., p 138.
17- Mayer, P., D r o i t  In te rn a t io n a l  P r i v i ,  D eu x i'em e Edition, Paris, E ditions  
Monchrestien, 1983 , p 203.
1 8 -D. P. 1879,1 .56; S. 1878,1 .429.
19- Mayer, P., Op cit., pp 191-192.; For more details see. Cowan, T.A.," Renvoi Does not 
Involve a Logical Fallacy", 87t/. Pa. L. Rev.., (1938- 1939) p 38.
20- See the cour de cassation  in which the application o f French law has been 
advocated. Cass. req. Mars 1910, D. P. 1912, I. 262, S. 1913. I. 105, C lunet ,  1910. 888.; See, for 
instance, Mayer, P., Op cit., p 199; See Supra.,  Chapter 2, Sectionl, Sub-section 2 p 76.
21- Paris, 19 Mars 1965, C lu n e tx (1966). 118, note Goldman, 56 Re. crit. dr. inti, p riv .,
(1967). 85, note P. Lagarde; See loussouarn, Y et Bourel,. P jO p .c i t . ,  pp 271, 294; For more details
See Derruppd, J et Agostini, E., "Le Renvoi Dans la Jurisprudence Frangaise", Fasc. 532-B , 1983,
Juris-Classeur de Droit International, 7, (1987), Paris, Editions Techniques, pp 9-10; See Infra .,  
p 132.
22- Cass.Civ.I, 15 Mai 1963, Re. crit. dr. inti priv.,( 1964), p 532, note Lagarde; 90 C lunet ,  
(1963), p 1016, note Malaurie; J .G .P .  (1963) II. 13 65 note Motulsky. See for instance Mayer, P., 
Op cit., p 193; Loussouarn, Y et Bourel, P., Op.cit.,p 271.
23- Mayer, P., Ibid., p 191.
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21- F ie lds w here  renvoi has been ann lied .
Due to the fact that the field of renvoi mechanism is numerous or vague the 
reference, in this context, however, will be to those different areas but the 
discussion will cover only some of the cases. Generally, renvoi has been applied 
mostly in personal status24
Concerning the field of succession it is obvious and clear that F o r g o '  s case 
is an illustration of renvoi application in the field of movables succession.25 
Later on the Tribunal de la Seine  adm itted renvoi in order to distribute 
m oveable succession of an English intestate who died settled in France. 
According to French judge the succession of H e n ry  O p p e n h e im e r26 should be 
governed by French law on the basis that the law of his nationality, i.e., English 
law, refers to French law as the law of his domicile.27
With regard to immovable succession renvoi mechanism has been used by 
the tribunal d ' instance de L ille ,28 which held that the succession of 
immovables of the French deceased, who died in France, should be governed by 
Spanish law as the law of the lex rei sitae. Spanish conflict rules, however, refer 
the hereditary devolution of such immovables to the law of his nationality, i.e., 
French law. Renvoi from Spanish law to French law, therefore, was accepted.2^
Divorce is another field where the m echanism  of renvoi has been
ap p lie d .30 For instance, in the case of Sieur Patino  c. Dam e P a tino  the French
court held that P a t in o 's  petition on 16 April in which he asked for divorce was
in a d m is s ib le .31 His wife claimed that their national law, i.e., Bolivia, did not
24- Nouveau Repertoire de Droit, M ise A Jour (1980 k 1987), Jurisprudence Generale 
D alloz, Paris, (1987), p 928.
25- Potu, E., Op.cit.,p 71, See Supra., Chapter 1, Section 3 Sub-section 1 pp 39-41.
26- 3. civ., Seine, 4 Ddcembre 1899. C/.,(1900), 368.
27- See Potu, E.,Op.cit., pp 38-39.
28- Consorts Vaudeville 28 Mars 1980.
29-See in this context, Lequette, Y., (case note) 70 Re. crit. dr. inti, p r iv^  (1981), pp 289- 
290, 293.
30- See the decision o f the supreme court in the case o f B ir c h a l l . c .  B i r c h a l l ,  ( ch. Req),
10 Mai 1939, S. 1949. 1. 73, note Niboyct, Clunet, (1940- 1945). p 107.
31- See the tribunal civil de la Seine. 28 Juin 1950. 79 C l u n e t ,  (1952) p 175, n o t e s
Philonenko. M.
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allow such divorce to occur in accordance with the lex locis celebrationis's  point 
of view, i.e., Madrid.32 This is the way by which the use of partial renvoi led to 
he refusal of the divorce. By referring to Bolivian law, which should decide the 
questions of the status of Bolivian citizens, the French court found that according 
to the provision of article 24 of Bolivian law there was a reference to a third 
legislation , i.e., Spain as the law of the place where the m arriage was 
c e le b ra te d .33 In its turn, the cour de cassation on 15 May 1963 admitted34 a 
partial renvoi from the law of the spouses' nationality to Spanish law.35
The use o f  renvoi mechanism can also be noticed in matters that concern 
forms of marriage. In fact, Dame M oatti c. dame Zaghcfi^ is an illustration of 
that application in which renvoi from Italian to Syrian law is said to be used for
the first time with clearness in forms of acts. In this case the marriage of 1924
which was celebrated in Italy according to the forms of the spouses nationality, 
i.e., Syria , was held valid on the ground that Italian law which was designed by 
French Conflict rules refuses this competence and would have referred to syria 
as the law of the spouses common nationality.37 In order to declare the validity
32- The husband and w ife Antenor patino and Marie Christine de Bourbon got married 
on April the 8 th 1931 in Madrid in a church following the religious ceremony o f the place o f  
celebration. Castel, J.G., Conflict o f  Laws, Cases ,Notes and Materials  3rd edition, Toronto, 
Butterworths, 1974, pp 48-51.
33- This article states that H A marriage celebrated abroad may be d issolved  in the 
Republic on the condition that the law o f the country in which it was celebrated recognizes 
the dissolution o f the marriage tie. " See, Ibid.,  pp 50-51.
34- Cass, civ., I 15 May 1963, Re. crit.dr. inti, priv., (1964), p 532, note Lagarde; 90 Clunet,
(1963), p 1016, note Malaurie, P.h.
35- The reason o f such reference is to know whether it is possible to divorce them; For 
more details See Derrupp6, J et Agostini, E., Loc.cit.,  p 9; Mayer, P., Op.cit.,p 193.
36- Cour d'Appel d'Aix en provence. 21 Janvier 1981.
37-The spouses D avid  Zagha  and Adele  A bad ie  residant in Great Britain o f Syrian 
nationality but o f Jewish confession got married in Italy in 12 October 1924 follow ing the 
mosaic law before the chief Rabbi o f Milan and in 20 May 1955 obtained a French nationality. 
In 8 May 1968, the husband Zahga  obtained a divorce sentence from his w ife Mrs A b a d i e  
from a Paris tribunal and later in 12 juin 1973 got married with Mrs M a d d y  M o a t t i  in 
Palestine according to the Mosaic law. In 26 Mai 1977 Mrs M addy M oa tti  declared that her
marriage with Mr D a v id  Zagha  on 12 Juin 1973 is valid whereas the first marriage o f  12
October 1924 was nul and void. According to her claim the law o f the place o f celebration, i.e.,
Italy forbade during that time the occurence of a religious marriage before the celebration o f
a civil one. See Legier, G. et Mestre, J., (case note), H R e. crit. dr. inti, priv., (1982) , pp 297-298,
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of the marriage of D a v i d  and Mrs Adele  A bad ie  the court of Aix had to discuss 
an important issue which is the rule locus regit a c tu m m d  see whether it is an 
imperative or facultative rule. The court held, therefore, that the marriage of 12
October 1924 was valid because it was celebrated according to the national law
of the spouses. This means that D a v i d  and Mrs A d e le  A b a d ie  were not
obliged to observe the Italian rules.because the rule locus regit actum  w a s  
facultative and also Italian law referred the issue to Syrian law. It has been 
added that the religious marriage was, therefore, admitted by Syrian law and 
would be admitted as well in France.38 This has led to confirm that renvoi in
f a v o r e m  can be justified if the marriage is considered as null according to X 
local law whereas that law refuses the competence and would refer the issue to
a third law.39 The cour de cassation  too admitted renvoi term and confirmed 
the validity of a marriage of 1924.40
In the same field, i.e., forms of Act, renvoi has also been applied , for
instance, in forms of will but led to the negative result. In this matter the civil 
tribunal de la seine41 admitted renvoi concerning the form of wills from 
American law to French law.4^ According to the tribunal American law as the 
law of nationality is applicable to the succession of S a n c h e z  an American citizen. 
In view of American law, however, French law is applicable as the law of the 
domicile of the deceased at the time of his death. The holograph will, therefore, 
was annulled through the process of renvoi because it was made in France
according to American forms.43
Renvoi mechanism has also been admitted in the field of company. In fact,
309-310 .
38- ALthough Italian law required a c iv il celbration before a relig ious one their 
marriage is considered valid because the rule Locus regit actum  at that time is said to be 
facultative concerning the foreigners who get married in a third country. I b id . ,  pp 298, 300, 
302-304..
39- This is the tendency o f the court o f Aix which has been considered as using renvoi 
in order to confirm the validity o f marriage. See Gerard Legier, Ib id . ,  pp 311-312: See also 
Derrupp6, J et Agostini, E., Lo.cit.,  pp 15-16.
40- Premiere chambre civile- 15 juin 1982. Robert, L., 110, C lu ne t ,(1983), pp 596-600.
41- Succession de Sanchez, trib. Seine, 13 Juillet. 1910. Gaz. tri., 12 Oct. C l.,  (1911), 912, 
note L. D; Potu, E., Op.cit., p 72. note 5.
42- Potu, E„ Ibid., p 62.
43- Ibid., p 62, See also Francescakis, P.h., Op.cit., p 251.
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the B a n q u e  O t to m a n e  A f fa i r e  can be cited as an illustration of renvoi
transmission in this field.44 Concerning this matter, the Paris court of Appeal in 
19 mars 1964 admitted renvoi from English law, as the law of the real seat, to 
Turkish law as the law of the incorporation of the company.45 Furthermore, in 
the judgm ent of 19 October the tr ibunal de commerce de Paris  held that
according to judges' reasoning French conflict rule refers to England as the real 
seat of the company which was in London. English conflict rules, however, refers 
the matter to Turkish law as the law of the place of incorporation. The point to 
be considered is that Turkish law is inapplicable to the activities of the Banque 
outside Turkish territories. The applicable law according to Turkish private 
international law is, then, the law of the real seat. French court applied, therefore, 
the law of the real seat, i.e., English law.46
Furthermore, the French jurisprudence admitted renvoi also in matters of 
the recognition of a natural child47 and extends its application into the field of
property regim es.48
B - Adm ission of renvoi in G rea t B rita in .
1) T he  ju d ic ia l  c o n tro v e rs ie s  o f  th e  renvo i a p p lic a tio n  in
E ng lish  co u rts ,
( i>-D ifferen t form s of renvoi which a re  used bv E nglish  c o u r ts . 
As shown in the first chapter the discussion of renvoi in English jurisprudence is 
to clarify whether the origin of renvoi should be considered from Re A n n e s le y  
case or before it.49 The analysis in this section, however, will be based upon the
different forms that are said to be used by English judges, i.e., whether it is
44- See Loussouarn, y et Bourel, P., Op.cit., pp 271,.294.
45- See B akalian  et H adjithom as  c. B anqu e  O tto m a n e ,  Cour d' appel de Paris, 3e 
chambre. 93 Clunet, (1966); p 118, note Goldman, B; 56 Re.crit . dr..inti.priv., (1967), p 85, note 
Lagarde, P; See in this context DerruppeJ et Agostini, E., L oc.cit . ,  pp 9-10.
46- 73 Re. crit. dr. inti, priv., Loc.cit., pp 93-94, 103.
47- Dame K. c. L...Trib. civ. (ler  Ch) Seine, 18 Nov. 1958, J. C. P., (1959). H. 11. 258, note
Bellet, 48 Re. crit. dr. inti, priv., (1959). 672, note Mezger, E., See Potu, E., Op .cit., p 71.
48- Trib.civ. Orleans 27 Fev. 1951, Re. crit. dr. inti. priv.,(  1954), 358, note Batiffol, H.,: 
Nouveau Repertoire de Droit, loc.cit., p 928 See Francescakis. Ph Op.cit., pp 242-243.
49- See Supra.,  Chapter 1. Section 1, pp 32-36, 38-40.
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renvoi remission, renvoi transmission or the foreign court theory. As a matter of 
fact English court are said to have followed different ways or approaches in 
order to define the meaning of the law of a country X., i.e., the internal law 
theory, partial or single renvoi and double renvoi.50 The following discussion, 
therefore, represents merely an exposition of scholars' ideas which prove that 
different approaches have been used by English courts in relation to the 
definition of the meaning of the foreign law.
a )-  Concerning the first approach which tends to apply only the internal 
law of the foreign country. Different cases have been cited as an example to 
maintain this view. It has been claimed that by referring to the nineteenth 
Century Bremer  v. Freeman  can be cited as an English decision which is hostile 
to renvoi. This has been justified by the fact that if in Collier  v R iv a z  the judge 
upheld the will and codicils, the case of B rem er  v. F reem a n  contradicts the 
prev ious cases51 in that from the Privy Council point of view the will was 
formally invalid.52 According to the reasoning of the English court the deceased 
who was domiciled in France from English point of view53 and in England from 
French point of view,54 made a will of movable in France in French form which 
is invalid from the point of view of French law.55 In fact the Privy Council did 
not accept renvoi from the law of domicile , i.e., French private international law,
50- Graveson, R.H. Conflict o f  Laws, Private International Law^ 7th edition, London, 
Sweet & Maxwell, 1974, pp 65-66.
51- It has been claimed that the case o f Collier  v . Rivaz was overruled by the Privy 
Council' s decision in Bremer  v . Freeman. See in this context, Morris, J.H.C." The Law o f the 
Domicil" B rit i .Y .B .In t .L .,  XVIII, (1937), p 44; Morris, J.H.C. The Conflict o f  Laws, 3rd edition, 
London, Stevens & Sons, 1984, p 472.
52- The Privy Council Considered the w ill made by a British citizen in France, in 
English form, as void because it did not comply with French law.(1857) 10 Moo P. C. 306, 359, 
374; 14 Eng. Rep 508. See Graveson, R.H., O p.c it . ,  p 67; Cheshire & North, P riva te  International  
Law, 11th edition, London, Butterworths, 1987, p 67.
53- At that time, i.e ., before the W ills Act o f 1861, the testator's dom icile at death 
governed the formal validity o f his will. Graveson, R.H. Ibid.,  p 66; Wolff, M., Op.cit., p 193.
54- Although the British subject was considered as dom iciled in France according to 
English law, French law, however, considered him not domiciled in France because he did not 
obtain an authorization for this in accordancee with article 13 o f the French civ ile code. See 
Falconbridge, J..D, "Renvoi in New york and Elswhere", 6 Vand. L. Rev.,{ 1953) p 712.
55- For discussion see Abbot , E.H., "Is the Renvoi Part o f the Common law?" 24 L a w  
Quar. Rev., London (1908) p 144.
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to the lex locis actus, but instead it applied directly the French municipal law to 
the validity of a will.56 It should be noted, however, that there is a considerable 
controversy among scholars on whether B rem er  v. F re e m a n  represents a 
renvoi case due to the ambiguity of the reasoning in this case. As a matter of 
fact, some consider it as a case which accepts renvoi whereas others refute such 
c la im .57 According to the former group it has been claimed that "...the Privy
Council...held that the will was invalid because it did not comply with French
conflict rules and it obviously did not comply with the domestic French law, so 
that on the basis of this explanation the decision is favourable, rather than
unfavorable, to the renvoi..." 58
Among the latter group, however, is Martin W olff who maintains that the
decision of the Privy Council is hostile to renvoi ,.i.e., the reference to French law 
as the law of the domicile should be interpreted as a reference to the French 
internal law and not to its private international rules.59 A lbrecht M endelssohn- 
Bartholdy also has pointed out that "B rem er  v F re em a n  is a case against 
remission a fortiori against transmission." 60
A dditionally, H am ilton  v. D allas61 has not been considered as a case of 
renvoi in which English court seems to have applied the foreign internal law 
from  the beg inn ing .62 G oods o f  L u ig i  B ia n c h f i3 and A b d l-u l  M e ss ih  v .
5 6 -  Bremer  v F r e e m a n  , however, is said to be rejected in Goods o f  Lacroix.  (1877) 2 
P. D. 94, 96, 97. See Wolff, M., Op.cit., p 193.
57- See in this context, Schreiber, E.O., " The Doctrine o f the Renvoi in Anglo-American 
Law", 31 Harv. L. Rev.,(1917-1918), p 542; Dicey & Morris, The Conflict o f  Laws, Volume 1, 11th 
edition, by Lawrence Collins, London, Stevens & Sons Limited, 1987, p 77.
58- See Falconbridge, J D.," Renvoi in New York and Elswhere ", Loc. cit., p 712. It has 
benn presumed that even if  renvoi did not arise in this case it was, however, advocated  
indirectly by referring not only to French substantive rules but also to its conflict rules. 
Falconbridge, J D .,Essays on the Conflict o f  Laws, 1st edition, Toronto, Canada, Law Book  
Campany Limited, 1947, p 124.
59- Wolff, M., Op. cit., p 193.
60- M endelssohn-Bartholdy, A ., " Renvoi in Modern English Law, by Cheshire G.C. 
(ed.,), Oxford, The Clarendon Press, 1937, p 75.
61-(1875) 1 Ch. D. 257.
62- Morris, J.H.C. " The Law of the Domicil" Loc.cit., p 45.
63- (1862), 3 S.w. & Tr. p 16.
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F a r r  a 64 have also been considered as unfavorable to the renvoi theory but 
only by an obiter  d ictum f  5
Concerning the twenteeth Century the writer thinks that there is no doubt
that the recent case of Am in  R a sheed  Shipping Corp. can be considered as a
case in which the internal law theory has been applied.66
b) - With regard to renvoi at first degree different cases have been cited as
examples to indicate that this form of renvoi has also been used by English 
judges. Among them is first of all Collier  v Rivaz67 in which English municipal
law was applied through the process of rem ission.68 In this case the English
judge had to inquire upon the validity of a will made in Belgium by a British
national. According to English conflict rules the deceased's dom icile was 
applicable, i.e., Belgian law. Through Sir Herbert Jenner' s reasoning English law 
as the deceased's national law would have been applied if Belgian law was
seized of the issue.69 In other words, the reasoning of Sir Herbert Jenner led to 
the view that according to Belgian law the will made by a foreigner had to be 
determined by the law of his nationality.70 In this respect, it has been stressed 
that if the English judge applied only the Belgian domestic law which is
applicab le to B elgian citizens w ithout taking into account the p rivate 
international rules of that country "...The result in Collier  v. R i v a z  could not 
have been arrived...".71
Besides, there are who support the view that M a lta ss  v . M a lta s s 1 2 
represents a case in which renvoi was approved by o b ite r  d ic tum  and should,
64- (1888), 13 App. cas., p 431.
65- For discussion see Bate, J.P., Notes on The D octrine o f  R envo i in Priva te  
International Law ,London, Stevens & Sons, Limited, 1904, pp 14-18, 108.
66- See Infra., Section 1, Sub-section2., pp 171-172.
67- (1841) 2 Curt 855 ( per Sir Herbert Jenner).
68- See the view o f Wolff, M., Op.cit., p 194.
69- Ibid., pp 189-190.
70- According to him Belgian law is applicable only to w ills wchich are made by a 
Belgian citizen. See Graveson, R.H. Op.cit., p 67.
71- Hoyle, M .S.W ., P riva te  In ternationa  Law : C ases  and M ater ia ls ,  1st edition, 
London,The Laureate Press , 1982 p 19.
72- The matter in this case was about the formal validity o f a w ill made by a British 
citizen, in accordance with English internal law. (1844), 1 Rob. Eccl. 67.
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therefore, be considered as a case of remission.73
The case of Frere  v. F r e r e 74 has also been cited as an example where 
renvoi remission was recognised and led to the application of English internal 
law. In this case English judge referred to Maltese law as the law of the
deceased's domicile to govern his will. Maltese conflict rule, however, referred 
back to the place of the execution of the will, i.e., English law 75 According to 
Albrecht Mendelssohn Bartholdy, although the case of Frere  v. Frere  does not 
give reasons it "...is a case for rem ission or transmission".76
G oods o f  L a c r o ix 77 is an illustration of a fourth case in which renvoi 
remission is said to be recognized and English internal law was applied through
that process.78 From the judge's point of view, therefore, renvoi from French
conflict of laws to English law, is accepted.79 In other words, the judge accepts
the reference or renvoi from the law of the lex loci actus, to the national law.80
In his view, R.H. Graveson considers the case of R e J o h n s o n 81 as an 
example of the application of the renvoi remission. According to him English 
internal law was applicable after a remission from X conflict rules to English 
la w .82 The admition of the mechanism of renvoi in this case has been justified 
by the reasoning of Farwell, J. He is said to admit that Baden law, as the law of 
the lex  d o m ic i l i , declines com petence and would rather refer the m ovable 
succession to the law of the State that the deceased was its subject at the time of 
his death.83
73-See the view o f Wolff, M., Op. cit., P194.
74- (1847), 5 Notes of Cases, 593 (per endemn Jud).
75- Wolff, M., Op.cit., p 190; Mendelssohn-Bartholdy, A., Op.cit., p 68.
7 6 - M endelssohn-B artholdy, A ., I b id . ,  p 75. My emphasise. This case, however has 
also been cited as an example in which Sir Herbert Jenner Fust applied the total renvoi theory. 
See Cheshire & North ,Op.cit.,  p 67.
77- (1887) 2 P.D. 94, 96, 97 (per Sir P. Hannen), (1887) Ch. D.., 1, 257.
78- Wolff, M., Op.cit., p 194.
79- Potu, E., Op.cit., p 127; Wolff, M., Ibid., p 188.
8 0 - Wolff, M . , m , p l 8 8 .
81-[1903] 1 Ch. 821.
82- Graveson, R.H., Op.cit., p 67.
83- Concerning the deceased, who had a M altese dom icile o f origin, died intestate
domiciled in Baden.See Potu, E .,Op cit., pp 129-130.
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C )-Renvoi transmission has also been considered as the second form used 
by English judges. The firts case which has been cited as an example of renvoi
W eiterverweisung is that of Re T r u fo r t .84 In this case, which concerns the
distribution of movable property of a Swiss national,85 English court referred to 
the law of France as the law of the deceased's domicile. French law. however, 
refers to the law of Switzerland as the law of his nationality.86 In other words, 
the reference from French law to Swiss law was accepted. It has been held, 
however, that English court applied the law of a third country but without taking 
into consideration that the foreign court might accept renvoi from English law.87 
From another point of view Re Trufort,  is an authority of renvoi in the sense of 
W e i t e r v e r w e i s u n g  in a Jurisdictional issue. According to that view English law 
accepted the transmission from French law to Swiss law as to jurisdiction,, i.e, 
French conflict rules referred jurisdiction to Swiss courts according to the
trea ty .88
R e  A n c h i l l o p o u l o s 89 is said to represent another exam ple of renvoi 
transm ission in which the English court held that the Greek internal law is
applicable to the succession of the deceased who is a Greek citizen. According to 
its reasoning if Egypt was the deceased's domicile Egyptian private international 
rules would transmit the issue to Greek law.90
R egina  v. B re n tw o o d  S u p er in ten d e n t  R e g is tra r  o f  M a rr ia g es  E xpa r te
84-( 1887) 36 Ch. D. 600. See W olff, M„ O p .c i t . ,  p 194; Graveson, R.H., Op.cit., p 68;
Raeburn, W., " The ' Open Offer' Formula and the Renvoi in Private International Law". B r i t .
Y. B. Int. L , XXV, (1948) p 233; Bate, J.P.,O p.c i t . ,  pp 16, 112-115; See also this view  in Lorenzen,
E.G., " The Renvoi Theory and the Application of Foreign Law", 10 Col. Law. Rev., (1910), p 334.
Potu, E., Ibid., p 135.
85-It should be noted that according to the treaty o f 1869 between France and
Switzerland, it is the law o f Switzerland which should determine the claim o f X that he has the
right to the estate o f the deceased if the latter is a Swiss national died domiciled in France. It
means that the movable succession o f the citizen o f either Switzerland or France should be
governed by the law of the nationality. Bate, J. P., Ib id .
86- Wolff, M., Op.cit., p 194, Graveson,R.H., Op.cit., p 68.
87-See Morris, J.H.C, The Conflict o f  Laws, Op.cit., p 472.
88- Schreiber, E. 0 ., Loc.cit., pp 551-553. See in this context Abbot, E.H., Loc.cit . ,p 142.
89- [1928] ICh. 433, 443 ( per Tomlin, J.).
90- Wolff, M., Op.cit., p 194.
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A r i a s ^ 1 is a third case which is cited as an example of renvoi transmission.9 2 
According to the reasoning of the English court the judge referred to Switzerland, 
as the law of the domicile, which in its turn would have referred him to Italy as 
the law of the nationality. Italian law which applies the law of nationality
concerning the capacity to contract marriage is said, therefore, to apply its own 
law .93
d)-Concerning the foreign court theory it should be stressed that it might
be difficult to confirm by the absolute majority of scholars that this form of
renvoi had not been influenced by cases before 1926. It should be borne in
mind, however, that for the sake of clarity and avoiding any repetition the
discussion will start from the classical case of Re Annesley.
Due to the fact that the reported cases where the foreign court theory has
been applied are numerous the discussion, therefore, will include only some of
the cases and the analysis will be divided into two main points. In this context, 
the reference should be to some cases in which the total renvoi mechanism 
refers the judge to a country which adopts a partial renvoi and, then, to a 
country which rejects the mechanism of renvoi.
According to the latter, three cases are cited chronologically to illustrate this
fact. The first one is Re R o ss94. In this case the judge, Luxmoore J., applied
English internal law95 to both the movables and also the land situated in Italy of 
a British subject of English domicile of origin who died domiciled in Italy. To
m aintain the validity of the will Luxmoore.J. proceeded by the follow ing
91- [19681 2 Q.B. 956; [1968] 3 All E.R. 279.
92- Morris, J.H.C., The Conflict o f  Laws, O p .c i t . ,  p 477 ; Jaffey, A.J. E., Introduction to the 
Conflict o f  Laws, London-Edinburgh, Butterworths,1988, p 261.
93- In this case Galli was considered as having no capacity to contract a marriage with 
A ria s  according to Italian Law. See Welling, B and Hoffman, R.," ' The-Law o f .  in Choice o f Law 
Rules: ' Renvoi' Comme Nostalgie de la Boue" 23 University o f  Western Ontario Law Review  
(1985) pp 94-95. For more details see Infra., pp 149-150
94-[1930] ICh. 377, 389; Clunet, 1930, p 1092. It must be noted that the internal law theory 
which was advocated in Re Annesley  by obiter dictu.m  was rejected in Re Ross.  [1926] Ch. 
692, 708. See Morris, J.H.C., The Conflict of Laws, Op.cit., p 469.
95- The important consequence o f applying English domestic law is the validity o f  the 
deceased's w ill. See in this context, Collier, J., Conflict o f Laws, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1987, p 24.
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reasoning. According to Italian law, which rejects the theory of renvoi,
succession to movables is governed by English law as the national law of the
t e s ta r i x .  The internal law of the testatrix, therefore, should be applied on the 
ground that English conflict rules which referred the m atter to Italy would
accept the reference from Italian conflict rules. With regard to to immovables 
successions Luxmoore. J.' s view is that the reason for applying English domestic 
law is that English conflict rules referred the matter to Italy as the lex rei sitae. 
Italian law, however, rejects the theory of renvoi and would have referred the 
issue to English law as the national law of the t e s ta r ix ,96 Mr Justice Luxmoore's 
reasoning led to the application of English internal law and, then, the son's 
ac tio n 97 to be entitled by Italian law and his claim of having a legal rights to this 
assets was dismissed.98
The second case is that of Re O' K eefe . "  in which Crossman.J. applied, the 
law of Eire through the process of the double renvoi, to the immovable
succession of movable succession of a British subject who died intestate 
domiciled in Italy. According to English conflict rules the succession of movables 
situated in England is governed by the law of the deceased' s domicile at death, 
i.e., Italy. Italian conflict rules, however, do not accept renvoi and would referred 
such matter to the law of her nationality which was according to an English 
judge the law of Eire as the law of her domicile of origin.100
The third case, in this context, is that of Duke o f  W elling ton .101 In this case
9 6 -  Falconbridge, J.D., L oc .c i t . ,  pp 720-721; Mayer, P., O p.c i t . ,  p 194; W olff, M., O p .c i t . ,
p 196.
97- The deceased left an Italian and English W ills and had made no provisions for her 
son. The deceaased's property in England was given to her niece by her English w ill whereas 
her property in Italy was given to her Grand nephew by her Italian w ill. The plaintiff who is 
the son o f Janet Anne Ross,  claims that he is entitled as to one moiety o f her immovables left 
in Italy according to Italian law.. Re Ross v . Waterfield [1930] ICh. at p 387.
98- See in this context Cheshire & North, O p.c i t . ,  p 68; Anto, A.E., P riva te  In ternational  
Law, ATreatise From the Standpint o f  Scots Law, Edinburgh,W. Green & Son L.T.D.,1967 p 65; 
Mendelssohn-Bartholdy, A., Op.cit., p 13; Hoyle, M.S.W., Op.cit.,p 16.
99-[1940] Ch. 124, [1940] 1 All ER. 216.
100- See Falconbridge, J. D. " Renvoi in New York and Elswhere" L o c .c i t . ,  p 721; See 
Infra., pp 154-158.
101- [1947] 1 Ch. 506.
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Wynn Parry J. applied English domestic law102 concerning the devolution of land
property in Spain of a British testator domiciled in England who made Spanish 
and English w ills.103 It appeared thereafter that none of the qualifications stated 
in the two wills were satisfied. The court reasoning in this case was to decide 
exactly as the Spanish court would do. Following the mechanism of total renvoi 
and the reasoning of Wynn-Parry, J. Spanish conflict rule is entitled to govern 
such dispute. According to Spanish code, irrespective of the country where the 
property is located, the deceased's national law should determine both testate 
and intestate succession. After considering whether Spanish law would accept 
remission from English law to the lex situs  the judge held that Spanish court 
would not accept such remission from the law of the deceased' s nationality.104
There seems to be a controversy, however, upon the authority relied in this 
case. In fact, Re Duke o f  Wellington' s decision is said to rely on the d ic tu m  of 
the Privy Council as an authority for the application of the theory of renvoi.105 
In this context, there are who claim that the Privy Council statement in Kotia  v. 
N a h a s  confuses between double and partial renvoi theory.106 According to 
others the case of Kotia  v. N a h a s 107 is an example which is related to the
double renvoi theory .108 To put end to this controversies it has been claimed
that the judge Wynn Parry applied in the case of D uke o f  'W elling ton  the theory
102- According to English internal law the land would be transferred or given to the
next Duke o f  Wellington.
103- By his Spanish will, the movable o f land in Spain would be given to the person who 
fulfilled two qualifications whereas by his English w ill the reste o f his property would belong 
to a person who fulfil one o f the qualifications.
104- See in this context, Morris, J.H.C. & North, P.M. Cases and M ateria ls on Private  
In tern a tiona l  Law,  London, Butterworths, 1984, pp 70-71; Briggs, E.W., " ' Renvoi' in the 
Succession to Tangibles: a False Issue Based on Faulty Analysis, 64 Yale. L. J.., (1954-1955), p 211; 
Morris,J.H.C. The Conflict o f  Laws, O p .c it . ,  p 473; Falconbridge, J.D " Renvoi in New York and 
Elswhere" Loc.cit.,  p 721.
105- Kotia  v . Nahas was cited in Wellington  as an authoritative precedent.[1947] ICh. 
506, a ffd ,  [1948] 1 Ch. 118; [1941] A.C. 403. Dicey & Morris, O p.cit . ,  pp 79-80; For more details 
see Briggs, E.W., Loc.cit., pp 207-208, 210.
106- Dicey & Morris, Ibid., p 79
107- [1941] AC. 403; [1941] 3 All E.R. 20.
108- It should be noted that the Case is an example of an Appeal from the supreme court 
of Palestine to the Privy Council wchich was sitting in England. Cheshire & North, O p . c i t . ,  
p p 69 -7 0 .
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of double renvoi despite his reliance on & d i c t u m  that enunciates the single 
renvoi theory. In fact, his inquiry upon whether Spanish law would accept any 
renvoi from English private international law has been considered as a proof of 
the application of the former t h e o r y . 1 ^
Concerning English cases in which the judge refers to a country which 
adopts a partial renvoi, two cases can be cited as an example of this group. The 
first one is Re A n n e s ley 110 in which English court applied the French domestic 
law concerning the validity of will to a te s ta r ix  who was considered domiciled 
in France in view of English law whereas in French point of view she did not 
establish her domicile in France due to the lack of receiving a governmental 
au th o riz a tio n .111 In his decision Russell, J. used the foreign court theory by the 
following reasoning. French law is the applicable law as the law of the testarix' s 
domicile. French law, however, applies English law as the law of the testarix's 
nationality on the ground that the testarix was not legally domiciled in France. 
French internal law, therefore, is applicable due to the fact that French law 
adopts a partial renvoi and would accept a reference from English law .112 In 
fact, by admitting that the deceased' s movables had to be distributed according 
to French internal law, Russell J., threfore, came to the conclusion that the testarix 
power is to dispose only one third of her will.113
It should be noted that the controversy of the word internal law and also 
the expression used by the judge led some scholars to doubt about the
109- See in this context, Morris, J.H.C. The Conflict o f  Laws, Op.cit.,  p 474.
110-7/1 Re Annesley Davidson  v . Annesley. Chancery Division. [1926] Ch. 692; 95.L. J. 
Ch. 404; 42 T. L. R. 584.
111- Experts' evidences prove that the testatrix did not have a dom icile in French 
accordingto article 13 o f the French civil code. See Mendelssohn-Bartholdy, A., O p .c i t . ,  pp7-l 1; 
See also Falconbridge, J.D., " Renvoi in New York and Elswhere, Loc.cit . ,  p 720.
112- [1926] Ch. pp 706-707. See also Anton. A.E, O p.cit .,  p 65; See Falconbridge. J .D, Ibid.,  
Martin, W., Op.cit., pp 195-196.
113- According to English Law the will is valid but according to French law the Testarix 
could dispose only one third o f her moveable property and not all of her property because she 
left two children surviving her. [1926] Ch. p 708. See also article 913 o f the French civil code. 
Morris. J.H.C, Cases on Private International Law, 4th edition, Oxford, at the Clarendon Press, 
1968, pp 8-9.
142
application of the foreign court theory in this case and considers the judge1 s 
reasoning as unclear.114 As a matter of fact Russell J. said that he preferred to 
apply directly French internal without using the renvoi m echanism .115 In his 
view the application of the internal law theory is "...sim ple and rational 
s o lu t io n . . . " 115, and wished to reach the same solution without involving any 
question of renvoi.117 Furthermore, his expression in which he supported the 
view that applying French municipal law is a rational solution has been 
considered as a declaration that renvoi theory should be avoided.11*5 In fact, J. D. 
Falconbridge underlines that the judge Russell's reasoning in this case "...reached 
the same conclusion as if there had been no doctrine of the renvoi..." This 
scholar goes on to stress that "...the internal law of the domicil should be applied, 
declared by way of obiter dictum  his personal disapproval of the doctrine..."119 
From another point of view Russell. J. preferred to apply the internal law directly 
but without supporting his claim with any authority.120
The opposite view, however, maintains that the use of the term internal 
l a w 121 should be taken to connote "...evidently a slip for1 French private 
international law' 1,122 This has led to stress that although the judge's decision 
meant the reference to the internal law of a foreign country his preference was 
the use of the double renvoi theory.123
On the whole, Russel J. is said to have introduced this form in the case of 
Re A n n es ley  despite the fact that he did not give any authorities or justified his 
reasoning by giving reasons for using the foreign court theory.124
114- Cheshire & North, Op.cit., p 67.
115- Morris, J.H.C. The Conflict o f  Laws, Op.cit., p 472.
116-[1926] Ch. 692, at pp 708-709.
117- Morris J.H.C, Cases on Private International Law, Op.cit.,  p 9.
118- Hoyle, Mark, S.H., (ed.,), Op.cit., pp 20-21.
119- Flaconbridge, J. D." Renvoi and Succession to Movables" AlLaw. Quar. Rev.., London 
(1931) p 287.
120- See in this context Dicey & Morris, Op.cit., p 78;
121- The Judge found that according to French internal law the law of the person
nationality should be applied if  a person is a foreigner not legally domiciled in France.
122- See MorrisJ.H.C, Cases on Private International Law, Op.cit .,  p 7 notes 1
123- Cheshire & North, Op.cit., p 67.
124- Morris. J.H.C., The Conflict o f  Laws, Op.cit., p 472; Dicey & Morris, Op.cit., p78.
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The second case of the former group is Re A skew  in w hich judge 
M augham J. applied German municipal law and, then, held the child as 
le g i t im a te d .125 In his view, German law as the father' s domicile refers the 
matter of legitimacy to the father's nationality, i.e., English law. If, however, 
German court was seized of the matter it would have accepted a remission from 
English private international law to German internal law .126 According to an 
opinion, however, if renvoi was not used the concerned party would be 
considered as a bastard on the ground that according to the legitimacy Act of 
1926 an adulterinus could not be legitimated.127
It must be noted that the judge based his argument which is in favour of 
renvoi upon the acquired right theory. In his view English law refers to foreign 
domicil in order to know whether right had been acquired under that law .128 In 
fact, the consideration of the acquired right theory by Maugham J. in John Doe  
led him to maintain that by applying German, law as the law of the lex  dom ic il i , 
M a rg a re t  A sk e w  had acquired the status of legitimacy under that law .129 T h e  
Judge's reasoning, therefore, indicates that there is a close link between the 
theory of acquired right and the total renvoi theory. One view is that the former 
theory support the use of the la tte r.130 It means that Re A s k e w  has been 
considered as a legal source which indicates that the foreign court theory is 
based on the acquired right theory.131
125- In Re Askew; Marjiribanks v . Askew, Chancery Division. [1930] 2.Ch. 259; [1930] 
All E. R. 174; 99 L.J. Ch. 466; 46 T. L. R. 539. Collier J G, Op.cit., p 27; Cheshire & North, Op.cit., p 69.
126- See Graveson R.H., Op.cit .,  p 70, Wolff, M., Op.cit . ,  p 196; Falconbridge J. D, " Renvoi 
in New York and Elswhere" Loc.cit., P 720; Mayer, P., Op.cit.,  p 194.
127- Collier J. G,Op.cit., p 27.
128- Wolff, M., Op.cit., p 196.
129- According to the whole law of the lex domicili, i.e., German law, M arg are t  Askew  
child o f the husband John Ber tram  and his second wife Anna W engels  was legitim ated by 
this subsequent marriage, in April 1912, although the child was born( January 30, 1911) 
before the divorce was final ( July, 1911). See for instance Castel J. G, O p . c i t . ,  pp 58-61;
Mendelssohn-Bartholdy, A.,Op.cit. ,  p 20.
130- Edinger, E., Loc.cit., p 46.
131  - I b i d . ,  p 38. notes 19; For more details concerning the acquired right theory in 
relation to the foreign court theory, see Falconbridge, I. D Essays on the Conflict o f  Laws, 2nd 
edition, Toronto, Ontario, Canada, Law Book Company limited, 1954, p 195.
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( i i ) - S ch o la rs1 po in t of views upon the recen t and c u r re n t renvoi
ap p ro ach e s  used by E nglish  c o u r ts . It seems that judges' decisions and 
reasonings upon the acceptance or the rejection of renvoi by English courts will 
be an insufficient analysis if it is not completed and confronted with scholars' 
opinions on this issue. In addition, if the above discussion tries to clarify whether 
the reference to foreign law means its internal or private international rules, the 
analysis in this context, however, is based upon the question of how often 
English judges referred to the whole foreign law and find out from the cases
which of the theories represent part of English law and jurisprudence.
In this respect, it should be kept in mind that the problem which faces
English judges upon the application of foreign law concerns the interpretation 
and the meaning of that law .132 In fact, the ambiguity of the foreign law has 
been interpreted in different ways and scholars' views, in this matter, differ. On 
the one hand there are those who maintain that in the majority of English cases 
the tendency of English judges on the interpretation of foreign law has been 
considered as a reference to the internal law of that foreign system and not as a 
global reference. According to this view the few cases, however, in which the 
interpretation of English judges has been considered as a global reference are 
said to represent exceptional cases.133 In other words, the reference from
English private international law to a foreign country Y generally means its 
domestic rules and not its private international rules but a number of exceptions 
have to be recognized to this general principle.134 Besides, it has been claimed 
that there are many cases in which the reference to foreign law means the 
domestic law of that law without referring to its private international rules. This 
has led to believe that "...There is...no ...justification  for generalising the few 
English cases on renvoi into a general rule that a reference to foreign ' law ' 
always means the conflict rules of the foreign country..."135
132- Maugham, J. for instance, in the case o f Re Askew  was wondering whether the 
law o f Utiopia means the whole law o f the lex domicilii or merely its domestic rules. [1930] 2 Ch. 
259. See in this context Collier J. G ,Op.cit., p 22.
133- Morris J.H.C, The Conflict o f  Laws, O p .c i t . ,  p 12; See also the view of De Nova, R., 
Loc.cit.,  p 510.
134- Cheshire & North, Op.cit.,  p 72.
135- D icey & Morris,O p.cit . ,  p 83; Morris J. H. C., The Conflict o f  Lawsx O p .c i t . ,4, p 475,
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On the other hand there are those who claim that when English private 
international law rules refer the issue to the foreign country this reference is
interpreted "sometimes" as a reference to the whole law of that country 
including its Conflict ru les.136 The question which arises, therefore, is whether 
the reference to the foreign domestic law means usually or only sometimes?
The general view in this context is that the law of the foreign country X 
"...means, when applied to any foreign country, 1 usually ’ the domestic law of 
that country, 1 sometimes 1 any domestic law which the courts of that country 
would apply to the decision of the case..."137 According to this rule it can be seen 
that the foreign law, such as, France means usually French internal law. 
However, the term "sometimes" which is used in this structure allows the 
possibility of the application of any system of law that the French court would 
apply to the case.138
Despite the peculiarity of the foreign court theory and its differences from 
renvoi conception in the continent there is still doubt about the real tendency of
the English legal system on renvoi. Is English tendency in favour of renvoi in
one or in its different forms or is hostile completely to the admission of its 
mechanism? In other words, which of these approaches is the real conception 
adopted by English law and jurisprudence. Is it the internal law theory or the 
G e s a m t v e r w e i s u n g l  Concerning the former approach it has been maintained 
that this has been recommended by two judges because of its simplicity and 
r a t io n a l i ty .139 Concerning the partial or single renvoi this form is said not to 
represent to be the current theory of the courts in England.140 Another view, 
however, has claimed that renvoi is neither adopted nor rejected in English 
la w .141 This claim has been illustrated by the reasoning of Maugham J. in the
orig in ally  em phasised.
136-Morris J.H.C & North P.M. , Op.cit., p 655, emphasise added.
137- See Rule 1, Dicey & Morris, Op.cit., p 73, emphasise added.
138- Ibid., p 74. > .
139- Re Annesley [1926] Ch. 692, 708- 709. [1930] 2 Ch. 259, 278. This solution, however, is 
said to be rejected in Re Ross [1930] ICh. 377, 402. See Ibid., p 75.
140- See Dicey & Morris, Ibid.', Morris J.H.C , The Conflict o f  Laws, Op.cit., p 470.
141- Levontin A. V., Choice of Law and Conflict of Laws, Leyden, A.W. Sijthoff, 1976, p 52.
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case of Re A skew  in which he states that " ...if I 'am right an English court can 
never have anything to do with it except so far as foreign experts may expound 
the doctrine as being part of the lex domicilii" 142
Concerning the double renvoi theory it seems also important to highlight 
Rodolfo De Nova’s view in which he stresses that "...O ne must never forget that
the ' fo re ig n  court  1 theory ' is a judic ia l discovery and a jud ic ia l  tool not a
general theory presented by scholars nor a general principle declared by the 
legislator..." ,143 This reasoning, therefore, leads, to the point which concerns the 
prospect of the foreign court theory in English private international law! Rodolfo
De Nova examined the matter and has remarked that "...How far it goes and how
far it may go in English law in future, is hard to state and hard to foretell".144
It should be noted as well that whether English courts are generally in
favour of the internal law theory or has accepted renvoi in its different forms is 
an issue which does not concern only scholars ’ opinions but this controversies 
must be resolved by English courts themselves. In fact, it has been indicated 
that "...There is no case which prevents the court of appeal...from reviewing the 
whole problem, and it is submitted that such a review is long overdue."145 
According to another point of view "...until the matter is reviewed by a higher 
court it must be taken that the theory of double or total renvoi is the doctrine of 
the English courts in the situations in which they are willing to refer to the
conflict rules of the foreign law."146 Scott. A. is also certain that the double renvoi 
theory"... is part of English private international law. Nevertheless it is open to
the House of Lords to reject it and this would...be welcome..."147
Generally, it can be pointed out that the foreign court theory is not the only 
form used by English Judges.148
142- [1930] 2 Ch. 259; [1930] All E.R. 174.
143- De Nova, R., Loc.cit ., p 508.
144- Ibid., p 509.
145- Morris, J.H.C., The Conflict o f  Laws, Op.cit., p 480.
146- Dicey & Morris, Op.cit., p 81.
147- Scott, A.W ., Private International Law,2nd edition, Macdonald & Evans L.t.d. 1979,
p 45 .
148- See especially Edinger. E., Loc.cit., p 38.
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2)- F ield  of app lica tion  of renvoi in English case law . The renvoi 
theory in English jurisprudence, whether it is a remission, transmission or double 
renvoi, has been applied to different matters. Its mechanism has been used to 
the form al149 and intrinstic or essential validity of w ills150 In this context, it 
should be noted that among the reason which have contributed to the 
recognition of renvoi in English law is the tendency of favoring and upholding 
wills which are formally invalid. It means that renvoi has been used as a means 
of allowing wills to probate although they are not considered as formally valid 
according to the internal law of the country of dom icile.151 This can be 
illustrated by the fact in Collier  v. Rivaz152 in which Sir Herbert Jenner allowed 
the will and two codicils made according to Belgian form and also the four 
codicils made in English form to probate.153 In Frere  v. Frere the use of renvoi 
allowed the will to probate although it was void according to Maltese internal 
law .154
Its m echanism  has also been applied to intestate succession155 and 
legitim ation by subsequent m arriage.156
In relation to the lex loci ac tus157 its mechanism has been accepted when 
English Conflict rule refers to the place where the will was made.158
In the field of immovable succession it mechanism has been admitted
149- See For instance Collier  v . Rivaz (1841) 2 Curt. 855; Goods o f  Lacroix  (1877) 2 P. D. 
94; Frere v. Frere  (1847) 5 Notes of Cases 593; In the Estate of  Fuld (N°3) [1968], p 675.
150- See for instance Re Annesley [1926] Ch. 692; Re Ross [1930] ICh. 377; Re Trufort 
(1887) 36 Ch.D. 600.
151- Dicey & Morris, O p .c i t . ,  p 76; Morris J.H.C., The Conflict o f  Law s, O p .c i t . ,  p 471; 
Wolff, M., Op.cit., p 194.
152- (1841) 2 C u rt. 855.
153- Dicey & Morris, O p .c i t . ,  pp 76-77; In Bremer  v. F r e e m a n ,  however, English court 
refused to probate the will made in English form. (1857) 10 Moore P.C. 306. See Westlake, J., A 
Treatise on Private International Law, By Bentwich, N., (ed.,), 7th edition, London, Sweet & 
Maxwell, Limited, 1925 p 36.
154- See Potu, E., Op.cit., p 124.
155- See for instance, Re Johnson [1903] 1 Ch. 821; Re O' Keefe [1940] Ch. 124, [1940] 1 All 
ER 216.
156- Re Askew  [ 1930] 2 Ch. 259; Graveson, R.H., Op.cit., p 75.
157- In Bonis Lacroix (1877) 2 P. D. 94.
158- See in this context Dicey & Morris, O p.c it . ,  pp 81-82; Morris J.H.C., Conflict o f  Laws, 
Op.cit., p 475.
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when English conflict rule refer to the lex situs .15^
In family law there has been doubts upon the application of renvoi in 
marriage and divorce. Concerning the latter issue, the mechanism of renvoi is
said to be applied even in choice of jurisdiction, i.e., in matter of the validity of a 
divorce decree. A r m ita g e  v . A tto r n e y  G e n e r a l160 has been cited as an
illustration to indicate that the validity of divorce decree of South Dakota was
recognised. This led to maintain that the subsequent English marriage of an
English woman who married an English man, after obtaining a divorce from her 
American husband by the South Dakota court, is valid .161 It can be noticed that 
the positive answer given by the courts was based on the ground that the New 
York court allowed the married woman to have her separate domicile in order
to sue for divorce and would also recognize the validity of her Dakota divorce 
and enforce i t .162 It means that if a decree is valid according to the private
international law of the domicile it will be recognized in England.163
More important although the word renvoi had not been used by the court
it has been claimed that the reasoning of the court assume the use of renvoi in 
order to reach this solution. In fact, Sir Corell Barnes maintains that in order to 
reach the result that would be reached by a New York court if it was confronted 
with the case, English court, therefore, had to put itself in the position of that 
c o u r t.164 From another point of views "...English...court...looked to New York 
court regarded the south Dakota decree as valid, accepted this onward
transm ission and itself recognized the validity of the divorce d ec ree ..."165
159- See for instance Re Duke o f  Wellington [1947] 1 Ch. 506.; Re Ross  [1930] ICh. 377.
160- [1906] P 135; 75 L. J. P. 42; 94 L. T. 614; 22 T. L. R. 9 Prob., Divorce, & adm. Div.). This
case has been considered as an English case which admits W i t e r v e r w e i s u n g ,  i.e ., renvoi
transmission. See Potu, E., O p.c i t ., p 135.
161- See in this context,. Griswold, E.N.," Renvoi Rivisited " 51 Harv. L. Rev., (1937-1938)
pl203.
1 6 2 -  See in this context Schreiber, E.O., Loc.cit.,  p 560.
163- Se Rabel, E.,The Conflict o f  Laws, A Comparative Study , Volume 1, Second edition, 
Ann Anbor, University o f Michigan Law School, 1958 , p 551; Lorenzen, E.G .,L o c .c i t . ,  P 335; 
Graveson, R. H., Op.cit., pp 74-75; Potu, E., Op.cit., p 131.
164- [1906] P 141, See also Schreiber, E.O., Loc.cit., pp 560- 561
165- G raveson, R. H., O p . c i t . ,  p 68; But one should refer no further to
M ounbattenvM ountbatten  [1959] P.43; [1959] 2 W.L.R. 128; [1959] 1 All.E.R. 99.
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Additionally, the outcome of the reasoning of the court, led to believe that renvoi 
has been used as an alternative rule of validation.166
In the former issue, i.e., in marriage there has been a doubt upon whether 
renvoi might be applied in both formal validity of marriage and capacity to 
m a r ry .167 Concerning the essential validity of marriage Regina  v. B ren tw o od  
Superin tendent R egis trar  o f  M arriages Exparte  A r ia s 168 has been considered as 
the only English case where the mechanism of renvoi, in its transmission forms 
has been used in this contex t.169 This led to confirm that B r e n t w o o d  
Superin tendent R egis trar  o f  M arriages Exparte  Arias  is a case complicated by 
the mechanism of renvoi.170 What happened in this case is that the validity of 
the Swiss divorce, which represents the incidental question,171 was decided not 
by the lex fo r i  but by the lex causae, i.e., by Italian law which led to the fact 
that the husband cannot remarry in England because of lacking the capacity to 
remarry according to Italian law .172 Accordingly, English court applied Italian 
conflict rules to decide both the incidental and the main question through the 
doctrine of re n v o i.173 It has been confirmed, however, that the case of 
B rentw ood  Superintendent Registrar o f  M arriages  is overruled and according to 
a recent case Law rence  v. L a w r e n c e ^ 4 the incidental case in this area, will be 
decided according to the lex fo r i  and not the lex cu a sa e .115 In other words, the
166- Edinger, E., Lo.cit.,  pp 42-43.
167- Dicey & Morris, Op.cit .,  pp 81-82; Morris, J. H. C., The Conflict o f  Laws, O p.cit . ,  p 475; 
Jaffey, A. J. E. Op.cit., p 261.
168-[1968] 2 Q B 956, [1968] 3 All E.R. 279.
169- Jaffey, A.J. E., Op.cit., p 49.
170- Collier, J. G., Op.cit., pp 31 notes 85 and 266 notes 73.
171- The preliminary question in this case is the recognition o f the foreign divorce
decree whereas the capacity to marry is the main issue.
172- The D iv isional court maintained that the husband cannot remarry again in 
England. This is due to the fact that according to Swiss conflict rule, where he was domiciled, 
the reference is made to his national law, i.e., Italy, which does not recognize his divorce on 
the ground that he lacks capacity to remarry under that law. See Jaffey, A.J. E., O p .c i t . ,  p 34; 
Collier, J. G, Op.cit., pp 30-32.
173- Dicey & Morris, Op.cit., p 54; Cheshire & North, Op.cit.,  p 55.
174- [1985] Fam 106; [1985] 1 All ER. 506; [1985] 2 All ER. 733.
175- See section.7 o f the Recognition of Divorce and legal Separation Act (1971). See also
Section 50 o f the Family Law Act (1986), Jaffey, A. J. E., Op.cit.,  pp 34-35.
150
court of Appeal recognised to the wife the freedom to remarry although that 
capacity is denied by the law of her domicile.176
It should be noted that analogy has been made in this respect which 
maintains that the same solution should be adopted for both the essential and 
the formal validity of marriage in relation to the use of the doctrine, of renvoi.177 
As a matter of fact, it has been recommended that the reference to the lex loxi 
c e l e b r a t io n i s  should mean the reference to the whole law of the country where 
the marriage was celebrated and not only to its domestic ru les.173 A lth o u g h  
there is no English case which maintains that the marriage is formally valid if it 
complies with the law that the le x  c e le b r a t io n is  would apply it has been 
stressed that in case of formal validity of marriage the reference to the lex loci 
c e l e b r a t i o n i s  should be considered as "...an alternative reference to either its 
conflict rules or its domestic ru les..."179
There must be, therefore, justifications for applying the renvoi mechanism 
in the formal validity of marriage. This situation, in fact, can be explained by 
two facts. According to the first one the application of whatever law the lex loci 
c e l e b r a t io n i s  would apply is merely an inference or a deduction from the case 
of T a cza n o ska  v. T a c za n o w sk i .18° This case concerns the formal validity of 
marriage of two polish nationals who went through a ceremony of marriage 
according to the rites of the Roman catholic church in Rome in 1946.181 From 
the court of appeal1 s point of view the M arriage in T a c z a n o w s k a  v .
176-The difference between Lawrence  v . Lawrence  and B ren tw ood  Superin tendent  
R eg is trar  M arr iages  is that in the former case the remarriage took place abroad. See Collier, J. 
G., Op. cit., p 32.
177- The Law Commission working Paper N ° 89 and the Scottish Law Comm ission  
C onsu lta tive M emorandum N °6 4 , Priva te  International Law, Choice o f  L aw  Rules in 
M a r r i a g e ,  London, Her Mejesty's Stationery Office, 1985, p 96; See the later report o f the 
Scottish Law Commission, D iscussion Paper N° 85, Family LAw, Pre-Consolidation  Reforms,  
1990, pp 114-115.
178- The Law Commission working Paper N° 89 ,Ibid., p 35; See Collier J. G. Op.cit.,  p 273.
179- Dicey & Morris , Op.cit.,  p 85; See Morris, J.H.C. The Conflict of Laws, Op.cit., p 477.
180- This case has been considered as an indication that renvoi may be applicable to the 
forms of marriage.[1957] P.301, 305, 318, [1956] 3A11 ER 457, [1957] 3 W. L. R. 141.
181- [1957] 3 W.L.R. 141, See Carter P. B., " Decisions of British Courts During 1956-1957  
involving Questions o f Public or Private International Law, Brit. Y. B. Int. L„  XXXIII, (1957), 
p332.
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T a c k z a n o w s k iw a s  held formally invalid182 according to both Polish and Italian 
la w .183 According to the court of Appeal' s point of view the marriage will be 
held valid from English point of view if it is formally valid as well in polish 
la w .184 In other words, if the marriage is formally valid according to the conflict 
rules of the country of the celebration this could be considered enough despite 
its formal invalidity according to the domestic rules of that country.185
Due to the fact that Ta ckzan oska  v. T a c za n o w sk i  has been considered an 
Authority that supports the application of renvoi in the formal validity of 
m a r r ia g e 186 it has been held therefore that the marriage can be considered as 
formally valid if it is done according to the conflict of laws of the lex loci 
c e l e b r a t i o n i s ,  and not to its domestic law .187 Furthermore, it is through the 
d ic ta  in the case of T a c za n o w ska  v. T A cza n o w sk i  which led to stress that the
reference to the law of the lex  loci ce lebra tio n is  should be considered as a
reference to either its internal rules or its conflict rules.188
The second fact, however, is justified by using the renvoi as a means to 
upheld the formal validity of marriage celebrated abroad as an analogy to the 
use of renvoi in the formal validity of wills. It must be noticed that the analysis
182- The marriage, however, is said to be upheld because it was considered as agood
common law marriage. [1957] P.301. See Collier, J.G., O p .c i t ., p 29; Dicey & Morris, O p.c it . ,  p 91 
notes 99.
183- For discussion see also Carter, P. B., " Decisions o f British Courts During 1959- 1960 
Involving Questions o f Public or Private International Law, Brit. Y. B. Int. L., XXXV I, (1960), 
p416. notes 2
184- The problem wich emerged is that the Polish spouses celebrated their marriage in 
Italy wchich was considered as void  according to Italian internal law because it was a 
marriage without a civ il celebration. According to Italian Conflict rules, however, Marriage 
w ill be considered as formally valid if  it respect the requiremants of the law o f the Parties' 
nationality. [1957] P 301; [1957] 2 All ER 563.
185- Jaffey, A. J. E., Op.cit., pp 50, 261.
186- Cheshire & North,Op.cit.,  p 73.
187- North, P. M., The Private International Law o f  Matrimonial Causes in the British  
Isles and the Republic o f  Ireland, Volume 1, North- Holland , 1977 p 138, notes 3.
188- Dicey, Conflict o f Laws, 7th edition, by Morris, J.H., (ed.,), London, Stevens & Sons 
Limited, 1958, p 76; For discussion see also Carter, P. B., " Decisions of British Courts During 1959- 
1960- Involving Questions o f public or private International Law" L o c .c i t . ,  p 416. See Morris, 
J.H.C. The Conflict o f  Laws, Op.cit., p 477.
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in this context requires the writer to relate this justification with the rule of 
locus  reg it  actum .  As a matter of fact this rule, with regard to the formal 
validity of marriage, is imperative and not optional in English law whereas in 
Italy, for instance, it is facultative.189 It has been claimed in this context that in 
England, where the locus reg it actum  is an imperative rule, the use of the 
doctrine of renvoi is practically needed. According to Lennart PMsson it is the 
acceptance of renvoi which "...w ill tend to relax the imperative nature of the rule 
L o cus  reg it actum  and ...b ring ...a  certain r a p p r o c h e m e n t  to those countries 
whose conflicts systems admit a choice between the lex loci and the personal 
l a w . . . " 190 This means that the application of only the lex locis celebrationis  as 
stated by the Rule 70, is a rigid rule whereas the flexibility in the continental 
countries takes into consideration either the lex loci celebrationis  or the parties' 
personal law .191
As can be seen there is a tendency which supports the view that the 
reference should be either to the domestic rules of the lex loci ce lebra tion is  or 
whatever system of domestic law is referred to by the conflict rules of the 
country of celebration. It means that the marriage will be held as formally valid 
if it complies with the formalities stated either by the law selected by the conflict 
rules of the lex loci celebrationis  or simply by the internal law of thecountry of 
c e le b ra t io n .192 This led to maintain that the use of renvoi mechanism is only to 
validate a marriage from point of view of form and not invalidate it.193 In other 
words the application of renvoi in the formal validity of marriage has been 
justified by the fact that the predominant views of English writers is that the use
189- Dicey & Morris,O p.c i t . ,  P 599; Morris J.H.C., Ibid.,  p 150; See also Loussouam, Y. et 
Bourel, P Op.cit., p 469.
190- P&lsson, L., "Marriage and Divorce", International Encyclopedia o f  Comparative  
L a w ,  by L ipstein, Kurt., V ol III, Chapter 16, Chapter 16, (1978) p 30. See also  
P M sson .L .,Marriage and Divorce in Comparative Conflict o f  Laws, Leiden, A. W. Sijthoff, 1974, 
p 304.
191- Dicey & Morris, Op.cit., pp 84-85.
192- P&lsson, L., Marriage and Divorce in Compartrive Conflict o f  Laws, O p .c i t . ,p p  304-
305.
193- See the Law Commission working paper N ° 89 and the Scottish Law Commision 
Consultative Memorandum N° 64, Op.cit .,  p 35.
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of renvoi in this field should be admitted in order to uphold a marriage and not 
to annul it.194 In fact , there are those who think that English court would be
prepared to apply foreign conflict rules if it appears that this would lead to the
validation of marriage.195 Additionally, the application of renvoi in the formal 
validity of marriage is said to represent a way of preventing a limping marriage 
between the law of the forum and that of the country of the lex  loci
celebrat ionis  .196
On the whole, it has been claimed that by the process of renvoi the
marriage will be held valid in England even if it is formally invalid by the
domestic law of the lex loci celebrationis  but formally valid by the law chosen
by the conflict rules of the place of celebration.197 Moreover, there are
indications that the marriage of a British subject should comply with the
requirements of Common law of England if it appears that it is impossible to 
confirm with the local forms of the country X .198 It means, that the marriage 
will be held as formally valid if it is celebrated in the country X according to the 
requirements of English Common law whereas it appears that it is impossible to 
use the local forms of the country X.199
3)- Renvoi and domicile of origin of a British su b jec t .
a)- C o n t r o v e r s i e s  on how  to find out the na tiona l  law of a
B rit ish  su b jec t  The question on how to interpret the meaning of the law o f - 
the subject who belongs to a Plurilegislative territorial or personal unit is a
vague question. The discussion in this context, however, will be based only on
194- Pdlsson.L., Marriage and Divorce in Compartrive conflict o f  Laws, O p .c i t . ,  pp 304-
305.
195- Ibid., p 303.
196- The Law Commision Working Paper N ° 89 and the Scottish Law Comm ission
Consultative Memorandum N° 64, Op.cit .,  p 34.
197- Morris, J.H.C., The Conflict o f  Laws, Op.cit., p 151.
198- See in this context Cheshire, G.C., Private International Law, 5th edition, Oxford, at
the Clarendon Press, p 329 see also Carter P.B., "Decisions of British Courts During 1956-1957
involving Questions o f Public or Private International Law", L oc .c i t . ,  p 333.
199- If it seems impossible for the parties to use the local form of a country, such as, a
marriage in M oslim  country which does not provide a Christian form. Their marriage , 
however, is said to be held valid despite the fact that it did not comply with the local form of the 
lex locis celebrationis. See Dicey & Morris , Op.cit., Rule 70(2) , pp 597, 605.
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the question of how to find out the national law of a British subject when the
foreign conflict rule indicates the application of a national law of a British national 
X. Does this mean the application of English law or scots law? Thus, the inquiry 
will be as follow: by which law the word "national law" should be interpreted; is 
it by the forum or foreign law? For that purpose some of the English cases will
be cited to illustrate this situation. These are as follows: Re R o s s 2 0 0 , Re
A s k e w ? ® *  and Re O' Keefe?®2
In Re Rossthe  question was how the Italian courts would determine the 
national law of X. This has been answered by Italian witnesses which claim that 
"...The English law applicable is that part of the law which would be applicable to 
an English national domiciled in England."203 In his view Falconbridge J. .D., 
however, claims that the Italian witnesses explained what is the meaning of the 
national law of an English national and not that of a British national.204
In R e  A s k e w  too the German witness' reasoning is said to be 
unsatisfactory in that it did not succeed to interpret the meaning of the national 
law of a British subject205
Concerning the case of Re O'  Keefe206 the deceased who died a spinster
and intestate in Italy, where she resided for forty seven years, had been
considered by Crossman as having a British nationality. Eire in Southern Ireland
was considered as her domicil of origin although she spent most of her life in 
India and died domiciled in Italy.207 Crossman reached his solution by using the
200- [1930] 1 Ch. 377.
201- [1930] 2 Ch. 259.
202-[1940] Ch. 124.
203- [1930] 1 Ch. 377.
204- Falconbridge, J.D., " Renvoi in New York and Elswhere " L oc.cit . ,  p 723.
205- A ccording to German w itness "...John B etram  A skew  was an Englishm an. 
Therefore English law would be applied by the German court in deciding the question." [1930] 
2 Ch. 259; See Ibid., pp 723-724.
206- Re O' Keefe ( deceased); Poingdestre  v . Shuman. [1940] Ch. 124; [1940] 1 All E.R.
216; 109 1. L. J. Ch. 86; 162 L. T.
207- Eire is the country o f the dom icile o f  origin o f her father.Besides the d e
c u ju sv is i tc d  Ireland with her father when she was a child. Falconbridge," Renvoi in New
York and Elswhere" L o c .c i t . ,  p 724; Graveson, R. H., Comparative Conflict o f  Laws, Selected
Essays^  Volume 1, Amsterdam, New York, Oxford, North Holland, Publishing Compagny, 1977,
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mechanism of the double renvoi theory. In fact, the reasoning starts by 
admitting that the deceased who died intestate acquired a domicile of choice in 
Italy. According to the evidence given by the affidavit art 8 of the preliminary 
dispositions of the Italian civil code of 1865 the law of the deceased nationality 
should govern her succession. The question, therefore, which faces the court is 
the meaning of the British nationality. To resolve this situation Crossman, J.
claims that according to experts evidences the succession of the deceased would 
be distributed by the law of the country "...to which- the intestate belonged and 
belonged, I think at the time of her death" 208 He goes on to emphasises that the 
applicable law to is the "... the part of the British empire to which the intestate 
can be said to have belonged...". He, then, come to the point that " ...in  the
circumstances, is the part from which she originated..."209, i.e.,the law of Eire was 
considered as the only part from which the deceased originated.210 In other 
words the court held that although the deceased acquired domicile of choice, in 
Italy she had never acquired Italian nationality.211 Accordingly, the deceased' s 
movables succession was distributed according to the internal law of Eire 
through the process of renvoi.212
In this regard, it is important to keep in mind that scholars' views differ as
well concerning the application of domicile of origin in the case of Re O ’ Keefe
Starting with the view of Anton A. E., this scholar maintains that the rule will be 
as follow: "...if we must find the national law" of persons belonging to a state with 
two or more territorial systems of internal law, Crossman J' S approach is the 
only practicable one".213 According to another view, however, when the 
question of what is the national law of a British national arises before the court, 
this will apply the most closely connected conception 214 It means that the court
p 331.
208- [1940] Ch. 124, 126.
209- Ibid., at p 130.
210-Castel, J. G., Op.cit., pp 63-64
2 1 1 -  Hoyle, M S.W., (ed.,),Op.ci7., p 25.
212- See Morris, J. H. C., The Conflict of Laws, Op.cit., pp 478- 479.
213-Anton, A.E., Op.cit., p 67.
214- Wolff, M., Op.cit., p 132.
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has to choose the law that is most closely connected to the deceased.215
The first critical remark which has been made upon Crossman' s reasoning 
reads as follows. Although the judge applied the law of Eire by basing his 
reasoning upon Italian experts, this law, however, is said to be neither the law 
which would be applied by Italian courts for movables situated in Italy nor the
law of the deceased's last domicile designed by English Conflict rule.216 In other 
words, the legal system by which the parties' rights were determined in this 
case is "... neither the national law nor the law of the domicil as envisaged by the 
English rule for choice of law" This is what makes the ju d g e 's  comment "...surely 
superflous" 217 Among other criticisms which have been said towards the use of 
the domicile of origin is that there was no evidence which prove that the
national law of the British citizen means the law of his domicile of origin. 
According to this view the assumption of the English court to decide how the
foreign court would determine the national law of a British subject is not
n e c e s s a r i ly  a c c u ra te .218 Furthermore, it is thought that if the English 
interpretation maintained that Italian law substitutes nationality for domicile in
case of a non unified system the more acceptable solution would be the
application of Italian law as the deceased domicile.219 Moreover, there are those 
who consider the solution reached by Crossman, J., in Re O' Keefe  as absurd.220 
This is the view approved by Morris in which he emphasizes that " .. . if  the
evidence of foreign law is misleading or inadequate" the consequences will be, 
therefore, " English court may reach a result which is unreal or unjust to the
point of absurdity..."221 The same argument has been made to justify that the 
application of domicile of origin leads also to "...some bizarre results ..."222
215. See in this context Nadelman, H., M Mancini's Nationality Rule and non Unified Legal 
Systems, Nationality Versus Domicile, 17 Amer. J. Comp. L, (1969) p 446.
216- Flaconbridge, J. D., " Renvoi in New York and Elswhere" Loc.cit . ,  p 724.
217- Cheshire & North , Op.cit.,  p 65.
218- Dicey & Morris, Op.cit., p 87.
219- Batiffol, H., " Principes de Droit International Prive"., Recueil des cours.  Vol. II, 
Tome 97, (1959) p 529.
220- See Falconbridge, J.D., " Renvoi and the Law of Domicile" 19 Can. B. Rev., (1941) 324, 
326; See also Rabel, E., Op.cit., p 142.
221- Morris, J.H.C., The Conflict o f  Lawsx Op.cit., p 478.
222- Carter, P. B., " Domicil: The Case for Radical Reform in the United Kingdom", 36 Int' I
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Additionally, it has been maintained that if Italian court had been asked to 
express their view upon the country where "...the intestate ' belonged 1 at the 
time of her death?... the answer might very well have been Italy..."223 Another 
basic argument, in this respect, is that Italian courts nowadays interpret the 
national law of a British citizen domiciled in Italy to mean Italian law and not his 
domicile of origin.224 If this belief is accurate an important point must be taken 
into consideration which is "...the case of Re Ross and Re O' Keefe  are no longer 
reliable guides."225
b)- Su b s t i tu t io n  o f dom ic i le  fo r  n a t io n a l i ty  as a connecting  
f a c to r .  It is obvious that the substitution of domicile for nationality is the case 
in a composite or non unified system, such as, the situation in Great Britain. In 
other words, the only solution to solve the problem when a reference is to a 
composite system is the renounciation of nationality and the return to 
d o m ic i le .226 This is why Rodolfo De Nova, for example, has remarked that the 
nationality in this context fails as a connecting factor and the person would be 
considered as stateless. Following this view Re O'  Keefe  estate, therefore, should 
be distributed according to Italian law as the law of her l a s t ' residence.227 
According to this scholar if the person is in the situation of Re 0  Keefe  his status 
should be governed by the law of domicile and will be, therefore, considered as 
stateless.228
It is not astonishing, to indicate that the use of the domicile of origin229 has
& Comp. L. Q . f m i ) ,  pp 716, 722.
223- Inglis, B. D., " The Judicial Process in the Conflict o f Laws " 74 Law. Quar Rev., (1958) 
p 498. Originally emphasised.
224- Dicey & Morris, Op.cit., p 87.
225- Ibid., p 88.
226- Batiffol, H., Loc.cit., pp 527- 529.
227- De Nova, R., Lo.cit., pp 549, 555.
228- De Nova, R.," Les Systbmes Juridiques Complexes en Droit International Prive" 44 
Re. crit. dr. int. priv.,  (1955), p p l, 14; See in this context Nadelmann, K.H., L o c .c i t . ,  p 444; 
Kahn-Freund, 0 . ,  Loc. cit., p 390.
229- As a matter o f fact domicile of origin is too difficult to be changed that dom icile of 
choice. This, in fact, led to believe that the conception o f English domicile of origin is similar to 
the nationality conception in civ il law countries. Furthermore, La raison d ’ etre o f this form 
of domile is to allow everyone at every time having a domicile. See. Gravcson, R.H., Conflict o f  
Laws: Private International Law, O p .c i t . ,  pp 48, 198; Gravcson, R.H., Comparative Conflict, o f
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been interpreted as an important defence used by English judges against the 
application of laws to British citizens that might be different from English 
conceptions.230 In fact as E. M. Meijers puts it "...countries accepting the principle 
of domicile have only two ways of escape: Public Policy or the introduction of a 
domicil of origin..."231
It should also be observed that the artificiality of the doctrine of revival of 
the domicile of origin led to admit the undesirability of this doctrine.
Accordingly, a tendency for a switch from this doctrine to the rule of continuance
,.i.e, the continuity of a person's domicile until another one is acquired, has been
a d v o c a te d .232 In fact, the case of Ramsay  v. Liverpool  Royal  I n f i r m a r y ^ ,  in
which the House of Lords adhered to the domicile of origin, has been considered 
as the principal cause for the recent tendency in English law which calls for the 
change of domicile and the rejection of the domicile of origin 234
4)- W h a t is the Scots Jud ic ia l view on the d o c tr in e  of renvoi, 
Although Scots Courts have not been seized yet of the issue it will be better to 
refer to scholars views in this matter. In fact, the question that should be asked 
is what tendency will be favoured by the Scots courts. Is it the internal law
LAws, Selected Essays, Op.cit., p 245;. Collier, J.G., Op cit, .p 41.
230- Batiffol, H., " Principes de Droit International Privd, Lo.cit. ,  pp 512-513.
231- Meijers, E. M., H The Benelux Convention on Private Internationla Law ", 2 Amer. J. 
Comp. L.,( 1953) p 2.
232- The Recommendation o f  the English and Scottish Law Commison was that the 
revival o f the dom icile o f origin rule sould be abolished. See the first report o f Private 
International Committee (1954) Cmd. 9068, Para. 14., See in this context The Law Commission 
Working Paper N ° 88 and the Scottish Law Commission Consultative Memorandum N ° 63, 
Private International Law. The Law o f  Domicile.  London, Her M ajestey's Stationery O ffice, 
1985, pp 57-60; See also the Law Commission and the Scottish Law Commission (Law Com N° 
168) (Scot. Law Com. N° 107), Private International Law, The Law o f  Domicile, London, Her 
Majestey's Stationery Office, 1987, p 44; See Dicey & Morris, The Conflict o f  L aw s ,T h ird  
Cumultative Supplement to the Eleventh Edition, by Lawrence Collins , London, Stevens & 
Sons, 1989, pp 12,14.
233- His Scots dom icile was retained altthough he lived in Liverpool for many years 
without the intention o f returning in Scotland.(1930) A.C. 588.
234- Graveson, R.H., " The Comparative Evolution of Principles o f the Conflict o f Laws in 
England and the U.S.A", Recueil des Cours, Vol I, Tome 99 (1960),p 48; Graveson, R. H„ 
Comparative Conflict o f  Laws, Selected Essays, Op.cit., p 245.
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theory, renvoi remission, transmission or the double renvoi theory? It can be 
deduced from the reasoning of some scholars that a court in Scotland might 
adopt the total renvoi although this, practically, leads to a negative consequences 
if the other legal system will be England, i.e., the circulus inextrecabi l is  becomes 
inevitable. As a matter of fact, Falconbridge maintains that : 235
"...A court in Scotland...would not be strictly bound to follow  the series o f  
decisions o f single Judges supporting the theory o f total renvoi in English 
law, but might adopt the theory of total renvoi if  the necessity arose ...o f  
defining exactly  what theory o f the renvoi Prevails or should prevail 
there..."
According to anther opinion, however, Scottish court should accept 
remission from foreign conflict rules if it is seized of the case. In this context A.E. 
Anton points out that:236
"...From a practical standpoint there is a case o f common sense in the view  
that a Scottish court should not necessarily refuse to apply its own law when 
the chosen system refers a question back to it...w hile, as yet, the courts in 
this country have not given practical effect to this approach, it is thought 
that it should not be entirely discounted"
Above all, Scots courts can be classified among other legal systems which
have not taken position on the renvoi issue. Does this judicial and legal emptiness
means the implicit rejection of renvoi? Although this might be supported
theoretically, Practically, however, there is no evidence which justifies this claim.
II)- R e p ud ia t io n  of renvoi in the two d if fe ren t  legal system s, 
The repudiation of renvoi in both Civil and Common law countries has been 
divided into three main points : rejection of renvoi in legal systems which are 
silent on the renvoi matter, those which reject its mechanism expressly and
special reference to Algerian law in this respect.
235- See Falconbridge, J. D. " Renvoi in New York and Elswhere,Loc.cit . ,  p 719.
236- Anton, A.E., Op.cit ., p 64.
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A)- Legislative system s which a re  s ilent on renvoi.
Starting from the Latin American countries, among the legislative systems 
which do use renvoi are, for instance, Argentina237 Colombia and Uruguay.238 
This position has been justified by the fact that historically, the codes of those 
countries date before the development of the renvoi theory.239 In addition , the 
rejection of renvoi by the jurisprudence of those stated Latin American countries 
has been justified by the fact that rules for the application of renvoi do not
exist.240
In the Arab world Lebanon241 and Tunisia242 can be cited as an example of
States which reject renvoi without any statutory provisions.243
B)- R e jec t io n  of renvo i bv leg is la tion  and c o u r t  d e c is io n s . I n
Europe many of the statutory legislative systems are against renvoi. In fact, Italy 
which adopts nationality principle rejects the mechanism of renvoi.244. Greece is 
another country which adopts nationality  and also rejects the renvoi 
m e c h a n i s m .245 Among the countries which adopt the principle of domicile,
237- The Argentinian project does not contain rules on renvoi. Von Overbeck, A.E., 
L o c .c i t ., P 133; See Rabel, E., The Conflict o f  Laws, A Comparative Study, 2nd edition, Volume 2, 
Ann Anbor, University o f Michigan Law School, 1960, pp 514-515.
238- De Maekelt, T. B., " General Rules o f Private International Law in the Americas. New  
Approach M Recueil des cours, Vol IV, Part 177, (1982) p 276.
239- Ibid.
240- Id.
241- Although there is no legislative D isposition wchich reject expressley renvoi , 
Lebanese jurisprudence tend to reject renvoi from the law o f personal status, in fact its 
mechanism is rejected by the majority o f the courts' decisions. See Sadekh, H.A., Cours de Droit 
I n te r n a t io n a l  P r i v i ,  B eiru t,( N .D .) p .87; Benattar, R.," Problem es R elatifs au Droit 
International Priv6 de la Famille dans les Pays de Droit Personnel" , Recueil des cours, Vol n ,  
Tome 121, (1967) p 35.
242- Despite the fact that in Tunisia there is no legislative disposition which rejects 
renvoi its mechanism, however, is siad to be rejected by the Tunisian cour de cassation.  See, 
in this context Benattar, R., Ibid.
243- See in this context, PAlsson, L.,Marriage and Divorce in Comparative Conflict o f  
Laws, Op.cit.,  p 111,footnotes 239.
244- See the Italian civil code of 16 Mars (1942). Disp. Prel. art. 30; T. M. C. Asser Institut, 
O p .c i t . ,  p 125.; Rabel, E.,The Conflict o f  Laws A Comparative Study, 1958, O p .c i t . ,  pp 88, 142 
notes 123; Francescakis, P.h., Op.cit., p 268; See also Siehr, K.G.J^oc.cit., p 65.
245- See article 32 o f the Greek civ il code. T. M. C. Asser Institut, I b i d . ,  P. 140. 
Francescakis, P.h Ib id . ,  P 267; P&lsson, L., Marriage and Divorce in Comparative Conflict o f
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however, and reject renvoi are, for instance, Norway and Denmark.246
With regard to the Arab countries which have a Moslem majority, these 
have been considered as ignoring the renvoi theory.247 As a matter of fact, 
renvoi is rejected expressly by the civil codes of Egypt,248 Irak,249 Syria, 250 and 
libya.251
C)- R ep ud ia tio n  of renvoi by the A lgerian legal system,
1)- The silence of the A lgerian leg is la tu re  on renvoi. It should be 
noted that despite the fact that Algeria is considered as a moslem country it is, 
however, classified into a civil legal system.252 Concerning the theory of renvoi 
Algeria, as other Moslem countries, do not contain rules on this issue253 ,i.e., 
renvoi is not regulated by the Algerian civil code. According to an Algerian 
scholar Algerian Jurisprudence has not yet been seized of the renvoi question.254 
Due to the fact the law of this country does not give a solution to the renvoi issue 
it has been claimed, therfore, that the silence of the Algerian legislature means
Laws, O p .c i t . ,  p 111, notes 237; Siehr, K .G .Jb id . ,  P 65; See also Von Overbeck., A.E., L o c .c i t . ,  
p l5 7 .
246- Schwind, F.," Aspects et Sens du Droit International Prive", Recueil des cours, Vol 
IV, Tome 187, (1984) p 75; Von Overbeck, A.E., Ibid., p 156.
247- Isaad, M., Droit International Privd, Volume I, Alger, O.P.U.,1986, P 175; Mayer, P., 
Op.cit., p 192.
248- See Art 27 Of the Egyptian civ il code o f 29 July 1948, See Journal O fficiel du
Gouvernement Egyptian, N ° extraordinaire du 29 Juillet 1948, N ° 108 bis " A "; Francescakis,
Ph. O p .c i t . ,  p 266; Anton, A.E., Op cit, p 61, note 90; Maridakis, G.S., " Le Renvoi en Droit 
International Priv6, A n n u a i r e ,  Vingt Troisi'eme Commision, Volume 50, Tome I, Session de 
Bruxelles, (1963) pp 501-502; Lalive, P.," Tendances et M6thodes en Droit International Priv6 
(Cours Gdndral)", Recueil des cours, Vol H, Tome 155, (1977) P 268; Sadekh, E.A.,Op.cit.,  P 86.
249- See article 31 para 1 o f the Iraky civil code; See in this context Peyrard, G., " La 
Solution des Conflits de Lois en Algerie ", 66 Re. crit. dr inti, priv., (1977) p 386; Benattar, R.," 
L o c .c i t . ,  p 34; Charfi, M., " L' Influence de la Religion dans le Droit International Priv6 des Pays
Musulmans ", Recueil des cours., Vol III, Tome 203, (1987) p 401; PMsson, L M arr ia ge  and
Divorce in Comparative Conflict o f  Laws, Op.cit .,  p 111, notes 239.
250- See article 29 o f the civil code o f 16 May 1949. Journal Officiel o f 31 May 1949. See 
Levontin, A .V ., O p .c i t . ,  P 52; Francescakis, P.h., O p .c i t ., pp 225, 270; Maridakis, G.S., L o c .c i t . ,  
pp501-502; Charfi, M.,Ibid., Peyard, G., Ibid.
251- See article 27 o f the libyan civ il code, P&lsson, L., M arriage  and D ivo rce  in 
Comparative Conflict o f  LawsjOp.cit.,  p 111, notes 239.
252- Amin, S H., " Classification o f Legal System in the Moslem Countries ", Islamic & 
Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol VII, N° 2, (1987) p 94.
253- Von Overbeck, A .E Loc.cit., p 133.
254- Isaad, M.,Volume 1, Op.cit.,  p 175.
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that renvoi is excluded by the Algerian private international law.255
One commentator has remarked that it is astonishing that the Algerian civil 
code has not referred to the renvoi problem in that it has neither accepted or 
rejected it by legislation disposition.256 He wishes that the Algerian civil code 
had accepted renvoi remission in matters of personal status. This scholar has 
justified his argument by relying on two main points. First, Algeria is a country
which imports foreigners many of whom are of Anglo Saxon origin and their
countries adopt domicile as a connecting factors in matters of personal status. 
According to him rejecting renvoi means the application of the law of the
foreigners which are numerous and unfamiliar to him and might cause problem 
for the Algerian courts to find out its rules25 7 , i.e., it might require the 
ascertainment of foreign domestic law. Secondly, the application of foreign
substantive law means the restriction of the field of Algerian law.258 It can be 
replied to this that none of the justifications can be considered as an excuse for
accepting renvoi by the Algerian court. First, because the difficulties which this
scholar refers to seems irrelevant in the contemporary age where the foreign 
law can be known and understood through different means, such as conferences
periodicals, case books and comparative law. Second, does this scholar 
understand that the application of renvoi at first degree in Algeria could 
represent a risk for the non Algerian citizens. It should also be noted that if his
suggestion is accurate this requires a disestablishment of the religion from the
state which is not the case now in Algeria. Third, widening the field of the
application of Algerian law by accepting renvoi is a kind of advocating the 
previous conceptions of the territoriality principle and the preference of the
forum law.
There is ,however, a considerable controversies about article 23 of the 
Algerian civil code on whether it involves the renvoi issue.259 Concerning this
255- Peyard, G., Loc.cit., p 386.
256- Soulaiman, A .k . ,N o tes  on Algerian Private International Lawx Alger, O.P.U, 1984,
p49.
257- Ibid., pp 55-56.
258- Ibid., p 56.
259- According to its disposition " Lorsque les dispositions qui precedent ren voien t. au
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matter, it has been claimed that article 23 of the Algerian civil code has nothing 
to do with renvoi at first degree or second degree. According to this view the 
purpose of this article is only to indicate to the Algerian judge that when the 
Algerian Conflict rules refer to a foreign country which is a composite legal 
system he should, therefore, refer to the internal law of that country which will 
indicateto him the applicable law system to the legal problem. It means that if 
the Algerian judge is seized of the legal issue which might refer him, for instance, 
to the United States of America he must, therefore, refer to the American 
Federal law in order to know which law is applicable. Is it the law of Dallas, 
California, or that of new york?260 In this context, it has been accepted that 
legally when the forum law refers to a composite state of territorial bases such 
as as the United States of America, where there are more than fifty federal 
States, the reference should be, therefore, to the internal conflict rule of those 
federal States.261
It should be noted that there are some scholars who have interpreted 
article 23 as an example of the so called N e c e s s a i r e ,  internal renvoi or the 
delegation conception which means that the forum makes a sort of delegation to 
a foreign law in order to indicate the internal applicable law. This internal 
renvoi, however, has been considered by others as having no similarities with 
the true renvoi because the latter leads to the application of the law of a foreign 
country which declines its competence and would rather have referred the 
matter to the forum or another law. Practically, this is not the case with the 
internal renvoi in which the law of the composite states does not decline its 
competence to a foreign law but it only indicates the applicable system according 
to the internal conflict rules of the different law systems.262
Generally it has been argued that the absolute rejection of renvoi should be 
maintained in article 23 when the Algerian conflict rule refers to a non unified
droit d'un Etat dans lequel existent plusieurs syst&mes juridiques, le system e a appliquer est 
determine par le droit interne de cet Etat " C.f. ,  the dispositions o f article 26 o f the Egyptain 
civil code.
260- Isaad, M., Op.cit., p 175.
261- Loussouarn, Y., & Bourel, P., Op.cit., p 136.
262- Soulaiman, A.A., Op.cit., pp 62-63, Sadekh, H.A., Op.cit., p 90.
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system. This has been justified by the fact that it is too difficult to think that the 
Algerian judge, in this context, will accept a competence to its own law through 
the process of renvoi.263 It has also been admitted that, as a rule, the Algerian
judge will apply the substantive law of the foreign State and not its conflict rules 
if is seized of the m atter264
2)- The legislative policy of the Algerian leg is la tu re .
There must be a reason for excluding renvoi in Algeria. In fact, the general 
view of scholars is that in Algeria as in other moslem countries, such as, Egypt, 
family law is subject to islamic principles.265 It means that the law of the 
personal status in Algeria is based upon Islamic law266 which makes the
situation difficult to apply Algerian law to foreigners.267 In this context, an
Algerian scholar goes on to stress that there will be a risk for an American or an
Englishman if the Algerian law is applied. The risk is that they might become
polygamous if this application occurs.268 Furthermore, accepting renvoi from
foreign law to Algerian law, which is not the ca^se now in Algeria, will
undoubtedly lead to the application of Islamic religious principles to a foreigners 
if the case, for instance, concerns the distribution of succession, brought before an 
Algerian court of a British subject who died domiciled in Algiers.269 If the
Algerian court is seized of the matter it will held that in family law succession is 
subject to the law of the de cujus' s nationality, i.e., English law. Evidence will 
shows that English law adopts the last domicile of the deceased as a connecting
factor to govern matters of succession. The law of the last domicile in this
context is Algeria. The application of renvoi, in this context, is against the
263- Peyrard, G., Loc.cit., p 386.
264- Soulaiman, A. A., Op.cit., p 56.
265- Sadekh, H.A., Op.cit.,p 85.
266- See the Algerian family code wchich was adopted in june 1984, Loi 84-11, J o u r n a l
Officiel de la Republique klgerilnne^ N° 24 du 12 Juin 1984, p 612 et s; See also Borrmaus, M.,
le Nouveau Code Algdrien de la Famille dans 1' Ensemble des Codes Musulmans de Statut
Personnel, Principalement dans les Pays Arabes, R. I .D. C., (1986) p 133.
267- Isaad, M.,Volume I, Op.cit., p 176.
268- Ibid.
269-According to article 16 o f the Algerian civ il code" les successions, testaments et
autres dispositions k cause de mort, sont r£gis par la loi nationale du de cujus, du testateur ou du 
disposant au moment edu deces".
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expectation of parties in that it leads to apply on foreigners dispositions or norms 
which might be unknown to them.270
By maintaining the rejection of renvoi byAlgerian legal system, however, 
this is the way an Algerian judge will decide the case. He will apply to the
succession dispute English substantive rules if the deceased is an Englishman 
and avoiding any reference back to Algerian law.
Moreover, the discussion of the renvoi refusal in Algeria has been also 
related to the principle of nationality adopted by Algerian legal system. It has 
been said, in this context, that the advantage of nationality principle is that if the 
person is Algerian national, family law, i. e., Islamic principles will be applicable 
to him even if he is emigrant. This law, however, is said to be not applicable to a
foreigner even if his national law refers to Algeria as the law of his domicile.271
Additionally, article 15 of the Algerian civil code has been considered as an 
evidence which indicates the rejection of renvoi. This article states that the 
substantive rules as regard guardanship and other institutions of protecting the
incapable are determined by the national law of the person in protection.272 The 
law of nationality, therefore, has been taken to connote the substantive rules of 
that law.
Above all, it has been recognized that the admission of renvoi in Algeria 
seems, practically, impossible as far as the law of personal status in this country 
is not laicized273,.i.e., a non separation of the religion from the state.
S u b - s e c t i o n .......,2.;- S o m e  o b s e r v a t i o n s  u p o n  th e  im posed.
re s t r ic t io n s  on renvo i m echan ism .
The analysis of renvoi in the countries which are in favour of renvoi might
270- It must be noted that the distribution of succesion is regulated by the new A lgerian  
family law according to Islamic law.
271- Peyard, G., Loc.cit ., p 386.
272- " Les regies de fonds en matiere d Administration ldgale, de curatelle et autres 
institutions de protection des incapables et des absents, sont determines par la loi national de la 
personne A protdger ". Code civile, ordonnance n° 75-58 du 26 septembre 1975 portant le code 
c iv il .
273- Isaad, M.,Volume 1 Op.cit., p 176.
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be incomplete if it is not followed by the different decisions that have repudiated 
its mechanism in those countries. Of course, it is necessary to discuss the cases 
that illustrate the field of renvoi application but it is also important to show that 
this application is not absolute but restricted. However, it should be noted that 
the word restriction covers neither all the issues nor all countries in which renvoi 
has been rejected. This reflection, instead, deals only with the few important and 
main fields where the mechanism of renvoi has been rejected or might be 
re jected .
Generally, the purpose of this section is to state that if renvoi still exists in 
private international law, the reality is that its field of application has been 
d ecreased .274
I- The principle  of locus  r e n t  a c t u m a n d  re n v o i .
A)- The exclusion of renvoi in m a tte rs  re la ting  to forms of ac ts . 
Forms of acts have been claimed as representing an exception to the renvoi 
m e c h a n ism 275 ,i.e., its mechanism will be excluded in relation to the locus regit
a c t u m  rule.276 In this respect, it has been maintained that if a legal act
corresponds with the form prescribed by the law of the place where it was 
made, i.e., locus regit  actum,  there is no pretext, however, to consider it as 
invalid on the ground that it did not respect the form of the law indicated by the 
conflict rules of the locus regit  ac tum .277 The question that might be asked is 
what happens if the Act is invalid by the l o c u s l  Can reference be made to the 
conflict rules of the l o c u s l  In fact,, this was the origin of the development of 
renvoi thinking in English law concerning the formal validity of wills
By referring to English law, for instance, the will Act of 1963 has been
considered as an evidence that renvoi is excluded in matters of forms in that the 
reference made by this will has been interpreted to mean the internal law of the 
applicable law.278
2 7 4 - See Communication de Foyer, J., " Requiem pour le Renvoi ? " Seance du 4 juin 1980, 
Trav. Comite, Frangais. dr.in.privt^  (1979-1980), p 107.
275- Sadekh, H.A., Op.cit.,p 83.
276- Isaad, M.,Volume 1, Op.cit, p 177.
277- Sadekh., H.A .,Op.cit, p 84.
278- Graveson, R.H., Conflict o f  Laws, Private International Law, O p .c i t . ,  p 484. For more
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B)- The reasons  for the in com patib ili ty  of renvoi with form of 
ac ts  Different reasons have been cited for excluding renvoi from the form of 
acts. First, it might be difficult for the contracting parties to know the disposition 
of the law of the country other than the country of the performance.279 
According to this view the law of the place where the legal act was written is 
better known to the parties.280 From another point of view renvoi from the local 
law to another law is against the rule. In other words, the law of locus  regit  
a c t u m ,  which is respected by the parties, is the law which they think it 
confirms, the formal validity of their act.281 Second, the use of renvoi in this 
context could designate a law which might nullify the parties' act from point of 
view of forms.282 Alternatively, it might find a will-or a marriage- valid.
II)- Renvoi in the field of contract.
A)- Renvoi is In co m p a tib le  with the au tonom y law . It has been 
admitted that the majority of writers agree on the rejection of renvoi in the law 
of contract.283 As a rule284 it has been recognized that the parties are free to 
choose the law that govern their contract.285 This means that the party 
autonomy to choose their contract is recognized unanimously286 and accepted
details on the English W ills Act in relation to the alternative connecting factors. See I n fr a . ,  
p p l7 3 - 174.
279- Sadekh, H.A., Op.cit„ p 84.
280- Isaad, M., Volume 1,Op.cit., p 177.
281- Batiffol, H., Loc.cit., p 482.
282- Loussouarn, Y et Bourel, P., Op.cit., pp 294-295; Issad, M.,Volume 1 Op.cit.,  p 177.
283- See Spiro,E.," The Proper Law of Contract and Renvoi: Further Comments on the 
Amin Rasheed Shipping Case" 33 Int.' I & Comp. L. Q„, (1984), P 201; See also the view of Anton, 
A.E., O p .c i t . ,  p 198; Cheshire & North, Private International Law,  by North, P.M., (ed.,),10th 
edition, London, Butterworths,1979, p 198.; Batiffol, U .,Loc.cit. ,  P 480; Hoyle,Mark, S.W .,(ed.,), 
Op.cit., p 24, notes 8.
284- The discussion o f this rule from historical point o f view  should be related to the 
seventeenth Century when the Dutch scholar Huber stated that the lex loci contractus c o u ld  
not be applied if  the contracting parties would have the intention of the application o f the law 
of another place. See Morris, J.H.C., Op.cit.,  p 167; See also Llewelyn Davies, D.J., " The Influence 
of Huber's De Conflictu Legumon English Private International Law" 18 Brit.Y.B. IntJL{1931),  
p 49.
285- Hambro, E., " The Relations Between International Law and conflict Law", R e c u e i l  
des cours.,  Vol I, Tome 105, (1962), p 56; Diamond, A .L., " Harmonization o f Private 
International Law, Relating to Contractual Obligations " Recueil des cours, Vol IV, Tome 199, 
(1986), p 254.
286- Pelichet, M.," La Vente International De Marchandises et le Conflit de Lois", R e c u e i l
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by states all over the world and International Conventions.287 As an example of 
the latter article 3 alinea 1 of the Rome convention June,1980 on the law 
applicable to contractual transaction states that the contract is governed by the
law chosen by the parties.288
The application of the law chosen by the parties leads, effectively, to the
discussion of the proper law of the contract which is still a controversial issue.
The general view, in this context, is that the proper law of the contract is 
considered as either the law chosen by the parties or the law which is most 
closely connected to the contract.289 It is believed that adopting either the 
express or implied intention of the parties or the law which is most closely
connected to the contract, the reference to the applicable law should be
considered merely to its substantive rules.290 It means, that the intention of
parties has been considered as a reference to the internal law of the parties'
chosen law and not to its conflict rules and "...the connection with a given legal
system is a connection with substantive legal ru le s . and not with conflict
ru le s . . . " .291 According to the advocates of this view in absence of evidence to the 
contrary the parties' intention is to refer only to the domestic rules of their 
chosen system.292 By referring to the United States of America, for instance, it
des cours, Vol I, Tome 201, (1987), pp 107-108.
287- It must be noted, however, that there are limitations upon the party autonomy to 
choose their proper law. This is the case, for instance with certain mondatory provisions of 
the lex for i ,  ceratin mondatory provisions o f a foreign proper law and certain mondatoy
provisions o f a third State. See in this context article 7 o f the E.E.C. 'Convention on the Law 
Applicable to Contractual Obligations of 19 June 1980. For more details see Sandrock, Otto., 
"Choice o f Law and Choice of Forum in Civil and Common Law Jurisdictions" in Drafting and  
Enforcing C ontracts  in C ivil  and Common Law Jurisdiction,  Kojo Yelpaola et a l . ( e d . , ) ,  
Deevnter, Antwerp, London, Frankfurt, B oston, New York, KLuwer Law and Taxation  
Publishers, (1 9 8 6 )., pp l70-179.
288- .See also article 2 of the Hague Sales Convention, Article 5 o f the Hague Convention 
on Agency See in this context Weintraub, R.J., " Functional Developments in Choice o f Law for 
Contracts", Recueil des cours, Vol IV, Tome 187, (1984), p 279 ; Sandrock, O .,Ibid.,  pp 154, 155, 
196.; Diamond, A.L., Loc. cit., pp 254, 309, notes 3; Pelichet, M„Ibid„ pp 109-110.
289- Dicey & Morris, 1987, Op.cit., p 82.
290- Kahn-Freund, 0 . ,Loc.cit.,  P 436; Carter, P.B., " Decisions o f British Courts During 1983 
Involving Questions o f Public or Private International Law" L I V Brit. Y. B. Int. Lx( 1 9 8 3 ) ,  
p309.
291- Morris, J.H.C., The Conflict o f  Laws,. Op.cit., p 270.
292- Morris, J.H.C., Ibid., See also Spiro, E., Loc.cit., p 201.
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can be seen that the second Restatement also states that in the absence of the 
contrary indication of intention the reference to the law of a State should be 
considered as a reference to local law of that State and not to its choice of law 
rules.293
On the whole, it can be said that the autonomy is very important in the 
field of contract and when the contracting parties choose the law of the country
X to govern their contract they intend to refer directly to its domestic ru le s294 
This indicates one think that renvoi is incompatible with the autonomy law.
B )-  Motives for objecting to the admission of renvoi in the field 
of co n tra c t .
Different arguments have been stated to indicate the exclusion of renvoi in 
the field of contract. As a matter of fact renvoi is said to be incompatible with the 
autonomy law because its process may lead to the application of law that was 
not chosen by the parties, i.e., there will be incompatibility of renvoi mechanism 
with the parties freedom. From another point of view, it is unwise to apply the 
renvoi mechanism in the field of contract because it is presumed that when the
parties choose a law of a particular state they intend to refer only to its local 
law .295 Accordingly, there should be no renvoi in matters of contract where the 
parties autonomy in choosing the law prevails and is strong.296 Another 
justification concerning the incompatibility of renvoi with the autonomy law 
stresses that when the parties indicate implicitly or explicitly that the law of the 
country X is applicable, this makes the mechanism of renvoi unacceptable 
because it does not follow the expectations of the parties.297 To prove this it has
293- See the Restatment of the conflict of Laws, Second ( 1971), Sec. 187 (3), See in this 
context, Spiro, E .,Ibid.
294- The internal dispositions o f that country has been interpreted as representing 
parts o f their contract and, then, becomes a tacit clauses. See Castel, J. G., " Comment" 39 Can B. 
R ev.,(1961) pp 97- 98.
295- Cavers, D.F.," Re-Restating the Conflict of Laws : The Chapter On Contracts", in X X th
Century Comparative and Conflicts Law, Legal Essays in Honor o f  Hessele E.Yntemat  by
Nadelmann, Kurt H .,et al., (ed.,), Leyden, A.W. Sythoff, (1961), p 363; Falconbridge, J.D., "Renvoi 
in New York and Elswhere" Loc.cit . ,  p 715.
296- Von Overbeck, A .E .^oc.c//.,pp  146-147.
297- Loussouam, Y et Bourel, P., Op.cit.,  p 293.
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been claimed that renvoi is incompatible, for instance, with the construction of 
wills because the testator' s expectation in this respect is the application of the 
internal rules of his domicile.298
Generally, the conflict rules which are based on the autonomy law are said 
to be incompatible with the use of renvoi because of the drawbacks of its 
m echan ism .299
C)- Cases th a t  i l lu s tra te  the d e te rm ina tio n  of the applicab le  law 
bv p a r ty  au to n o m y .
By referring to England it can be noticed that there is a divergence upon the 
meaning of the proper law of the contract. In fact, some scholars think that the 
proper law means the freedom of the parties to choose the law that governs 
their contract. According to westlake and Cheshire, however, it means the law 
which is most closely connected with the contract.200 It might be said that it is 
only if there is no express choice of law that the argument between inferred 
intention and closest connection comes into play. It is the latter meaning, i.e., the 
law of the closest connection, which was adopted by the House of lords in the 
Case of Re Uni ted Rai lways  o f  Havana  and R e g l a W d r e h o u s e s ^  in which the 
court admits, although o b i t e r ,  the rejection of renvoi from the field of 
c o n t r a c t .202 In fact, the court of appeal makes its position clear towards its 
mechanism when it has said unanimously that " the principle of renvoi finds no 
place in the field of contract."202 Furthermore, it has been stressed that if the 
parties had chosen Cuban law as the proper law of the contract the reference to 
this law should mean internal Cuban law without its private international
298- See Rule 144, Dicey & Morris,1987, Op.cit., p 1022.
299- Von Overbeck, A.E .,Loc.cit., p 160; See also Weiderkehr, G., C lu n e tf  1981), p 583.
300- Morris, J. H. C„ The Conflict o f  Laws, Op.cit., pp 268-269.
301-[1961] A. C. 1007, See in this context the view of Lords Denning and Morris at pp 1068,
1081.
302- See for instance Spiro, E . J o e . c i t . ,  p 200; Munro, C.R.," The Magic Rounabout o f 
Conflict o f Laws" The Jur. Rev., Part 1,(1978) p 84, notes 60; Graveson, R. H., C om parative  
Conflict o f  Laws, Selected Essays JO p .c i t . ,  p 71; Morris, J. H. C., The Conflict o f  Laws, O p .c i t . ,  
p 475.
303- [1960] Ch. 52, 96- 97; [1959] 1 All ER 214 (court of appeal); [1959] 2 W.L.R. 251 at 277 
(per Jenkins L. J.).
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ru le s .304 More important, although Vita Food Products  v. Unus Shipping Co 
L t d .  has been cited as a case where renvoi was suggested in the field of 
c o n t r a c t305 the court of Appeal in Re United Rai lways  o f  Havana  and Regia  
W a r e h o u s e s , however, disapproved and rejected the declaration given by Lord 
wright in the former case.306
The second recent case which should be cited as an example of the 
exclusion of renvoi from the field of contract is Amin Rasheed  Shipping  Corp.  
v. Kuwai t  Insurance C o ,307 In this case the House of Lords as well applied
English law as the system of law with which the contract has its most real 
co n n ec tio n .308 According to Lord Diplock the meaning of the proper law of the 
contract with regard to English conflict rules is the substantive law of the country 
that the parties have chosen excluding any kinds of remission or transmission
that might be applied by the court of their chosen country if it was seized of the 
A f f a i r .309 Lord Diplock' s reasoning, therefore, has been considered as an 
illustration that renvoi is rejected from the field of contract In English
ju r isp rud en ce .310
It can be concluded,through the discussion of English cases, that renvoi is 
not accepted when the parties agree expressly or implicitly that the law of the 
country X will govern their contract.311
304- See Morris, J. H. C & North, P. M., Op.cit., p 665.
305- English court said that " English rules relating to the conflict o f laws must be
applied" (1939), A. C..277, 292.
306- Cheatham, E.E., " Problems and Methods in Conflict o f Laws" Recueil des cours Vol I,
Tome 99, (1960) p 345; Graveson, R. H., " The Comparative Evolution of Principles o f the Conflict
o f Laws in England and the U.S.A." L o c .c i t . ,  p 94; Graveson, R. H., Comparative Conflict o f
Laws, Selected Essays, O p.c it . ,  p 287; Morris, J, H. C., The Conflict o f  Laws, O p .c i t . ,  p 270, notes
26; Edinger, E., Loc.cit., p 36.
307- [1983] 2 All ER 884; [1983] 3 WLR 241 ( House of Lords); [1984] A.C. 50.
308- Morris, J. H. C., The Conflict of Laws,Op. cit., p 270.
309- The judgment given by the House o f Lords, however, did not quote an Authority 
which either rejects or accept the exclusion o f the renvoi mechanism in relation to the 
proper law of the contract, Spiro, E., L oc .c i t . ,  pp 199-200, 202; Morris, J. H. C., & North, P. M., 
O p.cit . ,  pp 665-666; Carter, P. B.," Decisions o f British Courts During 1983 Involving Questions of 
Public or Private International Law" L oc.cit . ,  p 308.
310- Cheshire & North, 11th edition, Op.cit.,  P 72; Jaffey, A. J. E., Op.cit., P 262; Lipstein, K., 
" Conflict of Laws 1921- 1971, The way Ahead" 31 Cambridge. L. J., (1972) , p 83.
311- See W olff M., Op.cit., p 197.
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III)- Renvoi and the a l te rn a t iv e  connecting  fac to rs  m e th o d .
To refute the claim of the pro-renvoiists that renvoi maintains the validity 
of Acts another method, practically, has been used to maintain such validity 
without using any forms of renvoi. This is the case, for instance, with the
alternative or optional conflict rules where there is coexistence of two connecting 
factors or more to govern the same legal issue.312
A)- R e a so n s  t h a t  justify the exclusion of renvoi in a l te rn a t iv e  
conflic t r u le s .
The reason for the exclusion of renvoi from the alternative connecting 
factors is simple in that admitting its mechanism might be against the
substantive aim of those connecting factors.313 In other words, the alternative 
connecting factors are used for achieving a determined purpose and using 
renvoi, however, might be against the achievement of this purpose.314 From 
another point of view, if the conflict alternative rules design a law this reference 
should be taken as reference to its internal dispositions and not to its conflict
rules on the ground that the latter has no interest to be applied.315
Practically, the reasons for the emergence of the alternative conflict rules in 
private international law, is of course, to maintain the validity of legal act if this 
corresponds with the internal law of one of the various stated laws.316 To say it 
differntly, under this method the application of one of the different connecting
factors, i.e., one selected law leads to the validity of a legal act. This fact,
therefore, led some to believe that renvoi is not a good means to assure the 
validity of act.317
B ) - Discussion of the English Act re la t in g  to the form al valid ity
of wills. The best example which can be cited concerning alternative conflict
rules is the Wills Act of 1963 which has been established in order to save wills
312- See Derruppd, J., " Etude Th6orique du Renvoi ", Fasc. 532-A, 1984, Juris Classeur de 
Droit International, 7,(1987), Paris, Editions Techniques, p 17.
313- Von. Overbeck., A.E., Loc.cit., p 148.
314- Ibid., p 131.
315- Foyer., J., Loc.cit., p 118.
316- Francescakis, P. h., Op.cit., p 221.
317- Derruppe, J.," Etude Theorique du Renvoi " Loc. cit., p 17
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from the formal invalidity.313 As a matter of fact the exclusion of renvoi from 
the Wills Act of 1963 has been related to the Favor  testament i  principle.3 ^
By referring to its disposition, it can be noticed that the act gives the5 court 
the possibility of choosing the law of different legal systems.320 This is the case, 
for instance, with sections 1 and 2 (b) which tend to obviate renvoi in matters 
that concern the execution of wills whether it is related to moveable or
immovable. In fact, section 1 allows the testator to choose between the internal 
laws of either the law in force of the territory of its execution, the law of the
testator domicile, the law of his habitual residence or with the law of the country
of his nationality.321 A strong argument has been made that since the English
wills Act of 1963 provides many internal law systems by which the testator' s 
formal validity of wills might be tested, the renvoi mechanism, therefore, should
be considered as excluded in this context.322 It means that the rules stated by
the wills Act of 1963 are considered as domestic rules.323
Concerning the execution of wills relating to immovables, it can be seen that 
section 2 (b) as well provides that its execution may conform with the internal
law of the territory where this immovable is situated.324 In this issue it should 
be noted that although there is support for the application of renvoi in title to
land situated abroad on the ground that the country of lex si tus  has control
over this land325 it has been claimed, however, that according to the Wills Act of
318- Morris, J.H.C., " The Wills Act, 1963 ", 13 Int' I. and. Comp. L. Q.,(1964) p 685.
319- Castel, J. G., Conflict o f  Laws, Cases Notes and Materials,. Op.cit . ,  P 66; Contrast early 
development o f renvoi which operarted to uphold w ills.
320- See in this context, Edinger, E., "Loc.cit., p 41.
321- Section 1 states that " a will shall be trested as properly executed if  its execution
conformed to the internal law in force in the territory where it was executed or in the
territory where, at the time o f its execution or o f the testator's death, he was domiciled or had
his habitual residence, or in a state o f which at either of those times, he was a national" see in
this context, Graveson, R.H., Comparative Conflict o f  Laws, Selected Essays^Op.cit. ,  pp 200, 205;
For more details see especially, Anton, A.E., Op.cit.,  pp 521-525 at 523.
322- Cheshire & North* 11th edition, Op.cit., p 67.
323- Collier, J. G., Op.cit., p 28.
324- See Anton, A.E., Op.cit ,  pp 521- 525 at 523; See Rule 141, Dicey & Morris, Op cit, 11th 
edition, p 1017.
325-This argument is said to be not convenient with the title to movables situated abroad
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1963 renvoi is excluded from the formal validity of will of immovables.326 To 
say it differently, admitting that the Wills Act of 1963 refers to the internal law 
of the various systems of laws renvoi exclusion should be maintained even in 
relation to immovable property.327 This repudiation has also been justified has 
also been justified by the fact of achieving f a v o r  te s tamentary  in relation to the 
lex s i tus ,328 The question which remains is when the conflict rules of the l e x  
s i t u s  refer to a system of law of X or Y and the will of immovables is said to 
comply with those systems, shall this be considered as formally valid or not? 
According go Dicey & Morris this is not clear.329
I V ) - Renvoi and the l e x  rei sitae. View are divided as well in relation 
to immovables. There are those who admit that if the forum considers that the
transfer of property is governed by the law of the s i t u s  whereas private 
international rules of the State of the s i t u s  refers the capacity of property 
transfer to the national law it is preposterous that the forum applies the 
substantive rules of immovables situation.330 In this context 0  Kahn-Freund 
states that "...effective control is in the hands of the authorities of the country 
where the land is ..."331 Another opinion has indicated that it is better to refer 
directly to the requirement of the lex rei y/tarather than introducing renvoi in 
this context.332
By referring to English jurisprudence, it can be seen that three years after 
the Torrey  G r a n f i 33 Affair the English Supreme court of Egypt rejected renvoi 
in 1910 in the D a l e  Affair.334 Although the former Affair was invoked the
supreme court, however, rejected renvoi from the law of nationality to the l e x
because the foreign court might have no jurisdiction on the movables. See D icey & Morris, 
1987, Op. cit., p 84.
326- Ibid., pp 83-84.
327- Morris, J. H. C.," The wills Act ,1963", Loc.cit., pp 685, 688; Jaffey, A. J. E., Op.cit., p 205; 
Morris, J. H. C., The Conflict o f  Lawsx Op.cit., p 476.
328- Kahn-Freund, 0 ., " Wills Act 1963", 27 Mod. L. R., (1964), P 58.
329- Dicey & Morris, 1987, Op.cit., p 1017.
330- See Lalive., P., Loc.cit., p 272.
331- Kahn-Freund, O .JLoc.cit., p 436.
332- Von. Overbeck, A.E.,Loc.cit., p 160.
333- Law Magazine and Rev., 1909, 297; CL, 1911, 320.
334- Cl., 1912, 726.
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rei  si tae  concerning the validity of will of immovables. According to the
justifications given by the court Egyptian civil code allowed English people to 
dispose their immovables according to English internal law.335
V ) - C ondem nation  of renvoi in m a tr im o n ia l  p ro p e r ty  re g im es .
A ) - The in co m p a tib i l i ty  of renvoi in the field of m a tr im o n ia l  
p ro p e r ty  re g im es . It has been said that if renvoi may coordinate the conflict 
rules in matters, such as, succession and personal status where the connecting 
factors are not numerous this, however, is not the case in matrimonial property 
r e g i m e . 336 According to this view the spouses' need is to know their legal 
situation in a particular country. Admitting the mechanism of renvoi, however, 
is inadequate to their needs.337 This means that the autonomy law of the parties 
recognized in matrimonial property regime is incompatible with renvoi.338 This 
is why, it is thought, that there should be no renvoi in the field of property 
regimes where the autonomy of parties in choosing the law prevails and is 
strong.330
B ) - Evidence th a t  ju s t if ies  th is  co n d e m n a t io n .
The exclusion of the mechanism of renvoi in principle in this field has been 
advocated by the French jurisprudence.340 This hostility, in fact, can be seen 
through the discussion of three French cases.
The first case which illustrates this hostility is the decision of D a m e  
G o u t h e r t z  c. G o u t h e r t z 341 where the French court of Appeal decided that
French spouses, who got married in Russia, established their first matrimonial 
domicil there and should, therefore, be considered as married under the legal
335- Potu., E., Op.cit., p 132.
336- Droz, G.A.L.," Les Regimes Matrimoniaux en Droit International Prive Compare" 
Recueil des cours. , Vol III, Tome 143, (1974), pp 122-123.
337- Ibid.
338- See Audit, B.," Le Caracere Fonctionnel de la Regie de Conflit( Sur la ' Crise 'des
Conflits de Lois) " Recueil des cours. Vol III, Tome 186, (1984), p 333.
339- Von. Overbeck, A.E., Loc. cit, pp 146-147.
340- See for instance, Derrpp6, J et Agostini, E.JLoc.cit., p 12.
341- Civ. lere, ler Fevrier 1972; J. C.P. 1972. II. 170, 96, Concl. Av. Gen. Gegout; 61 R e .  
crit.dr. inti priv.,  (1972) p 644, note Wiederkehr, Georges.; 99 C lu n e t ,  (1972) p 594, note Ph. 
K a h n .
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regime of the property separation which is in force in Russia.342 The court of 
Appeal, then, held that the choice of the regime depends upon the express or 
implicit intention of the spouses. Accordingly, the court deduce that the spouses 
intend to refer to the Internal Russian law by excluding its conflict rules.343 
Concerning the position of the French cour de cassat ion  this also held that the 
applicable law would be the substantive rules chosen by the parties on the 
ground that the renvoi mechanism cannot work especially in the field where the 
au tonom y law p re v a i l s .3'44 It has been claimed, therofore, that the
incompatibility of renvoi with the autonomy law led the French judge to apply 
Russian internal law by excluding its conflict rules.345
Secondly, the case of Sideny Edward  Liss  c./ Dame Li l iane Za iong346 has
also been considered as a decision where the French court of Appeal rejected the
mechanism of renvoi in matrimonial property regime347
Later on in M a r i  c. C o w / t e r 348 the cour de cassat ion  held that the 
s p o u s e s 349 intentions were to localise their money interest in Italy and to be
bound by Italian law. This meant the application of the Italian legal regime of
the properties separation without taking into consideration Italian conflict
ru le s .350 In fact, the exclusion of renvoi occurred in that case despite the fact 
that the spouses had pronounced for the application of the French law to their
342- In 25 October 1915 C a sim ir  G o u th e r tz  a French national married in Odessa
N a th a l ie  R iab im in e  a Russian. In 1916 the former left Russia to France to do his military 
service and then in 1921 both spouses came to install in France. See 61 Re .cr i . t  
d r . in t .p r iv .J b id ., pp 644-646.
343- See Ibid., pp 644-645; Foyer, J., Loc.cit., pp 108-109; Audit, B .,Loc. cit., p 333.
344-.Droz, G.A.L., Loc.cit., p 34.
345- Loussoaurn, Y et Bourel, P., O p.c i t . ,  p 294; Bellet, P., 70 Re .cri.t dr..int..priv, (1981),
P210.
346- Paris 3 dec. 1980, 108 C l u n e t , (  1981), P578, notes G. W iederkehr; Re .cri.t
dr..int..priv.,{  1981) p 501, notes H. Gaudemet.
347- See 108 C lunetjb id . ,  pp 578, 581, 583-584.
348- See Cour de cassation l re Ch. Civ., 24 Janvier 1984.
349- Mr Charles M ari  a French national married G raz ia l la  M agni  an Italian national 
in Italy on the 25 june 1912 without a marriage contract. The latter died on the 18th o f August 
1970. on the 15th of july 1976 he married Mme Ciline Coutier. 73 Re .crit. dr..int..priv., (1984) 
pp 631-632, note Bertrand Ancel.
350- Ibid., p 632; 111Clunet,  (1984), P 870, note J. Derruppe.
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acquired property in France.351
On the whole it has been stressed that renvoi is excluded completely in 
relation to property regimes and for practical reasons the rejection of its
mechanism should, therefore, be approved in principle.352
V I ) - Rejection of renvoi mechanism in law of to r t .
A)- Discussion of the reasons for re jec ting  renvoi in the field of
t o r t . The repudiation of renvoi does not apply only to contract but has also been 
extended to other areas, such as, the law of tort where renvoi is said to be
excluded in this field.353 In fact some scholars underline that in matters of
delictual liability "...renvoi seems unthinkable."354 This leads us to suggest that 
renvoi will be excluded in principle in law of tort and the reference to foreign 
law should be interpreted to connote the foreign internal law, i.e., the internal
law of the lex loci delicti  and not its private international rules.355 More
important scholars have admitted that a similar argument concerning the 
application of the substantive law in matters of contract should be applied in
matters of delict where more attention has been made to the social environment 
of both the parties and the act.356 In this context, Cheshire points out that "...The 
purpose of resort to the lex loci is very largely to give effect to the presumed 
intentions of the parties. The average man thinks in terms of internal Law...".357
B)- C o n t r o v e r s i e s  upo n  the law th a t  governs m atte rs  of to rt .  It 
should be remembered that if characterization is subject to different theories,
351- 111, Clunet, Ibid., p 872.
352- 73 Re .cri.t dr..int..priv., Loc. cit., pp 651-652; See Nouveau Repertoire de Droit, Mise 
A Jour (1980 & 1990), Paris, Jurisprudence Generale Dalloz, 1990, p 301.
353- See Lipstein, K," The General Principles o f Private International Law "JRecueil des  
coursxNol I, Tome 135, (1972), p 212.
354- Anton, A.E., Op.cit., p 62 See in this context the case of M' Elroy v. M' Allister, 1949 
S.C.110.
355- The Law Commission working Paper N ° 87 and the Scottish Law Commision
Consultative Memorandum N° 62, Private International Law choice o f  Law in Tort and Delict, 
London, Her Majestey' s Stationery Office, 1984, pp 18, 94; See also Karsten, I.G.F " Chaplin v 
Boys: Another Analysis" 19 Int' t & Comp. L. Q .,( \910),  p 36; Cheshire, D ro i t  International  
P r i v i ,  7th edition, London, Butterworths, 1965, p 257.
356- Kahn-Freund., 0.," General Problems of Private International Law" L oc .c i t . ,  p 436.
357- Cheshire, G.C., 7th edition, Op.cit., p 257. Karsten, I. G. F., Loc.cit., p 36. notes 9.
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law of tort as well has been related to different theories. Accordingly, the 
discussion of the latter requires the writer to ask the same question, which law 
should govern matters of tort. Is it the lex f o r i ? 5 % the lex  del ic t  or the 
proper law of the tort?360
1 ) - L e x  loc i  de l ic t i  o r  the g o v ern m e n ta l  in te re s t  ana lys is .  It is 
well known that in the field of tort the lex loci delict i , i.e., the place of wrong was 
established for a long time in the United States of America in which the 
substantive law of the lex locus delict i  governs the rights and liabilities of the 
p a r t i e s . 361 As has been shown, however, the modern tendency in private 
international law has led scholars to switch from the traditional approach, the 
lex loci del icti , to a governmental interest analysis.362 In fact, Brainerd Currie, 
for instance, rejects the traditional choice of law and relies in his conception, 
instead, upon the policies of the substantive laws of the State which has some 
contact with the case.363 According to his view there will be no place of renvoi in 
his suggested analysis in that "...There can be no question of applying other than 
the internal law of the foreign state"364
358- Among its advoctes is Savingny, System des hentigen roemishe rechts  , Vol. 8, 
1849, P 275. In the united States o f America, this theory has been advocated by Ehrenzweig, 
A.A., " Not So 1 Proper " Law of a Tort : Pandora's Box "17 Int' I & Comp. L. Q., (1968), p 1. This 
theory, however, has been criticized on the ground that it favour the forum shopping. See in 
this context, Morris, J,. H. C., The Conflict o f  laws, Op.cit., p 302.
359- Its application is said to be still predominant in Europe. This theory, however, has 
been criticised because o f its ambiguity in that the defendant act may take place in a country 
X whereas the harm and its results might occur in the country Y. See Morris, J.H.C., I b i d . ,  
p p 30 3-30 4 .
360- It is important to not, in this regard, that Morris has been considered as the scholar 
who drew sholars' attention in the common law countries by suggesting the concept o f the 
proper law of the tort. According to it advocates the proper law o f the contract will govern the 
tort liability as an analogy from the use o f the proper law of the contract. Morris, J.H.C., Ib id . ,  
p 304. See Graveson, R.H., Comparative Conflict o f  Laws, Selected Essaysx Op.cit.,  p 207.
361- For more details see , Shapira, A.,The Interest Approach to Choice o f  Law with 
Special Reference to Tort Problems, The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1970, p 24.
362- Egnal., J.D.," The 'Essential' Role o f Modern Renvoi in the Governmental Interst 
Analysis Approach to Choice o f Law" 54 Temp. L. Q„  (1981), p 237
363- Siehr, K.G., Loc.cit., p 53.
364- Currie, B .,Selected Essays on the Conflict o f  Laws, Durham, N.C., University Press, 
1963, p 184. See Supra.,  Chapter 1, Section 2, Sub-section 1, p 15.
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In this context, the case of B a b c o c k  v. J a c k s o n ^  is said to represent an 
example of the proper law conception by using the expression center of gravity 
and is also inspired by Brainerd Currie's approach of the governmental interest 
a n a ly s is .366 It means that this case has been considered as a good opportunity 
for the American court of getting rid of the traditional rule of the lex loci  
d e l i c t i ,367 In fact, he court of Appeal allowed recovery in that it considered the 
parties as New Yorkers and the Ontario, i.e., the place of accident as Fortuitous.368
2 ) -The p ro p e r  law of to r t  and lex  loci  de l ic t i . In an English case 
B o y s  v. C h a p l i n ?169 the Maltese law as the lex loci  delicti  was excluded in 
favour of the application of English law 370 The reason for the application of this 
law has been the subject of much study. In this case both the plaintiff B o y s  and 
the defendent C h a p l i n  were British habitually resident in England and the 
former was injured by the negligence of the latter in Malta. The problem was
that under Maltese law £53 damages was recoverable whereas under English 
law the sum for damages was assessed over £ 2,000. The House of Lords 
decided that the plaintiff should receive the latter amount and not the former 
one.371
Accordingly, the House of lords is said to have the opportunity to 
modernize the English conflict rules concerning the delictual liabilities.372 Boys is 
taken after much discussion to support the possibility of an exception to the
double rule in a suitable case, on the lines of the judgments of Lords wilberforce
365-12 N.Y. 2d 473 ; 240 N.Y. S. 2d 743; 191 N. E. 2d 279 (1963); [1963] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 286.
366- See Loussouarn, Y et Bourel, P., Op.cit., pp 173, 175.
367- Morris, J. H. C., The Conflict of LawsxOp.cit„  pp 325, 329.
368- Ibid., p 326.
3 6 9 -  [1969] 3 W. L. R. 322; [1969] 2 All E.R 1085.
370- See Graveson, R. H., Comparative Conflict o f  Laws, Selected Essaysx O p .c i t . ,  p 213.
Therefore,the House o f lords in this case is said to have overruled the case o f M a c h a d o  v.
Fontes. [1897] 2 Q. B. 231; See Morris, J. H. C., The Conflict of Laws, Op.cit., p 312.
371- Graveson, R. H., Ibid.,  pp 208, 218; See also Morris, J. H. C.," L'Evolution Rdcente du
Droit International Prive Anglais", 100 Clunet,  (1973), p 197.
372- It must be noted that different arguments and approaches had been proposed by
the five English judges in deciding this case. [1971] A.C. 356 at 379, 380, 389, 392; [1968] 2 Q. B. 1,
20, 24-26; See in this context, Morris, J.H.C., Ib id .,  pp 197-198; Morris, J.H.C., The Conflict o f  
Laws, Op.cit., p 312.
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and Hodson.
3 ) - F ir s t  and second Am erican R es ta te m e n ts . A remarkable change 
has been done between the first and the second restatement of the conflict of
law s .373 The first Restatement of the conflict of laws adopted the traditional law 
in tort, i.e., the lex loci del ict i .374 The second Restatement of the conflict of
l a w s , 375 however, rejected this old rule by adopting the most significant 
re lationship approach.376 In other words, the traditional view, in this matter, 
was that the substantive law of the place of wrong, i.e., lex loci del ict i , governs 
matter of tort.377 in the second Restatement of the conflict of laws, however, the
tort will be governed by the local law of the State which is most closely
connected with the parties and the occurrence.378 The last principle, in fact, is
included in §145 (1) of the American law institute' s second Restatement which
states that "...The rights and liabilities of the parties with respect to an issue in
tort are determined by the local law of the state which as to that issue has the
most significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties".379
373-The First Restatement of the conflict of Laws o f 1934 which was inspired by Beale' s 
vested  right conception to resolve the conflict o f laws problem led , however, Professor 
Brainerd Currie to consider the mechanical application o f the principle o f  conflict o f laws by 
the first Restatement as nonesense. See in this context, Tate. A, Jr., " Governmental Interests in 
the Conflict o f Laws: Mr Currie's Views and their value for Louisiana Lawyers" 39 Tul. L. 
Rev.,(  1964-1965), pp 163- 164.
374-In order to determine the law o f the State that has the most significant relationship 
to both the occurence and the parties the Restatement takes into account the places where the 
injury happened and where the conduct causing the harm took place. See the Restatment of
Laws § 378 (1934); Morris, J.H.C., The Conflict o f  Laws, Op.cit., p 322.
375-See the Second Restatment, conflict o f laws, § 379 (1). (Tent Draft N 8, 1963). .
376- For more details see Palmer, V.V "Conflict o f laws-Guest Statute-Center o f Gravity 
Theory", 38 Tul. L. R e v (1963-1964), pp 398-399.
377- See Palmer, V.V.," Conflict o f Laws in Louisiana:Tort", 39 Tul. L. Rev., (1964-1965),
p96.
378- Restatment Second, conflict of laws, § 379 A-L (tent, draft N 8, 1963).
379- See the Restatement second o f the Conflict of law's, § 145 (1) (proposed official Draft,
1968; As quoted from James B. St. John,(notes) 43 Tul. L. Rev., (1968-1969), p 7 07 i See also
Morris, J. H.C., The Conflict o f  Laws, O p .c i t . ,  P 305; HanotianA B., " The American Conflicts
Revolution and European Tort Choice -of-Law T h in k in g ." 30 Amer. J. Comp. L,. (1982), p 83;
Kahn-Freund, 0.,"  Delictual liability and the Conflict of Laws" Recueil des coursx Vol II, Tome
124, (1968), p 50.
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C)- Cases th a t  i l lu s t ra te  the h o s t i l i t i tv  to w ard s  the  m echan ism  
of renvoi in to r t . The reference will be in this context merely to Scottish and 
American authorities. Before that it should be noted that although there is no 
English Authority concerning the doctrine of renvoi in relation to law of tort, it 
has been claimed that renvoi might have no place in this field.380
l ) - S co tt ish  A u th o r i t y . In this context, M '  E lroy  v. M '  A l l i s t e r 381 has
been considered as a Scottish case which supports the inapplicability of the 
renvoi mechanism in the field of tort.382 According to the facts in this case M ' 
E l r o y  was killed at shap in Cumbria in England and the widow sued the driver 
in Scotland, bearing in mind that the concerned parties had their residence in 
G la s g o w .383 By her action for reparation to the Scottish court , the widow got 
only a reparation for funeral expenses384
There has been a claim that Scotland is more related to both parties and to 
the occurrence than England. This has been justified by the fact that the accident 
took place not far south of the Scottish border and the victim was a Scotsman 
resident in Scotland. This led to consider that all elements concerning this case
were Scottish.385 Despite the Scottish connection, the double rule was applied 
with bad effects for the widow. In fact, Lord Russell stressed that the court 
refers to domestic law of the lex locus delicti and not to its private international 
law in order to know by which law the parties' rights and liabilities will be
380- Morris, J.H.C., & North, P.M., Op.cit., p 666.
381-(1949) S. C. 110, 126 (court of session).
382- Cheshire & North, 11th edition, O p .c i t . ,  p 71; Dicey & Morris, 1987, O p .c i t . ,  p 82; 
Jaffey, A. J. E., Op.cit„ p 262.
383- both the pursuer's claim to be entitled damages for solatium if  the accident occured 
in Scotland and for a substantitial damages under the law reform Act 1934, for the loss o f the 
deceased's expectation o f life, however, failed. The failure of the former claim is due to the fact 
that English law, as the lex loci delicti , did not recognize it whereas the latter claim failed on 
the ground that it was not actionable by the lex fori.{  1949) S.C. 110. See Morris, J.H.C., & North, 
P.M ., Op.cit., p 666; See also Cheshire & North, Ibid., p 529.
384- The widow got neither a moral dammage, unknown in English law but known to 
Scottish Law, nor a pecuniary compensation as damage because her claim was not made in 
time according to English law. See Kahn-Freund, 0 . ,  " Delictual liability and the Conflict of 
L a w s",Loc.cit . ,  pp 47-48; Morris, J.H.C. & North P.M., Ib id . ,  p 666. See also Cheshire & North, 
Ibid., p 529.
385- Kahn-Freund, O.Jbid .,  pp 45-46, 54.
182
re g u la te d .386 This reasoning, therfore, has been taken as a proof that the Scots 
court excluded renvoi in the field of tort.387
2)- A m e r i c a n  A u th o r i ty . In the United States of America P f a u  v. 
T ren t  A lu m in iu m  388 has been cited as an example which supports the rejection 
of renvoi mechanism in the field of tort.389 In this case the New Jersey supreme 
court held that Iowa where the accident occurred390 had no interest in this suit.
The court went on to maintain that the substantive laws of Connecticut, which
represents the law of the plaintiff s domicile and that of of New Jersey, which is 
the law of the defendant's dom icile, are sim ilar and the case, therefore, 
represents a false conflict.391 In Other words, the substantive laws of both 
Connecticut and new Jersey agreed on the point which allows guest passengers
to recover from his host-driver for ordinary negligence392 whereas in Iowa the
guest statute provided that the latter was not liable to the former for such
negligence.
Concerning the plaintiff 's claim for damage the defendant argues that the
reference should not be to the Connecticut’ s substantive law which allows the 
plaintiff recovery but it should be to the Connecticut' s conflict rules which stick, 
in this context, to the lex loci delicti. It follows from the defendant' s argument 
that the reference to Iowa substantive law, as the lex loci delic ti , means that the 
plaintiff would not be allowed recovery. The court decision, however, was not in 
favour of the application of the Connecticut' s choice of law rule by fear of 
fru stra ting  the governm ental analysis goals and instead held that the
386- (1949) S. C. P 126 (court o f session). Morris, J.H.C., & North P.M., Ibid., p 667.
387- Collier, J. G, Op.cit., p 29.
388- 55 N.J. 2d 511; 263 A. 2d 129, at 136-137 (1970).
389- Cheshire & North, 11th edition,Op.cit., p 71; Dicey & Morris, 1987, Op.cit.,  p 82.
390- Both the plaintiff P fa u  and the second defendent T re n t  were student at a College 
in Iowa. The former was injured why their car hit another one. Morris, J.H.C. & North P.M., 
Op.cit., p 704
391-The New Jersey court stated that the case in an eample o f a false conflict and, 
therefore, it was not necessary to choose between the laws o f Connecticut and N ew Jersey 
because both law were the same. Egnal, J.D., Loc.cit . ,  p 241; Morris, J. H. C., & North, P. M., Ibid.,  
pp 706-708.
392- In Pfau v. T ren t  Aliminium both the plinatiff and the defendant were dom icilked  
in a recovery States. Egnal, J. D .,Ibid.
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Connecticut plaintiff, P fa u  should be given the same protection as if he was a 
New jersey plaintiff.393 According to an opinion the New jersey court refused the 
use of "Modern renvoi" in order to determine the interests of Connecticut.394 As 
a matter of fact, New Jersey Supreme court states that " We see no reason for 
applying Connecticut1 s choice of law rule, to do so . would frustrate the very goals 
of governmental interest analysis. Connecticut choice of law rules does not 
identify that states' interest in the m atter..."395
Finally, there are indications that even in the continent renvoi has been 
excluded, for instance, by the French case law in the delictual responsibility on
the ground that it leads to a vicious circle ,396
S e c t i o n  2 :- R e n v o i  m e c h a n i s m  in I n t e r n a t i o n a l  C o n v e n t i o n s .
S u b - s e c t i o n  ! ;■ .General -  p o i n t s .
I ) - In te rn a tio n a l coopera tion  in the field of p riv a te  in te rn a tio n a l 
l a w . The codification of private international law by way of treaties has been 
considered as a natural method for resolving the conflict of laws problems.397 It 
should be noted, therefore, that the purpose of International Conventions is the 
creation of International harmony and the achievement of the unification of 
conflict of laws. As a matter of fact, the aim of the Hague Conferences, for 
instance, is " ...to  work towards the progressive un ification  of private
international rules".398 More important, the work of multilateral Conventions is 
to achieve not only the unification of the conflict rules but also the substantive 
ru le s .399 In fact, Geneva Conventions concerning the bills of exchange and
393- Morris, J.H.C., & North, P.M., Op. cit., pp 707-708.
394- See Egnal, J.D .,Loc.cit., p 257. originally emphasised .
395- P fau  v. Trent Aliminium  Co., 55 N.J. at 526; 263 A. 2d at 1367, As quoted from John
David Egnal, Ibid.
396- Trib. Gr.Inst. paris 21 Juin 1969: Gaz. Pal. 1970, 1, 138; D..S. 1970, 780, note J. Prevault; 
see also Derruppe, J et Agostini, E., L oc .c i t ., p 8.
3 9 7 -  Jayme, E., " Considerations Historiques et Actuelles sur la Codification du Droit 
International Priv£, Recueil des cours, Vol. IV, Part 177, (1982), p 51.
398- See article 1 o f the Hague Conference statute which came into force 15 Juin 1955, 
Conference de la Haye de Droit International Priv6" , Receuil  des Conventions de la 
H a y e , (1951-1977), Edit6 par le Bureau Permanent de la Conference, La Haye, Pays Bas, 
Martinus Nijhoff, p 1.
399- See Supra ., Chapter 1, Section 2, Sub-sectionl, p 20, Footnotes 82.
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prom issory notes of 1930 and 1931, which imposed a uniform  internal 
legislation, are an illustration of the latter unification.400 Besides, the United 
Nations Convention on contracts for the international sale of goods elaborated by 
UNCITRAL in Vienna in March-April 1980 is another example of a Convention 
which tends to unify the substantive law of contract..401 However, among the 
Conventions which can be cited as an example of the unification of choice of law 
rules are: the Hague Convention on the law applicable to international sales of 
goods of June 15, 1955 and the European Convention on the law applicable to 
contractual obligations of june 19, 1980.402 ^
I I ) -  T h e  h o s t i l i t y  of C o n v en tio n  ru le s  to re n v o i as a 
c o n te m p o ra ry  te n d e n c y . Scholars' intentions have been drawn to the fact 
that renvoi cannot occur by the establishem ent of C onventional private 
international rules. According to this view when all member States sign the 
Convention and adopt the same, connecting factors it should be understood that 
renvoi mechanism is unimaginable in this case.403 In fact, the incompatibility of 
renvoi with Conventional conflict rules has been justified by the fact that 
Conventional rules, should, normally replace the contracting States conflict rules. 
In other words, when the conflict rules of the former indicate the application of 
the law of the latter this should not mean the application of those contracting 
States' conflict ru le s404
This hostility can be illustrated, for instance, by the uniform conflict rules
established by the modern Hague Conventions which are considered as rejecting 
renvoi, implicitely or explecitly, by referring to the substantive rules.405
400- loussouarn, Y et Bourel, P., Op.cit., pp 31-32. This Convention is considered, 
therefore, as an example o f international uniform legislations. Mayer, P., O p .c i t . ,  p 80.
401- The aim o f this Convention is to replace the Hague Convention on the law of
international sales o f  contracts. Despite twenty one States have signed the Convention only 
seven States have ratified it till January 1985. See in this context, article 99 Par. (1), which states
that the minimum of ten States must accede to the Convention in order to come into effect.; See
in this context Sandrock, O .JLoc.cit., pp 151-152, footnotes 20, 22.
402- Ibid., pp 147-148.
403- Foyer, J .JLoc.cit., p 115.
404- Lewald, H., " la Th6orie du Renvoi" Recueil des coursx Vol. IV, Tome 29,' (1929), p. 578; 
See also Bellet, P., Loc.cit., p 211
405- This is with the exception o f the Hague Convention on Marriage o f 12 juin 1902; See
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S u b -  Se c t i o n  2 :- C o n v e n t i o n s  t h a t  a c c e p t  r e n v o i .
I)-  T he H ague C o nven tion  of 12 .Tune 1902 c o n c e rn in g  the  
conflict of laws. Article 1 of the Hague convention of 12 June 1902 relative 
to marriage is an example of the application of the renvoi system despite the fact 
that the majority of delegates were against it.406 In fact, its disposition states 
that " The right of contracting marriage shall be governed by the national law of 
each of the parties intending to marry unless a provision of such law refers 
expressly to some other law".407
Besides, this article has been considered as accepting renvoi from the 
national law to another one,.i.e, it admits renvoi from the national law to the law 
of domicile 408 There has been a divergence between scholars upon the forms of 
renvoi indicated in this article. According to some this means the acceptance of 
renvoi rem ission by the Convention409 whereas others believe that renvoi is 
accepted w hatever the process m ight be a rem ission or transm ission .410 
Additionaly, Meijers, E.M., goes on to stress that the Hague Convention as an 
institution applied a "unique renvoi" system, i.e., without considering whether 
this system involves a renvoi to the lex fo r i  or to a foreign law.411
On the whole, although article 1 is said to give marriage "...an  additional 
chance of validity"412 this Convention has been considered as a failure.413
Ibid., pp 578-579; Von Overbeck, A.E., Loc.cit., p 129.
406- These are for instance, Asser from Netherland, Laine from France and Pierantoni 
from Italy. See in this context Potu, E., O p .c i t . ,  pp 148, 153,159, Lerebours- Pigeonniere, P., 
"Observations sur la Question du Renvoi" Clunet,{  1924), p 897.
407- As quoted from Lorenzen, E.G., Loc .c it . ,  P 330; Westlake, John, A Treatise on Private  
International Law, by Norman Bentwich (ed.,), 7th edition, London, Sweet & M axwell Limited, 
1925, p 34; Wolff, M .,0p. cit., p 191.
408- Arminjon, P., " L' objet et la Methode du Droit International Prive" R ecueil  des  
cours., Vol. I, Tome 21, (1928). p 495; Pelichet, M.JLoc.cit., p 177, notes 246.
409-Pillsson, L., Marriage and Divorce in Comparative Conflict o f  La.wsJOp.cit., pp 106- 
107, notes 216.
410-See for instance, Wolff M., Op. cit., p 191.
411- M eijers, E.M., " la Question du Renvoi" 38 Bulletin  de I'Institut Juridique  
International^  (1938), p 206.
412- Lorenzen, E.G.JLoc.cit., p 331.
413- North, P. M., " Development of Rules o f Private International Law in the Field o f 
Family Law, Recueil des cours, Vol. I, Tome 166,, (1980), p 98.
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II)- D iscu ss io n  o f th e  fa m o u s  C o n v en tio n  of 15 Ju n e  1955 
know n as the renvoi C o nven tion . It must be underlined that the Hague 
Convention for regulating the conflict between the law of nationality and the 
domicile should be related to the Netherlands government project in which Mr 
Meijers suggestions was to regulate renvoi by a Convention.414 In fact, the 
proposed solution of Meijers in 1938, concerning the renvoi controversies, was
consecrated in both Benelux uniform projects on private international law415 
and the Hague Conventions of 15 june 1955 for the regulation of the conflicts 
between domicile and nationality.416 Only the latter, however, will be considered' 
in this context.
A)- T he  C onv en tio n  p ro p o sed  to in s t i tu t io n a l iz e  r e n v o i . This 
Convention has been labelled as the renvoi Conventio417 in that it tried to lay 
down or establish renvoi in this matter.418 It should also be noted that from the 
title of the Convention title the word renvoi has not been used but instead the 
Convention refers to its purpose which is solving the Conflicts between the two 
princip les.419
B)-  T h e  f ie ld  o f  the  C o n v e n t i o n  a p p l i c a t i o n .
1)- T he C o n v en tio n  a llow s re n v o i m ech an ism  on ly  b e tw een  
n a t io n a l i ty  and  dom icile . This Convention is said to deal only with the 
conflict between nationality and domicile, i.e., it admits renvoi only between the 
law of domicile and that of nationality.420 In fact, article 4 of the Convention
414- See Derruppe, J., " le Renvoi dans les Conventions Internationales, Fasc.532-C, 1984,
Juris -Classeur de Droit I n t e r n a t i o n a l Paris, Editions Techniques, 7, (1987), p 6.
415- See article 15.
4 1 6 - -Van Hecke, G., "Principes et Mdthodes de Solution des Conflits de lois", Recueil des 
cours,. Vol. I, Tome 126, (1969), p 438.
417- See Lalive, P.JLoc.cit., p 269.
418- Von Overbeck, A E., Loc.cit., p 130; See Foyer, J., Loc.cit., p 112.
419- See Derruppd, J., " le Renvoi dans les Conventions Internationales,"Loc.cit. ,  p 6; See 
also the provisional report o f Maridakis, G .S., " Le Renvoi en Droit International Prive" 
Annuaire , ,  Vingt Troisieme Commission, Session d' Amsterdam, Volume 47, Tome 11,(1957), 
p40.
420- P&lsson, L., Marriage and Divorce in Comparative Conflict o f  Laws, O p .c i t . ,  p 107. 
notes 218; Batiffol, H., Loc.cit ., pp 479, 485, 486.
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states that "...no Contacting state shall be obliged to apply the rules laid down in 
the Convention when its rules of private international law do not prescribe the 
application to a given case either of the law of the domicile or the law of the 
n a t io n a l i ty " .421 Accordingly, the Convention has been considered as not 
applicable if the conflict rules of the person’s nationality or domicile refer to a 
law which is not that o f  his nationality or domicile.422 In other words, the 
Convention is said to resolve only the conflict that occurs between either 
principle, nationality or domicilein which there will be a renvoi made by one 
principle to another. If, however, either the law of nationality or domicile refers 
to the lex rei sitae  or the lex  loci actus  such renvoi is not resolved by the 
Convention because its disposition do not give solutions to this legal situation423 
This is the case, for instance between France and Italy concerning the succession 
of immovables situated in Italy of a French citizen. In this case Italian law refers 
to the national law, i. e., France if an Italian court is seized of the case. French law, 
however, applies the lex rei sitae .424 Although the reference is made to the law 
of nationality this negative conflict is not resolved by the Convention.
Furthermore, there has been a claim that article 2 of the Hague Convention
of 1955 allows renvoi from the law of nationality to the law of domicile and not 
the inverse.425 According to this view the acceptance of renvoi from the national-
law to the law of domicile and not the inverse can be justified on the ground that
the former leads often the judge to apply the lex f o r i , i.e., the dispute in the 
former renvoi will be resolved by the lex f o r i .426 To prove this claim, some 
scholars have illustrated it by a hypothetical case concerning the capacity of a 
British subject domiciled in France. Following this view and the rule of the 
convention renvoi is possible because French law refers to the law of nationality, 
i.e., England, whereas English law refers to France as the law of domicile. French 
law, therefore, will be applied. If, however, the British citizen is domiciled in
421- P&lsson, L., Ibid.
422- Ibid., pp 107-108.
423- Derrupp6, Jean., " le Renvoi dans les Conventions Internationales", L oc .c i t . ,  p 6.
4 24 -Ibid., p 7.
425- Foyer, J., Loc.cit.,  p 112, Francescakis, P. h„Op.cit., pp 261- 262.
426- See Von Overbeck, A.E., Loc. cit., pp 154-155; Soulaiman, A. A., Op.cit., p 55.
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England an English judge, in this context, will apply automatically English law, i.e., 
the lex fo r i  without the mechanism of renvoi.427
One might ask how the mechanism of renvoi can, practically, occur 
according to this convention? By referring to article 1, it can be seen that its 
disposition states that " when the state where the person concerned is domiciled 
prescribes the application of the law of his nationality, but the state of which 
such person is a citizen prescribes the application of the law of his domicile, each 
contracting state shall apply the provisions of the internal law of his domicile".428 
According to this disposition in which the internal law of domicile will be applied 
it has been indicated that, in spite of avoiding the use of the renvoi term, the 
State which refers to the person' s nationality has to admit a remission to its own 
law .429
In order to comprehend the system of renvoi in this Convention it seems, 
therefore, important to refer to the position of both the state of nationality and
that of domicile when they agree and when they disagree
First, it has been noticed that according to article 1 when both contracting 
States disagree, i.e, the state of nationality links to domicile and the State of 
domicile to nationality the renvoi from the law of nationality to the law of 
domicile should be accepted by all States.430 This situation can, practically, be 
explained by an example in which French law will be applicable concerning the 
personal status of an Englishmen domiciled in France. According to this article 
both English and French judges will apply French law which means that renvoi 
from English law to French law is admitted.431
Second if, however, both the State of domicile and that of nationality agree 
on the application of the law of nationality all states should apply it.432 Following
427- Soulaiman, A. A., Ib id .
428- As quoted from P&lsson, L., Marriage and Divorce in Comparattive Conflict o f Laws,
O p .c i t ., p 107. See Conference de la Haye de Droit International Priv6, Op.cit.,  p 24.
429- P&lsson, LJ b i d .
430- Derruppe J., " le Renvoi dans les Conventions Internationales", L oc .c i t . ,  p 7.
431- Ibid.
432- It means that if the countries o f X and Z both apply the nationality principle this 
law must be applied not only by those two countries but also by a country which adopts
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the same cited example the personal status of a French national domiciled in
Belgium will be settled according to article 3 as follow.433 French law will be 
applied by both Belgian and French judges. This law should also be applied by a 
country which prescribes the application of the domicile. For instance, if English 
court is seized of the issue it should apply French law and then admits renvoi 
from the law of domicile, i.e., Belgian to French law as the law of nationality.434 If, 
however, the country of nationality, (X) and that of domicile(Z) both apply the 
domicile principle this law must be applied not only by the courts of X and Z but 
also in a court Y which adopts nationality principle, such as, Spain.435
Overall despite the Hague Convention of 15 June 1955 suggests a partial
so lu tion on renvoi it has been in terpreted , however, as an im portant 
contribution to the problem of renvoi.436
2)“ T he C onven tion  is designed to lessen the com plications th a t 
re su lt  from  the system  of na tio n a lity  and th a t of dom icile. When the 
Hague Conference in its seven session established a Convention on the 15 June
1955 it was for the purpose of regulating and resolving the conflict between the 
two different principles, nationality and domicile.437
It must be noted, however, that despite the aim of the Hague Convention to 
achieve the coordination between the two principles, this Convention has not
come into force up till now.438 According to some it is regrettable that the renvoi 
Convention has not come into force on the ground that it could reduce the
com plications caused by the divergence of the two system s of private 
in ternational law .439 According to others this Convention will lead to the
domicile. Philip, A., Loc.cit., p 50.
433- See Conference de la Haye de Droit International Prive , Op.cit., p 24.
434- Derruppd, J., " le Renvoi dans les Conventions Internationales," L oc .c i t . ,  p 7.
435- This is the case, for instance o f a capacity o f a Norwigian natioanl dom iciled in
Danemark. See Philip, A., L o c . c i t . ,  p 50; See article 2 Conference de la Haye de Droit
International Privd, O p.c i t . ,  p 24.
436- Derruppe, J., " Le Renvoi dans les Conventions Internationales" Loc. cit., p 6.
437- Ibid., See also Loussouarn, Y.et Bourel, P., Op.cit., P 274: Foyer, J., Loc.cit., p 112.
438- See PSlsson, L., Marriage and Divorce in Comparative Conflict o f  Laws, O p .c i t . ,
p l0 7 .
439- Lalive, P., Loc.cit., p 269.
uniformity of solution especially in the field where the main divisions of the 
contemporary legal systems is between nationality and domicile.440
3) -  T h e  C o n v e n t i o n  is a p p l i c a b l e  _ o n l y  to a n e g a t i v e  confl ic . t  o f
l a w s . The Convention, however, does not regulate the positive conflict and is 
applicable only in negative conflict between the national law and the law of
d o m ic ile .441 In fact, if the law of nationality supports the application of its own
law whereas the law of domicile claims the application of its own law, the 
Convention does not regulate this positive conflict. The consequences will be the
application of nationality by the country of nationality and the law of domicile
by the country of domicile.442 By referring, for instance, to article 1 it can be seen 
that if the country where the person is domiciled applies the law of nationality 
whereas the State of the person nationality applies the law of the domicile the 
internal dispositions of that domicile, therfore, will be applied 443 This is the case, 
for instance, of the personal status of an Englishman domiciled in France.444 To 
illustrate the failure of the Convention in solving the positive conflict the same 
example will be taken but with slight difference. Suppose that the person is a 
French but domiciled in England. Concerning his personal status French court 
will apply French law as the law of his nationality if it is seized of the case. If 
English court, however, is seized of the case it will apply English law.445
On the whole, if this hypothetical example supports the view that non of 
the first, second or the third articles could resolve the situation of the positive 
conflict, this means that the unity of solution cannot be achieved by the 
C onvention.446
440* Batiffol, H., Loc.cit., p 488.
441- See Von Overbeck, A E., L o c . c i t . ,  p 156; Derruppe, J„ " Le Renvoi dans les 
Conventions Internationales,", L oc .c i t . ,  p 6.
442- Philip, A., " General Course on Private International Law" , Recueil des cours, Vol. 
n, Tome 160, (1978), p 51.
443- See Conference de la Haye de Droit International Priv6, O p .c i t . ,  p 24
444- See Supra., pp 188-189.
445- Derrup6, J., " le Renvoi dans les Conventions International,", L oc .c i t . ,  p 6.
44 6-lb id .
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C)- D efinition of dom icile in th e 1' Renvoi C o n v en tio n " .
1 )-  E m ergence , of h ab itu a l residence a s ., a connecting  f a c to r . An 
important element which should be discussed in this respect is the definition of 
domicile by the renvoi Convention. As a matter of fact, the Hague Convention of 
15 June 1955 defines itself the meaning of the domicile in article 5 to connote 
the habitual residence of a person.447
More important the difference between the English concept of domicile and 
the continental concept of habitual residence should also be taken into 
consideration for the non ratification of this Convention by the U.K. as one of the 
participating States .448 In fact, according to an opinion, the reason why the 
Convention has not been ratified is that " ...it is impossible for the United 
Kingdom to ratify the convention unless domicile in English law is defined to 
mean habitual residence..." 449 which is not the case up till now in English law.
2)- I ts  p u rp o se s . It must be noted that in order to avoid differences in 
the interpretation of the connecting factor between the signatory states and for 
the sake of the unification of their private international rules Conventions 
normally give a definition of a connecting factor.450 As a matter of fact, by 
referring to the history of the Hague Conference, i.e., before the first world war, it 
can be noticed that Conventions that were prepared at that time were based 
upon nationality. It was held, however, that the adherence of Great Britain to 
the Conference does not permit the application of nationality as a general 
principle. Domicile as well was not accepted as an international principle, 
habitual residence, therefore, was taken as subterfuge.451 In other words, the
447- Article 5 indicates that " domicile for the purpose o f the present convention, is the 
place where a person habitually resides, unless it depends on that of another person or on the 
sear o f an authority ". See the Seventh Hague Conference on P. I. L, 1 Amer. J. Comp. L, (1952), 
P 280; Conference de la Haye de droit International Priv6, O p .c i t . ,  p 24; See in this context Van 
Hoogstraten, M. H„ " la Codificatin par T ra ils  en Droit International Priv6 dans le Cadre de la 
Conference de la Haye" Recueil des cours^ Vol III, Tome 122, (1967), p 357.
448- See Graveson, R.H., Comparative Conflict o f  Laws, Selected Essays, Op.cit., pp 163, 
198, 199.
449- Dicey & Morris, 1987, O p .c i t . ,  p 89 notes 90. See also the Seventh Report of 1963, 
Cmnd. 1955. Para. 13-17.
450- See Mayer, ?.,Op.cit.,y  148.
451- Schwind, F., Loc.cit., p 74.
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use o f habitual residence by the renvoi Convention has been related to the 
modern development which began in 1930.452
It can be said, therefore, that to resolve the problem of divergence in 
qualifications that m ight occur between the contracting States the renvoi 
Convention has defined the domicile to mean the place of the person habitual 
residence .453
D)- The reasons for the fa ilu re  of the C onvention . What makes the 
Convention considered as a failure is that it has not entered into force.454 This 
fact has been related to the problem of ratification in that among the five 
contracting States which signed the Convention only Netherlands and Belgium 
have ratified it.455 It is clear, therefore, that the Hague Convention of 15 june 
1955 has not been ratified yet although it has been accepted and supported by 
doctrinal argum ents.456 More important, there are those who wish the renvoi 
Convention a success in future and call for the signatory States to ratify it.457
I l l ) -  G e n e v a  C o n v e n t io n s  C o n cern in g  b ills  of exchange and 
p ro m isso ry  n o te s . The Geneva Conventions of 1930 and 1931 concerning the 
Bills of exchange and promissory notes, has also been cited as an example which 
recognizes renvoi.458 The use of renvoi, in fact, can be noticed through article 2 
( a l l )  which states that the capacity of a person to be bound by bills of exchange 
and promissory notes should depend upon the law of his nationality.459 This 
disposition, therefore, is said to represent an illustration of an express acceptance
452- Nedelamnn, H., Loc.cit.,  p 446.
453- Derruppe, J., " le Renvoi dans les Conventions Internationales'Toc.c/L , p 8;. Rabel, 
E., Vol 1,1958, Op.cit., p 89.
454- Derrupd, J., Ibid., p 6; Bellet, P., Loc.cit., p 211; Foyer, J., Loc.cit., p 112.
455- This Convention has been signed by Netherland, Belgium, Luxumboug, France and 
Spain; See Derrup6, J., " le Renvoi dans les Conventions International", L o c . c i t ., p 6; See also 
Gessner, A.F., 37 R. I. D. C., (1985), p 111.
456- See Von Overbeck, A. E., Loc.cit., p 156.
457-Batiffol, H., Op.cit., p 488.
458- Lewald, H., " Rbgles G6n6rales des Conflits de Lois, Contributions a la Technique du 
Droit International Privd, Recueil des cours, Vol. Ill, Tome 69, (1939), p 54; Madl, F„ F o o r e ig n  
Trade Monopoly, Private International Law, Buadapest, Akad6maii, Kiado, Budapest, 1967, 
pl60.; Lalive, P., Loc.cit., p 269.
459- Philip, A., Loc.cit., p 47; Wolff, M., Op.cit., pp 191-192.
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of renvoi in that its mechanism works if the law of the person nationality 
indicates the application of another law, i.e., renvoi is accepted from the law of 
the person nationality to another country.460 Furthermore, it has been stressed 
that the renvoi mechanism works also from the law of the person domicile or 
habitual residence, as his personal law, in the absence of nationality.461 It is, 
therefore, questionable whether the convention accept both renvoi at first and
second degree? According to an opinion both forms are, in fact, accepted 
whether it is renvoi to the law of the person domicile or to the lex loci actus .462
It should be noted, therefore, that the use of the mechanism of renvoi, in 
this Convention, has also been interpreted as a way of surm ounting the 
divergence between the nationality and domicile countries. In other words, the 
use of the renvoi mechanism, in this context, has been seen as a sort of 
compromise between the two connecting factors, nationality, and domicile.463
S u b - s e c t i o n 3  C o n v e n t i o n s  th a t  are  h o s t i l e  to r e n v o i .
I)- E xclusion of renvoi in b ila te ra l C onventions
A M s  renvo i inco m p atib le  w ith the b ila te ra l C o n v en tio n s . It has
been admitted that the mechanism of renvoi is impossible between contracting 
states in bilateral conventions. In fact, what makes renvoi not imaginable in the 
bilateral conventions is the purpose of these conventions which is the creation of 
a common rule by unifying the conflict rules of the two contracting States.464 A 
point to be emphasized is that if renvoi occurs because of difference in the
conflict of rules bilateral Conventions, however, have been considered as a 
m eans of rem oving such d ivergence.465 To maintain such claim  two 
Conventions, therefore, will be discussed as an illustration of the rejection of 
renvoi in this type of Conventions.
460-Derrupp6, J.," le  Renvoi dans les Conventions Internationales ", L o c .c i t . ,  pp 2-3; 
Philip, A., Ibid.
461- Derruppe, J., Ibid.,  Philip. A.,Ibid., p 49.
462-W olff, M., Op. cit., pp 191-192.
463- Philip, A., Op.cit., p 49.
464-Derrupp6, Jean.," le Renvoi dans les Conventions Internationales", L oc .c i t . ,  p 4.
465- Ibid.
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B)- C onvention betw een F ran ce  and Y ugoslavia of 18 M av 1971.
This Convention which concerns the competence and the applicable law in the 
field of personal and family law has been considered as rejecting renvoi 
im plicitly . 466 It has been claimed, in this context, that if the Convention 
designates only the law of one of the two contracting States renvoi, therefore, 
will be excluded between those two States. In addition to that renvoi from one of 
the two contracting States to a third State is also excluded.467 From another 
point of view, however, this Convention is an example of a bilateral Convention 
which does not pronounce on the renvoi issue.468
Q -  C o n v e n tio n  b e tw e e n  F ra n c e  and M orocco of 10 A ugust 
1 9 8 1 . The second bilateral Convention which rejects renvoi is the Convention 
between France and Morocco concerning personal and family status and the 
ju d ic ia ry  C o-operation .469 By referring to to the general dispositions of the 
convention it can clearly be seen that article 3 states that the reference to the 
law of either state should be considered as reference to the internal law of that 
state excluding its international system of conflict of laws 470
I I ) - Exclusion of renvoi in m u ltila te ra l C onven tions.
A ) - C ondem nation  of renvoi bv the H ague C onven tions.
1 ) - T he C o n v en tio n a l w isdom  fo r  th e  re je c tio n  o f re n v o i 
m e c h a n is m . If the Hague convention of 15 June 1955 admits renvoi471 It has 
been generally admitted that the recent Hague Conventions, however, do not 
accept its m echanism .472 In other words, it has been held that the tendency of 
the Hague Conventions since 1955 is to exclude renvoi implicitly. This means 
that according to the Hague formula, when the Convention designates or
466-Signed in Paris 18 May 1971, published by the decree N9 73-492 of 15 May 1973, J. 0 .,  
24 May 1973, p 5640; See 62 Re .cri.t dr..int..priv., (1973), p 570; Foyer, J., Loc.cit., p 113.
467-Foyer, J., Ibid.
468-Derrupp6, J., " le Renvoi dans les Conventions Internationales", Loc.cit., p 4.
469- Ibid., pp 3-4.
470- Signed in Rabat on the 10 August 1981 and published in France by decree N9 83- 435
of 27 May. J.O. Is June 1983; See 110 Clunet, (1983), pp 922-923.
471- Foyer, J.,Loc.cit., p 112.
472- Lewald, H., " Questions de Droit International des Successions", Recueil des cours.,
Vol IV, Tome 9, (1925), p 37; Mayer, P., Op.cit., p 192; Pierre, L., Loc.cit., p 269
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determines the applicable law, this should be interpreted as a reference only to 
the substantive rules of the chosen country.473 Furthermore, the exclusion of 
renvoi by the Hague Conventions in conflict of laws has been considered as one 
of the tradition of the Hague conferences.474 As a matter of fact, Emile Potu 
points out that the Hague Conventions that are in force or in the preparatory 
stage should be considered as rejecting the renvoi system and the applicable 
laws designated by the Convention are the internal dispositions. The Convention 
which accepts renvoi, such as, the Hague Convention of 1902 should be 
considered as an exception.475
2)- D i s c u s s i o n s  of the Hague C onventions which a re  hostile  to 
r e n v o i . It will be shown through this discussion that renvoi has been excluded
not only in one field but in different matters.475 The discussion, however, will
refer only to some of the Hague Conventions which are hostile to the mechanism 
of renvoi. Those Conventions, therefore, are cited in chronological order.
First, the Hague Convention on the law applicable to international sales of 
goods concluded in 15 June 1955 excludes implicitly renvoi.477 Article 2, in fact, 
states that the sale is governed by the internal law of the State designated or
chosen by the contracting party.478 It means that the Convention refers only to
the internal law chosen by the parties whether this choice is explicit or 
im p lic it.479 Concerning the ratification among the eleven member States eight, 
however, have ratified it.480
473- Foyer, JM L o c .c i t . ,  p 113; Loussouarn, Y et Bourel, P.,O p .c i t . ,  p 274; Philip, A., 
Loc.cit., p 48.
474- See Pelichet, M., Loc.cit., pp 176-177.
475- Potu., E., Op.cit., p 168.
476- Foyer, J., Loc.cit, p 112.
477- Ibid., p 113.
478- See article 3 o f that Convention which also excludes renvoi. Conference de la Haye 
de Droit International Priv6", Op.cit., pp 12-13 ; Diamond., A.L., Loc.cit., p 253.
479- Conference de la Haye de Droit International Prive, Ib id . ,  See also Loussouarn, Y et 
Bourel, P., Op.cit., p 293; Isaad, M., Volume 1, p 176.
480- It was ratified by by Belgium, Danemark, Finland, France, Italy, Norway, Sweden 
and S w itzerland . S ee Inform ation C oncerning the Hague C onven tion s on P rivate' 
International Law, 35 Netherlands International Law R ev ie w ,( 1988), p 198; Sandrock,' 0 . ,  
Loc.cit., pp 147- 148, notes 6.
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Second, the Hague Convention on the law governing transfer of title in 
International sales of goods of 15 April 1958 also excludes renvoi in article 3.481 
This Convention, however, which was signed by its two member states, Greece 
and Italy, has not entered into force.482
Third, the Hague Convention on the the conflicts of laws relating to the 
forms of testamentary dispositions of 1960, concluded on October 5 1961, has 
also been considered as rejecting the mechanism of renvoi.483 In fact, this 
exclusion can be clearly seen in its article 1 which indicates that the 
testamentary disposition is formally valid if it is made according to one of the 
five listed internal laws.484 These are either the laws where the testator made 
its testamentary disposition, the law o f , the testator' s nationality, the law of the 
place in which the testator had his domicile, the place in which he had his 
nationality or the place in which the testator had his habitual residence. Finally, 
in relation to the lex rei s itae , the reference is made to the internal law of the 
place where that immovables are situated.485 This Convention has been ratified 
by all members States except Italy, portugal.486
Four, the exclusion of renvoi can also be seen in the Hague Convention on 
the law applicable to traffic accidents concluded in May 4 1971487 in which 
article 3 States that the internal law of the State where the accident took place is
481- Foyer, J .,"L oc.cit., p 113; See Conference de la Haye de Droit International Privd, 
Op.cit., p 16.
482-See Information Concerning the Hague Conventions on Private International Law,
loc.cit., p 201.
483- Graveson, R.H., Comparative Conflict o f  Laws, Selected Essays, O p .c i t . ,  p 358; For 
more details upon the renvoi in relation to the formal validity of will see Su pra . ,  Section 2.
484- See Conference de la Haye de Droit international Privd, O p .c i t . ,  p 49; Foyer, J.,
,L oc .c i t . ,  p 113; Loussuarn, Y., " la R6gle de Conflit est elle une R6gle Neutre ?". Sdance du 30 
Janvier 1981, Trav. Comiti, Frangais. dr..in.privi., Tome 2, (1980-1981), pp 52-53
485- From the point o f view o f time article 3 states that this Convention "...shall not affect 
any existing or future rules o f law in contracting States which recognize testamentary 
dispositions made in compliance with the formal requirements o f a law other than a law
referred to in the preceding Articles. See Conference de la Haye de Droit International
Pri v 6 ,Ib id ,
486- See Information Concerning the Hague Conventions on Private International Law,
Loc.cit.,  pp 202-203.
487- Foyer, J.JLoc.cit., p 113.
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ap p lica b le .488 Among the ten member States who signed it nine, however, have 
ratified it.489
Five, article 3 of the Hague Convention on the law Applicable to 
M atrimonial property Regimes of 14 March 1978 which excludes renvoi.490 
According this article the applicable law that governs the matrimonial property 
regim e is the internal law designated by spouses before m arriage.491 If, 
however, the spouses did not designate the law to govern their matrimonial 
property regime before marriage this will be governed by the internal law of 
the State where both spouses, after the marriage, established their first habitual 
r e s id e n c e .492 Only two among the four member States have ratified it and 
consequently the Convention has not entered into force.493
Six, there are indications that the Hague Convention on the Law Applicable 
to Agency of 14 March 1978 excludes renvoi implicitly.494 According to article 5 
the agency relationship between the principal and the agent is governed by the 
internal law chosen by them. If this law, however, is not chosen the applicable
law will be the internal law of the State of the agent' s business establishment. If
there is no such business establishment it will be the internal law of his habitual 
re s id e n c e .495 This Convention has not entered into force because it has been 
ratified only by two countries.496
Seven, the new Hague Convention497 on the law applicable to contracts for
488- See Conference de la Haye de Droit international Privd , O p.c i t . ,$$ 142-143.
489- See Information Concerning the Hague Conventions on Private International Law,
Loc.cit., p 215.
490- Foyer, J.,Loc.cit.,y 113; Derruppe, J., I l l  C lunet,Loc.cit. ,  p 871.
491- The spouses have the right to designate one internal law. These are: the law o f the
State of the nationality o f either spouse, the law o f the State o f the habitual residence o f either
spouses at the time o f designation or the law o f the first State where one o f the spouses after 
marriage establishes a new habitual residence.
492- See Article 4. Conference de la Haye de Droit International Prive.Op.cif., pp 228-231.
493- See Information Concerning the Hague Conventions on Private International Law,
Loc. cit.,p 218
494- Foyer, J„Lo.cit., p 113; Dcrrupp6, J., U lC lu n e t ,L oc .c i t . ,  p 113.
495- For more details on the application o f the internal law o f the state where the agent 
is primarily to act see article 6 para 2 , Conference de la Haye de Droit International Prive 
Op.cit., pp 252 - 255.
4 9 6 -  See Information Concerning the Hague C onventions on Private International 
Law, Loc. cit., p 218 -
497- The revision of the Hague Convention on the International sales o f goods o f 1955
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the international sale of goods signed on the 22nd of December 1986 is said to 
exclude renvoi in Article 15 which says that ” In the Convention 1 Law ’ means 
the law in force in a State other than its choice of law rules".498
Finally, the more recent Convention established by the Hague Conference,
which excludes renvoi, is the Convention on the law applicable to succession to
the estates of deceased persons.499 In fact, article 17 states that " in this
Convention, and subject to article 4, law means the law in force in a State other
than its choice of law rules".500
B)- R epud ia tion  of Renvoi bv the Rome C onven tions.
1)- I m p l i c i t  re je c tio n  of ren v o i in the  C o n v en tio n  o f 10 
S ep tem b er 1970. The implicit exclusion of the mechanism of renvoi can also 
be noticed in the Rome Convention on legitimation by marriage signed in Rome 
on the 10 of September 1970. In fact, article 1 of the Convention indicates that if 
according to the internal dispositions of either the national law of the father or 
that of the mother, their marriage accords legitimation to a natural child, this 
legitimation should also be considered as valid in the contracting States. Besides, 
Article 3 as well states that public policy cannot stand against the validity of 
legitimation as far as this is* in accordance with the internal law of either the
national law of the mother or the father.501
2)- E x p l i c i t  re jec tio n  of renvoi in the C onvention of 19 .Tune 
1 9 8 0 . If renvoi has been excluded in matters of contract by legislation and 
jurisprudence such repudiation has also been advocated in international level. 
In fact, the E.E.C. Convention project on the applicable law to contractual
was, therefore, achieved by the elaboration o f New Hague Convention on the law applicable to 
contract for the international sales o f goods by which it states in article 28 that the latter
Convention shall replace the former. Pelichet, M., L o c .c i t ., pp 192, 207.
498- Ibid., pp 176, 203, Originally emphasised.
499- The final draft was completed in October 1988. See H ague C onven tion  on 
S u c c e s s i o n , C onsultation  paper, Lord C hancellor' s D epartm ent S co ttish  Courts 
Administration, 1990, p 30.
500- Ibid.
501-This is an indication that it is by the substantive rules that the legitimation can be 
reached. See Foyer, J., L oc .c i t . ,  p 113; Derruppd, J., lU C lu n e t ,  Loc .cit . ,  pp 113-114; See also 103 
Clunet, (1976), p 740.
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obligation, which became the Rome Convention o f 19 June 1980,502 is said to 
exclude renvoi expressly from the Convention through its article 15.503 By 
referring to its disposition, this article states that " The application of the law of 
any country specific by this Convention means the application of rules of law in 
force in that country other than its rules of Private International law".504 More 
clearly this explicitly can be noticed through the sub-title of the Convention 
labelled as exclusion of renvoi".505
By way of summing up, the aim of the E.E.C. Convention506 on the law 
applicable to contractual obligations is the establishment of uniform rules in this 
a re a .507 Article 15, in fact, is an example of such uniform rule which gives a 
negative solution to the mechanism of renvoi.508
502- The Rome Convention on the law applicable to contractual obligation was signed 19 
June 1980 in the framework o f the E.E.C. For the proposed Rome Convention on the law  
applicable to Contractual obligations. See 23 Official Journal o f the European Communities [ 0 .  
J.] L I 2261 1, Oct. 9, 1980; See Juenger, F., " The European Convention on the Law Applicable to 
Contractual Obligations. Some Critical Observations" 2 2 Virginia Journal o f  International Law  
(1982), p 123, note 1; See also Lawenfeld, A.F., " Renvoi Among the law Professors: An 
American's View of the European o f American Conflict o f Laws, 30 Amer. J. Comp. L  (1 9 8 2 ) , 
plOO, note 104.
503- Foyer, J., L oc .c i t . ,  p 113; Derruppd, J., I l l  C lunet,  L oc .c i t . ,  p 114, See also page 122 
footnotes 26 bis; See Bellet, P., 70 Re .cri.t d r . .in t. .pr iv^Loc.cit . ,  p 211; Von Overbeck, A E., 
L oc .c i t . ,  p 134; See Derrupe J., " Le Renvoi dans les Conventions Internationales,", L oc.cit . ,  p 3.
504- See Sandrock, O., Loc.cit., p 203.
505- Foyer, J., Loc.cit., p 122 footnotes 26 bis.
506- Concerning the problem of ratification its article article 29 par (1), states that the 
Convention shall enter into force unless Seven member states w ill deposit their ratification or 
approval., See Sandrock, O., L o c .c i t . ,pp 148-149; Morris, J.H.C., The Conflict o f  Laws, O p .c i t . ,  
p298; The U.K. now has enacted the Contracts (Applicable Law) Act, 1990. This constitutes the 
seventh ratification. See The British Institute o f  International and Comparative Law, N° 4, 
October 1990.
507- See in this context the preamble o f the Convention in English version in Sandrock,. 
O., Loc.cit., p 195.
508- Badiali, G.," le Droit International Privd des Communautds Europdenncs", R e c u e i l  
des cours Vol. II, Tome 191, (1985), pp 69, 102.
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Remarks
1)- Follow ing scholars' controversies upon the application of renvoi 
through different cases , the writer would like to draw attention to different
points.
First, Collier  v. R i v a z ,  Frere  v. F r e r e ,  and Goods o f  Lacroix,  have been
considered as the first English decisions which admitted renvoi despite the fact 
that they did not use the renvoi expression.5
Second, concerning the case of M a lta s s  v . M a lta s s  John D elatre 
Falconbridge has said that this case "...contains a dictum favourable to the renvoi 
but the decision did not involve the renvoi". 510 There are, however, those who
believe that M altass  v. M altass  cannot be regarded as a precedent or authority
that favours the use of renvoi for the simple reason that the treaty which
contains a rule of private international law, that is applied to both countries, does
not involve conflict of laws. In other words, the treaty of peace avoids the
emergence of any question of conflict of law because the disposition of the treaty 
itself represents a common private international rule for both the U.K. and 
T u rk e y .511 According to this view the application of English law concerning the 
succession of a British subject, who died in Turkey, is confirmed by a disposition 
of the peace treaty of 1809 concluded between Ottoman Empire and England.512 
Albrecht Mendelssohn Bartholdy denies, in fact, any form of renvoi in this case 
when he says that " M altass  v M a lta ssh  not concerned with either renvoi or 
transmission and is not a case of conflict of laws in the proper sense of the
te rm " .513 Moreover, John Pawley Bate himself denies any claim that M altass  v . 
M a l ta s s  should be considered as a renvoi case and in his opinion the succession 
of a British subject should be governed by English law because of the treaty and 
not by remission from Turkish law.514
509- Martin, W., Op.cit., p 189.
510- Falconbridge, J.D.,Essays on the Conflict o f  Laws, Op.cit., p 148.
511- It must be noted that in that case Dr Lushington refers to the case o f Collier  v .  
Rivaz.  (1844), 1 Rob, Eccl. 67; See Mendelssohn-Bartholdy, A., Op.cit.,  p 65.
512-See M endelssohn-Brtholdy, A.,Ibid.,  pp 65-67.
513- I b id . ,p  75.
514- Bate, J.P., O p.cit .,pp 11-12.
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Third, in Re J o h n s o n , although renvoi is said to be approved partly by 
obiter  d ic ta ,515 the English court in this case, used for the first time the renvoi 
expression .516
Four, in reply to the question of whether the case of Re Trufort  can be 
considered as an Authority for transmission A lbrecht M endelssohn Bartholdy 
has m aintained that the decision in the R e T r u fo r t  concerns m atters of
jurisdiction and could not be considered as a renvoi or transmission decision.517 
In his view, Edwin H. Abbot too maintains that "...The present case ...is an 
example not of renvoi but of res ju d ica ta . " 518
Five, if renvoi is said to be applicable in legitim ation by subsequent 
marriage the doubt, however, is whether under the legitimacy Act of 1976 S 3 
its mechanism is applicable to the recognition of a foreign legitimation.519
Six, it should be noted that A r m i t a g e  v. A tto rney  Gen is also controversial 
on whether it represents a renvoi case. As a matter of fact, it has been pointed 
out that the recognition of a foreign decree of divorce in England because it 
would be recognised by the courts of the domicil of the parties " ...has nothing to
do with renvoi )" 52{1 From another point of view A rm ita g e  v . A tto r n e y
G en.cannot be considered as a renvoi case but a decision which concerns the
courts ju risd ic tion .521 In other words, the issue deals with matter of the court 
jurisdiction and not with the conflict of laws.522
Seven, if it is a true to think that nowadays an Italian court will consider the
national law of a British subject domiciled in Italy to mean Italian law and not 
his domicile of origin or English law this belief will, lead to an important change. 
As a matter of fact, Morris, J.H.C., went so far as to say that "... the cases of R e
515- See Wolff, M., Op.cit., pp 194-195.
516- Ibid., p 195, note 2. See Schreiber, E.O.JLoc.cit., p 523
517- Mendelssohn-Bartholdy, A., Op.cit., p 75.
518- Abbot, E.H.Joc.c it . ,  p l42.
519- Cheshire & North, 11th edition, O p .c i t . ,  p 73, notes 12. Though o f course Re Askew  
[1930] 2 Ch. 259 ( pre Act) is a famous renvoi case on legitimation.
520- Morris J. H. C., The Conflict o f  Laws, Op.cit., p 475.
521- See Falconbridge, J.D., Essays on the Conflict o f  Laws, 1954, O p.c i t . ,  P 745; Cheshire
& North, 11th edition, Op.cit.,  p 71, notes 19; .
522- See Dicey & Morris , 1987, Op.cit., p 82. See Supra.,  Section 1, Sub-section 1, p 148. .
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R o s s  and Re O ' Keefe  are no longer reliable guides ",523 It should also be borne 
in mind that although the revival of the domicil of origin has been rejected in the 
U .S .A .524 and its abolition is recommended by the law Commission it is, however, 
still adopted by the English jurisprudence.525
Eight,with regard to the use of double renvoi to upheld a will it has been 
stressed that the use of total renvoi in Re A n nes ley  led to the partial validity of 
a will. According to an opinion, however, the will, would be entirely valid if the 
theory of simple renvoi was applied.526
2)- Of course the renvoi mechanism has been used and excluded by 
English courts. There must be, therefore, justifications of either position. It 
means if the repudiation of renvoi, for instance, in contract is due to the 
incompatibility of its mechanism with the intention of the parties, what is then, 
the justification of using its mechanism by English courts.527 Views in this 
context, however, differ. According to Elizabeth Edinger "...English Cases appear 
to use renvoi both as a rule and as an alternative ru le..."528 It is meant by the 
latter rule that "...renvoi is really being used ...as an alternative rule of 
validation...".529
3 ) -The argument which considers that the rejection of the mechanism of 
renvoi by the Algerian legislature is logical on the ground that it avoids the 
application of Algerian family law, i.e., Islamic principle on foreigners seems also
523- Morris, J.H.C., The Conflict o f  Laws,Op.cit., pp 479- 480.
524- In the United States o f America there has been a shift from the revival o f  the
domicil o f origin to a rule which maintains that an existing dom icile should continue until the 
acquisition o f a new domicile. See in this context, Graveson, R.H., C om parative  Conflict o f  
Laws, Selected Essays , Op.cit.,  p 243.
525- See the Law Commission Working Paper N ° 88, and the Scottish Law Commision 
Consultative Memorandum N ° 63, O p .c i t . ,  Para. 4.22., See also The Law Commission and the 
Scottish Law Commission (Law COM N° 168) (Scot Law Com. N° 107), Op.cit.,  p 8; For more details 
see especially, Carter, P.B., " Domicile: the Case for Radical Reform in the United Kingdoom., 
Loc.cit., p 716;
526-Wolff, M., Op.cit.,p 204. note 3.
527- Parties' intentions and expectations are important in contract, but different
considerations may be said to apply in matters o f status. However, the writer queries whether
there should be such a distinction.
528- Edinger, E., Loc.cit., p 50.
529- Ibid., p 48.
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unacceptable. It can be replied to this argument that if this is the only reason for 
the repudiation of renvoi by the Algerian legislation why should not the renvoi 
mechanism be accepted if the foreigners are not Christians but French or British 
Moslems? Because, whatever is the applicable law, in this context, nationality or 
domicile, Islamic religion principles will be applied. So What is the real problem!. 
It seems, therefore, that there will be no problem in accepting renvoi if the 
foreigners are British Moslems but otherwise, i.e., if they are British Christians. 
There is indeed a problem.
4)- Furthermore the penetration of renvoi in matter of form, i.e., l o c u s  
regit actum  has been seen from practical aspects. As a matter of fact it has been 
claimed that renvoi from the local law of the locus regit actum  to a third law 
should not be favoured if it leads to the invalidity of the legal act.530 Others have 
remarked that if renvoi from the local law to a third law, as the common law of 
the parties, leads to the validity of the act such renvoi should be admitted.531
5 )- It should be noted that the argument which supports the view that 
there is a certain incom patibility between the autonomy law and renvoi in 
m atter of contract532 has been considered as not absolute. In fact, From 
Graveson's point of view there is no reason to exclude renvoi in contract if the 
parties, themselves, chose expressly the proper law and would stress that it 
included the conflict rules of the chosen system.533 According to others, claiming 
that renvoi principle finds no place in contract is" also not invariably true".534 
From their point of view the Case of Re United Railways o f  H avana  and Regia  
W a r e h o u s e s 535, does not show that the intention of the contracting parties was 
the exclusion of the foreign conflict rules and the proper law, therefore, could 
include the whole foreign law. In addition to that, § 187 (3) of the second
530- Audit, B .JLoc.cit., p 334.
531- Ibid.
532- Foyer, J., L oc .c it .,p 124.
533- See Graveson, R.H., Conflict o f  Laws, O p .c i t . ,  p 76; See also Spiro, E.JLoc.cit., p 201;
Sadekh, H.A .,Op.cit., pp 83-84.
534- Levontin, A.V., Op.cit., p 60.
5 3 5 -[  1960] Ch. 52, 97.
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American Restatement of the Conflict of laws has also been cited as an example 
to support this view.536
6 ) -Concerning the problem of autonomy law in relation to matrimonial 
property regime it has been claimed that if according to the decision of Mari-
Magni renvoi is dismissed in a case of matrimonial property regime it does not 
mean, however, that it condemns the mechanism of renvoi totally in this field.537
7)- Alternative conflict rules have also been used by conventions, such as,
the Hague Convention on the testamentary dispositions of 5 October 1961 in 
order to achieve the validity of a legal Act.538
Moreover, the point to be emphasized is whether the Wills Act of 1963 
repeals the previous one, i.e., the Wills Act of 1861.? From a historical point of 
view and according to English law before 1861, the will was formally valid only 
if it complies with the forms prescribed by the law of the testator' s last 
d o m ic ile .53  ^ This, however, was amended by the passing of Lord Kingsdown' s 
Act of 1861 which gave the testator the right to choose between the forms 
required  by various law s.540 In the twentieth Century, however, Lord
Kingsdown' s Act was amended by the Wills Act of 1963.541 The problem to be
emphasized is that section 2 (1) (b) of the Act has been considered as excluding 
renvoi despite the fact that the doctrine of renvoi has not been abolished by the 
A c t .542 In the view of the advocates of the possibility of renvoi it has been
536- Levontin, A. V., Op. cit., 1976, P 60 notes 136. However, the modem ' British' view  
may be expressed generally to be against the use o f renvoi in contract.
537- Dirruppd, J., 111Clunet, Loc.cit.,  p 870.
538- Derruppd, J .,H le Renvoi dans les Conventions Internationales?"Z,0C.c/7., p 5.; Foyer, 
J., Loc.cit., p 117.
539- This rule is the old Common law rule concerning the formal validity o f w ills. See 
Dicey & Morris, 11th edition, Op.cit., p 80.
540-According to Lord Kingsdown's Act the w ill made by a British citizen w ill receive  
probation if  it is done outside the United Kingdom provided it respected the required  
formalities o f  one o f the three stated laws. These are first forms o f the law o f the place o f 
making the will. Second, Forms o f the law o f the domicile o f the testator at the time o f making 
the will. Finally, forms o f the laws of the domicile of origin o f the testator. See Falconbridge, J. 
D., " Renvoi in New York and Elswhere" L o c .c i t ., pp 712-713; Dicey & Morris, Ib id . ,  pp 76- 77 
notes 11.
541- Morris, J.H.C., The Conflict o f  Laws, Op.cit., pp 471-472, note 10.
542- Dicey & Morris, Rule 141, 11th edition, Op. cit, pp 1015, 1017.
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stressed that although the English Wills Act of 1963 excludes renvoi by 
referring to the internal law of various laws systems stated by this Act it does
not, however, abolish the old common law rules for the formal validity of wills 
through which there might be a possibility of renvoi from the law of the
testator's last dom icile.543 Others have remarked that despite the fact that the 
Wills Act of 1963 is said to be against the renvoi doctrine, section 2 (1) (d) has 
led to a belief in the possibility of renvoi through this provision. According to 
this view renvoi can be seen through this disposition because that section 
"...refers to ' the law 1 governing the essential validity of the power, and not to the 
internal law of that system."544
8)- It is obvious that International Conventions may either reject renvoi or 
accept it. The problem, however, is with the Conventions which are silent on 
renvoi. According to an opinion those conventional rules qualified as silent on 
renvoi should be considered as rejecting it implicitly.545
9 )- It must also borne in mind, however, that even the rejection of renvoi 
in the Hague Conventions is not absolute.546 The question which arises, in this 
context, is whether the testamentary dispositions will be valid if it complies with 
the laws other than those stated in article 1? The answer is positive in that
article 3 of the Hague Convention on the conflict of laws relating to the form of
testamentary disposition states that " ...The present Convention shall not affect
any existing or future rules of law in contracting states which recognizes
testamentary dispositions made in compliance with the formal requirem ents o f
a law other than a law referred to in the preceding Articles."547 This means that
if there is a rule in the contracting state which accepts the mechanism of renvoi
543- See Ibid.,  p 80; Morris, J.H.C., M The Wills Act, 1963 ", L oc.cit . ,  P 684. See alsoJaffey, 
A J. E., Op.cit., p 205 notes 36.
544-This provision concerns the English Powers o f appointment Originally emphasised. 
See in this context Graveson, R.H., Comparative Conflict o f  Laws, Selected  Essays, O p .c i t . ,  
pp202, 205.
545-Derrupp6,J., " Le Renvoi dans les Conventions Internationales" L oc .c i t . ,  p 4.
546- Ibid., p 3.
547- See Art 3, o f the Convention on the Conflict o f Laws Relating to the Forms of 
Testamentary Dispositions, Concluded on the 5th October 1961. Conference de la Haye de Droit 
International Privd, O p .c i t . ,  pp 48-49.
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in a matter of form of act this rule should be upheld.548
1 0 ) -It has been noticed that the renvoi mechanism may occur in the 
Conventional level if the conflict rule selects or indicates the application of law of
a non contracting State.54  ^ In this respect, it has been claimed that if a conflict
rule rejects the mechanism of renvoi between the contracting States and accepts 
it in relation between those States and a non contracting State this is due to the 
fact that in the former there is a common rule which eliminates a negative 
conflict and then the renvoi issue.550 For instance, the Hague Convention on the 
law applicable to succession to the estates of a deceased person551 is said to 
admit the mechanism of renvoi when the case involves a non Contracting States. 
As a matter of fact article 4 states that: " If the law applicable according to article
3 is that of a n o n -C o n tra c tin g  State, and if the choice of law rules of that State
d e s ig n a te .. . . the law of another non-Contracting State which would apply its own 
law, the law of the latter state a p p lie s .” 552 It can be noticed that although the 
Convention excludes renvoi in its article 7 an exception has been made by article 
4 .558 Whether the United Kingdom will admit the limited renvoi of this article or 
benefits from the reservation of article 24 para 1(b),554 in case the Convention 
come into effect, is still questionable.555
Additionally, Article 4 (2) of the Hague Convention on the law applicable to 
matrimonial property regimes is said to consecrate renvoi. According to its
dispositions "...the matrimonial property regime is governed by the internal law 
of the State of the common nationality of the spouses...where that State is not a
548- Derruppd, J., " Le Renvoi dans les Conventions Internationale?" L oc .c i t . ,  p 3.
549- Von Overbeck, A. A., Loc.cit., p 130.
- 550- Derruppd, J., " Le Renvoi dans les Conventions Internationales" L oc .c i t . ,  pp 5 - 6 .
551- See the manuscript that was under revision in the sixteenth session o f the Hague 
Conference on private international Law during the 3rd and the 2oth o f October 1988. See in 
this context Aranguren, G.P., L oc.cit . ,  p 80, note 149.
552- I b id . ,  emphasise added; Hague Convention on Succession,  C onsultation Paper, 
Op.cit., p 18.
553- Hague Convention on Succession, Consultation Paper, Ibid.,  p 30.
5 5 4 -  This article concerns the possibility o f a State in making a reservation against 
article 4 ehich allows a limited renvoi, Ibid.,  p 36.
555- Ibid., p 40.
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Party to the Convention and according to the rules of private international law, of 
that State its internal law is applicable...".556 It has been pointed out, m  this
context, that the Matrimonial Property Regime Convention consecrates renvoi 
between a contracting State and a State which is not a party to Convention. The 
latter, therefore, must be the State of the Common nationality of the spouses that 
accepts the com petence557,i.e., a reference is made to the international private 
law rules of the non-Contracting State.
556- Conference de la Haye de Droit International Privd ,L o c .c i t . ,  pp 228-229; S e t  R e .  
exit. .dr. inti. priv.,(1976), p 822; See la Treizibme session de la Conference de la Haye de Droit 
International Privd, 65 Re. crit. dr. inti, priv., (1976), p 821. Emphasise added.
557- Derruppd, J., " Le Renvoi dans les Conventions Internationales" L oc .c i t . ,  p 3.
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Chapter 4 
Conclusion
1)- It follows from the facts stated in the above chapters that the main 
characteristic of the mechanism of renvoi is that it represents a difficult issue. 
B esides, it is a problem  which concerns the general theory of private 
in ternational law .1 One should also remember that if renvoi might be applied 
by a country X whereas its mechanism is rejected in the country Y this indicates 
that up till now there is no universal solution to the subject that can be accepted 
by all countries. This failure , in fact, is another problem.
2 ) -  W ith regard  to the h is to rica l co n sid era tio n s  o f p riv a te  
internationational law it should be noted that this is not an elem entary 
discussion of this discipline but an account of its elements seems useful as a basis 
of making a detailed study of the renvoi issue. By referring, for instance, to the
development of private international law in the United States of America it can
be seen that there has been a substitution of flexible rules of the second 
Restatement of the conflict of laws for the regid rules of the first one. C o n cern in g  
the conflict crisis evoked by Kegel it must be emphasised that all differents
conceptions, such as, unilateralism, conflict rules, substantive rules and lois de 
p o l i c e  means one thing; that the discipline of private international law knows a 
coexistence of methods.2
3 )-  If one admits that renvoi occurs because of the divergence of the 
connecting factors adopted by the two legal systems, it should be remembred
that, historically, it is the clash of the internal rules of different countries which 
gave birth to the discipline of private international law.3 To this interpretation
1- Badiali, G., "le Droit International Privd des Communautds Europednnes", R e c u e i l  
des cours, Volume II, Tome 191,(1985), p 102.
2- See Supra., Chapter 1.
3- Bate, I.V.,Notes on the Doctrine o f  Renvoi in Private International Law  , London,
2 0 9
one m ight ask a sim ple question whether or not renvoi is inevitable? 
Theoretically, different justifications have been given in this context. There are 
those who believe that if laws are governed by a super law there will be no 
conflict of laws.4 Concerning the call of Savigny for a uniform law it has been 
stressed that when the diversity of conflict rules is abolished renvoi will not 
ex is t.5 In practical terms, one must realize that these days are not yet with us.
4 ) -It should also be borne in mind that the main problems of private 
international law is not only renvoi but other issues which are related to its 
mechanism, such as, preliminary questions and qualification. Concerning the last 
issue despite different solutions which have been proposed by scholars in 
treating the process of characterization, two points are worth emphasasing. First, 
characterization is a prim ary process that precedes the renvoi mechanism. 
Second, both characterization and renvoi have a close link.6 Of course, it is 
worth emphasizing the different theories of characterization but it seems also 
important to make a reflection on the hypothesis that, if renvoi is due to the 
difference in qualification will the former disappear from private international 
law when the problem of the latter is resolved? In truth this is another 
controversial question which requires a thorough search.
5 )-Chronologically, it' s clear that renvoi has contributed to the emergence 
of controversies between scholars from German court via English decisions down 
to the French jurisprudence in 1882. This is an indication that the phenomenon 
of renvoi existed even before l'A ffair F o r g o J  In fact, if F o r g o ' s case 
represents an authority upon the origin of the theory of renvoi the truth which
Stevens & Sons ,1904, p 120;’See Supra., Chapter 1.
4- Ehrenzweig, A .A ., " Specific Principles o f Private Transnational Law" R ecueil  des  
cours,  Volume n , Tome 124, (1968), p 219.
5- Lewald, H., "la Theorie du Renvoi", Recueil des cours., Volum elV, Tome 29, (1929),
p 616 .
6- See Supra.,  Chapter 1.
7 -  I d .
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should not be denied is that the previous reasoning must not be neglected, 
otherwise, they might be forgotten. In other words, l'Affair Forgo  is not the 
only renvoi case, but renvoi is the subject of discussion of courts, scholars, 
lawyers before 1882 until the contemporary age. With regard to English 
jurisprudence it will also be a mistake if the previous cases are ignored and
might be an illogical analysis if the discussion started only from the case of Re 
A n n e s ley .  The writer, therefore, disagrees with those who believe that this
case should be considered as the begining of the application of the renvoi 
mechanism in English jurisprudence. As a matter of fact, the historical discovery 
of renvoi is an indication that the reference to those cases, since Collier  v R iv a z ,
are not only relevant but also necessary to this reflection.
Furthremore, if the controversies upon the acceptance of renvoi in the 19th 
Century increased it does not mean that before that Century the renvoi question 
was ignored but it was less dealt with. This is due to the fact that the renvoi 
issue did not occur so often and also it did not have a lot of advocates to support 
its mechanism as is the case in the 19th and the 20th Centuries.8 It was only
after 1882 that the controversies upon the process of renvoi have widened.
6 )- If either nationality or domicile represents the favoured connecting 
factor for the country X or Y this means that each country bases its choice for 
either principle on practical and social factors.9 In fact, if personal law is 
governed by the concept of nationality or dom icile, this shows that each 
connecting factor is taken into account on the basis of its characteristics.
7 )- As the "cold war" between the two camps illustrate, the controversies 
on renvoi indicate that scholars differ on the question of what is the real and 
logical solution that will be achieved by renvoi? One must remember that each
8 -C ./ . . ,  Meijers, E.M., M la Question du Renvoi" 38 Bulletin  de I’Institut Jurid ique
International " (1938), pp 200, 202; See Id.
9- Graveson, R.H., Conflict o f  Laws. Private International law, 7th edition, London, 
Sweet & Maxwell, 1974, p 190.; See Supra., Chapter 2.
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conception that defends or condemns its mechanism does not escape other 
scholars' c ritic ism .10 Concerning the question of whether renvoi can achieve 
principles of private international law, such as, harmonization and coordination 
of systems this should be related, historically, to Savigny who recognised for the 
first time the possibility of the legal harmony in private international law .1 1 
This consideration, therfore, is useful in that it leads to the question of whether 
this legal harmony is totally achievable nowdays? More important, if the basic 
argument of the pro-renvoiists is that renvoi represents a technique that leads 
to uniformity of law, the real question is whether it is the only technique which 
provides such uniformity? To this it can be replied that there are other ways by 
which the uniformity of law can be achieved, such as, uniform legislation and 
International Conventions 12 Besides, if uniformity of decisions and harmony of 
laws have been considered as the main arguments of justifying renvoi one must 
find out whether renvoi really achieves these principles or the fact that scholars 
want only to talk about them? If the answer supports the view that renvoi 
achieves these principles it will be still doubtful once those exceptions where 
renvoi has been repudiated are taken into account. Does it mean that uniformity 
of decisions and harmony of laws cannot be achieved by renvoi mechanism in 
those situations? If yes the writer believes that although those arguments might 
be advocated by the pro-renvoiists they are not strong enough to be applied as a 
general principle. Concerning the view that renvoi might achieve international 
harmony and coordination of conflict systems this becomes unacceptable when 
one hears that renvoi also leads to the infringement of the expectations of the 
parties or to nullify certain legal acts. Is is, therefore, possible that renvoi can
10- See Supra.,  Chapter 2.
11- Id.
12- See Nadelmann, Kurt, H., Conflict o f  Laws: International and Interstate, S e l e c t e d  
E ssays ,  by Cavers, D.F., et a l ,  The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1972, p 88; Von Ovebeck, A.E., " Les 
Questions G6n6rales du Droit International Priv6 A la Lumibre des Codifications et Projets 
R6cents. Cour G6n6ral de Droit International Privd," Recueil des cours, Volume IE, Tome 176, 
(1982), p 162.
2 1 2
lead to the the former without making the latter consequences possible ? In 
other words, if renvoi according to those who advocate it leads to a positive 
consequences, logically, its process should not lead to negative consequences as 
well. Of course it is a better way if principles, such as, harmony of solutions, 
coordination of systems, etc can be achieved through the process of renvoi. It is 
worse and dangerous, however, if its mechanism is used as a ruse under the 
name of the achievement of of certain principles of private international law.
Moreover, it is difficult to maintain the view of those who believe that 
accepting renvoi is better than rejecting it on the ground that it leads to the 
application of a uniform law by different countries.13 It can be replied to such 
reasoning that if uniformity of law can really be achieved by renvoi why is the 
num ber of countries that refute renvoi num erous and also what is the
usefulness of a non ratified Convention which adopts its mechanism, such as the 
Hague Convention of 1955? Besides, if international harmony can really be
achieved by the process of renvoi why does article 15 of the EEC. Convention of
1980, for instance, excludes its mechanism?14
8 ) -If  the anti renvoiists support their view by referring to the difficulty 
found by W ynn-Parry J in the Case of Re  Duke  o f  W e l l i n g t o n , .i.e., of
ascertaining the view of Spanish law on renvoi, it can be said that this particular 
statem ent is outdated .15 Moreover, the view which says that renvoi does not 
erase the opposition between nationality  and dom icile but m ultip lies the 
difficulties and makes harder the judge' s task16 should not be considered as
the main argument to reject renvoi. Perhaps, this argument might have a legal
value in the 19th Century and the beginning of the 20th Century, but it should
13- Meijers, E.M., Loc.cit ., p 219.
14- See Supra.,  Chapter 3.
15- Anton, A.E., Private International Law, A Treatise from the Standpoint o f  Scots Law,
Edinburgh, W. Green & Son L.T.D.1967, p 59; See Supra., Chapter 2.
16- Maridakis, G.S.," les Principaux Traits de la R6cente Codification Hdllinique Touchant 
le Droit International Privd" Recueil des cours, Volume I, Tome 85, (1954), p 169.
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not be considered as the most important justification nowadays, otherwise the 
contribution of International Institution, International Conferences, Comparative 
studies and more im portant the publications might be ignored. To say it 
differently, it might be acceptable to maintain the view that renvoi is not a 
useful device but not under the pretext that it is hard for the judge to know the 
foreign law and its contents. k
9)- The view that renvoi is a classical problem and should be neglected is 
not accurate. In fact, the arguments of those frho are against a further analysis 
of its mechanism should be considered as exaggerating. Of course renvoi is a 
difficult issue but this is not a justification for ignoring it. Was it , practically, 
possible and easier for Wynn Parry to ignore renvoi in the case of the Duke o f  
W e l l i n g t o n ?
10)- Furtherm ore, if your fascination about renvoi leads you to know 
more and more about this controversial issue you might be astonished if you are 
advised by a professional or a novice that you have only a few things to say on 
this subject. How would you react? It seems that this advice could be right if 
you are dealing with renvoi only from one legal system or you are based only on 
a limited conception. It is also a right guidance if your analysis refers to different 
criticisms but without any analytical mind. This advice, however, is wrong on 
the basis that logically a person who is entering a cinema while the movie is in 
progress might not see the audience clearly at the first time. This, however, does 
not mean that later he could not see who is sitting close to him despite the 
darkness of the room.
11) From a logical point of view, why should the problem  of the 
complexity of renvoi be raised if other techniques are being used to facilitate its 
discussion, such as, the technique of diagrams? In addition to this, sarcasm is 
another technique of compensation which tries to clarify what is ambiguous and 
explains what might be seen as difficult and makes it understandable. So how
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can one justify the complexity of the renvoi theory if by the intermediary of the 
sarcasm technique the reader understands the mechanism of renvoi and also 
shows a sign of confidence once he can imagine such autopsy being made on 
renvoi and follows the process of the trial till the end of the deliberation of either 
c a m p ? 17
12)- Scholars' controversies also indicate that there is a trend which is in 
favor of renvoi and the second one rejects it. Concerning the first trend, although 
the pro-renvoiists' s arguments have tried to prove the usefulness and the 
necessity of the mechanism of renvoi theory these are divided upon its 
application. There are those who support renvoi remission others adopt renvoi, 
transm ission and a third tendency prefers another conception of a unilateral 
application. The first approach has been adopted by French cour de cassat ion  
in the famous F o r g o '  s case. The last approach, known as the foreign court 
theory, works in relation to countries that apply renvoi of first or second degree 
and to those who reject it. It does not work, however, with another country that 
applies the same doctrine. The second trend, however, means always the 
application of the domestic law of the foreign law, as illustrated by the Hague 
Conventions and the Italian civil code.18
13)- With regard to the application of renvoi as a general principle or 
exception scholars' arguments can be grouped into two main tendencies. First, 
the rejection of renvoi in principle but allowing some exceptions : in fact, 
although the opponents camp is against the application of the renvoi theory it 
has, however, accepted its application in exceptional cases.19 Second, its 
acceptance in principle while recognizing some exceptions: it means that an 
intermediate tendency has been found in which renvoi is accepted in some field
17- See Supra.,  Chapter 2.
18- See Supra.,  Chapter 3.
19- See Cowan, T.A.," Renvoi does not Involve a Logical Fallacy," 87 U o f  Pa L. 
Rev.,  (1938) pp 40-41.
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whereas rejected in others.20
Concerning this point the writer agrees with the view which stresses that 
the question of whether you are pro-or anti-renvoiists is out of date. In fact, the 
real and the logical question seems to be whether renvoi is a general principle 
subject to exceptions or the exclusion of its mechanism is the principle.21 In 
other words, which is the suitable and logical solution: the rejection or the 
acceptance of renvoi? According to the writer the answer should be subject to 
different criteria. First, if renvoi really should be used as a general principle it 
should be subject to different principles, such as, the necessity to avoid the 
infringment of the parties' expectations. In fact, this reflection has shown that
renvoi controversies deal with different personalities such as, Mr F o r g o ,  Mrs 
A n n e  s l e y  and Miss O' Keefe.  These and others , however, might be a victim of 
any unsuitable conception or a solution to the renvoi problem. Second, if the 
rejection of renvoi will be maintained it should be subject to another condition, 
such as, avoidance of the dogmatic view that it is difficult for a judge to know the 
foreign law. Which of these criterion is likely to be fully supported nowdays is a 
question not easily answered. To say it differently, the question whether the use 
of renvoi is much better than its elimination or vice versa is still controversial.
1 4 )-One plus one is definitely two. Two, however is not only the addition
of those two numbers but it could be the substitution of four minus two. This
leads straight to the point that even if the phenomenon of renvoi is universally 
known its justifications differ from one scholar to another and from  one 
jurisprudence to a different one depending on their own legal, theoretical, 
practical and rational bases. In other words, despite the usefulness of both 
camps' conceptions it can clearly be noticed that there is still a lack of general
consensus from all scholars on the renvoi dispute. More important the analysis
20- Pagenstecher, M., " Renvoi in the United States, A Proposal" 29 Tulane Law Review, 
(1954-1955), p 387; See Von Overbeck, AM.,"Loc.cit., p 133.
2 1 - C.f., Foyer, J., "Requiem pour la Renvoi?" Stance du 4 Juin 1980, Travaux du C om iti  
Frangais de Droit International Privi,  (Anne6s 1979-1980, p 129.
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of the controversial conceptions that have tried to justify renvoi leads to the 
question of whether those justifications represent truly decisive arguments that 
prove the soundness and the inevitability of renvoi? To answer this question the 
accuracy of these theories should be looked at not only from a dogmatical 
standpoint but one should also examine whether they interpret and justify the
mechanism of renvoi as logical and a unique process? If the answer is yes, the
doubt will still persist as far as many scholars, jurisprudence and legal systems 
reject its mechanism. It can also be noticed that what scholars have tried to do is 
to prove either the usefulness of renvoi or its uselessness. The writer' s view is
that this justifications are not convincing because you cannot prove that each
argument is correct : nothing is perfect 100%. For this reason in order to 
understand the renvoi difficulties and try to solve its controversies we must
rely on logical and pragmatic solutions. In other words, the logical solution 
should depend not only on the unilateral proposition of scholars and Judges' 
views but it should also be supported by international agreements whether they 
are bilareral or multilateral Conventions.
1 5 ) -It is not only the theory which is divided into two camps upon the 
problem of renvoi. The division, however, can also be seen through case law,
legal systems and International Institutions. In fact, The analysis of its 
mechanism in Continental and Common law countries clarifies the controversial 
discussion among scholars and judges and also shows the consequences22 that 
result from either position, i.e., acceptance or repudiation of renvoi.23
The application of renvoi in France shows , of course, the different forms of 
renvoi and the various fields of its application. It also indicates the legislative 
policy of the French legal system behind accepting renvoi in some areas and 
rejecting its process in other areas.
22- Graveson, R.H., Conflict o f Laws, Private International Law, 7th edition, London,,
Sweet & Maxwell, 1974, p 65.
23- See Supra.,  Chapter 3.
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Concerning its application in England it must be admitted that there has 
been a divergence between judges and scholars upon the adoption or the
rejection of the theory of renvoi in English jurisprudence. There are those who 
support the view of the application of the internal law theory by English judges. 
Others, however, agree upon the application of renvoi but differ upon the forms 
used by English judges. On the whole, whether it is a transmission, remission or 
foreign court theory all these forms represent part of English law. Concerning
those scholars who believe that the foreign court theory has an advantage in
achieving principles of private international law, it can be replied to this view 
that if this is the case why, practically, the double renvoi theory is not the only 
form applied by English courts? Second, what is the usefulness of a doctrine that 
in its application can only be unilateral?
Although Algerian jurisprudence and legislature are silent about renvoi, it 
has been said that as a rule its mechanism is excluded by the Algerian legal 
system. This rejection has been supported on the ground that it will avoid the 
risk of applying norms which are unknown to the foreign citizens domiciled in
Algeria, bearing in mind that Algerian family law is based upon Islamic religious 
principles. However, it can be proposed to the Algerian legislature that there 
should be an express position on the renvoi issue. The express rejection of 
renvoi, according to the writer, seems to represent the right solution as far as 
there is no disestablishment of the Islamic religion from the State. Besides, this 
can avoid any misunderstanding of the legislature' s position and also avoid the 
misinterpretation of article 23 which concerns the internal conflict 24
16 )- Concerning the limitations of renvoi this can be seen through both 
internal conflict rules and Conventional conflict rules.25 As indicated above 
there are strong arguments against the use of renvoi in matters related to the. 
autonomy principles and alternative connecting fa c to rs25 With regard to the
2 4 -Id.
25-Id.
26- Von Overbeck, A, E., Loc.cit., p 153.
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position of International Conventions these have either rejected or accepted its 
mechanism. As an example of the latter position it can be noticed that the Hague 
C onvention of 1955, which established renvoi, tends to coordinate the 
divergence of the Conflict rules between different States.27 C oncerning the 
former position one has to mention the work of the Hague Conference since 
1960 which have tried to establish Conventions that refer to the internal law of 
any State indicated in the Convention.28
With regard to the prospects of its mechanism in the future, it can be said 
that whether renvoi should be repudiated or admitted in private international 
law is a very difficult issue to be predicted. What is true is that the flexibility of 
the law shows that there is a movement of revolt in the whole field of private 
international law, such as, the condemnation of renvoi in many fields and lastly 
the international call for the unification of private international law. It can also 
be argued that what has been said against renvoi has restricted its field of 
application. An examination of the scopes of renvoi justifies this claim. More 
important, the imposed restrictions expression used in the third chapter does not 
mean the total rejection of renvoi in these stated fields by all countries. It shows, 
however, that if renvoi mechanism has been excluded in some areas this is not 
the final and definitive scope of its mechanism. Who knows? Other arguments 
could be proposed in the future to support the view that other areas might be 
found as incompatible with the process of renvoi. In fact, this proves that its 
mechanism is not safe and might be subject in the future to other exceptions and 
then to another failure. The question which has to be asked, therefore, is what 
will be the reaction of renvoi advocates if the future can admit the possibility of 
witnessing a day to checkmate renvoi?
27- De Nova, R., ” Historical and Comparative Introduction to Conflict o f Laws ’’Recueil 
des cours, Vol II, Tome. 118, (1966), p 523.
28- Conference de la Haye de Droit International Ynvi,_Actes et Documents,  Tome III, 
Edit6s par Le Bureau Permanent de la Conference, Imprimerie Nationale, La Haye, 1978, p 37..
On the whole as a general rule it can be affirmed that sooner or later 
everybody is going to die. With renvoi it can be maintained that this star has left 
its moments of adolescence and is facing what might come afterwards according 
to the rule of transition. Who knows this might be the last days of its old age!
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